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Foreword 
Regulation is an inescapable part of doing business and the way it is implemented is 
often as important to business and to compliance outcomes as the content of the 
regulation itself. Small businesses face greater challenges in understanding and 
fulfilling their compliance obligations than do larger businesses. By exercising 
discretion and choosing judiciously how regulation should be implemented, a 
regulator can reduce costs for small businesses while maintaining or even improving 
compliance outcomes — a win-win for business and the community. 
In this study, the Commission has been asked to benchmark regulator approaches to 
engagement with small business in order to improve the delivery of regulatory 
objectives for communities and reduce unnecessary compliance costs. The study 
was commissioned with agreement from the Council of Australian Government’s 
Business Regulation and Competition Working Group. While much of the analysis 
in this report focuses on Commonwealth, state and territory regulators, the 
regulatory engagement approach of local governments and the experiences of 
businesses — collected during other recent Commission benchmarking studies — 
are also drawn on where relevant. 
The study was undertaken by a team in the Commission’s Canberra office, led by 
Rosalyn Bell. The study benefited from discussions and submissions from a variety 
of stakeholders in the government and business sectors. In particular, the 
Commission is very grateful to those regulators which responded to its detailed 
survey on business engagement practices and to all those small business people who 
gave up several hours of their time to participate in regional roundtable meetings.  
 
 





   




Terms of reference 
BENCHMARKING STUDY ON REGULATOR ENGAGEMENT WITH SMALL 
BUSINESS  
I, David Bradbury, Assistant Treasurer, pursuant to Parts 2 and 4 of the Productivity 
Commission Act 1998 hereby request that the Productivity Commission undertake a 
research study to benchmark the extent to which the different approaches to regulator 
engagement with small business have the potential to affect the costs (including time and 
effort) incurred by these businesses.  This request follows agreement by COAG's Business 
Regulation and Competition Working Group that the Productivity Commission undertake a 
study of this type. 
Small business stakeholders consistently raise with Governments their view that 
compliance approaches and the regulatory posture adopted by regulators with respect to 
small business, and the degree to which regulators recognise and accommodate the 
particular circumstances of small business, can have a significant impact on regulatory 
burden. 
Approaches to the regulation of small business can be wide ranging, with some regulators 
adopting a facilitative role, assisting small businesses to meet their compliance 
responsibilities, recognising that regulatory compliance activities impose a 
disproportionate cost on smaller firms.  Other regulators adopt a more traditional 
compliance based regulatory posture.   
In undertaking this study, the Productivity Commission is asked to: 
• identify the nature of the regulatory posture of Commonwealth and state and 
territory regulators with respect to small business, including the extent to which 
facilitative and educative approaches are appropriately combined with compliance 
based approaches, and the extent to which approaches vary according to the nature 
and objectives of the regulations; 
o In doing so, the Commission should draw where appropriate on examples 
of the various approaches that are used in shaping regulatory culture 
(including by incorporating regulatory objectives into legislative 
instruments). 
• identify the levels of assistance and education that jurisdictions provide to small 
business and consider whether this could be better targeted;  
   




• identify the extent to which regulators apply a risk based approach to enforcement 
and compliance, including the mandating of information requirements, in 
regulating small business;  
• clarify the extent to which regulators consider the size and nature of a business 
when undertaking compliance and enforcement and compliance based 
information-gathering activities;  
• identify whether particular approaches to the exercise of regulatory roles have the 
capacity to reduce unnecessary compliance costs incurred by small business, while 
sustaining good regulatory outcomes, and could therefore be described as best 
practice; and  
• have regard to leading practices in overseas jurisdictions. 
In order to undertake this study, the Commission will also need to consider and determine 
a definition of what constitutes a small business, noting that different regulators and 
jurisdictions use different definitions.  As a starting point, the Commission may wish to 
consider whether there would be benefit in broader adoption of the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) definition of a small business to provide for ease of comparison with ABS 
data. 
A report is to be completed within nine months of the receipt of this Terms of Reference.  
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Mr Peter Harris 
Chair 
Productivity Commission 
GPO Box 1428 
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Dear Mr Harris 
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date for the Productivity Commission’s study into Regulator Engagement with 
Small Business, from 7 September 2013 to 18 October 2013. 
I approve an extension of the final reporting date to 18 October 2013 and note your 
advice that this extension will enable the Commission to meet its obligations under 
the caretaker conventions. 
I have copied this letter to the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and 
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Key points  
• Small businesses feel the burden of regulation more strongly than other businesses. Almost 
universally, their lack of staff, time and resources present challenges in understanding and 
fulfilling compliance obligations. 
• How small businesses ‘experience’ regulation has as much to do with the engagement 
approaches of regulators as it does with the regulations. Regulators are generally committed to 
effective engagement and to minimising unnecessary burdens, but many do not have robust 
frameworks to ensure high level ideals consistently translate to good practices on the ground.  
• Regulator culture is crucial. Those regulators with effective engagement practices have 
adjusted their culture by focusing on senior management priorities, training and skills of 
enforcement staff, performance monitoring, stakeholder feedback, and rewarding behaviour 
consistent with desired practices. 
• Regulators’ communications can be more responsive to small business needs and capacities. 
In particular: tailoring information requirements around data already collected by businesses; 
greater use of industry associations to disseminate information; ensuring regulatory 
information can be readily found on websites; and enabling timely access to regulatory staff, 
would improve small business experiences with regulators.  
• There is scope for increased targeting of those businesses and activities which present a 
higher risk to communities, and for adoption of lesser compliance cost approaches for lower 
risk businesses, such as less frequent inspections or less onerous reporting requirements.  
– When done well, such targeting is likely to achieve outcomes at a lower cost than an 
engagement approach based on strict application of a small business definition. 
• Governments can improve engagement outcomes by ensuring the frameworks within which 
regulators operate do not inhibit adoption of leading practices. This includes ensuring 
regulators have access to an appropriate range of compliance and enforcement tools, and 
resourcing to effectively achieve the policy objectives behind their regulatory responsibilities. 
– Where regulators are inadequately resourced, either some risks to communities go 
unmitigated or the costs of mitigation are pushed onto those regulated (including small 
businesses). Governments should provide regulators with explicit guidance on regulatory 
priorities, given limited resources.  
• Regulator discretion in compliance monitoring and enforcement must be accompanied by 
appropriate guidance and transparency and accountability measures as well as a separation 
of education and enforcement roles, where feasible. Governments should ensure low cost 
mediation services for the resolution of disputes, particularly with local governments. 
• More widespread use could be made of formal cooperation arrangements between 
regulators, including lead agency models to facilitate joint compliance checks and proactive 
sharing of compliance information.  
• Continuous improvement in regulator performance requires ongoing monitoring of the 
effectiveness of delivery approaches and costs imposed on business. Governments should 
require regulators to report against engagement principles and encourage regulator forums 
which exchange views on good practice and build professional capacity.    
   




Over 95 per cent of Australia’s businesses are ‘small’, with the majority of these 
functioning with the owner as the only person working in the business. Small 
business is the dominant form of business in all industries but is particularly 
prevalent in: construction; professional and technical services; rental and real estate 
services; and agriculture.  
Regulation is an inescapable part of doing business. From health and safety to 
environmental protection, from construction standards to fair trading, from 
employment conditions to competition, there is a broad spectrum of regulations — 
at multiple levels of government — that can impact on a business’s activities. 
However, these impacts can be more pervasive for some businesses than for others. 
For some small businesses, compliance necessitates the diversion of a substantial 
proportion of productive business time and modifications to their production or 
service delivery processes in ways that are uncertain to deliver improvements in 
regulatory outcomes. Australian studies have found that small businesses spend, on 
average, up to five hours per week on compliance with government regulatory 
requirements. Overseas studies have found that small businesses sometimes bear 
compliance costs (per employee) that are many orders of magnitude higher than for 
larger businesses. 
The way regulations are implemented is often as important to small business and to 
compliance outcomes as the content of the regulations themselves. Regulators, by 
their conduct in interpreting, administering and enforcing regulatory requirements, 
can take considered, well designed regulation and produce regimes which discourage 
compliance, squander government resources or add to business costs and delays. 
Alternatively, a regulator might take an unwieldy accumulation of regulation and, by 
choosing judiciously what, when and how to enforce, deliver the desired regulatory 
outcomes in an efficient manner. It is through engagement with regulators in their 
role of administering and enforcing regulation that small businesses primarily 
‘experience’ regulation and much of the associated compliance burden. 
For businesses, good engagement with a regulator is generally associated with an 
educative and facilitative regulatory posture, rather than a combative approach. Most 
businesses want to comply with regulatory requirements and, for the benefit of their 
industry and own competitiveness, want other businesses to also comply.  






Figure 1 Nature of engagement between regulators and businesses 
 
Small businesses especially value: 
• compliance requirements that are straightforward to find, understand and 
implement 
• regulators who are reasonable, demonstrating a capacity and willingness to be 
understanding of small business, and flexible, consistent and proportionate in their 
compliance management and enforcement approaches, in order to minimise the 
imposition of unnecessary compliance and reporting costs. 
From a community wide perspective, good engagement necessitates that the benefits 
of improving regulatory outcomes (mitigating risks to communities) more than match 
the costs of achieving further reductions in risk (both business compliance costs and 
regulator costs). The priorities for governments and regulators should be directed at 
achieving outcomes at minimum necessary cost (avoiding the inappropriate transfer 
of costs to regulated parties) and encouraging innovation in meeting regulatory 
objectives. The culture of regulators and their approach toward business engagement 
is crucial to delivering these priorities. 
In this study, the Commission has been asked to benchmark the approaches to 
engagement with small business of Australia’s 480 or so Commonwealth, state and 
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territory regulators and the 560 local government regulators. The aim of this 
benchmarking is to make recommendations to improve the delivery of regulatory 
outcomes for communities and reduce unnecessary compliance costs.  
Figure 2 Small business preferences and leading practices in engagement 
 
Overall, the Commission considers that Commonwealth and state/territory regulators 
are generally committed at senior levels to adopting leading business engagement 
practices and minimising unnecessary burdens for businesses. Indeed, the 
Commission has found little evidence of systemic problems with the approaches of 
Commonwealth and state/territory regulators and positive feedback has been received 
about many regulators across jurisdictions and functions.   
However, a number of stakeholders have identified unacceptable and costly 
regulatory experiences, as distinct from the content of the regulations. Further, 






reviews and audits of some Commonwealth and state/territory regulators in recent 
years have identified scope for improvement in individual practices and have 
emphasised the cumulative burden of regulator engagement. It is apparent to the 
Commission that many regulators do not have robust frameworks in place to ensure 
high level ideals on engagement are implemented in practice on the ground, nor do 
they rigorously monitor the impact of their engagement practices on businesses. 
Furthermore, there are significant and widespread challenges in the execution of local 
government regulatory functions, as examined comprehensively in a separate 
Commission study in 2012. The Commission considers that the identified 
shortcomings in regulator approaches could be readily addressed through judicious 
implementation of leading practices in engagement in poorer performing areas. The 
Commission’s recommendations for these are highlighted at the end of this overview.  
Getting the regulatory framework right 
A first step for governments concerned with the impact of regulator engagement on 
small business is to ensure that the regulatory frameworks — including the 
institutional and governance arrangements under which regulators operate — do not 
inhibit regulator adoption of leading engagement practices. With vast differences 
between regulatory systems, however, there is a limit to the value of detailed ‘one 
size fits all’ prescriptions for regulatory frameworks or indeed, for regulator 
approaches to business engagement.  
The right tools for the job 
While some regulators are expressly obliged by their overarching legislation to 
proactively identify potential breaches or to encourage compliance with the 
regulatory scheme (such as most food safety regulators), others are confined to 
assessing applications or granting approvals for business activities (such as 
development assessment regulators), or reacting to notifications of potential 
compliance breaches (such as anti-discrimination regulators). Local councils face 
particular challenges when handed regulations by their state government without 
having been consulted about their capacity to enforce them, or the appropriate 
circumstances for enforcement.  
For many regulators, the tools available to enforce compliance are established in 
legislation or government directives and can shape their approach to engagement 
with business. From examples provided by study participants, better outcomes for 
small businesses and the community are achieved when regulators have a range of 
tools that enable them to tailor their responses to breaches (or potential breaches) of 
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regulation in a proportionate way, rather than having to rely solely on combative 
approaches such as initiating legal proceedings.  
Some 30 per cent of regulators reported to the Commission that they have an 
insufficient range of enforcement tools. For the most part, these regulators saw the 
need for more tools in the mid range of sanctions, such as improvement notices and 
enforceable undertakings. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that 
governments ensure their regulators have a sufficient range of enforcement tools 
available for their activities. 
Resources matter  
When regulators are not adequately resourced to effectively enforce all regulations 
within their ambit, either risks to communities go unmitigated or the costs of 
mitigation are pushed onto those regulated. Furthermore, some engagement 
approaches available to well resourced regulators with broad regulatory roles and 
the capacity to attract and retain skilled staff are sometimes neither feasible nor 
efficient for smaller, less well resourced regulators. The Commission’s survey of 
regulators found that regulators adopting a risk based approach were, on average, 
six times larger in terms of staff and budgets than those not using a risk based 
approach.  
While governments should make every effort to ensure their regulators, including 
local governments, are adequately resourced, where this is not possible in the short 
term, the Commission recommends that governments provide regulators with 
explicit guidance as to which regulatory activities should be given priority. In the 
longer term, governments should ensure that new regulatory functions are properly 
resourced. 
Human resource capability is critical to engagement approach — people matter. For 
regulator staff to be able to perform their duties competently and professionally, 
they must have the appropriate knowledge, skills and values. Whether the regulator 
values and hires staff with law enforcement skills, educative skills and/or with in-
depth industry knowledge critically affects the extent to which high level ideals on 
engagement are put into practice on the ground. Better skilled regulatory staff 
means more effective communication with small businesses, a greater 
understanding by the regulator of the small businesses they are regulating, and 
ultimately, improved regulatory outcomes for communities. For many local 
councils, attracting and retaining the necessary skills to implement regulatory 
requirements is a major issue — in some remote and regional areas, appropriate 
staff are simply not available and/or affordable.  






The Commission considers that all regulators should review the skills of their staff 
in light of their desired business engagement approach and address any deficiencies 
— governments should be advised of additional resource needs. Practices which 
may help address regulator skill shortages include more extensive sharing of 
compliance and inspection information between government agencies (where 
allowed under privacy arrangements), and greater mobility in resources, such as the 
‘Regional and Rural Planning Flying Squad’ established in Victoria to moderate the 
effects of local government skills shortages in regional areas.   
Cultural change may be necessary 
Regulator culture embodies the implicit rules, beliefs and expectations of behaviour 
under which regulatory officers operate — leadership is clearly important. Culture 
influences the regulator’s perceptions about the skills and information required by 
staff to adequately do their job and is critical to the way the regulator exercises 
discretion in assessment of risks, responds to non-compliance, and uses 
enforcement tools. Does the regulator view its role as one of simply enforcing 
regulation, or alternatively, as one of seeking to facilitate business activity whilst 
mitigating the risks posed to the community?  
At one extreme, the culture of a regulator is based around formal, precise rules, with 
adversarial and punitive enforcement and an underlying distrust of the regulated 
community. At the opposite extreme, a regulator may become ‘captured’ by 
industry perspectives and be less wedded to achieving regulatory objectives. 
Engagement in between these two extremes would be results oriented, stressing 
responsiveness and leaning toward engagement tools involving targeting, trade-offs 
and persuasion to achieve compliance with, as opposed to enforcement of, 
outcomes.  
There is no single regulatory culture that best delivers regulatory outcomes and 
avoids unnecessary burdens for those regulated. For example, some regulators (often 
those which deal with potentially costly or catastrophic outcomes) understandably 
develop a culture that has a low tolerance of non-compliance. This behaviour may 
also reflect an aversion of the regulator to adverse political and/or community 
reactions associated with the outcome being mitigated occurring, even if compliance 
with a robust regulatory framework had been achieved.  
Risk aversion can lead some regulators to require excessive evidence of compliance 
or to rely on overly harsh enforcement approaches which do not adequately take 
into account small business efforts required to mitigate risks and a realistic 
assessment of the risk posed by the individual businesses. Regulators which 
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reported using comparatively harsh penalties (such as criminal proceedings) with no 
risk based assessment, included several transport agencies and an animal welfare 
body. 
To develop an engagement framework most likely to improve regulatory outcomes,  
the Commission considers cultural change is required in some regulators. 
Regulators which have undergone such cultural change or been noted by industry 
and government as having particularly effective engagement practices (such as the 
Australian Taxation Office, Energy Safe Victoria and Workplace Standards 
Tasmania) have variously focused on senior management priorities, training and 
skills of enforcement staff, the monitoring and seeking of feedback from 
stakeholders, rewarding activities or outcomes that are consistent with the desired 
culture, and monitoring and reporting on perceived regulator successes.  
Working with business to improve regulatory outcomes 
Within the bounds set by regulatory frameworks, there is usually considerable scope 
for regulators to be responsive to small business needs and capacities in their 
delivery of regulation. In particular, there are a range of communication, 
information management and consultation practices used by some regulators that 
could, if adopted more widely, yield tangible improvements in regulatory outcomes. 
It is in these areas that the Commission considers there is likely to be more scope 
for regulators to tailor their engagement, where feasible and cost effective, to 
characteristics of small businesses. There is also scope for improvement in relation 
to compliance and enforcement practices and, for the most part, these improvements 
would be of benefit to regulatory outcomes irrespective of business size.  
More effective communication practices 
Communicating regulatory requirements 
Communication of regulatory requirements is particularly important given the 
growing number and range of regulations of which small business need to be aware. 
In communicating regulatory requirements to small business, regulators should 
place a premium on simplicity, clarity, brevity and accessibility — a small business 
is not just a big business on a smaller scale but one that operates in a fundamentally 
different way, and may lack the time, knowledge and often motivation to distil the 
relevant compliance requirements.  
Regulators should modify their engagement approach where necessary to ensure 
communication remains effective, including with small business people who are 






from non-English speaking backgrounds and/or have cultural perspectives which 
impact on their response to regulatory activities. The NSW Office of Fair Trading, 
for example, has worked with ethnic community organisations and media outlets to 
implement changes flowing from the Australian Consumer Law.  
There are differences between regulator and business perceptions of the usefulness 
of various communication approaches. In particular, regulators consider their 
websites to be one of the most effective means of communicating with small 
business. Small business, on the other hand, find regulator websites less useful than 
advice from third parties (such as accountants and solicitors) or from other business 
owners (although third parties may find websites useful). Industry associations have 
reported that the quality of regulator websites varies substantially. Both regulators 
and small business generally consider industry groups to be one of the most useful 
conduits for communication on regulatory requirements. 
Figure 3 Communication approaches — who views them as effective? 
Per cent of regulators Per cent of small business 
 
 
For regulators employing a risk based approach to compliance and enforcement, 
there may appropriately be a drop off in regulator interaction with some lower risk 
businesses. In those cases where ‘small’ equates with ‘lower risk’, this will mean 
smaller businesses receive fewer visits from regulator staff or inspectors — 
sometimes one of the main sources of information on compliance requirements. In 
the longer term, lower interaction may also reduce regulator knowledge and 
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To counteract this, the Commission considers that regulators should be prepared to 
modify their communication approach to ensure small businesses receive practical, 
industry specific information on regulatory requirements. Regulators should also, as 
far as possible, draw on the networks of industry, professional and business 
associations to communicate regulatory requirements and to ensure that advice is 
specific and readily implementable in different business environments. In addition 
to exploiting the preference of many small businesses for sourcing regulatory 
information from other businesses and industry associations, this approach removes 
any perceived liability associated with regulators providing business specific (rather 
than general) advice. It also can provide greater impetus for compliance. However, 
as many small businesses are not members of industry associations, such an 
approach should complement rather than substitute for a regulator’s own 
interactions with small business. 
More generally, there is scope for greater use by regulators of stakeholder advisory 
groups, such as those used by the Australian Taxation Office and the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, as a means to identify better ways to 
achieve compliance and ensure small businesses are (and consider they are) 
adequately consulted on regulatory changes. Consultation should enable 
consideration of the views of a cross section of regulated businesses to reduce risk 
of capture by a dominant business or industry group. Regulators should put in place 
systems to ensure that information collected through consultations with business is, 
and is seen to be, used to inform ongoing improvements in regulatory processes. 
Collecting information on compliance 
For small business, supplying information to the regulator can be the most 
burdensome aspect of complying with regulation. Regulators indicated that for 
collection of compliance information from business, they are just as likely to use 
electronic forms as they are to use paper forms. Irrespective of the format, data 
requests should be the minimum necessary to allow the regulator to perform its 
function effectively, and, as far as possible, be tailored around data that is already 
collected by business.  
The use of web based and other electronic solutions by regulators for transaction 
processing and information collection and dissemination is increasing — 
AUSTRAC Online is one leading practice example in this area. Such approaches 
are particularly important as an after hours access point for small business. While 
the appropriate use of web based and other electronic solutions will vary depending 
on the nature of the regulation and the characteristics of the industry, more 
widespread adoption has the potential to deliver further benefits, providing 
appropriate strategies are also maintained for less computer literate business owners 






and those without the necessary internet access. For example, ABS data indicates 
that around one quarter of businesses in the accommodation and food services 
sector do not have internet access. 
Small businesses have complained about the unnecessary burden of providing the 
same or similar information to multiple regulators (for example, for approval to use 
a particular chemical) or to the same regulator more than once. Arrangements which 
seem particularly effective in minimising such burdens include where regulators 
cooperate with third parties — such as industry associations or other government 
agencies — to elicit information on business compliance.  
The Commission recommends that regulators be proactive in identifying areas 
where they can make use of compliance data from third parties, share data with 
other regulators and ensure regulatory requirements do not conflict. This includes, 
for example, greater efforts to ensure consistency in the frequency and format of 
business reporting requirements, presentation of information to business in a 
common format and location, and greater coordination of inspections. 
More targeted compliance monitoring and enforcement 
Targeting on the basis of risk 
Some regulators are explicitly required by their legislation to adopt a risk based 
framework. In recognition of their finite resources, many other regulators prioritise 
their engagement and enforcement activities on the basis of minimising (as far as 
feasible) the risk to achieving desired regulatory outcomes. Regulation of food 
safety and environmental outcomes, for example, typically draw heavily on risk 
frameworks; in contrast, regulation of liquor has comparatively less focus on risk 
management approaches — one liquor regulator advised the Commission that 
(regardless of the nature of the business and risks involved) ‘it’s meant to be hard to 
get a liquor licence’. A risk based approach to enforcement requires that regulators, 
governments and the community accept some risks and understand that the costs of 
further reducing these may outweigh the benefits to the community. The 
Commission recommends that governments provide explicit acknowledgment to 
regulators (for example, via ministerial statements of expectations), that it is neither 
feasible nor socially optimal to attempt to eliminate all risk. 
Where targeting is done well, most compliance and enforcement resources are 
allocated to, and reporting required of, business activities which pose a higher risk 
of adverse outcomes — because of the magnitude of harm posed and/or the 
likelihood of harm materialising. Activities with lower risk can be regulated in less 
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resource intensive ways — such as through provision of less onerous or lower cost 
pathways to manage risks and demonstrate compliance, and, in the event of non-
compliance, through the use of warnings and provision of information on how to 
comply, in the first instance.  
The Commission considers there is scope for greater focus on risk in determining 
appropriate enforcement strategies. One outcome of such a focus would be adoption 
of an enforcement approach that varies consistently and proportionately with the 
risk to regulatory outcomes posed by particular types of businesses. Such an 
engagement approach requires that regulators have robust systems for examining 
different situations and choosing the appropriate response and procedures in place 
to collect information on risks to regulatory outcomes. Regulators reported using 
risk assessments most often to determine the nature and frequency of business 
inspections and audits — activities which potentially involve substantial 
commitment of both regulator and small business resources.  
Figure 4 Aspects of engagement that are affected by risk assessments 
Per cent of regulators who use a risk based approach to determine particular 
engagement practices 
 
Providing less onerous options for small businesses where they present a lower risk 
does not innately constitute ‘special’ treatment, but simply reflects the lower 
benefits of compliance activities by businesses that are low risk. Indeed, of the 70 
per cent of regulators who identified adopting a risk based approach, less than half 
provided differential treatment for small business. The primary reason given for 
lack of differential treatment of small business was that the regulator aims to 
facilitate compliance by all businesses, regardless of size. 
















Targeting on the basis of size 
When regulators have little information on risks to regulatory outcomes or limited 
resources to fully implement a risk based approach, some use business size as a 
proxy for the likelihood and/or magnitude of an adverse outcome and differentiate 
their approach to business on that basis. The most common forms of differential 
treatment for small business are tailored education, training or forms and simplified 
requirements. Where small businesses are treated differently, the approach adopted 
should have a reasonable prospect of delivering net benefits to the community.  
Concerns have been expressed about apparent inconsistency in definitions of ‘small 
business’. The Commission (and indeed, most stakeholders who commented on the 
issue) found little merit in the idea of adopting a single harmonised definition for 
small business, as it could lead to inflexibility and higher costs. If necessary to have 
a definition, policy makers and regulators are best placed to define small business 
for their regulatory area, but generally they should give careful consideration to 
existing definitions before introducing further variations and should also consider 
the extent to which a definition of small business is even necessary when 
implementing a risk based approach to engagement. Grant making bodies should 
adopt a similar approach. 
In implementing an engagement approach which varies (directly or indirectly) with 
business size, regulators should consider the responsiveness of different size 
businesses to alternative approaches. Several Australian studies have found that 
compliance monitoring of regulated small and medium size businesses can provide 
flow-on incentives for compliance by other businesses but this can be less important 
for many larger businesses, which go beyond the regulation and compliance 
‘baseline’ to meet a perceived need to protect their market share. That said, the 
Commission considers that regulators should continue to undertake spot compliance 
checks and apply tough sanctions on comparatively low risk businesses (of 
whatever size) for serious breaches, because a strategy based entirely on persuasion 
and self regulation can be readily exploited by those intent on non-compliance. 
Offering alternative compliance pathways 
Around 40 per cent of small businesses indicated that they primarily want to be told 
what they need to do in order to comply with regulation. Unlike larger businesses, 
many small businesses are not looking to be innovative in how they meet regulatory 
requirements and have little capacity to develop alternative, lower cost, compliance 
approaches.  
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To meet the needs of many small businesses that prefer prescriptive guidelines but 
also to accommodate those other businesses which may want to develop their own 
lower cost ways of complying, the Commission considers that regulators should 
offer businesses multiple compliance pathways. These pathways would offer 
flexibility for businesses to propose alternative (outcome based) compliance 
solutions, as well as provide an approach, which if adopted, would deem business 
compliant.  
Reducing the cumulative burden of engagement 
One third of regulators (primarily Commonwealth and Western Australian 
regulators) acknowledged to the Commission that unclear delineation of 
responsibilities caused them difficulty in carrying out their regulatory functions. 
Most difficulties were reported to occur with state/territory and national level 
regulators, although regulators in New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania 
reported problems arising through unclear delineation with local governments.  
Streamlining development assessment processes and tracking of referrals to other 
agencies are two approaches adopted by some governments in recent years, but 
business groups have indicated broader issues of delays in obtaining licences to 
operate or undertake particular activities.  
The Commission considers that more widespread use could be made of formal 
arrangements between agencies in related regulatory areas — for one regulator, 
agency or certifier to undertake inspections or compliance checks on another 
regulator’s behalf, in order to minimise the overall interaction burden on businesses. 
In these circumstances, the regulator whose area poses the greatest risk to the 
community would take the ‘regulatory lead’. The Victorian Environment Protection 
Authority, for example, has a formal arrangement for Dairy Food Safety Victoria, 
whilst undertaking its food safety audit activities, to also undertake preliminary risk 
assessments of dairy farm effluent management systems. The Commission also 
encourages jurisdictions to consider whether there are certain industries for which a 
‘one business, one licence’ approach may lead to lower regulatory burdens with 
similar or improved regulatory outcomes. 
Similarly, recognition by regulators, where appropriate, of industry and other third 
party certification, accreditation and audit processes would substantially reduce 
duplication in compliance efforts for some businesses. For example, some 
regulators in Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia recognise 
accreditation under the Australian Tourism Accreditation Program, when granting 
access licences to National Parks.  






Regulator discretion in compliance and enforcement 
The discretion to waive certain requirements or to not enforce penalties for minor or 
initial breaches of regulation, not only enables regulators to deal with regulations 
that are out of date or conflicting with other regulations but can also be a way of 
gaining cooperation from businesses and attaining a higher level of overall 
compliance. How much discretion regulators have available to them and whether 
they use it in an open, systematic and defendable manner, are the critical questions. 
Too much discretion without transparency and accountability creates opportunities 
for corruption and discrimination and opens a regulatory agency to capture by the 
regulated community — thus heightening the exposure of the wider community to 
the risk being mitigated.  
Regulator use of discretion is influenced not only by culture specific factors (such 
as aversion to risk) and industry specific factors, but also by regulator resourcing 
and the skills and capacities of staff. For example, regulators may prefer to 
undertake inspections or other compliance checks if the costs of these can be 
recovered from businesses. Alternatively, given the relative costs of delivering 
different regulatory approaches, a poorly resourced regulator may adopt a punitive 
approach over a more educative approach.  
Nearly all regulators reported having some discretion in responding to compliance 
breaches. Most provide some sort of guidelines and/or training on the use of 
discretion, and some (such as Brisbane City Council) formally review their use of 
discretion. Business complaints and audit reports suggest guidelines and training 
alone are not entirely effective. In particular, small businesses have noted that some 
regulators get caught up with minor oversights or administrative errors rather than 
focussing on the bigger picture. The Commission recommends that (consistent with 
a risk based approach) where at all possible, there be a greater focus on improving 
regulatory outcomes rather than on simply identifying non-compliance with 
regulatory requirements. 
In order to address inconsistency in the use of discretion, ongoing attention of 
senior regulator staff to the practical implementation of high level engagement 
principles is essential. This would be aided by: transparent documentation of all key 
processes and decision making criteria; separation of education and enforcement 
roles (where practicable); training and guidance for enforcement officers on the 
appropriate use of discretion; and provision of a service charter on what business 
can expect when engaging with the regulator. Regulators should also implement 
checks and measures to avoid regulatory capture of their staff by industry groups, 
particularly in regional areas.  
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The Commission also recommends that all governments develop, endorse and 
monitor the application of, in liaison with regulators and business, a set of better 
practice engagement principles, including general guidance on the use of discretion 
by regulators. This can be done via government wide actions, such as the United 
Kingdom’s statutory Regulators’ Compliance Code, or in a more targeted fashion, 
such as through the ministerial statements of expectations given to Australian 
statutory authorities. 
Engendering further improvements in engagement 
Engagement practices must adapt to changes in regulation, overarching institutional 
and governance structures, industry advances and changes in market structures and 
business capacity to comply with regulatory requirements. 
Monitoring engagement and providing scope for redress 
There is a lack of clear and robust evidence on which engagement approaches work 
well in particular circumstances, and which do not. Currently, only 15 per cent of 
regulators monitor the costs imposed on business by their engagement practices. To 
bridge this gap, and enable an overall improvement in engagement, the Commission 
considers that regulators should regularly monitor, evaluate and report on their 
business engagement activities. Activities which could be monitored include 
compliance levels, business compliance costs, other costs and benefits of 
implementing particular enforcement or educative approaches, and business 
satisfaction with regulator activities.  
Effective complaints handling and grievance processes, which have a degree of 
independence from the enforcement activities of the regulator, would help build 
business confidence in overall regulatory processes. Such processes could include 
external dispute resolution mechanisms for aggrieved small businesses, use of small 
business commissioners (where these are available and other processes do not exist) 
and ready access by businesses to documentation and reasoning related to decisions 
made about them. 
Performance measures for regulators 
For the longer term improvement of regulator performance, there are a number of 
key steps that governments can take to improve the frameworks within which 
regulators operate. The Commission recommends that governments in all 
jurisdictions ensure that regulators regularly monitor and report on their 






performance against an agreed set of indicators. In addition to rates of compliance, 
emphasis should be on measuring effectiveness in achieving outcomes, while 
minimising compliance costs. Over time this would encourage the wider adoption 
of engagement practices that are consistent with better practice principles, thereby 
increasing the frequency of good engagement experiences for business and 
generating greater certainty on what they can expect from regulators. 
In addition to strengthening incentives for regulators to improve their practices, 
performance monitoring and reporting would also provide more scope for regulators 
to learn from each other and highlight areas where greater cooperation and 
coordination between regulators might be possible in order to reduce the cumulative 
burden of engagement. However, given the significant differences between 
individual regulators (even those within the same regulatory area), the Commission 
recognises the limitations of any comparisons of performance across regulators.  
There is also a role for governments in facilitating interactions between regulators 
to remove areas of overlap, duplication and inconsistency. This may be achieved 
through formalised coordination arrangements such as memoranda of 
understanding, but also by aiding the development or expansion of regulator fora to 
encourage an exchange of views on good practice and build professional capability.  
Increased attention needs to be given to regulator conduct and practices by central 
agencies or those with special responsibilities for small business. In Victoria and 
NSW where this has occurred (through the Victorian Competition and Efficiency 
Commission and the NSW Better Regulation Office, respectively), it has facilitated 
learning across regulatory functions and more widespread understanding of good 
engagement approaches. In some jurisdictions regulators have drawn on the advice 
of small business commissioners for the design of proposed regulatory strategies. 
Finally, governments should be mindful that good regulatory engagement 
experiences for business are most likely when regulation is designed with 
consideration given to its implementation and transition arrangements from the 
existing regulatory environment. Small business associations have reported that 
regulator enforcement officers in many jurisdictions complain to businesses that the 
rules are not sensible, they would not design them the way they are, but they still 
have to enforce them. Accordingly, governments should adhere to their agreed 
regulatory impact analysis criteria and fully consider, when designing regulation, 
how it will actually be implemented and enforced in practice. Victoria goes part 
way toward this by considering in the design of regulation, the possibility that 
compliance with the proposed regulation may be less than complete.  
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With ongoing evaluation and reporting of their practices in delivering regulation to 
business, regulators will be able to determine, in dealing with small business, which 
engagement practices are most effective at achieving regulatory objectives and 
reduce the imposition of unnecessary compliance burdens. Even regulators 
currently engaging effectively with the business community must adapt their 
approaches in the face of changes in regulatory frameworks and in the businesses 
being regulated. 







Culture is critical 
RECOMMENDATION 1  (CHAPTER 2) 
Governments should recognise the fundamental importance of regulator culture in 
influencing engagement practices. Working closely with regulators, they need to 
ensure that appropriate transparency, accountability and capacity building 
mechanisms are in place to foster the adoption of a culture — reflected in the actual 
engagement practices of all staff — that: 
• promotes a facilitative and educative posture towards business which seeks to 
achieve regulatory objectives without unnecessarily constraining business 
activity and growth 
• embraces continuous improvement, including critical evaluation of existing 
practices and opportunities to learn from the experience of other regulators. 
Get the regulation right, provide sufficient resourcing and guidance 
RECOMMENDATION 2  (CHAPTER 2) 
When designing regulation, all governments should apply agreed regulatory impact 
analysis principles, including evaluation of: intended approaches to regulation 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement; and the likely impacts on business. 
RECOMMENDATION 3  (CHAPTER 6) 
Governments should ensure that regulators have sufficient resourcing to enable 
them to administer and enforce regulation effectively and efficiently. This includes 
ensuring regulators have the capacity to make appropriate use of educative and 
facilitative engagement practices. Clear guidance needs to be provided by 
government on enforcement priorities, especially where more severe resource 
constraints cannot be addressed in the short term.  
RECOMMENDATION 4  (CHAPTER 2) 
Governments should explicitly acknowledge that some risks cannot be eliminated 
and that regulators should operate independently, and without undue interference 
from government, in implementing risk management approaches. These 
acknowledgements should be incorporated in a public statement of governments’ 
expectations of their regulators. 
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Proportionate compliance obligations and enforcement responses 
RECOMMENDATION 5  (CHAPTER 4) 
Regulators should adopt a risk based approach, ensuring that decisions about the 
nature and level of compliance obligations and enforcement responses consistently 
reflect an assessment of the relative risks posed by business activities. While the 
appropriate degree of sophistication will vary depending on the types of risks and 
businesses regulated, risk based approaches should generally be formalised and be 
made known to businesses.  
RECOMMENDATION 6  (CHAPTER 4) 
Governments should ensure that regulators have access to a sufficient range of 
enforcement tools to enable them to respond to compliance breaches flexibly and in 
a graduated, fair and proportionate way.  
RECOMMENDATION 7  (CHAPTER 4) 
To increase voluntary compliance and reduce compliance costs for small business, 
regulators should ensure — subject to the overarching goal of maximising 
community net benefits — that: 
• they are adopting an educative and facilitative approach to achieving 
compliance  
• licensing, registration, and other processes and requirements are as simple and 
streamlined as possible — for example licences are rationalised and less 
frequent or comprehensive inspections are required for low risk businesses 
• they cooperate and coordinate to reduce the cumulative burden of regulation, 
for example through mutual recognition of approvals and permits or joint or 
delegated inspections  
• existing industry and other third party certification and inspection processes are 
recognised when determining compliance requirements for business. 
Governments should ensure that there are no unnecessary legislative or other 
constraints on the capacity of regulators to adopt such strategies where 
appropriate. 
  






A tailored approach for small business 
RECOMMENDATION 8  (CHAPTER 3) 
Governments and regulators should provide different treatment for small business 
when net benefits to the community would be enhanced. In determining whether such 
treatment is appropriate, consideration should be given to: 
• the likely change in compliance outcomes and any risk to regulatory objectives 
• the potential to reduce unnecessary compliance costs for small business, 
including any transitional costs that might affect the appropriate pace of 
implementation of regulatory requirements 
• the administrative cost, complexity and potential for resulting distortions to 
business behaviour from altering the content or delivery of regulation for small 
businesses. 
Before providing for different treatment in the design of regulation, governments 
should undertake formal regulatory impact analysis, including consultation with 
small businesses and the community. 
RECOMMENDATION 9  (CHAPTER 3) 
Regulators should, as far as possible, enable small businesses to more effectively 
and easily manage their own compliance. Given small businesses generally have 
less capacity to distil regulatory requirements and higher compliance cost 
structures, regulators should, where possible: 
• remove any unnecessary complexity in regulatory requirements and associated 
guidance material 
• set outcome based regulatory requirements, but also offer detailed guidance 
about acceptable solutions including, where feasible, offering a compliance 
pathway which, if fully implemented, would deem businesses compliant with 
requirements. 
RECOMMENDATION 10  (CHAPTER 1) 
Governments should not impose upon regulators a single definition of small 
business as this could lead to inflexibility and higher costs for some businesses and 
for the community more generally. Policy makers and regulators are best placed to 
define small business in ways that are practical and appropriate for their 
regulatory area. 
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Effective communication practices 
RECOMMENDATION 11  (CHAPTER 5) 
Regulators should ensure information and advice on regulatory requirements is brief, 
readily available, reliable and provided in user friendly language and formats. To 
cater for the diversity of small businesses, a multi-channel engagement strategy 
should be employed.  
• Where the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs, information and advice 
should be tailored to reflect the compliance capacities of small businesses, 
including the needs of business owners from non-English speaking backgrounds. 
• Regulators should provide email and call-back services wherever possible to 
assist those small businesses that have difficulties accessing regulator helplines 
and call centres. 
• Governments should recognise and support progress made by regulators in 
making their websites and online engagement practices more user friendly.  
RECOMMENDATION 12  (CHAPTER 5) 
Regulators should ensure data and information requested of business are:  
• no more than is needed to regulate effectively 
• tailored around data businesses already collect 
• not already collected by another part of government.  
Regulators should make it as easy as possible for small business to complete and 
lodge forms, including through the use of electronic lodgement.  
RECOMMENDATION 13  (CHAPTER 5) 
Regulators should ensure that effective consultation processes are in place that 
allow small businesses to provide feedback, at low cost, on: the source and 
magnitude of compliance burdens; how well the regulation is achieving objectives; 
and any unintentional adverse impacts, including interactions between different 
regulations and cumulative effects. 
To facilitate this, governments should ensure that already agreed principles for 
effective consultation, including those for small business recently endorsed by 
COAG’s Business Regulation and Competition Working Group, are adhered to by 
regulators. 






Processes that are timely, transparent and accountable 
RECOMMENDATION 14  (CHAPTER 4) 
Regulators should undertake their regulatory activities in a timely manner, so as to 
minimise the cost of delay for businesses. In addition to the use of statutory time 
limits, wherever possible, regulators should: 
• commit publicly (for example in service charters or annual reports) to target 
timeframes for key processes 
• report on their performance in meeting targets 
• routinely communicate expected timeframes to businesses in relation to 
individual applications  
• adopt other measures to improve timeliness, such as tracking of referrals to 
other agencies and the use of pre-lodgement meetings. 
RECOMMENDATION 15  (CHAPTER 6) 
Regulators should ensure there is transparency and accountability in decision 
making and in the use of discretion, in order to minimise uncertainty and the risk of 
corruption or the inappropriate treatment of one business relative to another. 
Generally, this should include:  
• formal documentation and publishing of compliance and enforcement strategies 
and key decision making processes 
• documenting enforcement decisions with reasons 
• publication, subject to meeting any confidentiality and privacy requirements, of 
decisions with broader implications or with particular educational or deterrent 
value 
• provision of a client service charter detailing what business can expect in their 
interaction with the regulator  
• ensuring all decisions are potentially subject to review and businesses have 
access to appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms. 
RECOMMENDATION 16  (CHAPTER 5) 
Regulators should ensure that processes for lodging complaints and seeking review 
of decisions are readily accessible by small businesses. Appropriate mechanisms 
would have a degree of independence from the compliance monitoring operations of 
the regulator, provision for businesses to obtain reasons for decisions taken, and 
processes that allow regulators to learn from complaints. 
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Further, governments should ensure that there are independent, low cost mediation 
services in place to resolve disputes and misunderstandings between small 
businesses and regulators.  
• As a minimum, regulators should be required by legislation or ministerial 
direction to cooperate with the mediation agency and provide whatever 
information the agency reasonably seeks.   
• Mediation services should be provided by Small Business Commissioners where 
currently in place. Such processes should complement (not replace) existing 
statutory and administrative rights to have decisions formally reviewed and the 
functions performed by offices of the ombudsman. 
Continuous improvement in engagement 
RECOMMENDATION 17  (CHAPTER 6) 
Governments and regulators should ensure mechanisms are in place to strengthen 
the incentives for continuous improvement and the wider adoption of leading 
practice engagement approaches. This includes: 
• ongoing internal, and periodic independent, evaluation of the effectiveness and 
costs of regulator engagement strategies 
• facilitating the efficient sharing of information, experiences and lessons learnt, 
for example, through the use of forums of regulators or ‘communities of 
practice’ 
• requiring regulators, including regulatory functions embedded within 
departments, to monitor and regularly report on their performance — including 
measures of effectiveness in achieving outcomes and reducing the compliance 
burden imposed on business (and small business in particular) 
• a commitment to common, whole of government, performance measures that can 
be used to facilitate, where appropriate, comparisons of regulator performance, 
both within and across jurisdictions 
• development of better practice regulator-business engagement principles that 
can be used as a guide for regulators, including to inform the development of 
performance indicators. 
An appropriate body in each jurisdiction should monitor and periodically report on 
regulators’ progress in implementing engagement practices that are consistent with 
the agreed principles. Such reporting would also provide an opportunity to 
highlight innovative practices that could be adopted more widely. 






RECOMMENDATION 18  (CHAPTER 6) 
To address gaps in staff skills and capacities regulators should: 
• implement policies that focus on the recruitment and retention of staff with the 
appropriate industry knowledge and mix of enforcement, investigative and 
communication skills 
• ensure the provision of appropriate training and written guidance for staff, 
including on the rationale for risk based enforcement and the appropriate use of 
discretion, and monitor regulator practices for consistency with such guidance 
• facilitate opportunities for staff to enhance their understanding of business 
practices and the nature and magnitude of the compliance costs their 
engagement approaches impose on small businesses 
• implement cooperative arrangements with other regulators that facilitate the 
sharing of knowledge and resources. 
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1 Scope of the study 
 
Key points 
• Small businesses account for more than 95 per cent of Australian businesses. Many 
are operated solely by the owner with no employees and generally do not have 
specialised skills or extensive time to devote to regulatory requirements. Some 
operate to provide their owners with an alternative to working as an employee while 
others produce only a small income to fund a hobby or supplement other income. 
• It is neither feasible nor appropriate to develop a single definition of small business 
that will be suitable for all regulatory purposes. Policy makers and/or regulators 
should determine which businesses are considered ‘small’ in their regulatory field 
based of an assessment of the policy purpose. Regulators should also consider the 
extent to which a definition of small business is necessary when targeting their 
engagement. 
• Regulators are entities that are empowered by legislation to grant approvals, 
monitor compliance and enforce laws. Regulators will often have complementary 
roles such as developing and reviewing regulations or standards and providing 
information or education about regulatory requirements. 
• The Commission estimates that within Australia there are roughly 130 national 
regulators, 350 operating within state and territory governments and 560 local 
councils. These regulators operate in a vast array of areas — from health and safety 
to environment, from construction standards to fair trading, from employment 
conditions to competition. 
• Businesses incur a range of costs associated with complying with their regulatory 
requirements. Unnecessary burdens can be created by a regulator’s engagement 
approach through, for example, inconsistent advice, excessive reporting 
requirements or unnecessary delays in processing licences and permits.  
• A cross-section of businesses reported that regulator behaviour can be just as 
important as the design of regulation in contributing to compliance costs.  
 
1.1 Background to the study 
The Productivity Commission has been asked to benchmark regulator engagement 
with small business. This includes considering how different regulatory approaches 
affect business and highlighting any approaches which have the potential to reduce 
unnecessary compliance costs. The study was commissioned with agreement from 
COAG’s Business Regulation and Competition Working Group and followed 






concerns raised at the inaugural COAG Business Advisory Forum meeting in 
April 2012 that ‘small and medium enterprises are particularly vulnerable to 
inappropriate or unnecessary regulations’ (COAG 2012). It also reflects growing 
recognition that regulator behaviour in the delivery of regulation needs to be 
considered, in addition to the design and review of regulation, to ensure business 
activities are not unduly constrained by regulation and its implementation.  
The design and review phases of regulation have been the topic of other recent 
Commission studies (PC 2011, 2012b). The current study concentrates on the 
delivery and implementation of regulation. While much of the analysis in this report 
focuses on Commonwealth, state and territory regulators, evidence of the regulatory 
engagement approach of local governments — collected during the Commission’s 
study on Local Government as Regulator (PC 2012a) — is also drawn on where 
relevant. 
1.2 Small business in Australia  
The vast majority of Australia’s 2 million businesses are small (96 per cent) with 
around 60 per cent of these businesses functioning with the owner as the sole 
operator (figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1 Proportion of businesses by employment sizea 
At June 2012 
 
a Small: employing fewer than 20 employees; Medium: employing between 20 and 199 employees; and 
Large: 200 or more employees.  
Source: ABS (2013b).  
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Small business are the dominant business type in all industries but operate 
predominately in: construction; professional, scientific and technical services; 
rental, hiring and real estate services; and agriculture (table 1.1). In 2011-12, small 
business produced around 35 per cent of GDP and accounted for 43 per cent of 
employment (ABS 2013a).  
Table 1.1 Small business by industry, June 2012 
 Share of total small 
businessa 
Share of small business 
within industry 
Industry per cent per cent 
Construction  17 98 
Professional, scientific and technical services 12 97 
Rental, hiring and real estate services 11 99 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing  9 98 
Financial and insurance services 8 99 
Retail trade 6 92 
Transport, postal and warehousing 6 97 
Health care and social assistance  5 95 
Other services 4 97 
Manufacturing  4 89 
Administrative and support services 4 93 
Wholesale trade 4 92 
Accommodation and food services 3 84 
Arts and recreation 1 95 
Education and training  1 91 
a Does not sum to 100 as: (i) 2.3 per cent of small businesses are not classified by industry; (ii) industries with 
a small proportion of total small businesses are not listed (information media and telecommunications (0.9 per 
cent), mining (0.4 per cent), public administration and safety (0.3 per cent), Electricity, gas, water and waste 
services (0.3 per cent)).  
Source: ABS (2013b).  
What is a small business? 
A small business is usually not just a larger business on a smaller scale but one that 
operates in a fundamentally different way. The issue of what constitutes a small 
business has been well examined.1 In qualitative terms, a small business typically 
has the following three fundamental characteristics: 
• it is independently owned and operated, that is, it is not part of a larger 
corporation or controlled by another firm 
• the owner manager is the principal decision maker  
                                              
1 For example, ABS (2000), Beddall (1990), Forsaith and Hall (2001), Kenny (2013), Lattimore 
et al. (1998), Schaper et al. (2010).  






• the owner manager contributes most, if not all, of the operating capital.  
Other characteristics common to the way a small business operates include: 
• a small number of individuals work in the business — sometimes from the same 
family 
• a simple management structure, usually with no specialised finance, personnel or 
regulatory/legal managers or systems  
• limited resources, including finance, staff and skills — this often requires the 
owner manager to fulfil all regulatory obligations, leaving them time poor  
• a small market share with a greater propensity to only supply the local market, or 
operate within a single state or territory. 
According to a recent Council of Small Business of Australia (COSBOA) survey, 
small businesses viewed these characteristics as central to the nature of a small 
business (COSBOA, sub. 31). Many participants also provided similar views in 
submissions (box 1.1). 
Despite these core characteristics, small businesses differ in a variety of ways. They 
vary in purpose and function across industries, some exist for many years, others for 
only months (ABS 2013b). Small businesses take on a number of different 
organisational and legal operating forms, some are run on a part-time basis, 
sometimes from home, while others have a more conventional business structure 
(ABS 2013b; Schaper et al. 2010). Some small businesses have a comparatively low 
income, turnover or profit margin (perhaps to supplement another income or fund a 
hobby), while others produce a higher income for the owner than would be earned if 
they were employed by someone else (Schaper et al. 2010).  
The motivation for owning a small business also varies with some owners looking 
to earn an income sufficient to support a household and others preferring increased 
flexibility associated with being their ‘own boss’ or greater capacity to balance 
personal or family interests. A recent survey reported that the majority of small 
business owners said they created their business to capitalise on their own expertise 
and skill set, with 24 per cent saying they wanted to be self-employed and have the 
opportunity to do something which they love (Redrup 2013).  
Looking at the people behind small businesses, the profile of small business owners 
in Australia is changing over time but current statistical information indicates that 
the ‘typical’ owner is: male, born in Australia and working either as a tradesperson 
or using financial skills (ABS 2008). They are likely to have completed secondary 
school or a trade qualification but often have not undertaken formal management 
training and tend not to use a business plan (ABS 2013a; Schaper et al. 2010). 
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Migrant small business owners are a significant group (27 per cent) and are most 
likely to have been born in Europe. Those small business owners who have 
migrated to Australia from Asia are more likely to be female than are owners from 
other regions of birth (ABS 2008).  
 
Box 1.1 Participants’ views on the characteristics of a small business 
Lack of specialised management functions 
… in small businesses the owner is often responsible for doing the work, managing staff and 
meeting all the regulatory obligations. (NSW Business Chamber, sub. 25, p. 2) 
As small businesses generally do not have dedicated human resource or payroll staff, all 
changes to the regulatory environment are typically dealt directly by the business 
owner/operator. (WA Small Business Development Corporation, sub. 22, p. 7) 
… it is unlikely that they will have a dedicated compliance manager. (Business SA, sub. 3, 
p. 2) 
… we have significant evidence to suggest that it is not until employment reaches 
approximately 50 employees that the business case and costs of dedicated in-house WHS 
[workplace health and safety], HR [human resource], environmental and/or financial 
compliance staff are appointed. (Chamber of Commerce and Industry Queensland, sub. 16, 
p. 3) 
These people in small business do not have experts to assist them. They do not have 
paymasters, OH&S experts, tax experts, health experts etc. (COSBOA, sub. 15, p. 3) 
Limited resources: time and staff  
Many small businesses are family owned and run and often operate with a small number of 
staff which means that they are both resource and time poor … The nature of small business 
means that many do not have access to the same level of resources as larger companies. 
(Business SA, sub. 3, p. 1) 
In general, small business operators are, more often than not, extremely time poor. (WA 
Small Business Development Corporation, sub. 22 p. 4) 
Small businesses differ from large enterprises in a fundamental way in that they are 
operated by one or two individuals … (Tasmanian Small business Council Inc., sub. 13, p. 1) 
Small geographic market  
… small businesses tend to sell their goods and services within a local area and within a 
single state or territory, while only a small percentage of small business sell their products 
overseas. (ACCI, sub. 5, p. 6)  
 
Defining small business in the regulatory environment 
The terms of reference direct the Commission to consider what constitutes a small 
business and to consider the merits of broader adoption of the ABS (number of 
employees) based definition to provide for ease of comparison with ABS data.  






The Commission believes the best way to define small business is through its 
inherent characteristics described above, such as in the following general definition 
of: 
… an independent firm that is usually managed, funded and operated by its owners, and 
whose staff size, financial resources and assets are comparatively small in scale. 
(Schaper et al. 2010) 
Such qualitative definitions can be difficult, if not impossible, to define in 
regulation. Definitions based on a metric (such as employment or turnover) that 
proxies the characteristic based definition are therefore often used in regulation or 
by regulators (appendix C).  
The Commission believes it is neither feasible nor appropriate to develop a single 
definition (qualitative or quantitative) of small business that would be suitable for 
all regulatory purposes. While there may be benefits in broader adoption of the ABS 
definition, the Commission considers these are unlikely to outweigh the costs of 
moving to a single definition for regulators in all parts of the economy (box 1.2).  
The Regulation Taskforce (2006) also acknowledged that different policy objectives 
mean a single definition is often not achievable, despite recognising that numerous 
definitions of small business can add complexity and create confusion for small 
businesses. Similarly, the Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research 
and Tertiary Education (DIISRTE) noted that policy makers and regulators need 
flexibility in defining small business to allow each definition to ‘turn on the 
particular traits of the small business’ which a policy is intending to target 
(sub. 18, p. 2). In short, definitions need to be fit for purpose.  
Several participants are supportive of not adopting a standard definition for 
regulatory purposes. For example, the Master Electricians Australia supported each 
regulator developing a definition that is ‘geared towards their specific regulatory 
purpose’ (sub. 8, p. 1) but stressed the importance of regulators effectively 
communicating the definition of small business used for their regulatory 
purpose (sub. DR35). Likewise, BusinessSA viewed having different definitions for 
different situations as ‘positive rather than negative, as it is impossible to apply a 
“one size fits all” approach to small business’ (sub. DR33, p. 1). It explicitly 
supported, in its draft report submission, not adopting a standard definition of small 
business.  
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Box 1.2 The pros and cons of a single definition of small business 
A myriad of small business definitions exist in Australia and internationally (appendix C). In this 
study, business associations generally reported that varying definitions can pose problems for 
some small business. These participants claimed that:  
• varying definitions caused confusion as some businesses are defined as ‘small’ by some 
(but not all) regulators  
• the different definitions of small business can increase the compliance costs for small 
business as they need to take more time researching and understanding whether particular 
regulatory requirements apply to them  
• small businesses may not understand that they are exempt from regulatory requirements 
and mistakenly comply, incurring unnecessary compliance costs  
• small businesses may believe they are exempt from regulatory requirements and mistakenly 
not comply, which may result in fines and penalties.  
Some industry and government bodies have highlighted that a consistent definition of small 
business would allow for greater analysis of data across different collections (assuming privacy 
issues are addressed) with subsequent analysis better informing policy making.  
Nevertheless, the costs incurred by business to research and understand whether particular 
regulatory requirements apply are likely to be a relatively small component of overall 
compliance costs and imposing a single definition would not remove or reduce these costs 
greatly. Moreover, having a single definition of a small business, such as the ABS definition, 
may: 
• lead to higher overall costs to the economy as differential treatment is not appropriately 
targeted (chapter 3) 
• require regulators to collect additional information to be able to use an externally decided 
definition, imposing an additional burden on business to supply such information.   
Sources: Australian Chamber of Commerce (ACCI), sub. 5; Housing Industry Association, sub. 24; 
Institute of Public Accountants, sub. 29; Chamber of Commerce and Industry Western Australia, sub. 7; 
Australian Hotels Association (AHA), sub. 17; The Tax Institute, sub. 11; DIISRTE, sub. 18; Commercial 
Asset Finance Brokers Association of Australia, sub. DR38.    
 
Policy makers and regulators are well placed to determine whether a definition of 
small business is needed and which businesses are considered ‘small’ for the given 
regulatory area. In making such determinations, they need to be clear about the 
problem or barrier they are attempting to overcome (such as a difficulty of some 
businesses in understanding regulatory obligations), which businesses should be 
targeted and whether business size is relevant. The nature and need for differential 
treatment for small business is discussed in depth in chapter 3. 
Nevertheless, government and regulators should be mindful that varying definitions 
do add to small business compliance costs and have a cumulative burden. Given the 
information gaps associated with developing a precise definition (such as one based 
on the number of employees or value of turnover) to delineate small from larger 






businesses — as a first step — regulators could consider the relevance and 
applicability of the existing definitions of small businesses. Another definition of 
small business should only be introduced (after consultation with business) if there 
are clear reasons that such a definition would better address the particular regulatory 
problem and if there are greater net benefits from using such a definition.  
Furthermore, for regulators that adopt a risk based approach to administering and 
enforcing regulation, having a definition of small business is not necessary as their 
regulatory approach is based on risk rather than business size. Depending on the 
regulatory field and individual business circumstances, smaller businesses may be 
either high or low risk (chapter 3). Around 70 per cent of regulator respondents that 
had a risk based approach, did not have a working definition of small business 
(Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013). 
Some participants’ concerns on the issue of defining small business relate to 
eligibility for government programs and grants rather than the nature of regulator 
posture with small business. Governments may wish to review how information for 
programs and grants is disseminated to assist small business more easily understand 
their eligibility.  
RECOMMENDATION 
Governments should not impose upon regulators a single definition of small 
business as this could lead to inflexibility and higher costs for some businesses 
and for the community more generally. Policy makers and regulators are best 
placed to define small business in ways that are practical and appropriate for 
their regulatory area. 
1.3 Regulators and their engagement with business 
The term ‘regulator’ is used throughout this report to denote government officials, 
departmental units and independent statutory authorities that are empowered by 
legislation to administer and enforce regulation, or more specifically to: grant 
approvals (including registration and licensing); monitor compliance; and enforce 
laws. Regulators will often have complementary roles such as: developing and 
reviewing regulations or standards; providing information or education about 
regulatory requirements; resolving disputes and giving regulatory advice to third 
parties. Given the scope of this study, the Commission focuses on regulators that 
have a direct impact on business, particularly small business, or its employees (for 
example, through required professional accreditation).  
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While not traditionally considered to be regulators, in this study we have included 
as regulators those agencies which require business, by force of law, to provide data 
or information on a regular or ongoing basis. It is clear from the evidence provided 
during this study that small business regard meeting these obligations as part of 
their regulatory compliance burden, and our recommendations for minimising this 
burden apply equally to such data collection agencies for the design and operation 
of their interactions with small business. 
The Commission estimates that within Australia there are roughly 130 national 
regulators, 350 regulators operate within state and territory governments and 560 
local councils (see appendix B for a full list of national and state and territory 
regulators in Australia. Local councils are listed in PC (2012a). Since the vast 
majority of businesses in Australia are small, most regulators are primarily 
engaging with small rather than large businesses.  
Regulators operate in a vast array of areas — from health and safety to 
environment, from construction standards to fair trading, from employment 
conditions to competition. In the Commission’s regulator survey there were 
respondents for each of these regulatory areas, with environmental protection and 
public health and safety being the most represented.  
The institutional and governance arrangements under which regulators operate vary 
substantially between regulatory areas and jurisdictions. This was reflected in 
responses to the Commission’s regulator survey. 
• Governance: the vast majority of regulators reside either within a department or 
operate as statutory authorities.  
• Roles and responsibilities: the breadth of roles performed by regulators varies 
from only one regulatory task such as registration/licensing or collecting fees to 
a combination of many regulatory roles including providing education, and 
conducting inspections and investigations. Further, roughly 90 per cent of survey 
respondents have some involvement in policy development and/or review in 
addition to their administration and enforcement roles. 
• Resourcing: reflecting the varied roles and responsibilities above, the number of 
full time equivalent staff employed by survey respondents in 2011-12 ranged 
from one employee to several thousand. 
These and other differences affect the way regulators are able to perform their role 
and their posture towards business and are discussed further in chapter 2.  






Compliance costs associated with regulator engagement 
Regulators engage with businesses for a variety of purposes (figure 1.2) and it is 
through this engagement that businesses primarily ‘experience’ regulation and much 
of the associated compliance costs. These costs include the time taken to research 
and learn about requirements, filling in and lodging forms, establishing and 
maintaining reporting systems (such as details of accidents in the workplace) and 
preparing for enforcement activities such as inspections.  
A typical small business must comply with a large number of regulations 
administered by multiple regulators. Some of the regulation is generic, applying to 
all or most businesses (such as taxation or occupational health and safety laws), 
while other regulation is specific to an industry or business activity. Additional 
regulatory burdens can also arise when a business operates across jurisdictional 
boundaries. While the burden of each individual regulation may be small and 
justified, the combined or cumulative burden can have a major impact on the 
development and growth of small business.  
Figure 1.2 Nature of engagement between regulators and businesses  
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Australian studies have found that small businesses spend, on average, up to five 
hours per week on compliance with government regulatory requirements and deal 
with an average of six regulators per year (ACCI 2012; AI Group 2011). The 
cumulative burden of regulation faced by small businesses is further discussed in 
Appendix E, including specific examples of the range of regulatory obligations faced by 
two types of businesses — a winery and a residential builder. 
Within each area of engagement, there is potential for business compliance costs to 
be compounded by a regulator’s approach to engagement. Possible sources of 
additional or unnecessary compliance costs include:  
• ineffective communication: lack of effective communication with business about 
proposed regulatory changes; lack of guidance or inconsistent advice about what 
constitutes adequate compliance 
• excessive licensing and approvals processes: unnecessarily extensive reporting 
requirements; the supply of similar/same information to a number of government 
organisations; excessive delays in processing licensing applications 
• unduly onerous compliance requirements: excessive number of inspections or 
audits, given the business’s compliance record or risk of an adverse outcome 
• heavy handed enforcement: excessive prescriptiveness in interpreting 
regulations; rigid enforcement actions; an adversarial attitude to business 
owners; poor communication on why a breach was considered to have occurred 
and what must be done to be compliant. 
In some cases, the costs to business of regulator behaviour will be influenced by the 
regulation administered, which makes it difficult to untangle whether the source of 
the compliance burden on business is the regulation itself, or the way it is delivered. 
The majority of small business respondents to a COSBOA survey reported that 
regulator behaviour is just as important as the design of regulation in contributing to 
compliance costs (COSBOA, sub. 31). A number of business associations have 
commented on how significant the engagement approach taken by regulators is in 
determining the impact of regulations on business (for example: Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry Queensland (CCIQ), sub. 16; Business SA, sub. 4; 
COSBOA, sub. 15). In particular, the CCIQ claim that:  
[it] has significant evidence that in many cases it is the approach of regulators — their 
communication, advice and support, enforcement and reporting requirements — that 
has the most significant impact on business owners. (sub. 16, p. 1) 
Nevertheless, Sparrow (2000) notes that even when the fault lies with the regulation 
itself, the blame is usually borne by regulators: 






To the public, and especially to industry, regulators seem all too often nitpicky, 
unreasonable, unnecessarily adversarial, rigidly bureaucratic, incapable of applying 
discretion sensibly, and (worst of all, since regulation costs so much) ineffective in 
achieving their missions. (p. 18) 
In addition to business compliance costs, there may also be broader costs of 
regulation and regulators’ engagement practices that arise from regulatory 
‘distortions’ — for example, where regulation reduces competition and affects 
incentives for investment and innovation. In a recent ACCI survey, just over half of 
small business respondents indicated that complying with regulatory requirements 
had to some extent prevented them from making necessary changes to grow and 
expand their business (ACCI, sub. 5). Similarly in a BusinessSA survey of small 
business members, around 40 per cent indicated that government regulations were 
one of the biggest obstacles to growth and development of the business 
(sub. DR33).  
Given these costs — and the fact that it can be difficult to change the underlying 
regulations and institutional and governance arrangements to reduce burdens arising 
from these — it is particularly important that regulators attempt to reduce regulatory 
burdens associated with their delivery of regulation to business. 
From the Commission’s consultations, it is clear that small businesses see good 
engagement with regulators as being associated with an educative and facilitative 
regulatory posture, rather than a combative approach. Most businesses want to be 
found compliant with regulatory requirements and, for the benefit of their industry 
and own competitiveness, want fellow businesses to also be compliant. Small 
businesses especially value: 
• compliance requirements that are straightforward to find, understand and 
implement — this necessitates brevity, clarity and accessibility in the 
communication of compliance obligations and reporting requirements that are 
consistent with existing business approaches  
• in the regulator’s approach to compliance management and enforcement, a 
demonstrated capacity and willingness by regulators to: 
– be flexible and proportionate in their enforcement, with a consistent focus on 
outcomes 
– minimise unnecessary compliance and reporting costs imposed on small 
business, including the cumulative burden derived from engagement with 
multiple regulators 
– understand the needs and constraints of small business generally and those 
specific to their business or industry. 
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1.4 Conduct of the study 
The Commission received the terms of reference for this study in December 2012 
(reproduced on page v). In preparing this report, the Commission has consulted 
widely to ensure input was sought from a broad range of stakeholders.  
The Commission released an issues paper in January 2013 and a draft report in July 
2013. A total of 48 submissions have been received in response to these releases. Of 
the 48 submissions received, 33 of these were from business or their associations 
and 15 were from regulators or other government bodies.  
The Commission has met with business groups, regulators, government departments 
and agencies, and intermediary groups in all Australian jurisdictions (see 
appendix A for the full list of study participants). To provide additional 
opportunities for small businesses to have input into the study. The Commission:  
• partnered with COSBOA to canvas views of small businesses on regulator 
engagement practices (COSBOA, subs. 31 and DR48) 
• offered an online feedback form on its web page to assist small business provide 
feedback on the draft report 
• liaised with local chambers of commerce and industry to convene roundtables 
with around 60 small businesses in Cairns, Perth and Wagga Wagga to obtain 
feedback on the draft report.  
In preparing this report, the Commission has also drawn on responses to its survey 
of Commonwealth, state and territory government regulators (appendix B) and 
surveys of local government undertaken for the Commission’s Local Government 
as Regulator study (PC 2012a). In addition, the Commission has considered 
business surveys undertaken for other studies, and analysis and findings in previous 
reviews, audits and studies from Australia and overseas.  
While it has not been possible to comprehensively review and compare the detailed 
compliance and enforcement policies and practices of all regulators across 
Australian jurisdictions, the Commission has endeavoured to highlight particular 
examples and models that could be considered good practices. If adopted more 
broadly, these practices could lead to fundamental improvements in regulator 
engagement with small business.  
 

   





2 Influences on regulator posture 
 
Key points 
• A myriad of factors outside regulators’ control can affect their posture towards 
business, including: regulation design; the overarching governance and institutional 
framework; and stakeholder pressures. 
• All jurisdictions have well established regulation design principles, which, when 
followed, can create an environment that enables regulators to minimise 
unnecessary regulatory burdens for business. Where issues such as 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement are not adequately considered during 
regulation design, regulators may be forced to adopt overly prescriptive or 
unnecessarily process (rather than outcome) focused engagement approaches. 
• Regulator culture is closely aligned with the posture adopted towards small 
business, and is critical in fostering optimal engagement approaches. To deliver the 
best outcomes for small business, leading practice engagement principles 
espoused by the leadership of regulators must permeate to officers ‘on the ground’. 
– Governments and regulators need to ensure that appropriate transparency, 
accountability and capacity building mechanisms are in place so that, in meeting 
regulatory objectives, all regulatory staff adopt a facilitative and educative 
posture towards business, without imposing unnecessary regulatory burdens.  
• It is important that regulators are adequately resourced so that they can carry out 
their regulatory responsibilities effectively. Small regulators (including many local 
councils) often struggle to adopt a proactive engagement approach due to the 
resource constraints they face. 
• Regulators face constant pressure from the public, the media and governments to 
reduce, or even to eliminate risks, regardless of their magnitude or mitigation costs. 
– To avoid any criticisms stemming from perceived regulatory failures, some 
regulators adopt an overly risk averse posture, imposing unnecessary 
compliance and regulatory costs on business. 
– Where governments directly intervene in regulator decisions, confidence in the 
regulator’s risk management approach is undermined. 
• The tools at a regulator’s disposal (such as the power to conduct inspections and 
audits and impose fines) must reflect the range of risks that they mitigate and 
enable regulators to facilitate compliance and respond proportionately to 
compliance breaches.  
 







Regulator ‘posture’ can be broadly defined as the approach that regulators adopt 
towards the businesses they regulate. The extent to which they educate and assist 
businesses in meeting their compliance obligations, or act as strict enforcers of 
regulations when breaches are detected can be either a deliberate or strategic 
decision, or simply the consequence of a range of internal and external influences. 
Regulator posture cannot be observed directly, but can be inferred from observed 
engagement practices (box 2.1). 
 
Box 2.1 Regulator posture and engagement approaches 
Regulator posture, and the resulting engagement approach, can be inferred by the 
extent to which the regulator adopts a: 
• proactive versus reactive approach — proactive approaches encourage, persuade 
and highlight ways to achieve or require compliance before a breach occurs. They 
are preventative. In contrast, reactive approaches involve following up complaints or 
adverse inspection results. Of course, in some respects, reactive approaches can 
have proactive effects where action to rectify a breach has a broader educative or 
deterrent effect. 
• combative versus cooperative approach — combative approaches often involve the 
threat of severe penalties as the incentive for compliance. The central idea behind a 
combative approach is deterrence. In contrast, cooperative approaches focus on 
education, advice, working together, appealing to self-interest and mutual 
interdependence. 
• prescriptive versus discretionary approach — while heavily influenced by the type of 
regulation being enforced, prescriptive approaches entail strict enforcement and 
interpretation, whereas a discretionary approach is more tempered and able to 
assess alternative means of compliance. 
Sources: Based on Office of Regulation Review (1995); PC (2009).  
 
A myriad of factors can affect regulators’ posture towards business, including: the 
area in the economy the business operates; the relative risks the business poses; as 
well as the level and depth of interaction (for example, through licensing or 
conducting inspections). Along with these general factors, regulator posture is also 
affected by a number of specific influences, some of which are outside the 
regulator’s direct control, including: 
• the design of the regulation and the nature of the risks to the community to be 
mitigated 
• the regulator’s institutional environment and available resources 
   





• operational factors, such as community and media pressures and the implicit 
rules, values and expectations of behaviour that are inherent in a regulator’s 
culture (figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 Influences on regulator posture 
 
Another important influence on regulator posture is the extent to which regulators 
have access to, and develop, a suitable body of skilled and competent staff. This is 
discussed in chapter 6 as a key influence on regulator performance. 
In practice, regulators adopt a variety of engagement approaches, with the choice of 
approach in any given situation depending on particular circumstances specific to 
the regulation being enforced, and the businesses being regulated. Where regulators 
are able to strike the right balance, unnecessary burdens on business are reduced 
and regulatory effectiveness increased, increasing the likelihood of community wide 
benefits from the regulation. 
2.2 Regulation design sets bounds on posture 
The content and design of regulation — which is typically beyond regulators’ 
control — set bounds on how regulators are able to engage with business. Features 
of regulation content and design which can most affect posture include: 
• the risks that are to be mitigated through regulation 
• the nature of the businesses regulated 
• the regulation itself and the process by which it is made. 






Risks being mitigated 
There are a range of risks to the community that regulators (both individually and 
collectively) attempt to mitigate — from threats to public health, to damage to 
environmental assets and the financial system. Risks are categorised either in 
regulation or by the regulator according to both the severity of the consequences of 
the events mitigated, and their likelihood of occurring (appendix D). Regulatory 
efforts should be targeted towards mitigating risks such that the resulting outcomes 
maximise net benefits to the community (chapter 3). 
If risks are incorrectly assessed, then regulator approaches to business can become 
unduly compliance focused, thereby subjecting businesses to unnecessary 
compliance and regulatory costs. In addition to the direct economic costs, there are 
significant costs incurred over time, such as reputational damage to the regulator 
and foregone industry investment and development (section 2.4). 
For businesses, this means they bear unnecessary costs where the severity of harm 
is minor or likelihood of occurrence is low. As stated by the NSW Small Business 
Commissioner: 
Many regulatory regimes are too risk averse and set regulatory standards that are too 
high, when a lower standard is likely to be acceptable. The result is a significant 
volume of unnecessary compliance responsibilities is imposed on the vast majority of 
operators who will do the right thing anyway. (sub. 12, p. 3) 
The severity of the consequences the regulation seeks to mitigate is an important 
determinant of regulator posture. For example, it is to be expected that regulators 
tasked with attempting to mitigate catastrophic risks (such as the risks to life posed 
by aviation or road transport accidents) will be more risk averse (that is, they are 
less tolerant of mitigated risks materialising), than regulators which attempt to 
alleviate relatively lower risks (such as those posed by newsagencies). Regulators 
tasked with mitigating catastrophic risks are more likely to adopt a very proactive 
posture — keeping in closer contact with the regulated industry — due to the 
attendant costs to the community if a regulatory breach were to occur (Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2010). 
Nature of businesses regulated 
The nature of the businesses regulated — in particular, the skills, experience and 
capacities of business owners and staff — critically affects their ability to comply 
with regulations. If the nature of businesses regulated is not adequately considered 
in the design of the regulation, then the regulator may be limited to adopting a ‘one 
size fits all approach’ and regulate all businesses identically (NSW Small Business 
   





Commissioner, sub. 12; Tasmanian Small Business Council, sub. 13; Department of 
Industry, Innovation, Science and Tertiary Education (DIISRTE), sub. 18). Such an 
approach would only be efficient if compliance costs are low and/or the 
consequences of non-compliance are minimal for all regulated businesses 
(see chapter 3). 
A business’s ability to understand and comply with regulatory requirements is likely 
to be affected by a range of factors specific to the business. These can include: the 
length of time the business has been in operation; whether the business owner has 
adequate technical and language skills to understand the regulatory framework; 
whether the geographic location of the business allows it to have frequent or ready 
contact with the regulator; the business’s capacity and resources available for 
compliance activities; and the business owner’s ability to access information on 
their regulatory obligations. Where businesses struggle to understand regulatory 
requirements, regulations need to be sufficiently flexible to allow regulators to 
adopt appropriately tailored engagement approaches (Hills Orchard Improvement 
Group, sub. 9; Tasmanian Small Business Council, sub. 13). Appropriate tailoring 
of regulators’ engagement strategies is discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
The posture of regulators is also, in part, determined by businesses’ willingness to 
comply. In instances where business are aware of their obligations and how to 
comply with them, but choose not to, tailoring regulation to businesses will not lead 
to desired regulatory outcomes. The New South Wales Food Authority stated that 
over and above educating business, additional ‘leverage’ is provided by the 
publication of penalties imposed in relation to food safety breaches for poor 
performing businesses (sub. 28, p. 12). 
Regulation and the regulation making process 
Good regulatory design processes are critical for creating the environment that 
enables regulators to deliver regulation effectively. Making regulations in 
accordance with well accepted principles — such as those of the Council of 
Australian Government (2007) — increases the likelihood that the regulation is 
better understood by business, and the regulator is able to adopt a more educative 
and facilitative approach towards the businesses it regulates; focusing attention on 
assisting businesses to meet their compliance obligations, rather than adopting a 
reactive approach once regulatory breaches have occurred. 
Where sound regulation making processes are not followed there are real risks that 
the resulting benefits of regulation will be either marginal or impose a net cost to 
the community, regardless of how the regulator goes about implementing the 






regulation (PC 2012b). As noted in chapter 1, the majority of small business 
respondents to a Council of Small Business of Australia (COSBOA) survey 
indicated that regulation design and regulator delivery approaches are equally 
important in contributing to compliance costs. 
The steps in the regulation making process that have the largest impact on regulator 
posture are consultation with affected businesses, and planning for the 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement of new regulations. The content of the 
regulation which results from this process is also critical in affecting regulator 
posture. 
Consultation with affected businesses 
Effective early consultation with business in the development of regulation is 
critical to ensuring it is appropriately targeted and is understood (and possibly 
accepted) by those affected. As stated by DIISRTE, inadequate consultation with 
small business during the regulation design phase can result ‘in unnecessary, 
excessive regulation that does not consider the constraints of small business or 
achieve the intended goals of the new regulations’ (sub. 18, p. 2). 
Regulators may struggle to effectively engage with businesses where consultation 
has been cursory. Regulated entities may lack awareness of their compliance 
obligations or question the merits of the regulation or the value of further 
engagement with regulators; particularly if they perceive their views were not taken 
into account when the regulation was being designed. In such instances, there is a 
risk that regulators are forced to become unduly reactive and focused on responding 
to instances of non-compliance, rather than facilitating compliance or attempting to 
prevent breaches occurring in the first place. 
Concerns have been raised by many participants in this study about poor 
consultation practices (for example: Master Electricians Australia, sub. 8; 
Australian Motor Industry Federation, sub. 23; NSW Business Chamber, sub. 25). 
Similar concerns were identified in other studies (Borthwick and Milliner 2012; 
PC 2012b). Where consultation has been inadequate, it is even more important that 
the regulator attempt to adopt a more educative posture. Inadequate consultation 
increases the likelihood of non-compliance as the regulation is less likely to be well 
designed and businesses may find it more difficult to understand the purpose of the 
regulation and their compliance obligations (for example, VCEC 2005, 2007). 
   





Planning for implementation, monitoring and enforcement 
The Commission recently found that regulation impact statements for regulatory 
proposals often neglect discussing how proposed regulations will be implemented, 
including: 
• which authority will enforce the proposal, and the resourcing requirements and 
costs involved 
• the actions regulated businesses are required to take, such as maintaining extra 
information, completing forms, or proving experience, expertise or educational 
achievements 
• transitional arrangements to minimise the impact on businesses, for example 
through delayed or gradual introduction of new requirements, and provision of 
information and other assistance to those affected (PC 2012b). 
Some regulators are in a better position to plan for the implementation of 
regulations than others. Just over half of surveyed regulators identified that, in 
addition to an enforcement role, they were responsible for writing regulations and 
setting regulatory standards (Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013). 
Where the delivery of regulation has been overlooked in the regulation design 
process, there is an increased likelihood that regulators will be ill-equipped to adopt 
some engagement approaches and/or there will be unnecessary overlap and 
duplication with other regulators. As submitted by COSBOA: 
A poorly designed policy will be difficult to police for a regulator. When new policy is 
developed there should always be involvement from the regulating agencies and small 
business … Our members still hear field staff of agencies complain that the rules are 
not sensible but ‘they didn’t design the rules they just enforce them’. (sub. 15, p. 6) 
An inquiry into food regulation by the Victorian Competition and Efficiency 
Commission (VCEC) found that implementation issues were not adequately 
identified and considered during the regulation’s design. Had the issues been 
considered at the regulatory design stage, the imposition of unnecessary overlapping 
and duplicative registration requirements on business could have been avoided 
(VCEC 2007). 
Content of the regulation 
As regulators are required to undertake their responsibilities in accordance with 
their overarching legislation, problems can arise if legislative requirements are 
unclear or ambiguous in their wording. In such instances, regulators may either be 
reluctant to provide information to regulated entities that could be regarded as 
conflicting or incorrect (Victoria Auditor General’s Office (VAGO) 2011a, 2011b), 






or alternatively, may interpret legislative requirements in ways that are not 
consistent with the original intent of the legislation or that impose unnecessary 
burdens on business (VCEC 2007). 
Elements of the regulation that are particularly important for the way regulators can 
operate include the following: 
• Regulation coverage — Ambiguity about which businesses are subject to 
regulation may result in regulators inadvertently regulating businesses that were 
not meant to be regulated (regulatory creep), or not regulating businesses that 
should have been (potentially defeating the purpose of the regulation). 
• Regulatory objectives — In instances where statements of regulatory objectives 
do not exist or are unclear, the approach the regulator adopts may be inconsistent 
with the underlying intent of the regulation. For example, recent audit reports 
found that where unclear regulatory objectives existed, there was no assurance 
that the regulatory outcomes sought were actually being achieved 
(ACT Auditor-General 2011; VAGO 2013). 
• Degree of prescription — While the appropriate level of prescription will vary 
on a case by case basis, where regulation is unduly prescriptive and the regulator 
is afforded insufficient discretion in determining compliance, their approach 
towards business may be (or may be seen to be) overly legalistic (see, for 
example, HOIG, sub. 9). Legislation can be prescriptive with regard to aspects 
such as the desired regulatory outcomes, required or acceptable compliance 
processes and the engagement approach required. For example, the legislation 
governing the New South Wales Food Authority requires it to undertake or 
facilitate the education and training of persons ‘to enable them to meet the 
requirements of the Food Standards Code and food safety schemes.’1 Although 
the means by which persons are educated is not mandated, it is clear that the 
Food Authority has more than an obligation to merely ‘inform’ businesses — it 
must enable businesses to meet their compliance obligations. 
• Relationship with other regulations — Where regulatory responsibilities are 
‘shared’ between regulators at the same or different levels of government, 
delivery of regulation can result in unnecessary overlap and duplication in 
reporting requirements for business (VCEC 2009). The VCEC inquiry into 
Victorian food regulation also found that inconsistent objectives between related 
Acts makes delivery particularly difficult for regulators (VCEC 2007). 
• Regulation’s appropriateness over time — It is important that the regulation is 
sufficiently flexible such that the regulator can adapt their approach to changes 
in the regulated industry over time (section 2.3). 
                                              
1  Section 108(2)(e) of the Food Act 2003 (NSW). 
   





Where insufficient consideration is given to these elements when formulating 
regulation, regulators may be forced to adopt strategies which are unduly 
burdensome, process focused or overly prescriptive in their requirements — all of 
which can lead to less effective engagement with small business. 
RECOMMENDATION 
When designing regulation, all governments should apply agreed regulatory impact 
analysis principles, including evaluation of: intended approaches to regulation 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement; and the likely impacts on business. 
2.3 Regulators’ institutional environment 
The institutional and governance arrangements, the range of legislated tools at 
regulators’ disposal, and the resources provided to them to effectively deliver 
regulation to business, establish bounds within which regulators operate. 
Governance arrangements 
Aspects of regulators’ governance arrangements which particularly impact on their 
posture towards business include: 
• where the regulator is located within the structure of government 
• the scope of the regulator’s roles and functions 
• the arrangements in place to ensure the transparency and accountability of the 
regulator. 
While governance arrangements can impact on the quality of regulator engagement 
with business, most businesses see such arrangements as internal to government and 
a part of the regulatory landscape that they cannot influence. It can be difficult for 
those outside of government to offer (or justify devoting resources towards 
considering) plausible alternatives to the status quo. As the NSW Business Chamber 
noted: 
It is difficult for outsiders to give regulators specific guidance on how they should set 
up their operations to ensure they have the capacity to deliver best practice regulation. 
(sub. 25, p. 9) 
Moreover, it is rarely possible to directly attribute differences in the way regulators 
approach business to their governance arrangements. 







Across Australia, regulators are most commonly separate units within portfolio 
departments, or statutory authorities. The Commission’s survey of regulators found 
that out of the 190 regulators which responded, 52 per cent were located in 
departments and 44 per cent were statutory authorities (Productivity Commission 
regulator survey 2013). In some jurisdictions, the default position is for regulators 
to be established as either additional regulatory units or statutory office holders 
within existing departments, rather than as separate entities (Department of Finance 
and Administration 2005; Victorian State Services Authority (SSA) 2009). A recent 
review by the Australian Government Department of Finance and Deregulation 
reiterated the preference for any new bodies to be department based rather than 
independent agencies (Australian Government 2012). 
Responses to the Commission’s regulator survey indicate that regulators in smaller 
jurisdictions are more likely (than those in larger jurisdictions) to be located within 
departments. The typically smaller size of regulators in these jurisdictions may 
mean it is administratively more efficient for regulatory roles to be undertaken 
within a department. 
The location of the regulator will have a bearing on the way it operates and its 
stance in delivering regulation to business. A regulator within a department, for 
example, may (because of its responsibilities to a minister) be more responsive to 
industry concerns (table 2.1). On the other hand, there may be more potential for 
conflicts of interest in the design or delivery of regulation. 
Statutory independence puts the regulator at arm’s length from government, 
potentially increasing the likelihood that it would be impartial and objective in its 
decision making and reduce the risk of perceived or actual conflicts of interest 
(Australian Government 2012). The Northern Territory Environment Protection 
Authority recently moved from a department to a statutory authority, in part due to 
perceptions ‘of inefficiencies and unresponsiveness to industry’ (Mills 2012, p. 1) 
and its independence is now explicitly legislated: 
The NT EPA is not subject to the direction or control of the Minister in the exercise of 
its powers or the performance of its functions.2 
Nevertheless, in providing statutory independence to a regulator it is also important 
that strong transparency and accountability frameworks are in place to ensure the 
activities of the regulator deliver the greatest net benefits to the community 
(OECD 2013). 
                                              
2  Section 9(1) of the Northern Territory Environment Protection Authority Act 2012 (NT). 
   





Table 2.1 Implications of regulator location for posture 
Departmental regulator Statutorily independent regulator 
• may be more responsive to industry concerns • more likely to be objective and impartial in 
decision making processes 
• likely to adopt the transparency and 
accountability arrangements of the 
overarching department 
• may be more transparent and accountable 
due to separate accountability and reporting 
arrangements 
• likely to adopt the prevailing culture of the 
department and be less able to adapt this to 
regulatory circumstances 
• may have more scope, with good leadership, 
to foster an engaging culture amongst 
regulatory officers 
• regulator may have less power of coercion 
and information collection at its disposal 
• may be highly intrusive into business 
operations, where the regulator is granted 
extraordinary powers 
• regulator is in a better position to instigate 
legislative change to remedy ‘gaps’ in 
legislation 
• more likely to result in a stable and 
predictable regulatory environment, robust to 
changes in government 
• staff with general administrative skills are 
likely to be used where the regulatory role is 
comparatively minor 
• regulator staff may be more likely to have 
specialised skills enabling better interaction 
with regulated entities 
Sources: Based on SSA (2009), PC (2009); Australian Government (2012); OECD (2013). 
Regulator roles and functions 
Regulators perform a wide range of functions including: registering, accrediting and 
licensing of businesses; collecting fees; conducting investigations, inspections and 
audits; educating business; and resolving complaints (figure 2.2). Apart from in 
legislation, these are most often set out in codes of conduct or charters, memoranda 
of understanding, or internal statements or plans (Productivity Commission 
regulator survey 2013). Most regulators undertake multiple functions — for 
example, the Victorian Environment Protection Authority (EPA) is responsible for 
registering and licensing businesses to operate, collecting fees as well as conducting 
inspections, audits and investigations (EPA 2011). However, some regulators have 
more specialised roles, such as the Queensland Department of State Development, 
Infrastructure and Planning (DSDIP), which collects fees and exempts businesses 
from paying fees, in specified development areas (DSDIP 2013). 
Some regulators perform only an enforcement role, for example the Victorian 
Business Licensing Authority is responsible for licensing and registering businesses 
such as debt collectors, estate agents and motor car traders (Consumer Affairs 
Victoria 2013). In contrast, some regulators are also responsible for setting the 
policy that they will then enforce, such as the aquaculture area in the Department of 
Primary Industries and Regions South Australia. Responses to the Commission’s 
survey indicate that nearly three quarters of regulators have a role in developing 
policy (Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013). 






Figure 2.2 Functions performed by regulators 
Per cent of regulatorsa 
 
a Based on responses from 190 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
Whether a regulator’s approach to engagement is improved by having a policy 
making role that supplements its enforcement functions will vary on a case by case 
basis (box 2.2). Where regulators solely perform an enforcement function, it can be 
a challenge to ensure that there is effective communication with the policy making 
agency when issues arise. The separation of enforcement and policy making roles 
has, on occasion, resulted in increased uncertainty and delays for business due to 
poor consultation and coordination between the policy making body and the 
enforcement body (Inspector–General of Taxation 2010). Furthermore, such 
separation can also create incentives for the regulator to adopt a more compliance 
based approach: 
… this delineation of roles tends to reinforce a more rigid compliance regime within 
the administrator due to the narrow focus of activity. That is, an administrator can 
justify their operations in terms of simple [key performance indicators] such as the 
number of infringements issued, whereas the responsibility for evaluation and 
modifying a regulation to better achieve the intended outcome does not fall within its 
remit. (Local Government Association of Queensland (LGAQ), sub. 27, p. 5) 
However, the potential for a regulator to adopt a more compliance based approach 
needs to be balanced against potentially reduced risks of regulatory capture when 


















   






Box 2.2 Relevant considerations of enforcement only versus policy 
making regulators 
Ensuring role clarity — It is important to ensure that policy making regulators have 
adequate delineation and separation between their enforcement and policy 
development roles. 
Dealing with changes to the regulatory environment — The policy making regulator 
ought to be able to identify problems and assess the feasibility of policy options to 
remedy any problems. 
Avoiding regulator capture — Both regulator models need to have appropriate 
transparency and accountability mechanisms to avoid becoming ‘agents’ for the 
regulated industry. 
Guarding against regulator creep — Policy making regulators must be sufficiently 
transparent in their activities so as to avoid regulating in areas where doing so would 
not be net beneficial to the community. 
Ensuring effective decision-making processes — Policy making regulators must be 
granted the authority to make impartial and objective decisions. 
Sources: Based on Uhrig (2003); VCEC (2005).  
 
Where the regulator is responsible for both policy development and enforcement, it 
may more readily ensure the regulatory framework appropriately reflects 
developments in the industry and technology changes by being able to instigate 
legislative amendments. The aquaculture area in the Department of Primary 
Industries and Resources of South Australia, for example, was able to update its 
legislative framework to respond to ‘the rapid development of industry practice, 
aquaculture management standards and administrative world’s best practice’ 
(Gago 2012, p. 1). The added flexibility and ability to quickly respond to 
developments that this regulatory model provides does pose potential risks, 
particularly that the regulator may impose additional costs on business (Hills 
Orchard Improvement Group, sub. 9) — highlighting the importance of 
governments ensuring all regulatory changes with a non-minor impact on business 
are subject to rigorous regulation impact assessment processes. Additionally, it is 
important to ensure that regulators from both models have adequate transparency 
and accountability mechanisms in place. 
Transparency and accountability 
Transparency refers to the availability and ease of access to information held by 
government, and to the ability of citizens to understand the basis of decision 
making. In a regulatory context, this means that regulators’ decisions are fully 






explained and the evidentiary basis upon which those decisions are made is publicly 
available. Transparency is also a precondition for accountability since a regulatory 
agency cannot be held accountable unless information is available on how they are 
engaging with business and meeting their responsibilities. Accountability is ‘the 
obligation to inform, explain and justify conduct and to face consequences 
associated with that conduct’ (PC 2012b, p. 238). The OECD Council on 
Regulatory Policy and Governance recommends that: 
Mechanisms of public accountability are required that clearly define how a regulatory 
agency is to discharge its responsibility with the necessary expertise as well as 
integrity, honesty and objectivity. (OECD 2012, p. 14) 
If businesses or other groups in the community do not have adequate information on 
regulator policies, practices and how and why decisions are made, there is a greater 
risk that regulators’ incentives and interests will become misaligned with those of 
the community. Transparency is also a mechanism for generating community 
support and enhancing the credibility of regulators. It also can greatly reduce the 
costs to business of understanding and complying with their regulatory obligations. 
As a consequence, transparency can promote increased voluntary compliance.  
At a broad level, some transparency and accountability is observed through 
requirements for annual reporting. While regulators report to a range of bodies, the 
most common are reporting directly to a Minister or to a board (Productivity 
Commission regulator survey 2013). 
Where transparency and accountability mechanisms have been found to be weak: 
• perceived or actual conflicts of interest have not been disclosed (ANAO 2006b; 
VCEC 2005) 
• roles and responsibilities between regulators have been unclear (VAGO 2010a; 
VCEC 2009) 
• record keeping and reporting standards have been poor or inconsistent 
(ANAO 2006a; New South Wales Auditor General 2011; VAGO 2010b) 
• reasons for decisions have not been transparently articulated (VAGO 2010a) 
• regulators have been unable to demonstrate that they are meeting the 
regulation’s objectives (ACT Auditor-General 2011; VAGO 2011b, 2012). 
If regulators are less open to scrutiny, it is more difficult for businesses and the 
public to hold regulators to account for their actions, heightening risks that 
regulators may become less concerned with potential conflicts of interest and lose 
sight of their ultimate client, the community. Effective transparency and 
   





accountability mechanisms are vital then in ensuring regulators discharge their 
duties objectively and impartially. 
Tools at the regulator’s disposal 
The tools that regulators have to carry out their regulatory responsibilities influence 
the ways in which regulators can interact with business. In principle, a regulator that 
has a sufficient suite of tools to deal with the range of risks it is regulating is likely 
to adopt a more proportionate response than a regulator with a very limited set of 
tools (chapter 4). Where, for example, regulators are provided with only low level 
infringement tools or tools with extremely strong sanctions, they may be unable to 
respond in a manner commensurate with compliance breaches. 
The tools available to regulators have four (often interlinked) purposes: 
• to permit/prevent entry into the market (for example, licensing and accreditation 
schemes) 
• to assist businesses to comply (for example, provision of compliance 
information through various interfaces) 
• to monitor business compliance (for example, audits and inspections) 
• to respond to instances of non-compliance (for example, correction notices, 
improvement orders, pecuniary penalties). 
As noted, some regulators have the power to create their own legislative tools, 
whereas others have the power to supplement legislated tools with administrative 
remedies. Regulations may prescribe a maximum penalty allowing the regulator to 
then set a series of cascading penalties (relating to different offences) from that 
maximum amount. The NSW Food Authority, for example, imposes penalties for 
offences relating to the handling and sale of unsafe food by individuals or 
corporations, which are orders of magnitude smaller than the maximum penalties 
allowed under legislation.3 
In principle, the tools that a regulator has access to should reflect the range of risks 
and the businesses they regulate. However, in practice this is not always the case. 
Indeed, 30 per cent of survey respondents stated that they had an insufficient range 
of tools, and 10 per cent of regulators surveyed stated that the lack of enforcement 
tools was a significant barrier to effectively engaging with business (Productivity 
Commission regulator survey 2013). Those regulators which identified that they had 
                                              
3  Food Act 2003 (NSW) s 16; Food Regulation 2010 (NSW) sch 2; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act 1999 (NSW) s 17. 






insufficient tools were mainly in the public health and food safety and environment 
areas (figure 2.3).  
Figure 2.3 Regulators with insufficient tools by regulatory area 
Per cent of regulatorsa 
 
a Based on responses from 55 regulators. Results do not sum to 100 as multiple regulatory areas could be 
selected by respondents. A further 9 per cent of regulators — who were responsible for regulating areas not 
classified by these categories — also indicated that they had insufficient tools by regulatory area.  
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
If regulators are provided with a limited set of enforcement tools, the approach that 
they are able to take with business when faced with non-compliance will also be 
limited (chapter 4). In the Victorian food regulation inquiry, for example, VCEC 
found that the effectiveness of efforts to inform and advise businesses about food 
safety could be strengthened by: 
… providing councils with enforcement options that are proportionate to the problems 
encountered … there is scope to expand the range of remedies available to councils, to 
create a more comprehensive spectrum of enforcement options. (VCEC 2007, p. xi) 
Small regulators in particular appear to have fewer tools available to them, relative 
to their larger counterparts. While this may merely be indicative of the fact that 
larger regulators regulate bigger and more complex risks, it is nevertheless 
important to ensure that regulators of all sizes have access to a sufficient range of 
tools so that they can proportionately respond to compliance breaches. Responses to 
the Commission’s survey indicate that over 30 per cent of small regulators had 
insufficient tools, compared to 25 per cent of large regulators (Productivity 
Commission regulator survey 2013). Moreover, larger regulators were more likely 
0 5 10 15 20 25
Tax & superannuation
Road or transport
OHS & industrial relations





Public health & food safety
   





to use the range of tools available to them, than were small regulators (Productivity 
Commission regulator survey 2013). 
An additional factor that determines regulators’ engagement approaches is the cost 
(to the regulator) of using particular tools. For example, regulators may heavily rely 
on the use of fines for compliance breaches because alternate compliance tools are 
too resource intensive to implement or because of delays or uncertainties associated 
with pursuing other remedies (such as taking court action) — see chapter 4. 
Regulatory environments are dynamic, and just as it is important that regulators 
have adequate tools when they are established, it is also important that the available 
sets of tools are refined as circumstances change. In instances where their roles are 
changed, it is important that regulators are not left with inappropriate (or 
unnecessary) tools. If a regulator no longer has responsibility for a particular area or 
activity, then it may be appropriate for governments to revise the range or scope of 
enforcement tools so as to ensure that regulatory responses remain appropriate to 
the risks they now regulate (ANAO 2011). 
The Commission was informed during consultations that where some regulators’ 
responsibilities have increased, there has been little or no consideration as to 
whether the existing set of tools remain appropriate. Similar complaints were made 
to the Commission in its Local Government as Regulator study (PC 2012a). 
Resourcing of a regulator 
Resourcing issues appear to be the largest and most significant constraint affecting 
engagement with business. Around 60 per cent of regulators surveyed by the 
Commission nominated budget or resource constraints as one of the most significant 
constraints on their capacity to effectively engage with business. 
Regulators must be adequately resourced to enable them to efficiently and 
effectively carry out their regulatory responsibilities. Inadequate resourcing — 
including insufficient access to adequately skilled staff (chapter 6) — can cause 
regulators to focus on minimising administration costs when making decisions 
about compliance and enforcement strategies, which may increase compliance costs 
for business (and possibly increase overall economic costs to the community). 
Regulators that are severely resource constrained may adopt a more reactive 
engagement approach or fail to provide the same level and quality of information 
and guidance to regulated parties (chapter 5). However, a ‘tight budget’ should also 
create incentives to implement a sound risk based approach that ensures scarce 
enforcement resources are targeted in an efficient way. 






Regulators’ sources of funding can also affect their engagement approaches towards 
business. Some regulators are partially or completely funded by industry. Around 60 
per cent of regulators indicated that they recover at least some proportion of the cost 
of providing regulatory services from regulated businesses (figure 2.4). Where some 
or all of regulatory delivery costs are recovered from business, both industry and the 
community more generally would benefit from the regulator continually seeking out 
least cost methods of engagement, subject to meeting regulatory objectives. 
It is important that appropriate transparency and accountability mechanisms are put 
in place to guard against regulatory creep, gold plating and cost padding where 
regulatory services are cost recovered by regulators (PC 2001). Regulators that are 
wholly funded by governments may face less industry scrutiny to reduce costs and 
should therefore be particularly transparent and accountable in their engagement. 
Figure 2.4 Contributions to regulator funding 
Per cent of regulators indicating each as a partial sourcea 
 
a Based on responses from 174 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
Resourcing of small regulators 
Regulators in the areas of professional services and public health and food safety, 
tend to have fewer regulatory staff than those which operate in regulatory areas such 
as fair trading or occupational health and safety (figure 2.5). The proactive 
approaches to engagement that are possible for large, well resourced regulators will 
often not be practical or efficient for many smaller regulators. 
In its recent benchmarking study of local government as a regulator, the 















   





effectively undertake their regulatory functions. In New South Wales and 
Queensland, roughly half of the local government respondents to a Commission 
survey indicated that they did not have sufficient resources (PC 2012a). The 
Commission has received no evidence to suggest that resourcing of local 
government regulators has significantly improved. 
Figure 2.5 Regulators by size and regulatory areaa 
Per cent of regulators 
 
a Based on responses from 164 regulators. Small regulators are defined as those in the lowest 25th percentile 
and large regulators are those in the highest 25th percentile, based on full-time equivalent staff directly 
involved in business regulation. There are 41 regulators in each quartile.  
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
Where resourcing is insufficient to ensure the effective delivery of a regulatory 
function, there may be pressure for regulators to shift the cost of some of their 
activities onto regulated businesses. This can also happen between levels of 
government. As submitted by the LGAQ: 
Cost-shifting by other levels of government onto local government has produced 
situations where the delegated regulatory activity has been unfunded, only partially 
funded or not funded on a continuing basis. In these cases the regulating local 
government entity becomes reliant on the revenues from licensing/registration and 
enforcement. This can also be true of entities set up as autonomous regulators. 
(LGAQ, sub. 27, p. 5) 
Similarly, small regulators may face difficulties in attracting and retaining suitably 
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strategies. Lack of suitably skilled staff can be a particular issue for very small local 
governments and those regulators in regional and remote areas (chapter 6). 
The Commission was informed that regulators in regional or remote areas have, on 
occasion, had to adopt a more reactive engagement approach. Specifically, this was 
attributed to the high costs of monitoring these areas, given the often vast distances 
between businesses. Small regulators are understandably less likely to be at the 
forefront of innovating or trialling new regulatory approaches, particularly where 
such approaches can involve substantial upfront financial commitments 
(chapters 4 and 5). 
2.4 Ongoing influences on regulator posture 
This section focuses on the way regulators’ posture can be affected through their 
ongoing interaction with stakeholders. The day to day influences that regulators 
face include community’s expectations of regulators’ ability to mitigate risks, as 
well as media reporting of perceived regulatory failures (which often results in an 
adverse reaction to the regulator from the community and government). This section 
also discusses regulator ‘culture’ — that is, the overall values, beliefs and attitudes 
of regulators — and how this can impact on its posture. 
External pressures on regulators 
Regulators face pressures from four interrelated sources: the regulated businesses 
(discussed earlier), governments, the media and the broader community (figure 2.6). 
Community views guide the priorities of governments — as they should in a 
representative democracy. However, there are some risks that communities tend to 
view as having an unrealistically high probability of occurring (such as air crash 
disasters), and there are other risks (such as car accidents) that communities tend to 
underestimate (OECD 2010). It is important that governments focus on actual risks 
rather than perceived risks when making policy decisions. The nature of risk is 
discussed further in appendix D. 
Growth of regulation is testament to the importance society now places on 
mitigating risks (PC 2012b). As society becomes less tolerant of exposure to risks, 
regulators are under increasing pressure to justify their activities, and demonstrate 
how they are efficiently managing risks. As Energy Safe Victoria (ESV) stated: 
Regulators have never been so scrutinised. We can be criticised for acting too late or 
too soon or not at all. We can be seen as heavy handed or captured by those we are 
supposedly regulating. We must be sticklers for process and procedure but not so 
inflexible that we are perceived as pursuing process as an end itself. (sub. 2, p. 2) 
   





Regulators are frequently faced with calls to ‘do something’ in response to what is 
publicly perceived as unacceptable. For instance, in a recent speech, the Chairman 
of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission stated: 
Indeed, the most common complaint we face is that we are not doing enough on some 
front … The complained about action is not actually against the law, and in our view 
nor should it be — this is by far the most common situation … 
For example, when faced with calls for us to block the entry of supermarkets into a 
market where they have no current presence, because their entry would see an 
oversupply of groceries, I have explained that while such entry may involve important 
planning issues, it is not against competition law, and nor should it be. (Sims 2013) 
Figure 2.6 Pressures to respond to risk 
 
Source: Based on Better Regulation Commission (UK) (2006). 
In some instances, however, despite the regulator acting in accordance with their 
regulatory guidelines and objectives, ministers have become directly involved, 
answering public calls to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the regulator’s 
risk based approach (box 2.3). 







Box 2.3 Parliament overrides a regulatory approach 
The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) is the regulator tasked with 
ensuring that the Australian Commonwealth’s fishery resources are efficiently 
managed and sustainably used. One such resource is the Small Pelagic Fishery (SPF). 
AFMA manages the SPF in part by setting total allowable catch limits and quotas, and, 
as a result ‘the size of the boat does not matter from a sustainability perspective … 
There is no evidence that larger boats pose a higher risk to either the target species or 
broader marine environment.’ (AFMA 2012b, p. 1) AFMA has explicitly acknowledged 
that ‘there are considerable economies of scale in the [SPF] and the most efficient way 
to fish may include large scale factory freezer vessels’ (AFMA 2008, p. 2). 
In 2012, an existing operator sought access to the SPF for a fishing vessel named the 
Abel Tasman. The Abel Tasman is a 142 metre trawler, capable of catching large 
quantities of fish and processing the fish onboard, holding them in cold storage until 
unloaded. This would have enabled the product to be used for higher value human 
consumption, adding significant value to the resource. On 5 September 2012, the Abel 
Tasman was registered as an Australian-flagged vessel. 
Concerns about the size of the vessel were nevertheless raised by a range of 
community groups (eg. Australian Recreational Fishing Foundation 2013), and were 
highlighted by the media. Notwithstanding AFMA’s approach to managing the fishery, 
on 19 September 2012 the Commonwealth Parliament enabled the Minister for the 
Environment to ‘prohibit fishing by large mid-water trawl freezer vessels’ for an interim 
60 day period, which was subsequently extended to 2 years (Interim (Small Pelagic 
Fishery) Declaration 2012, Final (Small Pelagic Fishery) Declaration 2012)). The 
legislation enabling the declaration required a regulation impact statement, but 
received a Prime Minister’s exemption (Office of Best Practice Regulation 2012). 
An independent review of the fisheries management legislation was announced in 
September 2012 and attracted over 2000 email submissions regarding the Abel 
Tasman (Borthwick 2012). Additionally, formal submissions received by the review 
expressed concern at the ‘Commonwealth Government’s ad hoc tampering with the 
existing structures and systems’: 
Given current Ministerial actions, [t]here is now no certainty in the legislation and 
management that in the past has been regarded as one of the best management systems in 
the world, and in fact suggests that the political processes’ deployed to date may in fact 
have imploded the good work. This has reduced confidence in the independent body 
(AFMA)… (Southern Shark Industry Alliance 2012, p. 2). 
This recent example demonstrates some of the external pressures that regulators are 
faced with when adopting a risk management approach. 
Sources: AFMA (2008, 2012a, 2012b); Australian Recreational Fishing Foundation (2013); Borthwick 
(2012); Office of Best Practice Regulation (2012); Seafish Tasmania (nd); Southern Shark Industry 
Alliance (2012); Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Declared Commercial 
Fishing Activities) Act 2012 (Cwlth); Interim (Small Pelagic Fishery) Declaration 2012; Final (Small Pelagic 
Fishery) Declaration 2012.  
 
   





These pressures on regulators can often lead them to adopt an overly risk averse 
approach: 
… the risk aversion exhibited by regulators, which business groups rightly see as a root 
cause of many of the problems they experience, is to be expected in an environment 
where any adverse event within the regulator’s field of influence is held up publicly as 
a ‘failure’, while any beneficial impacts on market performance that a regulator may 
have are not directly observable and go unremarked. Hence the incentives facing most 
regulators are to err on the side of being strict in their enforcement activities. 
(Regulation Taskforce 2006, p. 159) 
Indeed, the pressures placed on regulators to eliminate (not mitigate) risks were 
explicitly acknowledged by a former British Prime Minister: 
A civil servant or regulator who fails to regulate a risk that materialises will be 
castigated. How many are rewarded when they refuse to regulate and take the risk? 
Bodies set up to guard the public interest have one-way pressures. It is in their interest 
never to be accused of having missed a problem. So, it is a one-sided bet. They will 
always err on the side of caution. (Blair 2005, p. 2) 
And as acknowledged by DIISRTE, there is diminishing value in attempting to 
reduce risks: 
A regulator’s management of risk cannot … completely [eliminate risk] however, 
regardless of the industry or business activity being regulated. In the majority of 
regulatory contexts, there are diminishing marginal returns on increasing the 
compliance burdens on business to reduce risk through the traditional methods of 
regulation. (sub. 18, p. 3) 
If community pressures were such that no failure was tolerated, the government 
would have to ban the activity, rather than regulate it. Therefore, as long as the 
industry exists, community, governments and regulators must accept that, on 
occasion, there will be regulatory breaches. This view is evident, for example, in the 
risk based approach that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
adopts in managing Australia’s biosecurity system, implicit in which is the 
understanding that, ‘detecting an exotic pest, weed or disease within Australia is not 
a failure of the system if it is detected early and dealt with quickly’ 
(ANAO 2012, p. 11). 
In an attempt to help ensure regulators devote their resources towards the largest 
risks, ministerial statements of expectations (and regulators’ responses in statements 
of intent) have been developed (chapter 6). In a review of Victoria’s regulatory 
framework, the VCEC suggested that: 
The ministers’ Statements of Expectations could provide an appropriate avenue to give 
regulators high level guidance on the expected treatment of risk and use of risk-based 
approaches — including accepting that some risk is unavoidable. (VCEC 2011, p. 114) 






As VCEC has identified, an open acknowledgment by ministers that there exists 
some level of unavoidable risk may help to ensure that regulators do not become 
overly risk averse. Further, ensuring that systems are in place to avoid inappropriate 
or ad hoc regulatory decisions is important to ensure the integrity of, and business 
confidence in, broader regulatory systems. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Governments should explicitly acknowledge that some risks cannot be eliminated 
and that regulators should operate independently, and without undue interference 
from government, in implementing risk management approaches. These 
acknowledgements should be incorporated in a public statement of governments’ 
expectations of their regulators. 
Regulator culture 
The culture of regulators is closely aligned with their posture. There is no accepted 
definition of ‘culture’, but by way of illustration, Reason (1997) referring to 
Uttal (1983) stated that culture can be thought of as: 
Shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that interact with an 
organisation’s structures and control systems to produce behavioural norms (the way 
we do things around here). (Reason 1997, p. 192) 
In a regulatory context, culture is an inner organisational attitude, which then 
manifests as outward actions and communication (Reason 1997). The importance of 
regulator culture cannot be overstated — it is just as important as the specific 
actions of the regulator in attaining regulatory objectives (Health and Safety 
Commission (UK) 1993). 
A regulator’s values, beliefs and attitudes are typically shaped by its leadership and 
ideally flow through to the regulatory officers ‘on the ground’. However, this is not 
a straightforward process and improved culture at the top has not always translated 
to changes in attitudes from compliance officers. In a speech to staff on regulator 
culture and organisational integrity, the director of the ESV stated: 
There is an old rule called the 10/80/10 rule. And it applies as much to integrity as 
anything else. 10% will demonstrate integrity all the time, 10% will sadly be seriously 
challenged and the remaining 80% will operate on the basis of the prevailing culture – 
what are others getting away with and what is the boss doing … My job is to inspire as 
many of you as possible to move into the top 10% or recruit from that top 10% in the 
population so that it makes up 90% of ESV. (sub. 2, pp. 4-5) 
A similar view was put by the Independent Transport Safety Regulator of New 
South Wales: 
   





When an organisation starts to use transactional and logical processes, supported by 
experience in safety risk management and leadership that is spread throughout an 
organisation’s structure, culture and values are understood and promoted by the whole 
organisation. This starts to unlock up to 80 per cent of its strategic capacity or potential. 
(Neist 2012, p. 13) 
If a regulator adopts an ‘us and them’ mentality to regulating businesses, it is highly 
likely that this will manifest itself as poor regulatory engagement strategies, 
including an inappropriately compliance focused regulatory culture, potentially 
compromising good regulatory outcomes. As found by McIntyre and Moore 
(2002, p. 2) ‘a culture founded on confrontation between the regulator and the 
regulated is not conducive to promoting voluntary compliance’. Similarly, 
COSBOA stated: 
Some regulators will catch a business person and punish them and consider their job 
done; the good regulators will catch and fine a business person and consider their job 
has just begun. The first type of regulator will create a culture of fear and a lack of trust 
with no real change in behaviours. The second type of regulator will achieve better 
compliance through education and improved processes and communication. … A 
regulator who walks into a shop or workshop and orders the owner and the staff around 
is not useful yet, at times, that is exactly what happens. Sometimes this occurs as a ‘one 
off’ until that field officer is trained in professional communications but in other 
situations it is obvious that there is an aggressive policing culture in the organisation 
(which probably stems from the head and the executive). (sub. 15, pp. 4-5) 
As highlighted by McIntyre and Moore (2002), a regulator which is combative 
towards regulated businesses is more likely to interact with businesses once 
regulatory breaches have occurred, rather than devoting resources towards 
alleviating them in the first place. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Governments should recognise the fundamental importance of regulator culture 
in influencing engagement practices. Working closely with regulators, they need 
to ensure that appropriate transparency, accountability and capacity building 
mechanisms are in place to foster the adoption of a culture — reflected in the 
actual engagement practices of all staff — that: 
• promotes a facilitative and educative posture towards business which seeks to 
achieve regulatory objectives without unnecessarily constraining business 
activity and growth 
• embraces continuous improvement, including critical evaluation of existing 
practices and opportunities to learn from the experience of other regulators. 







There is a myriad of factors that can potentially impact upon regulator posture, 
many of which are outside of regulators’ control. 
• Ensuring policy makers adhere to good regulation design principles — including 
adequate consideration of implementation and enforcement issues prior to the 
creation of the regulation — is critical in fostering the optimal environment for 
regulators to operate in. Additionally, clear drafting is needed to avoid 
confusing, overlapping or conflicting regulatory objectives, or inappropriate 
regulatory coverage, each of which can add to costs for small businesses. 
• When developing new regulatory functions, policy makers need to consider 
whether the creation of new regulators is necessary, or whether the regulatory 
functions could be performed by an existing regulator. 
• Regulators need to be adequately resourced so they can undertake their 
regulatory functions effectively. Where regulators are resource constrained, they 
can be more likely to adopt approaches that minimise their costs, but may not be 
beneficial to the community. Typically, this manifests itself as a reactive (as 
opposed to proactive) approach to compliance. 
• Regulators need to be given fit for purpose tools so that they can carry out their 
regulatory responsibilities effectively. Where regulators’ tools are insufficient 
for the range of risks they regulate, they are likely to appear either ‘too hard’ or 
‘too soft’ in their enforcement approach. 
• Regulators face pressure from communities, the media and the government in 
their daily activities. Communities and media can have unrealistic expectations 
of the government’s ability to cure all of society’s ills. Regulators cannot be 
expected to eliminate all risks and it should be acknowledged that, on occasion, 
a mitigated risk may materialise. Business confidence in the regulator to mitigate 
risks can be undermined when governments directly intervene in regulatory 
decisions. 
• Finally, a regulator’s culture is critical in shaping its posture. However, changes 
in culture conducive to improved engagement will not be reflected in regulator 
posture towards business where the values espoused at the top of a regulator fails 
to permeate down to officers on the ground. 
   





3 Is a different approach needed for 
regulating small business? 
 
Key Points 
• Small businesses often lack the time and knowledge to innovate in managing 
regulatory obligations and very few have specialist staff to carry out compliance 
tasks. As a result, compliance with regulation can be a challenge for many small 
business people, who mostly want to be instructed, clearly and concisely, as to 
what they need to do to be compliant. 
• Many regulatory requirements give rise to economies of scale in compliance costs. 
This means small businesses tend to be affected by compliance costs 
disproportionately compared to larger businesses because such costs represent a 
greater share of revenue and they have less capacity to employ specialist staff.  
• Regulators should consider the overall costs and benefits to the community when 
designing their approaches to regulatory delivery for small businesses. In addition to 
any potential to lower compliance costs for small businesses, regulators should 
evaluate: 
– the risk profile of different businesses, and whether there is a relationship between 
business size and the risk (likelihood and consequence) of an adverse event 
– any reduced benefits from altering the standard of compliance obligations  
– the administrative cost, complexity and potential for errors (or perverse 
behaviour) from delivering regulations differently to small business. 
• Where implemented well, tailored or flexible delivery of regulation to small businesses 
can reduce compliance costs and sometimes improve rates of compliance. Compared 
to flexible delivery of regulation, targeting small businesses within the design of 
regulation (tiering) would tend to be net beneficial in a narrower range of circumstances, 
and should be informed by more rigorous assessment on a case by case basis. 
• A risk based approach to the delivery of regulation helps to ensure compliance 
burdens are the minimum necessary to achieve regulatory objectives. It means that 
small businesses classified as a lower risk may be provided with lower cost 
pathways to manage their compliance obligations.  
• To ensure compliance cost savings are achieved and to avoid any drop off in rates 
of compliance, regulators should: 
– endeavour to meet the needs of small businesses that want clear guidance or 
other (relatively low cost) forms of assistance to facilitate their compliance 
– ensure their enforcement strategy maintains a sufficient deterrence effect.  







Regulation is an inescapable part of doing business, but its impacts are more 
pervasive for some businesses than for others. These impacts may relate to both the 
size of a business and the particular activities it undertakes. However, for a given 
industry or activity, small businesses generally incur proportionately higher 
compliance costs when compared to larger businesses. And almost universally, 
small businesses face greater challenges in understanding and fulfilling their 
compliance obligations. Recognising these factors, regulators sometimes handle 
small businesses differently when administering regulation.  
Different regulatory treatment can be established as a requirement when policy 
makers design regulation, or it can be achieved in practice through a regulator 
exercising discretion in their administration of a regulatory regime. This chapter is 
primarily concerned with the latter type — differential practices used by regulators 
during the delivery of regulation to businesses, including strategies that assist small 
businesses to understand their regulatory obligations and the scope to regulate small 
businesses less strictly in some instances.  
The chapter develops broad principles to guide regulators’ decisions around how 
tailoring their engagement approach can ease compliance burdens for small 
businesses and deliver net benefits to the community. Where possible, this chapter 
provides some examples of what different treatment may entail in practice and 
evaluates the influence of risk (as a key determinant of the potential benefits from 
regulation to communities). In particular, it discusses whether a risk based approach 
to delivering regulation (appendix D) is likely to result in the appropriate treatment 
of small businesses, and why regulators should generally provide guidance and 
assistance to small businesses even if they are assessed as a lower risk.  
3.2 Compliance is a challenge for small businesses 
The depth and breadth of compliance responsibilities will vary considerably across 
small businesses, depending largely on the industry or activities undertaken. For 
small businesses operating in high risk areas, such as aviation, regulatory compliance 
would be expected to form a central part of a business’s operation and cost structure. 
Conversely, regulatory compliance may be more peripheral to the core activities of low 
risk small businesses, such as for a sole trading newsagent or florist.  
That said, across all regulatory areas the road to compliance is generally less familiar and 
more arduous for small businesses than for larger businesses. In any given area of 
activity, the nature of small businesses and various characteristics that are typical of 
   





them, will reduce their capacity, relative to larger businesses, to meet compliance 
obligations. 
Characteristics of small business that can impact on compliance 
Small businesses (and especially micro businesses) tend to have relatively simple 
systems and processes to support the management of their business, are less likely 
to employ staff with specific knowledge in compliance and are less likely to be 
informed about requirements.  
• The limited resources, capability and sophistication of most small businesses 
means that a significant proportion will have insufficient understanding of what 
needs to be done to comply with certain regulations (see, for example, NSW 
Small Business Commissioner, sub. 12). 
• To the extent that small businesses make smaller scale investments in simpler 
information management systems and processes, they tend to have 
proportionately higher compliance costs than suppliers that have more advanced 
systems (Europe Economics 2003, p. 3). 
• Thirty eight per cent of regulators responding to the Commission’s 
regulator survey reported that small businesses lack awareness of their compliance 
obligations. 
• Small businesses often need extra help in understanding compliance obligations;  
especially to interpret complex legislation, identify effective ways to manage 
risks and document their compliance to a regulator. 
– In many instances, compliance tasks are outsourced to an external party with 
the required technical knowledge, such as to a financial or legal practitioner. 
• A small business owner is typically also the manager and required to be skilled 
across a range of different areas of business activity, including compliance 
activity. 
– The volume of tasks that fall on a small business owner means they are 
notoriously time poor — 30 per cent of regulators responding to the 
Commission’s regulator survey cited this as problem for their engagement 
with small businesses. 
Many small businesses are relatively new businesses, which is a further factor 
explaining their lack of awareness and inability to locate and understand their 
compliance obligations. 
In principle, the nature of small businesses and the particular challenges they face may 
provide some justification for regulators to treat them differently to larger businesses. In 






a Council of Small Business of Australia (COSBOA) survey, of those respondents 
supporting different treatment for small business: 
• 82 per cent gave as a justification the disproportionate impact of compliance 
costs 
• 44 per cent gave as the reason that they do not have the skills or capacity to  
understand their compliance obligations (figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1 How are small businesses different? 
Small businesses supporting different treatment, per cent by reasona 
 
a Based on responses from 87 small businesses. 
Source: COSBOA sub. DR48, attachment A. 
High regulatory compliance costs can undermine a business’s profitability. This can 
create a strong incentive to minimise such costs or even to consciously breach 
regulations. Any incentive to disregard compliance obligations is arguably stronger 
for small business given the lesser likelihood of detection. While the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry Queensland (CCIQ) indicated that the majority of small 
businesses make a genuine attempt to comply with regulatory requirements they are 
also aware that not all regulations are enforced to the same degree. It observed that: 
Most businesses only do that which is absolutely necessary — that which implies the 
greatest penalty or is most strictly enforced. (CCIQ, sub. 16, p. 1) 
Many regulators clearly recognise this characteristic of small business — in the 
Commission’s regulator survey (appendix B), 30 per cent of regulators who 
supported differential treatment for small business reasoned that small businesses 
may be less likely to comply and therefore require extra attention from regulators. 
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Whereas some larger businesses are able to innovate and find lower cost 
compliance solutions generally this will not be the case for smaller firms. Indeed, 
throughout the Commission’s consultations for this study it has been clear that 
many small businesses want to be told, simply and concisely, what to do in order to 
meet their compliance obligations. Small businesses especially value guidance 
about regulatory requirements that is specific to their business’s context and 
conveyed in ‘business language’.  
The preference of small businesses for clear advice and guidance is likely to be 
strongest when regulatory requirements are complex. Indeed, some regulatory 
requirements are almost indecipherable for small businesses, with a common view 
that they have been ‘written … by lawyers for lawyers’ (Bradford 2004, p. 8). As 
stated by The Tax Institute: 
… some benefits within the tax law are almost off-limits to small business due to the 
complexity of the rules and the prohibitive cost of obtaining sophisticated tax advice to 
ensure the correct tax outcomes are achieved (for example; tax consolidation, share 
buy-backs, and certain fringe benefits tax concessions). (sub. 11, p. 2) 
Unravelling the relationship between regulatory compliance and costs  
Regulation requires certain processes and outcomes from small businesses that can 
impose direct and indirect costs. For example, direct costs may flow from obligations 
that require businesses to institute procedures to reduce risks, invest in capital 
equipment, submit information and keep records, train staff, or have additional IT 
systems. Businesses may also be required to pay fees and charges for permits and 
licences — usually to recover some of the costs of a regulator’s administration. And 
if found non-compliant, businesses may face penalties such as fines or suspension of 
a licence. 
Indirect costs include ‘opportunity costs’ (the value of forgone leisure time) to the 
owner of completing compliance obligations outside of normal business hours. 
Because indirect costs are often hidden or difficult to quantify, they are usually not 
considered in formal analysis of compliance costs (Chittenden et al. 2002, p. 21).  
Regulatory costs can significantly affect the motivation and decisions of small 
business owners, including a decision to shut down or grow their business. In 
particular, given the encroachment on their personal time (or reduction in their 
implicit hourly wage) to become familiar with regulatory requirements, a small 
business may be discouraged from expanding their business. For example, expansion 
may mean a small business moves from being non-employing to employing, and 
must then comply with employment regulations and related compliance costs. The 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) 2012 survey found that 






complying with regulatory requirements hampered the growth of over 50 per cent of 
small business members (sub. 5). The Australian Hotels Association suggested this 
is of particular concern for small business, stating: 
… the impact of red tape and compliance costs are proportionally greater when applied 
to small businesses, often impacting directly on the capacity of the small business to 
expand or to operate profitably. (sub. 17, p. 5) 
Indirect costs in particular can be especially important in influencing the rate of new 
business formation, which typically requires a period of ‘unpaid’ preparatory effort to 
identify, understand and implement regulatory requirements. The Western Australian 
Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) receives a significant number of 
enquiries from potential small businesses requesting advice about the complicated 
regulatory arrangements for entering into a retail premises lease (SBDC (WA) 2007). 
Better modes of engagement by regulators can ease both direct and indirect business 
compliance costs. For example, good communication strategies can reduce the need 
for small business people to have to search to find and understand their compliance 
obligations, especially to translate complicated or legalistic language into actionable 
tasks. Strategies for regulators to reduce compliance costs for small business are 
explored in section 3.3. 
To what extent does compliance impose disproportionate costs on 
small business? 
Many compliance costs are largely fixed in nature, such that they either do not 
increase with the level of business output or any increase is proportionately less 
than the increase in output. This can result in scale economies from compliance 
(box 3.1), which means compliance costs tend to be relatively higher for small 
businesses (measured as a proportion of input costs or per unit of output).1  
Although there is a lack of recent estimates, earlier empirical studies consistently 
support the premise that the cost base of small businesses is relatively more affected 
by compliance than that of larger businesses. Australian studies include: Pope 
(1991); ATO (1997); Evans et al. (1997, in Tasmanian Small Business Council, sub. 
DR44); Walpole et al. (1999); and the Working Overtime Survey for the Small 
Business Deregulation Taskforce (1996). This appears to hold across various 
                                              
1  In some industries, efficient production scale rarely, if ever, results in the formation of large 
enterprise. A hairdressing business would normally fall within this category. In such cases, 
compliance costs do not give rise to a disproportionate burden, per se. 
   





studies, countries and regulatory areas.2 For example, Chittenden et al. concluded in 
their review of the literature: 
… for businesses with less than 20 employees, the compliance costs borne are at least 
35 per cent higher [per employee] than for firms with more than 500 staff. This figure 
must be seen as an absolute minimum. (2002, p. 4)  
And more recently, the European Commission found: 
On average, where a big company spends one Euro per employee to comply with a 
regulatory duty a medium sized enterprise might have to spend around four Euros and a 
small business up to ten Euros. (2011, p. 2) 
Whilst these findings give some indications of the extent of the disproportionate 
burden on small businesses on average, this burden will vary depending on the cost 
structure of a business and their competitors, in addition to the range and type of 
regulatory requirements relevant to their industry and scope of business activity. In 
some industries, the size distribution of businesses heavily reflects the regulatory 
environment. For example: 
• the regulation of health professionals, including general practitioners, is likely to 
reduce participation by small or sole practices (Campbell Research & 
Consulting 2003, p. ii) 
• for fresh meat manufacturers, fixed or non-recurring compliance costs (as 
sources of higher unit compliance costs) are particularly high, with one study of 
UK businesses finding that fixed costs exceed recurring costs by 140 times 
(Henson and Heasman 1996). 
Given the range of factors that can potentially affect the extent of the 
disproportionate burden on small business, most studies are reluctant to generalise 
their findings beyond a single industry or a regulatory area, recognising it could be 
misleading to offer a ‘rule of thumb’ that extrapolates results across a very mixed 
population of small businesses.  
Although studies usually find that taxation is the largest single contributor to 
compliance costs for small businesses (Chittenden et al. 2000; European Network 
for SME Research 1995; Indecon 2006), this mainly reflects that all businesses face 
such regulation, whereas environmental and other regulations apply more selectively 
across businesses. 
                                              
2  Beale and Lin (1998); Chittenden et al. (2000); ENSR (1995); Europe Economics (2003); 
Hopkins (1995, 1996, 1998); Inland Revenue (1998); Lancaster et al. (2003); SBRT (1998). 







Box 3.1 The nature of compliance costs and scale economies 
Costs incurred by business to comply with regulations may be categorised as either 
one-off or ongoing. 
• One-off compliance costs: are generally ‘fixed’ — they do not vary with the level of a 
business’s output. Many implementation costs, such as when regulatory 
requirements are newly introduced or updated, fall within this category and can 
include new or updated plant or other physical infrastructure, IT systems and 
software, business restructuring, staff training and, in some cases, payment for 
external services to facilitate compliance.  
• Ongoing costs: typically vary with the level of output, but may also be fixed. These 
include the costs of employed staff and their time (such as a quality assurance 
manager), consumable materials and inspection costs, and having to compile and 
send out periodic correspondence to customers and regulators. 
Regulatory-induced economies of scale result from the lumpy (fixed) nature of many 
compliance costs and the fact that many of the compliance costs that increase as 
output increases, do so at a decreasing rate. For example, specialisation of compliance 
functions in large businesses can achieve unit cost reductions through the process of 
‘learning by doing’, as can the purchasing of compliance resources in larger quantities. 
In addition, the larger the business, the lower are one–off costs relative to output. 
In contrast, the scale of a small business’s activity may be unable to make full use of 
the fixed capital or labour required for compliance because they are frequently lumpy 
or indivisible investments. As a result, small businesses are intrinsically disadvantaged 
(or face higher unit costs) from fulfilling regulatory obligations compared to larger 
businesses, with compliance costs absorbed less readily within their smaller revenue 
base (or cost structure). For example: 
• in some jurisdictions a food safety supervisor is required to be onsite irrespective of 
the size of the business or meals served on any given night, with the cost of training 
and lost work time estimated to be around $700 per supervisor (PC 2009) 
• amenities, including a portable toilet, are required to be provided on a construction 
worksite, whether it is servicing 2 or up to 20 employees (WorkCover NSW 1997) 
• some information reporting requirements impose broadly equivalent fixed (form 
filling) costs on both small and large firms. Similarly, the cost of software systems, 
such as MYOB accounting software, is usually at least partially fixed. 
Recognising the additional challenges small businesses can face in meeting the costs 
of capital equipment or consultancy services to fulfil compliance, assistance is 
sometimes offered. For example, some statutory workplace health and safety insurers 
provide a rebate (up to the value of $500 in NSW) to help small businesses cover the 
cost of installing safety equipment, in addition to offering free safety advisory visits.  




   





When compliance cost estimates are adjusted to reflect that not all small businesses 
face all regulations, the extent to which a typical small businesses will face a higher 
than average burden is reduced. For example, the majority of small businesses are 
non-employing (chapter 1) and can therefore escape employment related regulations 
and associated compliance costs. After making such an adjustment, the US Small 
Business Administration Office of Advocacy reduced estimates of the 
disproportionate burden on small businesses from 30 per cent to 20 per cent higher 
than average per employee (SBA 1995). 
Small businesses find it hard to integrate compliance into their operations 
Disentangling the specific cost of a small business’s compliance from the costs they 
would have invariably incurred in a non-regulated context can be difficult. When 
compliance tasks are integrated into the business’s routine operation and 
administrative procedures, any increment in total costs from compliance can be small 
and have less noticeable effects on a business’s profitability, entry into markets or 
on other aspects of their operation. Likewise, regulation may sometimes align with 
an industry or business’s desired branding and goals. For example, many 
eco-tourism businesses willingly accept, or even ask for, regulations that support 
their environmental credentials and provide their business with an advantage over 
competitors that may be more inclined to tolerate lower environmental performance. 
However, it may not be straightforward, or even possible, for a business to embed 
regulatory requirements within their routine procedures and operating cost structure. 
Often, achievement of the objectives of regulation may be in direct conflict with 
fundamental businesses goals. In such cases, the costs (including opportunity cost) 
of regulatory compliance would tend to be more significant. For example, a small 
hotel may be disinclined to report suspected money laundering activity or take 
action to stop suspected problem gamblers, since doing so directly erodes their 
profits from gaming machines (Carson 2010).  
Further, small business may benefit less from industrywide regulatory measures, such 
as traceability systems and licensing regimes to support consumer confidence and 
access to export markets. For example, Dairy Food Safety Victoria imposes 
significant obligations and collects licence fees from all participants along the value 
chain. Whereas, a large scale dairy food manufacturer may view the requirements as 
‘not at all onerous’ (Victorian Parliament 2012, p. 29) and derive substantial benefits 
from the entire sector’s compliance, a small dairy operator may be less accepting if 
they perceive any industrywide benefits as less relevant to their business’s goals and 
immediate profitability. 






Regulators may contribute to small business compliance burdens 
The way regulators engage with small businesses can hamper the strategies a small 
business might normally employ to reduce unnecessary impacts of compliance on 
their business. Inefficiencies can arise, for example, if regulators fail to recognise 
the challenges many small businesses face in complying with regulations, overlook 
the fixed (and indivisible) nature of many compliance costs, or are unnecessarily 
draconian or forceful in implementing regulation.  
In the Commission’s assessment, problems for small business tend to gravitate 
around: 
• transition periods for the implementation of new or amended regulatory 
requirements that are not sufficiently long. According to the ACCI National Red 
Tape Survey (ACCI 2012), the implementation phase of regulatory compliance 
is the most costly stage of the overall compliance process for nearly 27 per cent 
of businesses  
• frequent churn in regulatory requirements, exacerbated by an inconsistent 
regulatory posture and a lack of coordination across regulators. Based on the 
Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission Wallis Survey (2011, p. 21): 
– over half of all businesses found it difficult to stay up to date with state 
regulations, with small businesses finding it the most difficult. Small primary 
industries (74 per cent) and construction (63 per cent) businesses found it 
most difficult to stay up to date 
• excessive complexity in applying regulatory requirements and insufficient or 
unclear guidance 
– this may cause small businesses to spend many hours self educating to 
understand requirements or to pursue high cost compliance pathways, such as 
meeting a higher standard of compliance than would strictly be necessary 
• overly prescriptive application of, or out dated compliance requirements, 
limiting the flexibility of a small business to accommodate their particular 
circumstances or innovate in how they achieve a standard of compliance. For 
example: 
– some businesses report that regulators are slow to accept non-standard 
solutions to improve the safety of manufacturing equipment, which can delay 
recognition of reduced accident risk by workplace health and safety insurers 
and discourage businesses from investing in new equipment 
– some participants criticised the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary 
Medicines Authority (APVMA) for being overly prescriptive in applying 
regulatory requirements, resulting in a particularly unhurried approach to 
   





accrediting certain new chemicals for safe commercial use (see for example, 
HOIG, sub. 9). The Commission understands that recent amendments to the 
legislation governing the APVMA attempt to address such concerns, 
including those raised in a Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
review (box D.3, appendix D) 
• the strictness of enforcement by a regulator, including whether enforcement is 
proportionate to the breach and an escalating approach is used (chapter 4). If 
enforcement is particularly stringent, a small business may interpret their 
compliance requirements more strictly than necessary. Studies find that strict 
enforcement of regulation constrains business size (Almeida and Carneiro 2008). 
Regulators can also incur disproportionate costs to procure a small 
firm’s compliance  
While some regulatory delivery costs will vary with the size and complexity of a 
business, the fixed nature of many costs (such as for conducting inspections) means 
that regulators can face additional challenges and incur higher costs (relative to the 
benefits of regulation) to procure a small business’s compliance than they would for 
a larger business. As a result, a regulator can scrutinise a greater share of the total 
output from an industry by focusing their finite resources on larger businesses 
(Bickerdyke and Lattimore 1997). 
Two thirds of regulators surveyed by the Commission indicated they face additional 
constraints or costs to engage with small business (on top of the mostly budgetary 
challenges in delivering regulation across all businesses). The most important of these 
appear to relate to small businesses being less aware of their obligations, and the large 
number and operational diversity of small businesses (figure 3.2). 
The extent to which a regulator should focus resources on procuring the compliance 
of smaller businesses depends on two inter-related factors (explored further in 
section 3.5): 
• how the relative risks (or externalities) posed by businesses vary with business 
size 
• the behaviour of small business and the role of enforcement in effectively 
deterring non-compliance by small businesses.  
It is also important to recognise that small regulators face higher unit costs in 
delivering regulation to businesses compared to larger regulators (chapter 2). In 
particular, retention of high quality staff can be an issue for smaller and regional 
regulators (PC 2012a). This may reduce the capacity of small regulators to 






effectively monitor the risks posed by different businesses and the costs their 
compliance and enforcement practices impose on businesses. The Commission’s 
regulator survey found regulators that adopt a risk based approach or monitor 
business compliance costs had (on average) around six times more staff and 
budgetary capacity than regulators not adopting such practices.  
Figure 3.2 Additional constraints or costs to engage small businessa 
 
a Left: based on 178 respondents. Right: based on 121 regulators who reported incurring additional costs — 
excluding ‘other’ costs (3%). 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
3.3 Strategies to contain regulatory compliance costs  
How regulators and governments can reduce compliance burdens for small business 
by treating such businesses differently (relative to larger businesses) is explored in 
this section. In principle, small businesses as a group can be provided with 
differential regulatory treatment at each stage of the regulatory process, including 
in:  
• Regulation design by policy makers — Small business could be excluded from 
legislative coverage entirely or their legislative obligations could be simplified 
or reduced (often termed tiering or lighter regulation). For example, small egg 
producers in New South Wales and Tasmania are exempted from having to hold 
a licence. (NSW Food Authority, sub. 28; PC 2009) 
• Regulatory delivery through the use of flexibility by a regulator to make obligations 
more accessible and easy to implement for small business (often termed tailoring). 
For example, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
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(AUSTRAC 2013) does not bill small businesses if the resultant levy from lodging 
a transaction report is less than $103.22.  
Some Australian regulators are already required by legislation to treat small businesses 
differently, while many others choose to do so without, or in excess of, legislative 
requirements. In its regulator survey, the Commission found that of the 40 per cent of 
regulators that provide different treatment to small businesses, one quarter were 
required to do so under legislation (figure 3.3). 
Before considering in more detail what governments and regulators can do, we 
briefly consider the performance of one strategy many small businesses themselves 
commonly employ to help them manage the impact of a regulator’s delivery 
practices and resultant compliance costs — the practice of outsourcing aspects of 
regulatory compliance. 
Figure 3.3 Forty per cent of regulators treat small businesses differently 
Per cent of all regulators responding to the survey questiona 
 
a Based on responses from 187 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
Small businesses use third parties to facilitate compliance 
Many small businesses choose to purchase external advice from intermediaries 
(such as accountants) to facilitate their compliance, particularly in relation to 
requirements of a more complex nature, because: 
• it may reduce direct and indirect compliance costs by relieving a small business 
owner of what would otherwise be a fixed cost of investing in their own (or 
another employee’s) training and skills development, and may be a particularly 
effective strategy if compliance requirements are frequently changing  
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• it can provide greater assurance that the level of compliance is adequate, which 
is particularly valued by small business if they perceive the consequence of 
non-compliance to be unpalatable, including in terms of fines, damage to 
reputation or loss of business income (resulting, for instance, from the 
suspension of a licence) 
• attempts to break down the complexity of regulatory requirements by obtaining 
advice directly from regulatory agencies may have been futile. As suggested by 
CCIQ, businesses are increasingly frustrated that regulators are reluctant to give 
specific advice: 
… the result is that businesses either end up being non-compliant or have to seek costly 
legal/expert advice from consultants. (sub. 16, p. 5) 
• as noted in section 3.2, small businesses are ‘time-poor’ and tend not to have a 
competitive advantage (or desire to innovate) in compliance, so outsourcing can 
allow them to focus on their core competencies (Adler 2000; Jennings 2002; 
Kremic et al. 2006). To the extent that regulators offer training and information 
sessions, these mostly occur within business hours, meaning that attendance may 
result in loss of productive output. 
In Australia, third party advisors are used widely, particularly to facilitate regulatory 
compliance in the areas of development and assessment, taxation and superannuation, 
environmental approvals, occupational health and safety and food safety. Often, the 
external adviser will deal directly with the regulator on behalf of the small business. 
For example, some development consultants will handle the submission process for 
development applications and liaise with the relevant local or state government agency.  
Further, as discussed in chapter 5, regulators sometimes leverage off the established 
relationship between third party advisers and small businesses, by using them to 
convey regulatory information to their clients. Similarly, industry associations can 
provide a useful conduit between regulators and many small businesses that 
displaces the need for a third party’s advice. However, rates of membership with 
industry organisations are usually lower among small businesses compared to larger 
enterprises, so the use of industry bodies is more likely to offer a complement to, 
rather than a substitute for, a regulator’s own engagement with small businesses.  
Outsourcing aspects of regulatory compliance can be a significant cost for many 
small businesses. For example, a survey of 1200 small businesses found that, on 
average, over 40 per cent of total compliance costs were incurred engaging external 
consultants (Small Business Deregulation Taskforce 1996). Similarly, a more recent 
survey by AI Group (sub. DR39) of Australian small businesses found they spend 3.5 
per cent of their total annual costs on hiring external consultants for compliance issues. 
   





It is far from proven that outsourcing compliance is an optimal strategy for all small 
businesses, or for all aspects of compliance. Numerous studies find that the use of 
third parties for compliance may not achieve compliance goals at lowest cost 
(Europe Economics 2003, p. 47) and may provide irrelevant or inappropriate advice 
(BRE 2008, p. 38). A further complication is the need for small businesses 
outsourcing compliance functions to manage the potential for conflicts of interest; 
including the possibility that an intermediary may ‘create work for themselves’, 
resulting in excessive compliance or risk reduction activity (Kremic, Tukel and 
Rom 2006, p. 473).  
Further, the third party advisor may still fail to fulfil compliance obligations, 
particularly those of a complex nature, which is an outcome that would also be less 
observable to the business until they are found in breach (and bear the associated 
consequences). As stated by the UK Better Regulation Executive (BRE): 
Third party support can be more than financially expensive. Poor quality advice and 
support can also lead some to become unduly complacent, believing — wrongly — that 
their consultant has enabled them to meet health and safety requirements. Instead, they 
may have instigated overly bureaucratic processes or actions that are disproportionate, 
and which do not make their workplaces, their employees, or the public, safer … 
(2008, p. 38) 
While the complexity of regulations may prompt the use of third parties and 
occasionally adverse outcomes for small businesses, it can also undermine the 
business model and profitability of third parties — many of which are small 
businesses themselves — who may face higher costs to keep abreast of complex 
regulations. 
Regardless of the availability of third parties, regulators should ensure small 
businesses have access to advice and guidance about their regulatory obligations. 
Regulators must consider the impact that shortcomings in the design or delivery of 
regulation can have on the ease and costs of small businesses fulfilling their 
compliance obligations given their varying knowledge and compliance capabilities, 
and ways to reduce these costs through better engagement practices.  
Small business can be considered in the design of regulation 
Disentangling the effects from the way regulations are delivered as opposed to the 
way regulation is designed is difficult. Given that aspects of regulatory design 
sometimes lie within a regulator’s control, the Commission has assessed how small 
business issues are formally considered at this stage of the process.  






Many regulators have considerable flexibility in how they articulate regulatory 
requirements, such as setting licence conditions, endorsing industry accreditation 
schemes and formulating enforceable codes of conduct. This is sometimes evidenced 
through variability in regulatory requirements across jurisdictions. For example, each 
Australian jurisdiction has a different interpretation (and handling) of the risks at 
various stages of the meat production process (PC 2009). 
Designing different regulatory requirements for different sized businesses (tiering) 
has been a central pillar of the US regulatory system for many years and has gained 
traction in other overseas jurisdictions, most recently in the United Kingdom and 
European Union.3 Designing regulatory requirements differently for small 
businesses occurs less extensively in Australia, with only 10 per cent of regulators 
required to implement special provisions for small business according to legislation 
or some other formal directive (figure 3.3). Based on the responses to the 
Commission’s survey of regulators, such requirements tend to be: 
• most evident in taxation, and professional services and fair trading regulation — 
implemented by around one-third of such regulators 
• at a state and federal level, not widely used in food safety (apart from 
exemptions for some small egg producers) or planning regulations. 
Small businesses should be consulted in the design of regulation 
Some participants have raised concerns about whether small business issues are 
adequately considered in the design of regulation. In particular, there is a view that 
relevant small business concerns are neglected when quantifying the costs and 
benefits of regulations, including when assessing the feasibility of implementing 
new requirements. Such disregard can result in regulation that unnecessarily diverts 
small business resources and managerial attention.  
For example, the Australian Association of Convenience Stores identified the 
introduction of plain packaging for tobacco products as one instance where they 
believed a rushed transition had negatively impacted small businesses, due to a lack 
of engagement and little consideration of small business conditions: 
In some cases, convenience store owners were left with obsolete stock on hand which 
had to be destroyed at their own expense, additional labour and staff training costs were 
incurred with no subsidy, stores were left out of stock while manufacturers attempted to 
                                              
3  The Regulatory Flexibility Act (US) (RFA) of 1980 provides the basis for different regulatory 
treatment of smaller businesses. The RFA was later strengthened by the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 1996, which allows small business representatives to 
challenge agencies on proposed regulations and their consistency with the RFA. 
   





comply within the brief time for the introduction of the legislation, and transaction 
times have been lengthened substantially. (sub. DR34, p. 4) 
The importance of consultation in regulatory design is taken up in chapter 2. For the 
purposes of this chapter, it is relevant to observe that consulting small business is an 
essential input into quality regulatory design, particularly if: 
• small businesses are a significant share of the regulated population  
• a regulator or policy maker is to make informed judgements about whether to 
target small businesses within the design of regulation or whether new 
regulations should be appropriately phased in 
• a regulator is to have an understanding of the size of adjustment costs and 
ongoing business compliance costs to determine whether regulation is likely to 
yield net benefits to the community. 
In an examination of jurisdictions’ Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) processes, the 
Commission recently found that the impacts of regulation on small business were 
not widely considered, featuring in only 35 per cent of 182 regulatory impact 
statements (RISs) analysed (PC 2012b, p. 166). Where adequate consultation with 
small business (or their representatives) was identified (for example, during the 
development of legislative changes affecting taxi driver standards in Western 
Australia), the Commission found that significant amendments were made to reduce 
the cost impacts for small business. 
However, even regulators and policy makers with the best intentions struggle to consult 
effectively with the large number of small businesses. The evidence from overseas 
paints a similar picture. In one study, for example, 60 per cent of small businesses 
indicated they are not adequately consulted in the design of new regulations 
(Indecon 2006, p. 39). Difficulties are compounded by the fact that business owners 
lack the time and resources to participate in consultation processes and are less inclined 
to submit information in written form. In the Commission’s regulator survey, 
regulators identified each of these concerns as a barrier to engagement. 
Recognising some of these issues, governments in Australia have put in place 
various institutions and processes that seek to ensure impacts on small business are 
considered and the views of small business are explicitly taken into account in the 
development of regulations. For example: 
• within guidance material for the preparation of a RIS, assessing the impacts of 
primary legislation on small business is required by all jurisdictions except 
Queensland and South Australia (PC 2012b, p. 165) 






• some jurisdictions have established separate units or advisory bodies that assist 
agencies to determine the impacts of policy proposals on small business (for 
example, the WA Small Business Development Corporation) 
• many Australian jurisdictions have a Small Business Commissioner with a 
capacity to undertake advocacy work and contribute to the design of regulations 
affecting small businesses (chapter 5). 
Overseas, many governments have also introduced various mechanisms to facilitate 
greater input from small business. As one example, in the United States the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 1996 requires federal agencies to 
engage small business in regulatory development through industry publications, direct 
mail, public meetings and electronic communications. 
It is difficult to assess whether these mechanisms produce tangible outcomes or give 
rise to regulatory changes that are net beneficial. However, they will generally 
increase the likelihood that small businesses are given additional tolerance and 
assistance to comply with regulation. 
Transition costs for small business must be considered when implementing new 
requirements 
More so than larger businesses, smaller businesses may struggle to implement and 
fulfil new regulatory requirements. Specifically, a rushed transition with an 
insufficient notification period can result in reduced small business understanding 
and compliance. It can also prevent small businesses from optimising the timing of 
investments in compliance tools, limiting their capacity to integrate compliance 
activities into their ‘business as usual’ operation. For example, when a business is 
approaching a decision to renew its IT system or purchase new software, it would 
likely ensure (where relevant) that any new compliance requirements are also met 
within those investments. The fixed nature of such investments, and their infrequent 
occurrence, means small businesses may be more vulnerable in a rushed transition.  
Although a longer transition period will delay the benefits of regulation, a rushed 
transition may initially procure very low rates of compliance, so the forgone 
benefits may not be material. Nevertheless, the potential for higher compliance 
costs on the one hand and delayed benefits on the other would require careful 
assessment of any proposed regulatory change on a case by case basis — for 
example, the prospect of a catastrophic outcome would generally justify faster 
implementation of a safety improvement. 
The Commission appreciates that some regulators may have only a limited formal 
role, if any at all, in determining the way new regulations are implemented. 
   





However, regulators can usually exercise some degree of discretion in how they go 
about delivering regulation where there is evidence of substantially higher transition 
costs. This could involve first concentrating on educating small business and, at 
least initially, delaying enforcement activity. 
For instance, WorkSafe Victoria (2013, p. 6) provides small businesses with an 
extended timeframe to complete the Declaration of Rateable Remuneration (used to 
determine a business’s WorkSafe insurance premium), which is intended ‘to give 
smaller employers the opportunity to gather the information they require to 
complete the declaration while continuing to focus on running their business’. 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) allowed an extended 
transition period over which relevant experience in the credit industry would continue 
to be recognised before new qualification requirements for credit licensees would be 
enforced. Such a decision was guided by consultation that revealed small businesses 
would face fixed transition costs of around $600–$1300 (per key employee) higher 
than larger businesses (ASIC 2012, p. 15). Not only did this give affected small 
businesses time to prepare for the upcoming changes, it also provided ASIC with a 
lead time to develop educational material and raise awareness among the significant 
number of small businesses affected. (Chapter 5 discusses the importance of 
pre-testing new requirements and providing education to small businesses with the 
introduction of new regulations.) 
As an alternative to relying on regulator discretion, an extended implementation period 
may be written into new regulations by governments. For example, under EU 
legislation small businesses have been afforded an extended period to install health and 
safety signs in their workplaces and, in the construction industry, to implement changes 
to the use of workplace equipment (European Commission 2011). 
Small business can be considered in the delivery of regulation 
Regulatory delivery can involve regulators exercising flexibility when: 
• choosing the appropriate tool for enforcement (chapter 4) when ensuring 
compliance with regulatory requirements  
• preparing guidance and education material to assist small businesses to 
understand their compliance obligations and when facilitating consultation with 
businesses (chapter 5) 
• setting the frequency of inspections and reporting requirements, or permitting 
the use of more streamlined processes to document compliance for different 
groups of business (chapters 4 and 5). 






As has been noted earlier in this report, the manner in which a regulator engages 
with business in the delivery of regulation can be as important as the content of the 
regulation itself. 
Where regulators use their discretion to provide different treatment for small 
businesses (35 per cent of respondents to the Commission’s regulator survey), it is 
most commonly implemented through tailoring education and training, tailoring 
forms and factsheets and simplifying requirements (figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.4 Types of different treatment provided to small businesses 
Per cent of regulators providing each type of assistancea 
 
a Based on responses from 67 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013.  
While the extent of discretion can vary, most regulators have some flexibility to 
tailor their delivery of regulation to assist small business to understand and fulfil 
their compliance obligations. In many instances, such tailoring simply involves a 
regulator adopting a more client focused model of service delivery and 
implementing process improvements to recognise and, where appropriate, 
accommodate the needs of small business. For some regulators, successful tailoring 
would require improved data and information, including on business compliance 
costs and the effectiveness of different strategies in actually assisting small 
businesses.  
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Regulators should offer standard compliance solutions and outcomes based 
pathways to fulfil regulatory obligations — a ‘hybrid’ model 
A hybrid model offering standardised compliance solutions and outcomes based 
pathways is a regulatory delivery strategy that can meet the varying knowledge needs 
and compliance capacities of small businesses by allowing them to choose a pathway 
to fulfil regulatory obligations. For example, while a building regulator (or standard 
setting body) may prescribe exact building methods or materials, they may also 
approve various alternative solutions to achieve a required outcome. Providing such 
a choice allows a small business to self select the level of: 
• certainty and instruction they desire in complying with detailed rules and 
regulations — the adoption of a standard (or prescribed) compliance solution 
• risk they are willing to accept, and learning the are prepared to undertake, in 
order to develop innovative compliance solutions and potentially lower 
compliance costs — the adoption of an outcomes based compliance pathaway. 
Given the generally accepted efficiency gains, including the potential to reduce their 
own administration costs, some regulators have shifted their administration of 
regulation towards outcomes based compliance and enforcement.4 In some 
instances, legislation has been redrafted to encourage an outcomes based focus — 
for example, Australian building regulations have been outcomes based since 1996. 
In cases where almost all businesses seek full flexibility in how they achieve a 
compliance standard, it would normally be sufficient for a regulator to provide 
general advice that outlines the principles according to which a compliance solution 
will be judged, but without detailing the process by which compliance could be 
achieved (PC 2004, p. 81).  
Such approaches can help to future proof regulation, ensuring its continued 
relevance and efficiency as risk mitigation technologies and business production 
processes change over time. They can also encourage a culture of voluntary 
compliance (chapter 4), since it is necessary for businesses to understand the goals 
or objectives behind a regulation to avoid the prospect of being found in breach. 
The option of outcomes based requirements will particularly benefit those small 
businesses that are more familiar with the risks their activities present and ways 
they can incorporate risk reduction activity with the least possible interruption to 
their business. For example, an innovative small business may alter its production 
process and technologies to reduce the output of emissions or improve workplace 
                                              
4  One Australian study of large-scale construction projects found that an outcome based approach 
yielded a cost saving to developers and the community of between 1-5 per cent (PC 2004, p. 82).  






safety, hence avoiding the need to install prescribed control equipment. In fact, 
regulators can learn from such businesses, and may even modify the prescribed 
compliance requirements that apply to the balance of small businesses. However, 
widespread use of outcome based compliance necessitates reliable, sufficiently low 
cost verification methods to assess the performance of alternative compliance 
solutions. Regulators sometimes have to rely on expert advice or thin sources of 
evidence about the effectiveness of emerging risk reduction techniques (usually 
demanding a higher tolerance of risk by regulators) (appendix D). Similarly, while a 
business may seek to comply with the intent of a law or regulation, it can be 
ambiguous whether they took all reasonable steps that could be expected of them. 
Decisions by regulators or courts can provide a precedent for businesses to learn from 
and adjust their conduct accordingly, but keeping abreast of such information can 
introduce further compliance costs (unless industry organisations and regulators 
themselves keep businesses informed of new developments). 
Rather than purely outcomes based approaches, many small businesses desire the 
certainty that comes with detailed instruction from a regulator about how to implement 
an acceptable compliance solution (figure 3.5). Recognising this — even where a shift 
to outcomes based regulation has occurred — in most cases regulators continue to 
produce non-mandatory codes, regulations and guidance material that recommend 
steps to achieve compliance. When combined with an outcomes based approach, this 
can form a useful ‘hybrid’ regulatory model.  
Figure 3.5 Small businesses are varied — some want scope to innovate 
but others prefer certainty 
 
Source: COSBOA, sub. DR48, attachment A.  
While being optional for small business to access and implement, the availability of 
prescriptive regulations and guidance can help to educate small businesses and 
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provide them with greater certainty. This may additionally reduce the need for small 
businesses to engage third parties for assistance with compliance. Prescribing what 
constitutes an acceptable compliance solution can also make a regulator’s task of 
educating small businesses much easier. An extension to this model can involve a 
regulator accepting that a business is ‘deemed to comply’ or ‘deemed to satisfy’ a 
regulatory standard if they can demonstrate the full implementation of the steps 
prescribed within a regulatory instrument.  
RECOMMENDATION 
Regulators should, as far as possible, enable small businesses to more effectively 
and easily manage their own compliance. Given small businesses generally have 
less capacity to distil regulatory requirements and higher compliance cost 
structures, regulators should, where possible: 
• remove any unnecessary complexity in regulatory requirements and associated 
guidance material 
• set outcome based regulatory requirements, but also offer detailed guidance 
about acceptable solutions including, where feasible, offering a compliance 
pathway which, if fully implemented, would deem businesses compliant with 
requirements. 
3.4 When is different regulatory treatment appropriate? 
Almost 70 per cent of regulators do not practice or do not support different 
treatment of small businesses. The main reasons for this given by regulators are that 
they aim to facilitate compliance by all businesses regardless of business size, or 
because they view small and large businesses as having similar needs (figure 3.6). 
Further, because the jurisdiction of many regulators may largely (or only) apply to 
small businesses, the standard delivery of regulation would already accommodate 
small business needs — this was the reason given by 34 per cent of regulators not 
supporting different treatment. Of the 31 per cent of regulators that did support 
different treatment for small businesses, the main reasons given were that small 
businesses need help to understand compliance requirements and that compliance 
costs are disproportionately greater for small businesses (Productivity Commission 
regulator survey 2013). 






Figure 3.6 Regulators’ views on the merits of different treatmenta 
 
The majority of regulators do not support different treatment for small business 
 
Reasons why some regulators support different treatment (per cent) 
 
Reasons why some regulators do not support different treatment (per cent) 
 
a Based on responses from 180 regulators — 56 support while 124 do not support different treatment. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
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The relationship between business size and the costs of regulation suggests it may 
be worthwhile considering ways to contain such costs. As discussed in section 3.3, 
this could involve either explicitly altering the content of regulation for small 
business or tailoring the delivery of regulations. However, in deciding whether to 
proceed down either path, a regulator must evaluate whether there is a realistic 
prospect of achieving net benefits for the community (box 3.2). 
 
Box 3.2 Different treatment of small business must deliver net benefits 
Whether or not providing special regulatory treatment to small business will result in 
net benefits is determined by the effect on: 
• the benefits of regulation (costs of non-compliance) 
• the cost of compliance for businesses  
• the benefits from any increased competition resulting from reduced compliance costs 
• the cost of enforcing and administering different regulatory requirements 
• the cost (and complexity) of targeting small business, including: 
– the cost of information collection 
– the risk of calibration errors when specifying a small business target group 
– the likelihood that business will alter their behaviour in response to thresholds.   
 
Differential design of regulations alters regulatory outcomes 
Enshrining different treatment for small businesses within the design of regulation 
may affect the standard embodied within legislation, and therefore alter the level of 
benefits that flow from regulation. In addition, there may be other potential 
drawbacks from allowing some businesses to comply with lower regulatory 
requirements, including: 
• the potentially significant costs for a regulator of administering different 
regulatory requirements or exclusions for small businesses. As found by 
Bradford: 
… absent transaction costs, size based exemptions can be efficient. But exemptions do 
have transaction costs, and those transaction costs complicate the analysis, making it 
less likely that any particular small business exemption is efficient. (2004, p. 25) 
• the cost of wasteful strategic behaviour by businesses seeking to escape 
regulation. For example: 
– in the UK, analysis by Chittenden et al. (2002, p. 37) found evidence of 
substantial distortion of business behaviour from the VAT registration threshold, 
particularly for businesses with annual turnovers between £30,000 and £65,000 






– in Australia, studies suggest that the average excess burden of payroll tax 
may roughly double (and the marginal excess burden at least triple) when 
distortions in business behaviour associated with the tax free threshold are 
taken into account (Dixon, Picton and Rimmer 2002; KPMG 
Econtech 2010, p. 63). 
• the costs of obtaining necessary information to enable targeting regulation to 
small businesses and the unavoidable trade-off between:  
– tiering that is well targeted and, therefore, less likely to have calibration errors 
– the simplicity of universally applied regulation that while being net beneficial 
on average, could subject a large number of businesses to regulation that 
actually generates a net loss. 
• the costs to businesses which must establish whether or not they are exempt or 
can avail themselves of lighter regulatory requirements. 
Despite the considerations above, it is an empirical issue whether it is appropriate 
for regulators to alter the design of regulation for small businesses. Case by case 
evaluation is the appropriate approach, which precludes definitive conclusions — a 
requirement that the NSW Business Chamber (sub. 25, p. 2) also acknowledged 
when contemplating the application of regulatory tiering. 
Previous analysis specifically considering the transaction costs and various 
pragmatic hurdles associated with regulatory tiering concluded that, in most cases, 
regulation should apply to businesses of all sizes but there may be greater scope to 
ease the burden faced by small businesses by delivering regulations more flexibly 
(Bickerdyke and Lattimore 1997, p. xvi). 
Tailored delivery usually maintains regulatory outcomes 
Treating small businesses differently need not necessarily involve regulating small 
businesses less strictly than large businesses or compromising the benefits of 
regulation to the community (NSW Small Business Chamber, sub. 25). By 
exercising discretion and choosing judiciously how regulation should be 
implemented, a skilled regulator can transform a set of ill defined or cumbersome 
regulations and actually reduce costs for small businesses while maintaining or even 
improving compliance outcomes — a win-win for business and the community.  
As was previously concluded by the authors of an Industry Commission 
publication, if the flexible delivery of regulation is done well, it can: 
… decrease regulatory costs, by easing compliance and providing better information to 
those firms having the greatest difficulty with regulation. And unlike tiering, flexibility 
   





in the way regulations are delivered to businesses does not weaken the standard or 
objective of a particular regulation or tax — safety, emissions, tax rates etc — and so 
cannot plausibly lower the benefits of a regulation. In fact, by lowering compliance 
costs, it may increase actual compliance and increase social benefits. (Bickerdyke and 
Lattimore 1997, p. 47). 
In a similar vein, the Australian Institute of Public Accountants submitted: 
There is a difference between taking a different engagement approach and applying the 
law differently. The law should be enforced consistently, irrespective of who is being 
regulated. However, good regulators are aware that small businesses are different in 
management practices and resources. The way a regulator ‘engages’ can be different, 
yet still result in a fulsome implementation of the law. (sub. 29, p. 6) 
And while the CCIQ acknowledges that, for various reasons, statutory instruments 
must be broadly developed on a one size fits all basis, it considers that: 
… it is vital that those responsible for implementing and enforcing regulation recognise 
and accommodate the particular circumstances of small and medium businesses … 
(sub. 16, p. 2) 
Of course, if poorly executed, tailoring the delivery of regulations to small 
businesses could squander the potential gains from regulation for the community, or 
raise compliance costs for businesses. To minimise the risk of inappropriate 
tailoring, regulators must: 
• respond promptly to any change in business conduct that could dilute regulatory 
outcomes 
• monitor whether any additional regulatory administration costs are offset by the 
reduction in compliance costs for small businesses (and any community benefits 
from improvements in rates of compliance).  
Although tailoring might initially put increased pressure on a regulator’s resources, 
over the longer term, tailoring the delivery of regulation can actually reduce 
administrative costs for regulators. For example, the upfront cost of developing 
simple and concise guidance material can reduce reliance on physical inspections as 
a relatively high cost means of educating small businesses. Also, compared to 
adopting a strict definition of small business, in order to exclude small businesses 
within the design of regulation, tailoring is less rigid, with small businesses usually 
able to self-identify whether they need extra assistance. 
Any different regulatory treatment for small business should have a realistic prospect 
of delivering net benefits to the community, which requires assessment on a case by 
case basis. While small businesses may have distinct characteristics that affect their 
costs and ability to comply with regulation compared to large businesses, their size 
does not alone provide a cogent basis for regulators to automatically treat small 






businesses differently. Rather, regulators must have the capacity to weigh up many 
different factors, which are likely to vary substantially across industries, regions and 
over time. 
The appropriateness of discriminating based on business size is likely to be 
increased if it provides a low cost, reliable and easy to implement proxy for a range 
of other factors that also drive the benefits of regulation. For example, looking at 
the size of a business may provide a useful window into the relative risks a 
business’s activities pose for public safety and community welfare. (The 
relationship between business size and regulatory risks is discussed in section 3.5.) 
RECOMMENDATION 
Governments and regulators should provide different treatment for small 
business when net benefits to the community would be enhanced. In determining 
whether such treatment is appropriate, consideration should be given to: 
• the likely change in compliance outcomes and any risk to regulatory objectives 
• the potential to reduce unnecessary compliance costs for small business, 
including any transitional costs that might affect the appropriate pace of 
implementation of regulatory requirements 
• the administrative cost, complexity and potential for resulting distortions to 
business behaviour from altering the content or delivery of regulation for 
small businesses. 
Before providing for different treatment in the design of regulation, governments 
should undertake formal regulatory impact analysis, including consultation with 
small businesses and the community. 
Equity and social considerations 
Section 3.2 established that small businesses often face cost disadvantages when 
complying with regulation compared to larger businesses. The imposition of 
compliance obligations can lower the relative returns earned by a small business 
owner, deter new entrants and as a consequence tilt the size distribution of business 
to favour larger businesses. While this does not necessarily provide economic 
grounds to treat small businesses differently, it may give rise to distributional (or 
equity) concerns.  
Despite the potential for the introduction of new compliance obligations to lower 
the returns to an owner and deter new entrants, it is not clearly of concern if 
additional compliance costs are the minimum necessary to achieve regulatory 
objectives. At the margin, however, an increase in regulatory compliance costs may 
   





mean that the profitability of a small business declines such that a business owner 
chooses to cease trading.  
Assuming regulation is well justified (although this is not always the case 
(PC 2012b)), governments should not seek to support small businesses that are no 
longer sustainable over the long term and should avoid distorting prices and 
competition. The demise or loss of small businesses is a natural and expected 
outcome of a market environment — often spurred by the formation, or increased 
profitability, of other small businesses. However, it may be appropriate to assist a 
small business owner to retrain and gain other employment. Further, because the 
owner of a small business typically contributes most, if not all, of the operating 
capital, failure of their business may mean they need to access other forms of welfare 
support until they ‘get back on their feet’.  
3.5 Does a risk based approach result in the efficient 
treatment of small businesses? 
This section assesses whether a regulator’s focus on risk results in the appropriate 
treatment of small business. Appendix D discusses the broader merits and means of 
regulators implementing a risk based approach when delivering regulation.  
What is a risk based approach? 
A risk based approach to delivering regulation ensures lower risk businesses can 
operate without unnecessary intrusion from regulators. Under a risk based approach, 
the compliance costs for business and administration costs for regulators are 
proportionate to the risks posed to regulatory outcomes and, in turn, to the community. 
For example, under a risk based approach, lower risk businesses may be subject to 
fewer inspections and less frequent reporting obligations, which can reduce costs for 
both businesses and the regulator. Conversely, higher risk businesses may face 
additional compliance costs, particularly if scrutinised more closely by regulators. 
Based on the application of accepted steps (appendix D), a risk based approach 
provides a process by which regulators can systematically identify, analyse and 
appropriately respond to public risks. Such a structured approach to evaluating risk 
allows regulators to allocate available resources (and impose compliance costs on 
business) to achieve regulatory objectives most efficiently. Importantly, the use of a 
risk based approach commands recognition that: 
Not all risks can be reduced to zero and tradeoffs in risk reduction measures are 
inevitable. (OECD 2010, p. 11) 






In some regulatory areas, primary legislation or other regulatory instruments require 
regulators to adopt a risk based approach (for example, the NSW Food Authority). But, 
even if legislation or statements of ministerial expectation do not specifically mention a 
risk based approach, most regulators: 
• have sufficient discretion to embed a risk based approach into their decisions and 
engagement practices, including when defining what constitutes acceptable 
regulatory outcomes from their compliance and enforcement activities 
• are faced with budget constraints that should necessitate the targeting of their 
regulatory effort and resources to activities yielding the greatest possible 
reduction in risk to achieving regulatory outcomes — that is, focussing on higher 
risk businesses.  
Based on responses to the Commission’s regulator survey, 70 per cent of regulators 
adopt a risk based approach to guide their compliance monitoring and enforcement 
activities — most frequently to determine inspections and auditing activity.  
The adoption of a risk based approach is likely, over the longer term, to deliver 
administrative efficiencies that reduce resourcing pressures for regulators. However, 
its implementation is not costless given: 
• the added complexity and need for adequate data and information to accurately 
measure risks, which can impose costs on both regulators and businesses who 
may have to submit more detailed information 
• the need to train staff in how to perform risk assessments and develop systems 
that translate those risk assessments and scores into efficient and effective 
compliance and enforcement activity. 
As such, some regulators could initially require additional resourcing to develop 
and implement a sufficiently structured and robust risk based framework — not 
only to refine the allocation of their existing compliance and enforcement activity, 
but also to give proper attention to the compliance pathways they offer to lower risk 
businesses. Currently, only 15 per cent of regulators monitor the costs imposed on 
business from their administration and enforcement practices (Productivity 
Commission regulator survey 2013). Hence, the majority of regulators would have 
no reliable information to assist the development of appropriate compliance 
pathways for lower risk businesses — many of which may be small businesses.  
Regardless of the resourcing available to regulators, given the costs to implement 
and continually improve a risk based regime, regulators should pursue refinements 
only to the extent they can deliver net benefits to the community (appendix D). 
Greater sophistication in risk analysis would generally be more feasible when: 
   





• there are existing sources of information and intelligence on the risk profile of 
different businesses 
• the risks being regulated are highly disparate in nature 
• compliance and enforcement resources are limited, so targeting of regulator 
effort to high risk businesses is essential to reduce priority risks and allow 
regulatory objectives to be met 
• resources are available to undertake appropriate analysis and consultation 
The net benefits of adopting a risk based approach are not always obvious and will 
vary over time across businesses and also depend on the industry, region, the area or 
objectives of regulation. However, the adoption of a risk based approach should 
generally address concerns, voiced by small businesses in consultations, that some 
regulators are taking a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach; and should result in 
lower compliance requirements for many small businesses.  
What is the relationship between business size and risk? 
On the one hand, the consequence of harm posed by smaller businesses is generally 
less than larger businesses, with 14 per cent of regulators that treat small businesses 
differently considering lower risk to be a factor warranting different treatment for 
small businesses (figure 3.6).  
However, the assessment of risk should also consider the likelihood of harm 
materialising. In particular, compared to larger businesses, smaller businesses may 
have less knowledge of their compliance obligations and some may have less of an 
incentive to invest in compliance. 
In these circumstances, the lower likelihood of small businesses complying may 
present a greater threat to regulatory outcomes not being achieved — a view held by 
around 30 per cent of regulators that treat small businesses differently (figure 3.6). 
Therefore, when considering differential treatment, apart from evaluating business 
compliance costs and their own administration costs, regulators may also need to assess 
whether risk to regulatory objectives is related to business size. As is widely accepted: 
… to decide if regulation should be lenient towards small firms, we need to first 
understand whether small firms are less likely, equally likely, or even more likely to 
engage in illegal behaviour. … If, for example, the empirical evidence shows that small 
firms are in fact more likely to engage in illegal behaviour, then even if the firm’s costs 
of compliance may be higher, societal benefits from imposing reporting requirements 
on small firms would also be greater. (Anginer et al. 2012, p. 3) 






In some regulatory areas or industries, a business’s size may provide a sufficiently 
robust, albeit indirect, predictor of risk. There is evidence of a variety of regulators 
affording less regulatory attention to (or requiring less compliance activity from) 
small business, given their assessment of small businesses posing a more limited 
risk of potential harm. The approaches of various regulators are discussed in more 
detail in appendix D, but some examples include: 
• based on the Australian Tax Office’s risk differentiation framework, 86 per cent 
of SMEs are classed as low risk taxpayers and therefore receive less attention 
from the regulator, 11 per cent are categorised as a medium risk and 3 per cent 
as higher risk  
• the Privacy Act 1998 (Cwlth), enforced by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 
automatically excludes small businesses unless the scope of their business activity 
falls within identified higher risk categories (such as if they handle or trade personal 
information; provide health services or operate a residential tenancy database; or 
fall within anti-money laundering or counter terrorism legislation)  
• small bars in New South Wales and Victoria are generally assessed as being 
lower risk, with access to streamlined licensing processes and reduced fees 
• small egg producers in NSW and Tasmania are exempted from having to hold a 
licence or participate in quality assurance programs (NSW Food Authority, 
sub. 28; PC 2009).  
In situations where the risk and size of a business are positively related, the 
application of a risk based framework to compliance and enforcement may appear to 
result in the different treatment of small businesses by a regulator. However, such an 
outcome may simply reveal that the regulatory treatment of businesses (large and 
small) appropriately reflects the relative costs and benefits associated with their 
regulation.  
Why might some small businesses present a higher risk? 
Some small businesses may present a very high risk and are deliberately given extra 
regulatory attention. For example, the NSW Food Authority (NSWFA 2008) 
assessed that small independent bakeries may not always have adequate knowledge 
of hygienic practices relevant to the type of products they sell, particularly 
Vietnamese style pork rolls (which resulted in the largest Salmonella outbreak in 
Australia). The Food Authority consequently undertook intensive education of 
targeted bakeries to reduce the likely incidence of adverse events in the future. 
Rather than simply misunderstanding regulatory requirements and the importance of 
reducing the incidence of adverse events, some small businesses may present higher 
   





risks because they compromise their compliance in an attempt to reduce regulatory 
burdens. For example, the National Transport Commission drew attention to the 
possibility of more systemic non-compliance among owner-operated truck drivers: 
Owner–operators interviewed for a recent project state that margins are tight and 
competition can be fierce, encouraging some to either overload their vehicles or speed 
up their trips to enhance profitability … Threat of repossession of financed vehicles and 
loss of the family home where it is offered as collateral are real concerns for owner 
drivers. (sub. 1, p. 1) 
Therefore, although based on the scale of potential harm, an individual small 
business may not, at first inspection, be viewed as a priority for regulators; 
considering the likelihood of non-compliance across a range of small businesses 
that together have a significant market share, could give rise to an assessment of 
higher risk. 
How should regulators handle lower risk small businesses? 
There are various strategies regulators can adopt that result in a reduced compliance 
burden on low risk small businesses, while broadly maintaining compliance with a 
regulatory standard. For example, regulators may devolve or delegate certain 
regulatory responsibilities to third parties, including to an industry or 
non-government body. Handing over such responsibility can lower the costs of 
administering regulation, since other parties may have superior knowledge and 
expertise about how best to manage risks. It can also leverage off the pride and 
loyalty within a profession (Bartle and Vass 2005) and take advantage of 
established conduits for communication — for example, a small business may be 
less threatened by and more receptive to advice and direction coming from an 
industry organisation than they would a regulator. Market based mechanisms and 
self–regulation may also provide an efficient option to manage some relatively low 
risk activities.  
However, as discussed in chapter 4, there are reasons for regulators to be cautious 
about delegating the detailed implementation and achievement of regulatory 
objectives to third parties. Principally, concerns relate to the potential for conflicts 
of interest — that is, whether such approaches correctly prioritise the public’s 
interests over the private interests of a business or industry. Nevertheless, such 
challenges can generally be avoided if delegation is limited to the handling of 
relatively low risks and effective systems are established to support transparency 
and public accountability.  
In fact, co-regulatory approaches are becoming more common as a complement to a 
risk based approach. For example, the English Farming Regulation Task Force 






(Macdonald 2012) suggested that regulators use membership of an accredited 
private assurance scheme as a means to assess risk and target inspections. Likewise, 
recognising that market provided services are usually lower cost, many Australian 
building, food and vehicle regulators recognise assessments by private inspectors.  
Alternatively, regulators may be able to make relatively simple changes to their own 
administration of regulation that reduces costs for low risk small businesses. For 
example, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, many regulators reduce the frequency of 
reporting obligations, allow self-assessment and reduce onsite inspections. 
In addition, some regulators operate accreditation programs to profile the risk status 
of small businesses. But, rather than using accreditation for the conventional 
‘gatekeeping’ purpose of determining a business’s right to operate, such programs 
are used to differentiate between businesses. For example, importers and exporters 
who become accredited under the Australian Customs Service’s Accredited Client 
Program are deemed to be low risk and receive tailored arrangements, including 
faster goods clearance, reduced costs and more efficient document processing (King 
& Wood Mallesons 2012, p. 82). 
Regulators should be careful not to overlook low risk small business 
Regulators may be tempted to overlook the compliance and education of low risk 
small businesses under a risk based approach, since the return to the regulatory 
resources allocated may not be viewed as worthwhile. However they must recognise 
the incentives and capacity of small businesses,  and consider in particular: 
• the importance of effective deterrence through surveillance and enforcement 
activity to discourage non-compliance by small businesses that perceive they may 
escape regulatory attention 
– given their higher unit compliance costs, it is sometimes suggested that small 
businesses have stronger incentives not to comply with regulations 
• that many small businesses face challenges in understanding and executing 
regulatory requirements, particularly more complex obligations. 
Concerning the first point, weak compliance behaviour from small businesses 
usually arises because there is an expectation of not being caught. This accords 
with studies that typically find enforcement activity has a cumulative deterrence 
effect on the consciousness of regulated small and medium size businesses 
(CCIQ, sub. 16; Gunningham et al. 2005, p. 313).  
The latter point simply recognises that a regulator’s engagement with small 
businesses, including via inspections, can provide a conduit for education and 
   





communication. Withdrawal of a regulator’s engagement under a risk based approach 
could potentially undermine regulatory outcomes, especially if a small business finds 
it harder and more costly to obtain information regarding their compliance 
obligations. In fact, studies find: 
• many small businesses welcome inspections to be reassured they are meeting 
compliance requirements and to draw on inspectors’ knowledge (National Audit 
Office 2008).  
• in the absence of inspections, small businesses may have low awareness of 
which regulations apply to them, not know where to search for advice, and find 
regulatory language and the demarcations between the roles and responsibilities 
of regulators confusing (Better Regulation Executive 2008).  
• under a risk based approach the drop off in inspections may compromise 
effective deterrence, and actually increase costs for some small business 
(Europe Economics 2003, p. vii).  
One instance where withdrawal of a regulator’s engagement appears to have 
undermined regulatory outcomes is among Canberra dry–cleaning businesses, 
regulated by Worksafe ACT. Evidence suggests that compliance standards dropped 
in the dry–cleaning industry after it was ignored by the regulator for many years. 
Previous audits (in 2005) uncovered 17 issues in 25 businesses, whereas 2013 
audits uncovered 60 issues in the first 6 audits (Knaus 2013a, 2013b). 
Recognising that many small businesses receive less attention under a risk based 
approach, some regulators provide additional education to small businesses directly 
(box 3.3) or through working with industry associations (chapter 5) to ensure their 
level of engagement with these businesses remains adequate  
While it is clear that a regulator should devote some attention to facilitating the 
compliance of low risk small businesses, the question is — how much? While this 
is an empirical matter, it can be noted that the returns to procuring the compliance 
of low risk small businesses will, by definition, be relatively low; so a regulator 
must invest prudently in procuring their compliance. 







Box 3.3 Examples of engagement with low risk small businesses 
• The ATO recognises most small businesses are classified as low risk, and ensures 
these businesses are not ignored by providing extensive online tools and free 
tailored assistance visits on request, including targeting assistance campaigns to 
areas of perceived low compliance. 
• AUSTRAC requires businesses to self–assess risk with reference to the services 
they provide. They provide a prescriptive checklist for small businesses to help 
ensure compliance requirements are made clear. 
– AUSTRAC also engages with businesses on an individual level to assist with 
particular difficulties. 
• The ACCC provides a popular free printed and online publication, Small business 
and the CCA: Your rights and responsibilities, that outlines key provisions of the 
Competition and Consumer Act that small business operators need to be aware of. 
– The ACCC also recently developed an online education program to further 
explain small businesses’ rights and obligations under the CCA. 
Sources: ATO website; AUSTRAC website; ACCC (sub. 26).  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Small businesses generally have more limited compliance capacities than larger 
businesses and can face disproportionate costs in fulfilling regulatory obligations. 
Given these disadvantages, there are clear reasons why all regulators should 
carefully consider ways to reduce the compliance cost burden on small businesses 
and improve the outcomes from regulation to the community. Any such endeavour 
need not involve regulating small businesses less strictly, but rather, would mostly 
involve regulating them more flexibly, closely guided by information on: 
• the cost burden for small businesses and the extent to which they may be 
disproportionately affected by particular compliance obligations compared to 
larger businesses 
• the relationship between a business’s size and the risk they present to regulatory 
objectives (assessing both the magnitude and likelihood of potential harm to the 
community) and considering any alternative key drivers of risk  
• whether compliance costs for small businesses are generally commensurate with 
the level of risk presented 
• the effectiveness of guidance material, checklists and other sources of 
communication that have been made accessible to small businesses (chapter 5) 
• the overall change to the cost of administering regulation, since better engagement 
may sometimes be more expensive for regulators to provide. 
   









• The regulatory burden borne by businesses, including small businesses, is 
substantially impacted by regulator approaches to managing compliance and 
enforcement. 
• Most small businesses want to meet their compliance obligations and want to see 
regulations enforced effectively and consistently within their industry. 
• For many businesses, the level of risk presented by their activities determines the 
extent to which their compliance is monitored and there is typically some degree of 
‘escalation’ in regulator response to non-compliance. 
• However, some businesses are incurring unnecessary compliance costs because 
regulators are not always consistently and systematically implementing a risk based 
approach to compliance management and enforcement. 
• Compliance costs for business and administration costs for regulators could be 
reduced, while maintaining (or even enhancing) regulatory outcomes, with the wider 
adoption of leading practices, including: 
– greater efforts to facilitate compliance and more consistent use of discretion to 
ensure minor breaches are dealt with in a proportionate manner 
– reducing the number of inspections, where justified by risk assessments, and 
better coordination of inspection activity with other regulators 
– appropriate recognition of industry and other third party certification processes 
and outsourcing of inspections, where cost effective and supported by suitable 
transparency and accountability mechanisms 
– public commitments to target timeframes for key processes and decisions 
– increased transparency and accountability of processes and decisions to ensure 
impartiality and greater consistency. 
• Key differences between regulated businesses and between regulators — for 
example in the nature of the industry, the risks being regulated or institutional 
arrangements — mean that the merits of applying different practices, at a detailed 
level, need to be considered by regulators on a case-by-case basis.  
 







The adoption by regulators of leading practices in compliance management and 
enforcement can contribute greatly to the achievement of a regulation’s underlying 
objective, and can reduce the costs of attaining a particular level of compliance. By 
contrast, poor regulator practices can discourage compliance, make inefficient use 
of scarce government resources and add to business costs and delays. Even where 
regulation is appropriate and well designed, poor compliance management or 
enforcement practices can render it ineffective, or unduly burdensome, or both. 
Indeed, as discussed in chapter 1, the practices of the regulator can have as much 
impact on business compliance costs as the regulation itself. 
The ability of individual regulators to deliver effective and efficient compliance and 
enforcement strategies can be constrained, to varying extents, by a range of factors 
outside their direct control. This includes, for example: their overall level of 
resourcing; the clarity of their powers (and delineation with other regulators) and 
government objectives; and the range of enforcement tools and discretion with 
which they are provided (chapter 2). The focus of this chapter is primarily on what 
regulators can control — how they interpret the guidance and responsibilities they 
are given and how they use their powers, resources, tools and available discretion. 
The chapter highlights a range of good practice principles and possible leading 
practices. However, because of the significant differences between regulators in 
terms of their size, the activities they regulate, the risks they seek to mitigate and 
their institutional and governance arrangements, there is no single best practice 
model. While this means that the merits of applying a specific compliance and 
enforcement practice need to be considered on a case-by-case basis, there does 
appear to be substantial agreement in Australia and internationally on many better 
compliance and enforcement practices and guiding principles that have wide 
application, irrespective of the regulator or regulatory area. 
While there are examples of special treatment or assistance for small business in 
relation to aspects of compliance monitoring and enforcement, generally the 
Commission has found that better practices are no less applicable to many larger 
businesses. A fundamental guiding principle for regulators, therefore, should be 
ensuring that the burden imposed on all businesses is the minimum necessary, 
consistent with achieving regulatory objectives. Central to ensuring compliance and 
enforcement practices are targeted and efficient is the consistent adoption of 
practices which appropriately take into account the risk to regulatory outcomes that 
is posed by different business activities (section 4.2). These need to be reflected in 
regulator strategies and in requirements designed to encourage compliance 
(section 4.3) and, once a breach of compliance occurs, in the enforcement responses 
   





of the regulator (section 4.4). Aspects of the quality of regulator engagement (such 
as timeliness, consistency, transparency and accountability) also have a major 
influence on compliance costs for businesses — these are discussed in section 4.5. 
The chapter is supported by more detailed explanatory material and examples on the 
use of different enforcement tools in appendix F. 
4.2 Compliance and enforcement approaches that are 
commensurate with risks 
A well designed approach to compliance and enforcement can lower costs for both 
business and the regulator, while at the same time maintaining or increasing overall 
compliance, thereby facilitating achievement of the underlying objectives of the 
regulation. Such an approach will necessarily require the regulator to make some 
kind of assessment of the risk that is posed by types of business activities, and the 
compliance and enforcement approach that will be taken in response to these 
different risk activities. In some cases, regulators assessing risk may adopt a formal 
risk based framework (see appendix D); whereas in others, they may only consider 
risk as part of an informal attempt to target limited regulatory resources at activities 
likely to yield the greatest possible improvement in overall regulatory outcomes. 
While a more formal risk based approach is generally most appropriate, an informal 
approach has the potential to improve the targeting of compliance and enforcement 
efforts, and both can be generically termed ‘risk based’ approaches. 
The consideration of risk in compliance and enforcement activities necessarily 
acknowledges that some adverse outcomes may occur. With limited resources, 
securing 100 per cent compliance (even if possible) is not usually feasible nor 
efficient. Regulators should make assessments of both the likelihood and impacts of 
non-compliance across sectors and, where possible, the individual businesses they 
regulate and allocate their compliance and enforcement resources so as to generate 
the greatest net benefit to the community. In practice, this means targeting the 
biggest potential problems by devoting proportionately more surveillance or 
inspection resources to monitoring the compliance of those activities and types of 
businesses that:  
• have the greatest potential to impose the highest costs on the community if they 
are not compliant with regulations  
• are more likely to have low levels of compliance (for example, those with a poor 
compliance history). 
Enforcement responses, when incidents or breaches occur, also need to be 
consistent with a risk management approach (section 4.4). 






When developing and implementing risk based compliance and enforcement 
approaches, regulators must consider the costs as well as the benefits. The 
appropriate level of investment in developing systems, data collection and risk 
analysis will depend on the expected benefits — in terms of resource efficiencies, 
greater consistency in regulatory decisions and reduced compliance costs for 
businesses — that are likely to flow from such an investment. 
Using a risk based approach to guide compliance and enforcement resources is 
likely to result in the greatest gains for the community in regulatory areas where 
businesses present diverse risks (for instance, in taxation or environmental 
regulation). However, a risk based approach can also be net beneficial when used in 
areas where risks are more uniform across businesses (appendix D). 
The Commission has found that most Australian regulators do, at least to some 
extent, adopt a risk based approach in their compliance management and 
enforcement policies. However, the degree of sophistication and consistency in the 
application of risk frameworks varies significantly. 
There is, for example, more extensive use of advanced risk profiling and risk based 
enforcement among regulators in the food safety, occupational health and safety 
fields and also by the Australian Taxation Office.  
Liquor regulation is an example of an area that makes rather less use of risk based 
approaches to enforcement (appendix D). Adoption of a risk based approach also 
tends to be less prevalent among smaller regulators. Only 44 per cent of small 
regulators adopt a risk based approach, compared with around 90 per cent of large 
regulators. Of particular concern is the apparent gap that often exists between what 
is set out in principle in agency policy documents and what is implemented in 
practice: 
… few would argue against … risk based regulation … However there is more debate 
about whether regulators have taken the appropriate practical steps to achieve best 
practice regulatory behaviour. (NSW Business Chamber, sub. 25, p. 5) 
There can be a number of possible explanations for this, including a lack of 
commitment and leadership at senior levels, deficiencies in the training of 
enforcement officers, or a paucity of evidence and analysis to inform technical 
judgements about the determinants of risk (chapter 6). 
Evidence from the Commission’s survey of Australian regulators suggests that the 
risk based approaches used by many regulators are not highly structured or 
formalised. Although 70 per cent of regulators claimed to adopt a risk based 
approach, of these: 
   





• over half did not make the details of this approach available to business 
• 85 per cent did not monitor the costs imposed on businesses — an important 
aspect of ensuring compliance costs are proportionate to the risks a business 
poses 
• 56 per cent did not give enforcement officers discretion in choosing the severity 
of sanctions used following a compliance breach (Productivity Commission 
regulator survey 2013). 
From these responses, it appears that there is considerable scope for many 
regulators to implement more effective risk based approaches, including more 
explicit consideration of the compliance costs imposed on businesses and 
opportunities to reduce those costs.  
Accord Australasia (a national industry association representing the hygiene, 
cosmetic and other specialty products industry) commented that regulators often see 
compliance as the end goal rather than focusing on risks and outcomes: 
An example of this can be seen in the road and rail dangerous goods regulators’ refusal 
to issue an exemption for [newly introduced] requirements applying to retail 
distribution of consumer products… This is despite the fact that no new risk was 
identified to warrant the requirement introduced … and a number of the regulators have 
stated that there are no safety issues … 
It is Accord’s view that the risk based approach is either not being used by regulators or 
being used inappropriately producing perverse outcomes. (sub. DR41, p. 6) 
A fairly common perception is that regulators are generally too risk averse in their 
compliance and enforcement decisions (see, for example, Small Business 
Development Corporation (WA), sub. 22 and the Australian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (ACCI), sub. 5). To some extent it is not surprising that regulators 
would err on the side of being strict in their enforcement activities given the 
incentives and pressures they face from governments and communities (chapter 2).  
In areas where the likelihood of severe consequences flowing from non-compliance 
with regulation is low, tolerating a higher risk of such non-compliance can be 
appropriate. There is, however, a concern amongst stakeholders that compliance and 
enforcement practices are generally not sufficiently adapted to the nature of the 
activities being regulated (or tailored to the specific circumstances of an industry or 
business). Too often a ‘one-size fits all’ or ‘lowest common denominator’ approach 
seems to be adopted, with compliance and enforcement practices for all businesses 
determined by what is necessary for the businesses that present the greatest risk 
(Office of the Australian Small Business Commissioner (ASBC), sub. 10; 
ACCI, sub. 5). This can unnecessarily hinder lower risk activities.  






As noted in chapter 2, a regulator’s risk tolerance can be influenced by public 
opinion, media attention (particularly following adverse events) and either explicit 
political direction or the regulator’s perceptions about the attitude of the 
government or a responsible minister. The importance of governments clearly 
stating their expectations of the regulator in terms of how risks are to be managed 
and, in particular, of explicitly acknowledging that some level of risk is 
unavoidable, is discussed in chapter 6. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Regulators should adopt a risk based approach, ensuring that decisions about the 
nature and level of compliance obligations and enforcement responses 
consistently reflect an assessment of the relative risks posed by business activities. 
While the appropriate degree of sophistication will vary depending on the types of 
risks and businesses regulated, risk based approaches should generally be 
formalised and be made known to businesses.  
4.3 Ensuring requirements on business are the 
minimum necessary 
The specific approaches adopted by regulators to engender business compliance 
with regulation depend to some extent on the area of regulation, the nature of 
business activities being controlled and the specific objectives and requirements of 
legislation. As noted by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), some 
strategies are more appropriate than others for particular compliance checks: 
… on-site inspections are well suited to gathering evidence of compliance with 
manufacturing standards. A desk audit of a procedures manual would not adequately 
confirm that a manufacturer was achieving production quality standards. 
(ANAO 2007, p. 7) 
The compliance management activities of regulators impose requirements on 
business that can be categorised as: 
• assessments, approvals, authorisations or accreditation for particular products, 
processes, occupations, business operations or activities (for example, permits, 
development approvals, registrations, licensing or other permissions) 
• reporting obligations — that is, provision of information and data to demonstrate 
compliance or enable the regulator to deliver a desired regulatory outcome 
(leading practice approaches to coordinating and streamlining reporting 
obligations imposed on businesses are discussed in the next chapter) 
• inspections, audits and investigations. 
   





These requirements impose costs on business that are one off or ongoing. The costs 
can take many forms, including: staff time associated with understanding 
requirements, gathering information, form filling or record keeping; investments in 
additional equipment or procedures to monitor hazards or manage risks; or lost 
profits or business opportunities associated with delays. As noted in chapter 2, these 
costs can be exacerbated by the regulator’s posture towards business. 
Non-compliance with regulatory requirements can result in sanctions or other 
enforcement actions which also impose costs on business (section 4.4). 
The regulator’s primary focus must be on achieving the objectives of regulations. 
The goal, therefore, cannot be one of minimising the burden on business; rather it 
must be to ensure that the only costs imposed on business are those that are 
necessary to achieving the outcomes sought — costs that cannot be avoided or 
reduced through the adoption of an alternative engagement approach.  
Some evidence of failure to achieve adequate compliance 
While the Commission has identified substantial scope for reducing unnecessary 
compliance burdens on business arising from regulator practices — and suggestions 
for improvement and some leading practices are identified in this and subsequent 
chapters — a number of participants have questioned the effectiveness of some 
current regulator practices in managing risks and achieving adequate compliance.  
Master Electricians Australia, for example, argues that regulators of registered 
training organisations (RTOs) need to better utilise their monitoring and 
enforcement tools to ensure that RTOs facilitate training of electrical apprentices to 
the standard required to deliver competent tradespersons. It considers that some 
RTOs are currently not meeting regulatory standards in their delivery of training. 
(Master Electricians Australia, sub. 8). 
The Australian Industry Group (sub. DR39, pp. 9-10) has found that in some 
regulatory areas there is ‘a severe lack of compliance activity against non-compliant 
competitors’ and further suggests ‘[s]ome regulators seem to have priorities and 
resources that rarely ever stretch to cover non-compliant products’. Around 50 per 
cent of respondents to the 2012 ACCI National Red Tape Survey ‘indicated that 
they are required to comply with regulations that are poorly enforced or businesses 
have concerns about the regulator’s behaviour’ (ACCI 2012, p. 11). 
Non-compliance can go undetected for a number of reasons, including poorly 
designed inspection or other compliance checking procedures or, in some cases, 
inadequate resources (chapter 2). If the level of non-compliance is significant, it 
may result in a failure of the regulation to achieve its objectives. Further, wherever 






compliance is uneven, those businesses that do the right thing will potentially be at 
a competitive disadvantage relative to those that do not bear the compliance burden. 
The Australian Industry Group, for example, submitted: 
… legitimate businesses believe they are forced to pay for both their own compliance 
and that of their non-compliant competitors … Business viability and long term asset 
values are likely being impacted. (sub. DR39, p. 11) 
Over time, a perception that a regulator is failing to enforce compliance is likely to 
undermine confidence in the regulator and potentially lead to more widespread 
non-compliance.  
The Regulation Taskforce (2006) recognised that regulators are faced with 
competing policy objectives and that trade-offs sometimes need to be made, 
including between the goal of reducing risk and the goal of lessening compliance 
burdens. It recommended (recommendations 7.14 and 7.15) that governments 
provide regulators with clear direction, in relevant legislation or in ‘Statements of 
Expectation’, accepting the reality that such trade-offs are inevitable (see chapter 6). 
A more rigorous and consistent application of risk based policies (for example, 
greater focus on businesses most at risk of non-compliance) could achieve higher 
compliance and also reduce overall costs. However, for some regulated activities or 
particular businesses it may be the case that more stringent approval processes, 
increased reporting or more frequent inspections will be appropriate.  
Encouraging voluntary compliance 
While there is a full spectrum of business attitudes to compliance, generally most 
businesses are willing to comply:  
The vast majority of small businesses seek to do the right thing and comply, even if the 
rule seems burdensome, unfair or illogical. (Office of the NSW Small Business 
Commissioner, sub. DR40, p. 2) 
Indeed, businesses will often be highly motivated to comply with regulatory 
requirements for reputational or customer relationship reasons. A reputation for 
poor compliance can have a major impact on the profitability of a small business (or 
in the extreme can cause it to fail) where customers have a personal interest in, or 
concern about, the consequences of the poor compliance — for example, poor food 
hygiene in a local restaurant. The consequences for a business can be greater (and 
more difficult to undo if a regulator makes an error) in a world with the internet and 
social media enabling very widespread and quick dissemination of opinions and 
reviews. This is also why ‘name and shame’ enforcement strategies can potentially 
   





be such a harsh (but nevertheless sometimes appropriate) sanction for 
non-compliance by a small business.  
Despite the motivation and attitude towards achieving compliance of many small 
businesses, often they do not have the knowledge or capacity to comply and 
struggle to understand their obligations (chapter 3). One of the most important 
strategies then for regulators is to ensure compliance obligations are clearly 
communicated and that appropriate guidance and advice is available, including on 
the consequences of non-compliance (chapter 5).  
To encourage voluntary compliance, participants emphasised the importance of 
regulators adopting an educative and facilitative approach to compliance. The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (sub. 29), for example, suggested that many 
small businesses would find it easier to comply with complex and confusing laws if 
regulators took a more educative approach.  
Businesses may also be more likely to comply with regulatory requirements where 
they have influenced, or have at least been consulted on, their design, rather than 
requirements simply imposed on them by regulators. 
As noted by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) in its 
submission, ‘prevention of a breach … is preferable to taking action after a breach 
has occurred and consumers or businesses have suffered harm’ (sub. 26, p. 1) and 
similarly Freiberg (2000, p. 8) points out ‘… enforcement should always be a 
weapon in the compliance armoury, but it should not be the first or only weapon’. 
Submissions highlighted a number of examples of regulators adopting a cooperative 
and educative approach to compliance. These included: 
• the conciliatory approach adopted by the National Measurement Institute and the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) in dealing 
with minor innocent breaches (Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, 
Research & Tertiary Education, sub. 18; Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd, sub. 20) 
• the Australian Taxation Office’s assistance and education in relation to Business 
Activity Statement preparation (Housing Industry Association, sub. 24) 
• the ACCC’s approach to enforcement in relation to price impact claims, 
following the introduction of the carbon price: 
Given the difficulty involved in calculating the impact of the carbon price, the ACCC 
… took a pragmatic approach to enforcement in this area (ACCC, sub. 26, p. 3). [In the 
first 100 days following the commencement of the carbon price] The ACCC issued 
over 40 formal and informal warning letters to traders in various sectors and sent out 
over 50 educative letters to traders providing them with information and guidance 
material about carbon price claims and the role of the ACCC. (ACCC, sub. 26, p. 7) 






While many regulators do recognise the value of a proactive educative approach to 
securing compliance, it can be a challenge, particularly for smaller regulators. There 
can be a tendency for some to focus on ‘what we’ve always done’ and the minimum 
required, rather than devoting resources to education strategies and actively 
promoting compliance, which in the short term can be more costly, but would be 
likely to have longer term benefits.  
A number of submissions stressed the importance of regulators understanding the 
challenges small businesses face and appreciating what motivates and influences 
them (see, for example, Strong Strategies, sub. 19 and NSW Business Chamber, 
sub. 25). The work of the United Kingdom Behavioural Insights Team was 
identified as an innovative model for finding ways of encouraging, supporting and 
enabling businesses to make better choices for themselves (DIISRTE, sub. 18).  
Some regulators have successfully implemented reward and incentive strategies that 
further encourage businesses to demonstrate a strong commitment to compliance. 
This can take the form of reduced frequency or less onerous inspection or reporting 
requirements for businesses with a good track record of compliance. The National 
Transport Commission will shortly release its Compliance Framework, which 
embodies the use of concessions, subsidies and grants to incentivise compliance 
(sub. 1). The Local Government Association of Queensland advocated that 
regulators facilitate the display by businesses of ‘a sign/permit that recognises 
compliance, and possibly the achievement of a rating or ranking’ (sub. 27, p. 10). 
Such a practice is common in some jurisdictions for businesses demonstrating good 
food safety practices (PC 2009). 
The Commission considers that regulators should generally adopt an educative and 
facilitative approach to achieving compliance, including rewards and incentives for 
businesses with a good compliance history, except where this would be inconsistent 
with the goal of maximising the overall community net benefits from regulation. 
Such an approach will generally reduce compliance costs for small business and 
increase voluntary compliance.  
Streamlining assessment and approval processes 
Licensing, registration and approval processes are considered by many businesses to 
be one of the major sources of compliance costs and ‘what many businesses think of 
when they hear the words ‘red tape’’ (NSW Business Chamber, sub. 25, p. 7).  
Submissions identified certain processes or requirements that, it was contended, are 
unnecessarily complex and/or burdensome. A sample of the concerns raised are 
   





provided in box 4.1, but the Commission does not take a position in this report on 
the veracity of any particular concern. 
The Commission is also aware, including from its recent benchmarking studies (for 
example on Planning, Zoning and Development Assessment (PC 2011b) and Local 
Government as Regulator (PC 2012)) that similar concerns are widespread in 
relation to assessment and approval processes of local governments. The Business 
Council of Australia for instance submitted the following comments to the 
Commission’s Local Government as Regulator study: 
The increasing complexity [of the regulatory system] is particularly evident in regards 
to planning and zoning where the documentation required to support development 
applications has continued to grow in volume and complexity … (BCA 2011, p. 3) 
 
Box 4.1 Participants’ views about unnecessarily burdensome 
requirements 
• The ‘overly legalistic and prescriptive’ processes of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission for the registration of self managed super fund auditors 
(Institute of Public Accountants, sub. 29, p. 6). 
• Complexity and vagueness of Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 
requirements (Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, sub. 5). 
• The Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA) is 
‘extremely risk averse’ and inflexible in its assessments of applications for the 
registration of veterinary medicines and pesticides; excessive or unpredictable in its 
demands for information; its processes do not sufficiently recognise appropriate 
overseas assessments and are too costly for applicants; and decisions are based 
on too narrow a consideration of costs and benefits (Hills Orchard Improvement 
Group Inc, sub. 9). The Commission notes that the Australian Government has 
introduced major reforms for the approval, registration and review of agricultural and 
veterinary chemicals via the Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Legislation 
Amendment Act 2013, which commences on 1 July 2014 (see appendix D). 
• Multiplicity of licences required by electrical contractors ‘and the processes for 
applying and maintaining each and every licence has become extreme’ (Master 
Electricians Australia, sub. 8, p. 7). 
• The high cost of annual repeat registrations under the requirements set by the 
Migration Agent’s Registration Authority’s Code of Conduct (Migration Institute of 
Australia, sub. 14).  
 
Governments, or regulators where they have discretion to change requirements, 
need to consider whether there is scope (without compromising achievement of 
objectives) to reduce the compliance burden of approval, registration or licensing 
processes by, for example: 






• rationalising the number of registrations and licences required or consolidating 
core licences — the Commission notes that the NSW Government recently 
commissioned the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) to 
examine licences (broadly defined) and identify priorities for reform to reduce 
regulatory burdens  
– governments should also give consideration, on a case by case basis, to 
whether a single licence could be developed to cover certain business 
activities that currently require multiple licences (box 4.2) — the Office of 
the NSW Small Business Commissioner supports a ‘one business, one 
licence’ approach (sub. DR40, p. 2) 
• ensuring governments cooperate to mutually recognise licences, registrations 
and approvals wherever possible — Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and 
Western Australia have introduced such arrangements, for example to enable 
mobile food vendors to operate without having to register with multiple local 
governments within their region/state (PC 2012) 
• extending the period of licences and registrations so that the requirement for 
renewal is less frequent — the Office of the Australian Small Business 
Commissioner suggested five or ten year licences could be considered (sub. 10), 
but given that licence renewal is an opportunity to establish ongoing compliance 
with requirements, there must be an appropriate evaluation of risks and the costs 
and benefits of different licence periods 
• making requirements clearer and simpler 
• ensuring all significant costs and benefits are appropriately taken into account in 
making assessments and determining approvals 
• reducing the requirements that lower risk businesses or products (those, for 
example, that have been approved overseas; or can demonstrate a record of a 
high level of performance, competency, internal quality assurance processes) 
need to meet to have an application approved. 
Better targeting and coordination of investigations and inspections 
For many regulators, investigations, audits and inspections are the most widely used 
tools for checking compliance. They are often the primary way small businesses 
‘experience’ regulations and regulators. Around 85 per cent of respondents to the 
Commission’s regulator survey undertake inspections as part of their compliance 
management strategies.  
Audit and inspection activity is a significant source of regulatory burden, 
particularly in light of their typically recurring nature. Costs are incurred by 
   





business in preparing for audits and inspections (including retrieving documents); 
staff time spent with inspectors (often senior management with a high opportunity 
cost of their time); and in administrative activities that flow from the inspection. 
That said, it is also the case that many small businesses welcome some level of 
inspections as an opportunity to draw on the inspector’s knowledge and get tailored 
advice and guidance or obtain reassurance that they are doing things the right way. 
 
Box 4.2 Combining licences where a business type typically holds the 
same licences 
For some activities, businesses are required to hold multiple licences covering different 
aspects of their activities and deal with a number of different regulators. Where it is 
common for businesses of a given type to hold the same suite of licences there may be 
merit in consolidating the different licences into a single combined licence. This could 
have the advantage of substantially reducing the licensing-related compliance burden 
on businesses. 
One possible application of this principle, for example, could be a single licence for 
restaurants that covers both food safety and the service of liquor. In considering 
whether a single licence is appropriate for any particular business activity, 
governments and regulators would need to establish whether the benefits of such a 
change would be likely to outweigh the costs for the community as a whole. A case by 
case assessment would be required, but a number of general issues would need to be 
considered, including:  
• Where the licences to be consolidated are currently administered by more than one 
agency, it is likely that the regulator responsible for the area of greatest risk would 
be the most likely choice to assume regulatory responsibility for the combined 
licence. For instance, in the example cited above, the food safety regulator might 
assume full regulatory control for licensing a restaurant, including its service of 
alcohol. 
• The administration and enforcement of the combined requirements need to be 
within the capacity of the agency that assumes regulatory responsibility for the 
combined licence. This means that if a regulatory area is highly specialised, it may 
not be efficient for another agency to assume partial responsibility in this area. 
• There may potentially be a greater burden placed on those businesses that do not 
require all of the licences that are combined within a single licence and therefore 
have to satisfy additional requirements associated with the broader licence.  
 
Audits and inspections are also costly for regulators, in terms of administrative costs 
preparing for and undertaking such activities. Given these costs for business and 
regulators it is very important that audit and inspection activity is targeted and based 
on appropriate risk management systems. In practice this should mean that higher 
risk businesses get audited/inspected more frequently and/or are the subject of more 
in-depth (and costly) investigations or inspections than lower risk businesses. 






The Office of State Revenue (OSR) in NSW has found that improved targeting of 
compliance activities, based on better data drawn from WorkCover and the ATO, 
has reduced the number of audits not resulting in an additional tax liability. In 
2011-12, only around 10 per cent of targeted businesses not registered for payroll 
tax were found upon investigation to not be liable for payment of the tax. This 
compared with the few years preceding where the businesses found to not be liable 
averaged more than 50 per cent. Better targeting reduced the number of businesses 
being subjected to unnecessary investigations and associated compliance costs and 
large savings in audit costs for the regulator (OSR NSW, pers. comm., 
March 2013).  
There are concerns amongst stakeholders, however, that many regulators do not 
sufficiently consider the different risks presented by businesses when planning audit 
and inspection programs. For example, a history of good compliance is not always 
taken into account in determining inspection frequency. This is consistent with 
findings of the Commission’s Local Government as Regulator benchmarking study, 
for example, that the frequency of swimming pool inspections by local governments 
often did not take sufficient account of the risk categorisation of the business and its 
compliance history (PC 2012). 
In addition to regular scheduled visits (for example, annually or once every six 
months), risk based inspections can be part of special targeted campaigns or in 
response to complaints or a particular event. There is also a role for inspections that 
are not strictly risk based. The threat of a random inspection or spot check provides 
an additional incentive for businesses classified as low risk to maintain their 
compliance and also makes allowance for the fact that risk assessments are not 
perfect and rogue businesses may otherwise ‘slip through the cracks’. Such 
approaches also recognise that risks change over time.  
Table 4.1 summarises the Commission’s regulator survey findings on the use of 
inspections by regulators. It is apparent that inspections following complaints and 
targeted inspections based on risk assessments are the inspection strategies used by 
the highest proportion of regulators. Where the latter strategy was used it accounted 
for the highest proportion of overall inspections. 
Since an objective of compliance programs should be to help businesses comply, 
there is an argument that inspections should be announced so that businesses have 
time to prepare and get the most value from the inspection. On the other hand, if a 
business has been in serious breach of regulations it is important that this does not 
go undetected (because the business had time to temporarily raise their standards 
prior to an announced inspection). Generally there should be a mix of announced 
and unannounced inspections, as is reflected in the practice of most regulators 
   





responding to the Commission’s survey. However, of those regulators reporting that 
they used announced inspections, such inspections accounted for around 90 per cent 
of all inspections (Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013). Irrespective of 
whether a business is given notice of an inspection ‘[r]egulators should always 
explain why they are there and what they are looking for’ (Australian Industry 
Group, sub. DR39, p. 14). 
Table 4.1 Use of inspection strategies 
 Per cent of regulators 
that undertake inspections 
& use specific inspection strategy  
 
Per cent of regulator’s 
overall inspectionsa  
Following a complaint 82 10 






Other targeted campaign 44 10 
Random spot check 56 10 
Regular visits  





Other 24 14 
a Based on the median of 147 regulator responses. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
More generally, regulators need to strike a balance in their risk based inspection 
programs between use of proactive measures (that is, preventative audits and 
inspections to check ongoing compliance) and audits and inspections that are 
reactive (that is in response to complaints or a particular event). Also, in responding 
to complaints about business practices, regulators need to be wary of complaints 
that may be frivolous or vexatious. In this regard, the Australian Industry Group 
suggests: 
If an inspection is undertaken following a third party complaint (by an employee, union 
or member of the public etc.), the regulator should not prejudge the situation and act as 
if the alleged breach has occurred, or the facts alleged are true, until they are shown to 
be true. (sub. DR39, p. 14) 
Better coordination of inspection activity with other regulators 
A particular issue for many businesses is the cumulative burden they face as a result 
of the number of separate inspections of their business carried out by multiple 
government authorities. In some cases the regulators have overlapping 
responsibilities and there is duplication in the inspections: 
[There] [c]ontinues to be significant overlap and duplication of audit and inspection 
effort, particularly in regard to food safety, export and quality assurance; for food 






producers, manufacturers, transporters and retailers this represents one of the most time 
consuming and inefficient aspects of their compliance. There is no coordination 
between jurisdictions in relation to reporting, documentation and audit processes – 
whilst each agency applies a ‘full-cost recovery/ fee for service’ model and charges 
businesses licence fees, audit fees and documentation processing fees. (Chamber of 
Commerce & Industry Queensland (CCIQ), sub. 16, p. 4) 
Streamlining of licensing and other requirements (including potentially the 
consolidation of multiple licences into a single licence for some activities) would go 
some way towards addressing the cumulative burden of regulation for small 
business. However, to the extent that businesses are required to deal with a range of 
different regulators, it is important that coordination mechanisms are in place to 
alleviate problems of overlap or inconsistency. Around 50 per cent of regulators 
routinely coordinate inspections with one or more regulators (Productivity 
Commission regulator survey 2013). 
In some regulatory fields, coordination will be required between regulators across 
jurisdictions or operating within different tiers of government. The enforcement of 
many state laws is devolved to local governments (for example, waste management, 
planning, building and development laws (PC 2012)) and in some areas of 
regulation (in some states), enforcement is undertaken by agencies at both the state 
and local government level, for example food safety.1  
Coordinating and streamlining inspection activity can result in significant savings 
for regulators and businesses. Strategies include ‘joining up’ inspections, 
coordination in scheduling or recognition of inspections carried out by other 
government or private bodies (see below). Many regulators appear to be aware of 
overlap and duplication in inspections and are actively trying to address the problem 
through formal agreements, for example, the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Victorian departments of Sustainability and Environment and Primary 
Industries (VCEC 2011, p. 106) or through other general mechanisms for 
cooperation such as forums of regulators. The NSW Food Authority has a number 
of measures in place to facilitate coordination: 
• The Authority’s Local Government Unit interaction with councils and the Food 
Regulation Forum 
• Food business notification information is shared between councils and Authority 
• The Authority maintains a MOU with DAFF/AQIS regarding export registered 
facilities to avoid double regulating 
                                              
1  For a discussion of considerations that are potentially relevant in determining an efficient 
allocation of regulatory functions between tiers of government see PC (2012). 
   





• The Authority maintains a MOU with Queensland to avoid double licensing of 
fishing vessels operating in both jurisdictions 
• Joint operations with fisheries, Office of Environment and Heritage, NSW Police, 
Liquor Gaming and Racing, NSW Health, Local Government, NSW Fair Trading. 
(NSW Food Authority, sub. 28, p. 13) 
One approach to minimising the burden of inspections is the concept of delegated 
inspections. This approach, which has had some positive results in the Netherlands 
(Blanc 2012), involves one regulator, when undertaking its inspections, acting as 
the ‘eyes and ears’ for one or more others. In Australia, Dairy Food Safety Victoria 
undertakes some limited risk assessments for the Environment Protection Authority 
(EPA) while undertaking its food safety related inspections. It then provides the 
EPA with aggregated information on areas in which businesses may require more 
attention, enabling the EPA to better target its enforcement resources 
(EPA Victoria, pers. comm., 4 June 2013). Some local governments also undertake 
checks on behalf of state health departments (PC 2009).  
For such approaches to be effective, inspectors may need to receive additional 
training that would equip them to at least spot the most critical problems. It is likely 
that in some areas of regulation there would be legislative or other legal barriers to 
such arrangements and perhaps resistance from regulatory officers, both those being 
asked to take on additional inspection responsibilities, and those who may feel their 
role is being usurped.  
Coordination between regulators is discussed further in chapter 6 in relation to 
regulator capacities and sharing of experiences. The next chapter also discusses 
coordination issues with a focus on information requests, including the concept of a 
‘lead regulator’ as a mechanism for simplifying and rationalising business 
engagement with regulators. 
Overall, the Commission has found that efficient delivery of regulation will 
generally be enhanced when the frequency, complexity and comprehensiveness of 
audits, investigations and inspections of businesses are commensurate with risks. 
However, regulators also need to strike an appropriate balance in the use of 
preventative and reactive action and also random and targeted measures. 
To reduce the burden associated with unnecessary or inefficient inspections, 
governments and regulators should implement measures to ensure there is: 
appropriate recognition of low risk activities and businesses with a consistently 
strong history of compliance, for example by requiring less frequent or 
comprehensive inspections; and cooperation and coordination in audits and 
inspections, including through joint inspections and inspections by one regulator on 
behalf of another. 






Making better use of industry and existing certification processes 
Outsourcing some aspects of compliance monitoring or management (such as 
inspections) to third parties, or relying on, or recognising existing private, 
government, or overseas certification processes can in certain circumstances lower 
costs for business and/or regulators.  
The Commission found that some regulators are engaging contractors — for 
example, around 20 per cent of respondents to the Commission’s survey said that 
their agency engaged contractors to carry out inspections or on-site visits 
(Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013). Building certification, for 
example is commonly undertaken by private certifiers in Australia, although states 
and territories differ in the range of areas in which private certifiers are empowered 
to act (PC 2012). 
Often a regulator, when choosing to outsource activities, will be primarily 
motivated by a lack of in house skills, or the need to achieve cost savings or other 
efficiencies in their operations. However, businesses can indirectly benefit, for 
example, where there are resulting improvements in timeliness or other aspects of 
quality. 
There can also be more direct benefits for business. For instance, there will be cost 
savings for a business where products they sell that have already satisfied rigorous 
overseas certification processes are approved for sale in Australia without the 
requirement for further assessment (for example, the Therapeutic Goods 
Administration in its regulation of medical devices, in some instances accepts 
certain manufacturer compliance certificates issued by overseas regulators). 
Some participants called for greater recognition of existing accreditation processes 
or professional qualifications in determining registration or other requirements. For 
example, the Migration Institute of Australia (MIA) considers that migration agents 
with certain levels of accreditation (that demonstrate their competency and clean 
record) under the Institute’s tiered membership scheme should be exempt from ‘the 
burden of annual repeat registration costs’ and that streamlined registration 
requirements and reduced fees should apply for lawyer agents — their Legal 
Practicing Certificate should be accepted as evidence they have already complied 
with many of the requirements for annual registration (MIA, sub. 14, p. 3). The 
Commission recently examined the compliance burden for lawyers practising in the 
area of migration law and recommended that those with a current practising 
certificate be exempt from the regulatory requirements of the Migration Agents 
Registration Scheme (PC 2010a). 
   





The Commission also heard in consultations that many businesses are required to 
meet standards required by major customers (for example, suppliers to large 
retailers such as Coles and Woolworths) or, in the case of franchisees, by 
franchisors, that in some cases are arguably higher, but not the same as, mandated 
standards. It is the Commission’s view that regulators could consider, in some 
cases, accepting evidence of compliance with such requirements as also meeting the 
relevant regulatory standard. 
Some examples of industry accreditation processes that are currently used as the 
basis for an exemption from, or a reduction in, licensing/registration requirements 
were highlighted by participants, including: 
• the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA 2010) recognises the 
ECO Tourism Australia Certification Program — operators with certification 
under this program are referred to as ‘high standard operators’ and can apply for 
extended 15 year terms for their Marine Parks permit 
• various state regulators recognise the Australian Tourism Accreditation Program 
(ATAP) — for example, operators in Victoria, Western Australia and South 
Australia with accreditation are eligible for extended licences for access to 
National Parks (ATAP Victoria 2010; South Australian Tourism Industry 
Council 2013; WA Department of Environment and Conservation 2012). 
In the Commission’s view, regulators should systematically consider the 
recognition of existing industry and other third party certification processes when 
determining compliance requirements for business. They should also consider the 
scope for outsourcing inspections and other compliance monitoring (but generally 
not enforcement) activities to industry.  
Where any outsourcing or third party processes are relied on, the regulator remains 
responsible for ensuring regulatory requirements are being satisfied. It is essential, 
therefore, that the regulator has appropriate monitoring and quality assurance 
systems in place to ensure standards are maintained and regulatory objectives are 
being met. For example, where private inspectors are utilised, there must be systems 
in place to certify their competency, create the right incentives for them to operate 
in the public interest and impose appropriate sanctions when they do not meet their 
obligations. Governments must also ensure that there are no unnecessary legislative 
or other constraints on the capacity of regulators to adopt such strategies where 
appropriate. 






Alternative approaches to managing compliance 
Some regulator approaches to managing compliance can impose a lower regulatory 
burden on some small businesses by providing them with greater flexibility as to 
how they comply — for example management systems approaches — or by 
generally accepting a business’s own assessment of compliance with requirements 
— self assessment. 
Use of management systems approach 
Certain regulators, for example in the food safety area, monitor compliance 
indirectly, by checking that appropriate management systems, processes or control 
procedures are in place, rather than direct checks on outputs. The principle behind 
such an approach is that with the right systems in place there is a strong likelihood 
that desired outputs and regulatory outcomes will be achieved.  
Compared to traditional models for verifying compliance, the potential benefits of 
such approaches include greater flexibility and reduced compliance costs for 
business, lower administration costs for regulators and the potential to build 
capacities and influence culture within businesses. The literature suggests that these 
regulatory approaches lend themselves more readily to some industry sectors than 
others and are particularly worth considering when dealing with diverse and hard to 
assess risks that can make it difficult to specify desired outcomes in regulatory 
standards or observe business compliance with those standards (see, for example: 
OECD (2010); Gunningham (1999); and Gunningham and Sinclair (2011)). 
Management systems approaches have been used quite extensively in Australia and 
overseas, for example, in the occupational health and safety and food safety areas. 
The food safety regime called HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Points) adopted in Australia and many other countries is one of the most prominent 
examples. Whilst the degree of flexibility under management system approaches 
varies significantly, generally businesses are expected to: 
… produce plans or adopt management systems that comply with criteria stated by the 
regulator, such as to identify hazards, develop options for risk mitigation, establish 
procedures for monitoring and correcting problems, train employees in these 
procedures, and develop measures for evaluating and continuously improving the 
firm’s management with respect to the stated social objective. Firms are sometimes 
expected to obtain approval or certification by government regulators or third-party 
auditors of their management practices and their compliance with their internally 
generated plans and procedures. (OECD 2010, p. 163) 
In most cases, the adoption by regulators of management systems compliance 
approaches simply reflects requirements set out in legislative frameworks. 
   





However, in other cases regulators have chosen to adopt a compliance regime with 
elements of a management approach as an alternative to more traditional 
compliance approaches. 
The NSW Food Authority submitted information on the use of the food safety 
supervisor (FSS) model in the regulation of retail food businesses in that state:  
… NSW ensures that each retail food business has the capacity to operate safely by 
requiring each business to have one trained food safety supervisor (FSS) for each 
premise it operates. The training involves two nationally accredited units of 
competency and is usually delivered in one day. Arrangements to deliver the training 
through Registered Training Organisations are overseen by the Authority whereas 
compliance with FSS requirements is overseen by councils. (NSW Food Authority, 
sub. 28, p. 7) 
The NSW Food Authority contrasted the FSS model with the requirements in some 
other states for businesses to document and implement a food safety plan (FSP), 
against which they are audited. According to the Authority, the main industry body, 
Restaurant & Catering NSW, ‘supports FSS as a lower cost alternative to FSP 
requirements’ (NSW Food Authority, sub. 28, p. 7). However, there have also been 
concerns about the costs for businesses, and particularly small business, of 
complying with the FSS requirements. These include the cost of attending a training 
course including lost work time and the need, in 24 hour food businesses or where 
staff turnover is high, for a business to train a number of FSSs (PC 2009). Further, 
FSS requirements may not be entirely compatible with a risk based approach, since 
requirements are universally applicable to all businesses, irrespective of their 
history of compliance or the type of food they serve. 
Depending on the specific design, there can be greater scope under management 
systems and similar approaches to build awareness within regulated businesses of 
the underlying rationale for regulatory requirements and the outcomes they seek to 
achieve. This builds capacities and can lead to businesses being more proactive and 
innovative, rather than adopting a narrow compliance checklist approach. If the 
regulator is not prescriptive about systems and processes that a business must have 
in place, a management system approach ‘leverages the private sector’s knowledge 
about its particular circumstances and engages firms in developing their own 
internal procedures and monitoring practices that respond to risks’ (OECD 2010, 
p. 159). As noted above, businesses may also be more likely to comply with 
procedural requirements that they have designed or substantially influenced. 
While some small businesses would have the necessary capacities to take advantage 
of the flexibility such approaches offer and would benefit from reductions in 
compliance costs, more typically any benefits are likely to be outweighed by set up 
and other costs. As was noted in chapter 3, while small businesses appreciate 






flexibility, they may often not have the knowledge or resources to develop their 
own plans or procedures and can prefer the certainty that comes with greater 
prescription.  
Use of self assessments 
A still more light handed approach involves regulators accepting self assessments or 
self declarations of compliance with no additional requirements for businesses to 
demonstrate compliance. Self assessments are commonly used in taxation and 
revenue reporting areas. The ATO, for example, initially accepts the information 
lodged by small business, but reserves the right to scrutinise the accuracy of the 
information at a later date, for instance as part of risk based audit strategies. The 
Brisbane City Council (2010) also allows self assessment of compliance for 
restaurants deemed as low risk and, to reduce the regulatory burden on home-based 
businesses, local government can employ a self assessment process for determining 
whether development approval is required (PC 2012).  
More generally, in relation to development assessments, each state has introduced 
track-based development assessment systems based on the Leading Practice Model 
developed by the Development Assessment Forum. Six ‘tracks’ were developed to 
allow applications to be streamlined commensurate with the level of assessment 
required to make an appropriately informed decision. One track accepts self 
assessment by the applicant:  
… where a proposed development can be assessed against clearly articulated, 
quantitative criteria and it is always true that consent will be given if the criteria are 
met, self assessment by the applicant can provide an efficient assessment method. 
(PC 2012, p. 436) 
Under a risk management approach regulators need to make judgements about the 
extent to which they can rely on businesses’ own systems or self declarations to 
achieve regulatory outcomes. Management plans that look to be suitable on paper, 
may not be effective in practice, or indeed may not be followed. Consideration 
therefore needs to be given to the optimal level and nature of auditing or checking 
that regulators must carry out as an assurance mechanism and also to appropriate 
sanctions for non-compliance to discourage ‘gaming’ or strategic non-compliance.  
RECOMMENDATION 
To increase voluntary compliance and reduce compliance costs for small 
business, regulators should ensure — subject to the overarching goal of 
maximising community net benefits — that: 
   





• they are adopting an educative and facilitative approach to achieving 
compliance  
• licensing, registration, and other processes and requirements are as simple 
and streamlined as possible — for example licences are rationalised and less 
frequent or comprehensive inspections are required for low risk businesses 
• they cooperate and coordinate to reduce the cumulative burden of regulation, 
for example through mutual recognition of approvals and permits or joint or 
delegated inspections  
• existing industry and other third party certification and inspection processes 
are recognised when determining compliance requirements for business. 
Governments should ensure that there are no unnecessary legislative or other 
constraints on the capacity of regulators to adopt such strategies where 
appropriate. 
4.4 Ensuring enforcement responses are effective and 
proportionate 
Enforcement will be most efficient — that is, net benefits for the community will be 
maximised — when regulators have access to a range of enforcement tools and are 
able to tailor their responses to breaches or potential breaches of regulation in a 
proportionate way. 
One of the key concerns raised by small business and their associations in this study 
has been that the enforcement response of regulators is often out of proportion with 
the nature of the breach and its consequences, and that there is insufficient focus on 
outcomes and the ‘bigger picture’: 
Where genuine mistakes or oversights have been made which can be easily 
rectified/changed by businesses owner whilst the enforcement officer is on premises, 
no leniency is provided and business is immediately breached (e.g. blown light bulb in 
fire exit sign which business owner offered to change immediately was not allowed and 
the business was issued a breach notice and fine). (CCIQ, sub. 16, p. 5) 
One of our case studies also provided an example of a business who was fined for only 
submitting one, rather than two, electronic backup copies. (CCIQ, sub. 16, p. 7)  
There is a perception amongst small business owners that regulators choose to focus 
their enforcement actions on minor matters, such as administrative errors made by 
contractors, as opposed to concentrating on the bigger picture. In the context of the 
electrical industry, electrical safety should be the ultimate intention behind any form of 
regulation … Such administrative omissions are more likely a result of small business 
not having the time or resources to dedicate to understanding what their obligations are, 
rather than a blatant disregard for the law. (Master Electricians Australia, sub. 8, p. 5) 







Leading practices in enforcement tend to involve a mix of ‘persuade and educate’ 
approaches (section 4.3) and tougher sanction based approaches. This recognises 
that the reason for, and consequences of, non-compliance will vary significantly and 
that regulators should be able to draw on a range of enforcement tools. It also 
recognises that: 
… an enforcement strategy based solely on deterrence would antagonise the many 
businesses that are willing to comply, as well as risk a subculture of regulatory 
resistance if the focus on punishing is deemed unfair. On the other hand, a regulator 
with a pure advise-and-persuade strategy could embolden recalcitrant businesses that 
intentionally choose not to comply. (PC 2011a, p. 11, appendix H) 
Many regulators apply an ‘escalation’ model where they start with a soft approach, 
but signal to businesses their commitment to escalate their enforcement response 
and apply tougher sanctions whenever lower levels of intervention fail to secure 
compliance. These models use what are commonly termed ‘enforcement pyramids’ 
(figure 4.1), with most regulated entities subject to action at the bottom of the 
pyramid, and fewer and fewer businesses subject to the higher levels of sanction or 
penalty further up the pyramid. This principle is reflected in the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) Best Practice Regulation guide: 
… enforcement options should differentiate between the good corporate citizen and the 
renegade, to ensure that ‘last resort’ penalties are used most effectively (rarely) but 
model behaviour is encouraged. (2007, p. 16) 
As an example of escalation in practice, WorkSafe Tasmania (part of the 
Department of Justice) advised the Commission that the lowest level of their 
enforcement pyramid — ‘improvements though information and guidance’ — 
accounted for 86 per cent of all enforcement actions in 2011-12, whereas 
infringement notices and prosecutions, the two most severe levels of enforcement 
tools available to them, together accounted for only 3 per cent of all actions 
(Department of Justice, pers. comm., 26 February 2013). 
Enforcement pyramids will appropriately vary across different fields of regulation 
— for example, in those areas where non-compliance has catastrophic or extremely 
costly consequences (such as in the area of aviation safety regulation), enforcement 
policies tend to make less use of ‘soft’ elements and move very rapidly to tough 
sanctions, higher up the pyramid.  
Apart from the nature and magnitude of any detriment associated with a breach, 
regulators need to balance a number of considerations in determining an optimal 
enforcement response. These include factors specific to the regulator, industry, or 
   





area of regulation, and also to the individual circumstances of particular businesses. 
Some of these factors are discussed further in appendixes D and F, but include:  
• the resources available to the enforcement agency and the resources involved in 
different sanction options 
• the ease of detecting breaches of different regulations or proving offences 
• the rate of turnover of businesses in a particular industry 
• public attitudes to risk 
• the size of the business and its capacity to comply  
• the compliance history of businesses and mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances. 
Figure 4.1 Example of an enforcement pyramid 
 
Sources: PC (2010b); adapted from Gilligan, Bird and Ramsay (1999); Ayres and Braithwaite (1992). 
The enforcement powers of some regulators, such as the new National Heavy 
Vehicle Regulator, recognise that the individual or business that is technically in 
breach of a regulation may not be the only one in the supply chain that is culpable 
for the non compliance. They seek to ensure the right incentives are created for all 
key parties in the supply chain to behave in a manner that contributes to positive 
compliance outcomes. The concept of ‘chain of responsibility’ in the context of 
heavy vehicle regulation enforcement, for example, means ‘a consignee that 
unloaded over-mass vehicles or a scheduler that forced drivers to speed to meet 






deadlines would be just as culpable for the noncompliance as the traditional target 
of enforcement: the driver’ (National Transport Commission, sub. 1, p. 5). 
The range of available enforcement tools varies 
The range of enforcement tools available to regulators varies significantly across 
regulatory regimes and between individual regulators. Beyond education and 
advice, common tools include: verbal warnings; written directives; negotiated or 
administrative resolutions; improvement, prohibition and ban notices; enforceable 
undertakings; adverse publicity (including ‘name and shame’ approaches); licence 
suspensions and cancellations; infringement and penalty notices; and prosecution. 
Figure 4.2 shows the extent to which different types of enforcement tools are used 
by regulators, while some of the key issues around their use are outlined in 
table 4.2. Key features, strengths and weaknesses of different tools are discussed in 
more detail in appendix F.  
Figure 4.2 Regulators’ frequency of use of different enforcement tools 
Per cent of regulatorsa 
 
a Based on responses from 186 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
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Some regulators have discretion to use a wide range of tools. The NSW Food 
Authority, while noting that the adoption of an escalating compliance and 
enforcement policy by local councils in NSW is not mandatory, submitted the 
following comments on the tools potentially available to enforcement officers: 
Auditors and inspectors have discretion under this [enforcement] policy to apply 
appropriate enforcement tools commensurate with the significance of breaches 
detected. These tools may include provision of information, warning letters and 
improvement notices. Further escalation requires consultation with management and 
may then include the issuing of penalty notices, prohibition notices, seizure of 
goods/products or collection of evidence for prosecution. (NSW Food Authority, 
sub. 28, p. 12) 
Table 4.2 Enforcement tools 




• Cost effective and timely to administer. 
• An effective first step in addressing compliance 
breaches in many instances. 




referred to as ‘name 
and shame’ 
• Used where there is a perceived public interest in 
identifying offenders. May also provide a greater 
deterrence value. 
• Needs to be applied judiciously — the impacts on 
businesses can be severe, and can be difficult to 
redress if the sanction is applied in error. 
• Not used by many 
regulators, but 
more common in 
areas such as food 




• Allows tailored remedial actions in response to a 
compliance breach. 
• Allows the regulator and business the opportunity 
to negotiate the most appropriate way to address 
non-compliance. 
• Used, for example, 
by ASIC and the 
ACCC, but not 
widely used by 
other regulators. 
Pecuniary penalties 
— refers to the 
imposition of 
infringement notices 
or on the spot fines 
• Useful as a formal, yet administratively efficient 
and timely, enforcement tool. 
• A key issue is getting the value of fines 
commensurate with the scale of the compliance 
breach. 
• Frequently used by 
many regulators. 
Trading restrictions  • Includes licence suspensions or cancellations, the 
imposition of additional licence conditions, as well 
as product seizures or recalls. 
• Can be a very severe form of enforcement that 
prevents a business from operating. Should 
typically be used where less severe tools have 
been ineffective, or there is an immediate public 
danger posed by the business activity. 






(civil and criminal) 
• Can lead to a broad range of remedies, including 
injunctions, fines and imprisonment. 
• Can be drawn out and costly. 
• Would typically be used where lower forms of 
enforcement have been ineffective (or have been 
challenged). 
• Infrequently used 
by most regulators. 
Source: Appendix F. 






Some other regulators do not have the tools they need to ensure a proportional 
response to non-compliance. Indeed, some 30 per cent of regulators reported that 
their agency did not have a sufficient range of enforcement tools and some 
regulators have only one type of enforcement tool available.  
Where regulators consider they have an insufficient range of enforcement tools, 
most commonly they see the need for more tools in the mid-range of sanctions, such 
as improvement notices and enforceable undertakings (Productivity Commission 
regulator survey 2013).  
One consequence of a regulator having a limited number of tools, or tools that do 
not allow a low cost and/or commensurate response, can be that enforcement is 
rarely exercised. For example, if the only available sanctions are criminal 
prosecution, many detected violations will go unpunished because the regulator 
deems they are too harsh and/or not worth the substantial expense associated with 
criminal prosecution. This significantly diminishes the threat or deterrence value of 
enforcement. 
Regulators should, within a range prescribed by legislation, have flexibility to adjust 
the size of penalties such as fines, depending on factors such as the severity of the 
breach, compliance history and scale of operations of a business. This is to ensure 
that the prospect of a penalty being imposed remains an effective deterrent for very 
large activities, but does not impose a burden on small business that is out of 
proportion with the significance of the breach. 
The discretion to choose a light handed response to a breach or to not impose any 
sanction for minor or initial breaches of regulations, can reduce costs for regulators 
as well as businesses. It can also, by securing the trust and cooperation of 
businesses, lead to higher overall levels of compliance. A significant challenge for 
regulators, however, is to ensure that enforcement officers are making considered 
and impartial judgements when exercising their discretion and that discretion does 
not lead to problems of inconsistent interpretations.  
The Commission considers that appropriate guidance and training for officers in the 
use of discretion is critical and can be a key driver of better regulator practices, in 
particular delivering more responsive and flexible enforcement (chapter 6). Various 
oversight and accountability mechanisms can also help ensure discretion is used in a 
manner consistent with regulatory and community objectives and the risk of 
corruption is reduced (section 4.5). 
   






Governments should ensure that regulators have access to a sufficient range of 
enforcement tools to enable them to respond to compliance breaches flexibly and 
in a graduated, fair and proportionate way.  
4.5 Improving the quality of processes and decision 
making 
Some aspects of the quality of regulator processes were touched on above in 
relation to ensuring requirements imposed on business are the minimum necessary 
(for example, streamlining of processes and targeting of investigations and 
inspections). This section discusses timeliness, consistency and impartiality in 
regulator processes and decision making. These are critical factors in determining 
how regulation ultimately impacts on business — for example, through licence and 
registration applications, development applications or other assessment and 
approval processes — and they have been the focus of many of the concerns raised 
by participants in this and other recent Commission studies (for example, PC 2009, 
2011b, 2012).  
Another common quality related concern is the apparent inability or unwillingness 
of some regulator staff to provide small business with assistance on what would 
constitute compliance. To the extent that this reflects capacity and competency 
issues (including excessive risk aversion of staff) the discussion in chapter 6 is 
relevant; more generally the communication of information about compliance 
obligations is discussed in chapter 5. 
Timeliness 
Several participants raised concerns about lack of clarity in expected timeframes for 
certain regulatory processes and the uncertainty, frustration and cost impact 
resulting from unexpected delays (see, for example: CCIQ, sub. 16; Small Business 
Development Corporation (WA), sub. 22; and Accord Australasia, sub. DR41).  
According to a recent Council of Small Business of Australia (COSBOA) survey, 
35 per cent of small businesses respondents found regulator processing times to be 
excessive (COSBOA, sub. 31). These concerns are consistent with those raised with 
the Commission in recent benchmarking studies (see, for example, Planning, 
Zoning and Development Assessments (PC 2011b) and Local Government as 
Regulator (PC 2012)).  






The Office of the NSW Small Business Commissioner provided a case study which 
highlighted the potential consequences of delays and also suggests there may often 
be scope for a quicker and more flexible responses from regulators: 
A small business trader … [after a random workplace inspection] was informed that he 
[was] required to comply with a certain regulatory requirement … [and] his business 
would not be able to trade until this regulatory requirement was granted which could 
take up to six weeks … [which] would result in the business needing to lay off staff as 
well as meaning no income for the business owner until the licence was obtained. [The 
intervention of the Small Business Commissioner’s Office] … led to the licence being 
granted in less than 24 hours … (Office of the NSW Small Business 
Commissioner, sub. 12, p. 2) 
Delay costs for business take a number of forms, for example: additional interest 
payments on loans and other holding or standby costs; forgone profits and interest 
on profits relating to existing activities; loss of good staff; and the costs associated 
with opportunities forgone. Businesses value certainty and stress the ‘importance of 
an “early no”, especially when considering whether proposed projects or approvals 
are potentially viable’ (VCEC 2011, p. 100). Delays can be a major problem for 
both big and small businesses. In a recent Australian survey of business chief 
executive officers, waiting for a regulatory decision was nominated as the most 
costly stage of the compliance process and 60 per cent of small businesses 
considered it a ‘high cost’ (Australian Industry Group 2011).  
Some delays are caused by factors outside a regulator’s control, for example, an 
approval or application process may be delayed because an applicant has not 
submitted all of the required information or has not responded in a timely way to 
requests by the regulator for further information. ‘Stop the clock’ provisions are 
used by many regulators to ensure that delays caused by the applicant do not count 
against the regulator’s timeliness performance. The Commission has, however, 
previously found evidence that some regulators use such provisions in inappropriate 
or inefficient ways (PC 2012). 
While some delays will be unavoidable, there would appear to be scope for many 
regulators to improve timeliness. First, stronger commitments to target timelines for 
key regulatory processes or activities would go some way towards addressing 
business concerns about lack of clarity and certainty.  
When drafting new or amended legislation, it would generally be good practice to 
include statutory time limits. In principle, this should impose a strong discipline on 
regulators to perform their activities in a timely manner. Overall, around two thirds 
of regulators reported that they are subject to time limits mandated in legislation or 
regulation. The use of mandated time limits does, however, vary across regulatory 
areas (and also between specific regulatory functions within areas) — for instance, 
   





while all taxation or superannuation related regulators and over 90 per cent of 
regulators in the area of building and construction reported mandated time limits, 
this was the case for only 50 per cent of food safety regulators (Productivity 
Commission regulator survey 2013).  
Governments and regulators can also commit to target timelines for standard 
processes and activities, in public statements or documents — for example, in: 
government statements of expectation and regulator statements of intent (see 
below); and service charters, corporate plans and/or annual reports. Overall, less 
than half of the Commonwealth and state and territory regulators surveyed by the 
Commission said that public commitments to target timeframes applied to their 
agency, although there were some differences by regulatory area. It was most 
common in the areas of industrial relations and occupational health and safety, and 
less common in the areas of planning, heritage or land use; gaming and racing; and 
environment protection (Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013). Further, 
the Local Government Association of Queensland noted that: 
It is … a common practice for councils to apply service delivery charters which set out 
the timelines involved in a process which include expected response times to 
applications and enquiries. (sub. 27, p. 6) 
Ideally, and particularly for non-standard applications, regulators should routinely 
communicate expected timeframes (the timeframes that would apply if the regulator 
has received all required information) to applicants, including all key milestones. As 
soon as the regulator is aware there is likely to be any deviation from those 
timelines the applicant should be notified (with reasons given for the delay). Only 
around half the regulators responding to the Commission’s survey said they 
provided regulated businesses with advance notice of expected timeframes. This 
was most common amongst agencies in the areas of taxation and industrial 
relations, but utilised less often in the areas of planning, heritage or land use; 
superannuation; and gaming and racing (Productivity Commission regulator survey 
2013). 
Some other leading practices for improving timeliness are listed below: 
• track based assessment and allowing non-contentious applications to be fast 
tracked (NSW Business Chamber, sub. 25; PC 2012) 
• pre-lodgement meetings (for example on a development application) with advice 
provided in writing (PC 2012) 
• monitoring by regulators of the timeliness of their decisions and processes (and 
benchmarking of their timeframes with comparable regulators/processes) and 
any complaints related to timeliness 






• tracking progress of referrals to other agencies (22 per cent of regulators 
responding to the Commission’s regulator survey use this practice) 
• public reporting of performance against timeliness benchmarks (47 per cent of 
regulators use this practice (Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013)) 
– where timelines are not being met a commitment to strategies for reducing 
times wherever appropriate — this would increase accountability and create a 
stronger incentive to improve performance (chapter 6) 
• consideration of fee waivers or discounts where statutory timeframes are not met 
(DAFF 2011, p. 44) 
• selective use of ‘silence is consent’ policies — if a regulator does not respond to 
a complete application within a certain timeframe, the application is deemed to 
have been approved — this is used, for example, in the ACT for development 
applications requiring referral to another body (that body’s support for the 
application is assumed if no response is received within the statutory timeframe) 
(PC 2011b). 
RECOMMENDATION 
Regulators should undertake their regulatory activities in a timely manner, so as 
to minimise the cost of delay for businesses. In addition to the use of statutory 
time limits, wherever possible, regulators should: 
• commit publicly (for example in service charters or annual reports) to target 
timeframes for key processes 
• report on their performance in meeting targets 
• routinely communicate expected timeframes to businesses in relation to 
individual applications  
• adopt other measures to improve timeliness, such as tracking of referrals to 
other agencies and the use of pre-lodgement meetings. 
Consistency and impartiality 
Regulations should be enforced and requirements interpreted by the regulator in a 
manner that is consistent and non-discriminatory. The importance of consistency 
was emphasised in submissions, for example:  
It is vital to effective engagement with small business that the rules set out by 
regulators be interpreted uniformly by those undertaking the enforcement. Small 
businesses need to know what to expect and what any associated penalties would be. 
Applying different penalties for the same breach with no justification has the potential 
   





to cause both confusion and frustration amongst small business owners. (Master 
Electricians Australia stated, sub. DR35, p. 2)  
Inspectors should acknowledge, respect and try to be consistent with rulings, notices or 
observations made to that business by other inspectors from the same regulator by 
another regulator dealing with the same issue (e.g. a similar regulator in another state). 
Inconsistency undermines authority. (Australian Industry Group, sub. DR39, p. 14) 
Inconsistency can disadvantage one regulated business relative to another. It also 
creates uncertainty, which can lead to some businesses doing more than is required 
in order to make absolutely sure they are not in breach. While this can result in 
significant unnecessary compliance burdens for business, a potentially greater cost 
of uncertainty is its impact on investment, innovation and the growth of businesses. 
Participants have raised concerns about inconsistent compliance advice and 
decisions — for example, between different officers, different regional offices, and 
between local governments. For example: 
One of Accord’s exemption [from dangerous goods regulation] applications was … 
rejected even though this application sought an almost identical exemption from 
another successful application from a different industry association, and the two 
applications were considered at the same time. 
Further, regulators issue exemptions to the specific applicant that seeks the exemption, 
which means that another business who may benefit from the same exemption as the 
applicant misses out and there is no guarantee that a submission of application to seek 
an identical exemption will be issued. (Accord Australasia, sub. DR41, p. 7) 
Where regulations are applied by local government authorities how they are interpreted 
can vary massively from one LGA to the next — meaning it is hard to get consistency 
in meeting requirements. There are too many ‘grey’ areas or contradictions in some 
legislation. (Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, sub. 5, p. 12) 
Inconsistent advice is a common complaint fielded by Appco Australia [a sales and 
marketing company] when dealing with small business owners who are confused and 
frustrated as a result of their engagement with regulators. For example, in the context of 
FWO [Fair Work Ombudsman] audits and investigations, small business owners will 
discuss which investigator has been assigned their case. The perception is that the 
success of the engagement with FWO will depend on the individual investigator and 
their personal style and interpretation of the regulatory matter. (Appco Group, 
sub. DR46, p. 17) 
The Commission notes that state governments have produced some guidance to 
promote consistency between local governments. For example, New South Wales, 
Victoria and Western Australia provide specific guidelines to promote consistent 
decision making and assist local governments in assessing development applications 
for mobile telecommunications infrastructure (PC 2012).  






Participants have also raised concerns about a lack of transparency or accountability 
in government processes and decision making by some regulators. The Small 
Business Development Corporation (WA), for instance, noted that the WA 
Government Red Tape Reduction Group had identified a lack of clarity about the 
government’s processes and a lack of transparency and clear accountability and 
‘ownership’ of decision making as major sources of frustration for business (Small 
Business Development Corporation (WA), sub. 22). 
Regulators must be held accountable for the decisions they make. Processes for 
decision making need to be clearly defined and transparent, including internal and 
external review processes. Regulatory decision making can be distorted towards the 
interests of certain businesses or an industry as a whole at the expense of broader 
community interests, when a regulator becomes ‘too cosy’ with the entities it is 
regulating or, in the extreme, is ‘captured’ by certain interests. The potential for 
conflicts of interest can often be greater in smaller communities and with regulatory 
enforcement by local government where, for example, established relationships 
between business owners and inspectors is likely to be more common (the so called 
‘country cop’ issue). Any overt corruption or conflicts of interest, or indeed 
perceptions of inappropriate conduct, can seriously impact on the community’s 
confidence in a regulator and lead to increased uncertainty for business and reduced 
voluntary compliance. 
Given the impact that regulator officers can have on the profitability or even 
viability of regulated businesses, the risk of corruption or other abuse of powers is 
very real. Regulators, therefore, must have systems in place to ensure such risks are 
minimised. 
Regulators have adopted a range of strategies for ensuring consistency and 
impartiality in decision making. Training and preparation of appropriate guidance 
material for staff, for example on the use of discretion and dealing with conflicts of 
interest, are critical (chapter 6). Other important mechanisms include:  
• formal documenting and publishing of compliance and enforcement strategies 
and decision-making processes 
• documenting of decisions (and reasons) 
• subjecting some proportion of decisions to review  
• implementing quality assurance processes (through adopting quality 
management systems such as ISO9000) 
• separation of investigation and education roles from enforcement functions and 
centralising inspection programs (to reduce decentralised discretion) 
• staff rotations (to reduce the risk of inappropriate relationships developing) 
   





• ensuring community groups are able to participate and have their views taken 
into account. 
In the Commission’s regulator survey, the most common mechanisms used to 
‘reduce the risk of capture, corruption or bias in decision making’ were the use of 
review mechanisms, the documentation of reasons for decisions and policies to 
report conflict of interest. Each of these three mechanisms was used by around 90 
per cent of responding regulators. Audits and staff rotation policies were less 
commonly used. When asked to report on any additional mechanisms used, 
commonly reported mechanisms revolved around increased oversight — such as 
having multiple staff undertaking inspections — and review and appeal 
mechanisms.  
The NSW Food Authority has implemented a number of measures to improve 
consistency and accountability: 
All food businesses receive a copy of any audit/inspection reports as they are generated 
during each audit/inspection and these are discussed with management. Businesses 
similarly receive copies of any follow up instructions or notices issued by the Authority 
or local councils. These processes include appeal mechanisms to ensure that businesses 
can have any disagreements relating to inspections or follow up properly considered … 
Licensed businesses are free to access any records held by the Authority in relation to 
their business. (NSW Food Authority, sub. 28, p. 11) 
[The Authority conducts] an audit verification program to ensure the consistency and 
integrity of regulatory audits provided by commercial food safety auditors. The 
Authority also undertakes [reviews of] … audit reports prepared by commercial 
auditors. (NSW Food Authority, sub. 28, p. 5) 
The Attorney General in NSW has issued Internal Review Guidelines to assist 
agencies to conduct internal reviews of penalty notices fairly, impartially and 
consistently across Government (NSW Attorney General 2010). The Commission’s 
Local Government as Regulator benchmarking report identified periodic external 
auditing of assessment decisions and processes as a leading practice (PC 2012).  
While transparency of decision making processes and documenting of decisions and 
reasons should be strongly promoted, regulators need to strike a balance between, 
on the one hand, achieving the primary objective of informing businesses and the 
broader community and, on the other hand, the protection of confidential 
information. 
In some cases regulators have their own Code of Conduct (or Code of Ethics) for 
staff or a Service Charter. Specific Acts also sometimes contain conflict of interest 
procedures or provisions which regulator staff (mainly executive level) must 






comply with. Another important accountability mechanism is ensuring fair and 
independent external dispute resolution mechanisms (chapter 5). 
In addition, a wide variety of whole of government measures are used by Australian 
jurisdictions to identify and prevent corruption. These include Codes of 
Conduct/Ethics for public sector employees, Ombudsman Offices that can 
investigate complaints about public officials, Integrity/Misconduct/Corruption 
Commissions, such as the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC), and various other review or investigative functions within Government. 
4.6 Conclusion 
There is widespread agreement on many elements of what constitutes ‘best’ or 
‘leading’ practice in compliance and enforcement. However, key differences 
between regulators, for example in the nature of the industry or risks being 
regulated or institutional arrangements, mean that the merits of applying any 
particular detailed approach need to be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Central to ensuring compliance burdens are not excessive is the consistent 
implementation of enforcement policies that are risk based and allow the regulator 
to respond to compliance breaches in a graduated and proportional way. For 
individual businesses, the nature and frequency of inspections, reporting and other 
requirements should generally reflect both the likelihood of non-compliance and the 
consequences should a breach occur. Enforcement resources should be prioritised 
and targeted towards highest risk businesses or activities where there is the 
maximum scope to reduce hazards or any harm associated with non-compliance. 
The appropriate use of different enforcement tools will vary depending on the area 
of regulation, the nature and severity of the risks as well as the capacity and 
willingness of businesses to comply. In many regulatory areas, there are likely to be 
compliance or administrative cost savings for regulated entities and the regulator, 
and improved compliance outcomes, when the regulator adopts a facilitative and 
educative approach to enforcement. 
Where breaches do occur, the use in the first instance of warnings in conjunction 
with education and information on how to comply, will often be the most 
appropriate response, particularly for small businesses, where non-compliance can 
often arise from a lack of awareness of obligations. The use of stronger sanctions 
such as fines or withdrawal of a licence should be reserved for more serious 
breaches or where lower level responses have failed to improve compliance. In 
some cases there are legislative or other constraints on the range of enforcement 
   





tools available to the regulator, which necessitates a heavy handed response to 
relatively minor breaches (or alternatively creates an incentive for a regulator to 
take no action at all). 
Most regulators in Australia do, at least in principle, adopt a risk management 
approach in determining their compliance monitoring activities and some degree of 
‘escalation’ in their responses to non-compliance. However, the effectiveness of the 
implementation of these strategies by regulators varies substantially and the 
concerns raised by participants in this study and the evidence and findings of 
various other recent reviews and audits suggest that there remains considerable 
scope for improvement in regulator compliance and enforcement practices. 
For many regulators there is scope to improve risk methodologies, data collection 
and assessments. Such improvements could facilitate a better allocation of 
enforcement resources and, overall, a lower compliance burden for business. The 
Commission recognises, however, the significant challenges involved in monitoring 
and appropriately differentiating risks — including the cost and complexity of 
gathering evidence on relative risks. The benefits of devoting additional resources 
to improving risk management approaches must always exceed the costs — 
including costs for the regulator and costs borne by businesses that may be required 
to provide additional information to inform risk assessments. 
The Commission has found that there is likely to be substantial scope to reduce 
business compliance costs, while maintaining (and even enhancing) regulatory 
outcomes, with the wider adoption of leading practices in the following areas: 
• ensuring that decisions about the nature and level of compliance obligations on 
business as far as possible consistently reflect an assessment of the relative risks 
posed by business activities 
• greater efforts to facilitate compliance and more consistent use of discretion to 
ensure minor breaches are dealt with in a proportionate manner 
• rationalising the number of inspections, consistent with risk assessments, and 
better coordination of inspection activity with other regulators 
• appropriate recognition of industry and other third party certification processes 
and outsourcing of inspections where the benefits are likely to outweigh the 
costs 
• public commitments to target timeframes for key processes and decisions and 
accountability for performance in meeting those timeframes  
• increased transparency and accountability of processes and decisions to ensure 
impartiality and greater consistency. 






Reporting obligations imposed as part of regulators’ compliance monitoring are also 
a major source of burden for business. Opportunities to streamline reporting 
requirements and greater coordination and sharing of information by regulators are 
discussed in the next chapter. 






5 Communication, information and 
consultation strategies 
Key points 
• The time spent by businesses understanding regulations can be substantially reduced, 
and the likelihood of regulators’ activities delivering good outcomes increased, when 
regulator communication is effective, and advice and guidance are accessible. 
– Given the growing number and range of regulations that businesses need to be 
aware of, a premium should be placed on brevity and clarity.  
• Small businesses are much more likely than large businesses to rely on third 
parties, including industry and professional associations and intermediaries such as 
tax agents, to receive information on regulatory requirements. Leading practice 
regulators are reflecting this in their communication strategies.  
• Regulators should provide ready access to advice and guidance via a multi-channel 
strategy, including printed guidance, websites, seminars, help desks and face to 
face interaction.  
– Websites tend to be the first line of communication with business and third 
parties. Provided they are well set out and maintained, comprehensive and easy 
to navigate, websites can be particularly helpful to small businesses, many of 
which undertake compliance activity outside business hours. 
• Data requests of business by regulators should: be the minimum necessary to allow 
the regulator to perform its function effectively; where possible, be in the form that 
business use themselves; and avoid unnecessary duplication such as the 
requirement for business to supply similar information repeatedly to single or multiple 
regulators. 
– Coordinating information requests and sharing information, where appropriate, 
are leading practices for reducing reporting burdens. 
• Local governments face substantial challenges in establishing effective strategies 
for communicating with small business, due largely to resource constraints.  
• Regulators should tailor their delivery approach to reflect the diversity of small 
businesses — such as those that are regionally dispersed or have a high proportion 
of owners from non-English speaking backgrounds — subject to an assessment of 
the costs and benefits. 
• Effective complaints handling and grievance processes — which have a degree of 
independence from the enforcement activities of the regulator — build business 
confidence in regulatory arrangements and promote better regulatory outcomes.  
• Governments should ensure that there are independent, low cost mediation 
services in place. In jurisdictions that have them, Small Business Commissioners 
should undertake this role.   
 







Effective communication by regulators is essential for achieving good regulatory 
outcomes. Put simply, it is no good having well designed regulatory regimes if the 
businesses that are affected are either unaware of regulatory requirements or face 
substantial barriers in accessing or understanding information about them.  
Accessible advice and guidance can reduce the time spent by small businesses 
understanding regulations and determining their compliance and reporting 
obligations. Well designed reporting requirements and ongoing information requests 
associated with licensing and the issuing of permits can minimise compliance costs 
for business, without undermining the regulator’s capacity to ensure that regulations 
are being met.  
Regulators also need to provide small business with information on their regulatory 
role, objectives, enforcement policies and sanctions for non-compliance. This can 
include documenting and communicating steps and timelines in decision making 
and the publication of key decisions (and their underlying rationales). The provision 
of such information promotes transparency and accountability and can improve 
consistency of decisions over time and across decision makers in a regulator. 
More broadly, by making it easier for potential new businesses to understand an 
industry’s regulatory requirements, effective communication promotes market 
openness — increasing economywide competition, dynamism and productivity.  
Regulators face many challenges in seeking to develop and consistently employ 
sound communication practices. In particular, meeting the needs of small business 
for clear, accurate and accessible advice requires careful judgment by regulators on 
where to devote staff and funding to achieve the greatest improvement to 
communication outcomes.  
Industry participants, review bodies and regulators themselves have identified a 
range of areas where there is scope to enhance communication strategies. This 
chapter identifies leading practices that can assist regulators to: better communicate 
regulatory requirements to small business; streamline reporting requirements; better 
coordinate actions and the sharing of data to improve communication and 
information handling and remove unnecessary burdens on business; and strengthen 
consultation and feedback — including complaints handling and appeal 
mechanisms. 
More detailed supporting material on communication approaches is provided in 
appendix G. 






5.2 Achieving better communication 
There is broad agreement on the leading practices for effective communication of 
regulatory requirements to business. Clarity is crucial. In its recommendation on 
regulatory policy the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) noted: 
Governments should have a policy that requires regulatory texts to be drafted using 
plain language. They should also provide clear guidance on compliance with 
regulations, making sure that affected parties understand their rights and obligations. 
(2012, p. 24)  
Other leading practices are listed in box 5.1. Despite widespread acceptance of their 
importance, ensuring these leading practices are reflected in actual communication 
practices ‘on the ground’ remains an ongoing challenge for regulators. 
 
Box 5.1 Leading practices for informing small businesses about 
regulation  
Flexibility — Information strategies should be designed to suit particular circumstances. 
Appropriate targeting — Small businesses affected should be carefully targeted to 
receive information. 
Timeliness — Information should be available to small businesses when they need it. 
Accessibility — Information about regulations should be easily available to affected 
small businesses at low cost. 
Clarity — Information should be communicated in a way that can be easily 
comprehended by small business. 
Accuracy — Information disseminated to small business should be accurate. 
Comprehensiveness — Information should tell small business what they need to know. 
Appropriate resources — Information strategies should be adequately resourced. 
Evaluation — Information strategies should be evaluated to monitor their effectiveness. 
Continuity — Information should be provided to small business on an ongoing basis. 
Source: Commonwealth Office of Small Business (2000).  
 
Small business concerns about regulator communication 
The Commission heard a number of concerns about regulator communication with 
small business, including: 
• regulators failing to communicate their requirements simply and clearly 






• poor quality advice — inconsistent, erroneous or lacking in specificity, with 
regulators unwilling or unable to advise what constitutes adequate compliance 
• time taken and costs involved in locating, obtaining and understanding 
requirements 
• too much written material leading to information overload and lack of clarity on 
priorities (box 5.2). 
These concerns about regulator communication are consistent with those identified 
in other reports and surveys.  
The Commonwealth Ombudsman (2011), for example, noted that most of the 
complaints received about government agencies arise from poor communication, 
including not writing letters in plain language, failing to provide key information 
such as notification of the right to review and having no single point of contact, so 
that business owners have to repeat their concerns over and over again.  
The ACCI (2012) National Red Tape Survey found that three of the top four most 
costly stages for business in complying with government regulatory requirements 
related to information and communication. While this was true for businesses 
regardless of size, small businesses were twice as likely to report that it is more 
costly to find information about regulatory obligations compared to medium sized 
and larger businesses. Almost one third of small businesses indicated that 
information from regulators at all three tiers of government is inadequate 
(ACCI pers. comm. 2013).  
Concerns about business access to and costs of purchasing standards they need to 
comply with regulatory requirements have been identified in a number of 
Commission studies in recent years (PC 2009b). In its study into standard setting 
and laboratory accreditation, the Commission recommended that Australian 
Government agencies should provide the funding necessary to ensure free or low 
cost access to standards, including Australian Standards (PC 2006). 
The AI Group CEO survey (2011) reported that finding information was 
consistently among the most challenging aspects of the regulatory process, noting 
that across federal, state/territory and local governments: 
… between 25 and 30 per cent of small businesses said that the information they need 
is difficult to find or is not available. Around 60 per cent said the information is 
available, but requires some time to find and hence comes at a cost. (sub DR39. p. 3) 
Similar views were reflected in a number of other reports including: ANAO (2011a, 
2011b, 2011c); (DesignGov 2013); Tasmanian Auditor-General (2012); NSW 






Auditor-General (2011); ACT Auditor-General (2011); and Regulation 
Taskforce (2006).  
 
Box 5.2 Small business concerns about regulator communication 
Regulators failing to communicate their requirements  
As a new business, simply knowing what to do, when to do it and how to report has been 
problematic. (Small business owner quoted in ACCI, sub. 5, p. 10) 
[regulators should] [a]nswer their … phones without a 50 minute wait. Write the instructions on 
their websites very clearly and concisely and then have a go themselves to see if they work, or 
do like the food safe people and get regular people to test out their websites. (Small business 
owner quoted in Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) WA, sub. 22, p. 5) 
It is the sustained stress, expense, disruption to business and uncertainty caused by ineffective 
communication that contributes to small business owners leaving the contracting industry 
(AppcoGroup Australia, sub. DR46, p. 16) 
Poor quality advice  
Little to no guidance is given on the level of compliance that is expected from business in 
practice, with constant reference to key terms which are undefined — such as ‘reasonable 
inquiries’, ‘assessment of unsuitability’ and ‘substantial hardship’. The regulator has shown no 
willingness to give clarity to these terms, instead referring the onus back on to business to be 
determinative of what is needed to comply. (Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd, sub. 20, p. 15) 
Requirements that are time consuming and costly to obtain and understand  
With the amount of regulation for pretty much every area the government get involved in — tax, 
employment, electricity etc. you need multiple degrees, unlimited time or tens of thousands of 
dollars to get someone else who has the degrees or time enough to care. In small business we 
don’t have any of that. (Small business owner quoted in ACCI, sub. 5, p. 10) 
Too much information  
[I]nformation is nearly always difficult to read and understand and certainly not engaging. 
These websites do not help with safety but, rather, inhibit safe practices … Assuming that 
the small business person has time to read and fully understand … pages of gobbledygook, 
is a common mistake made by regulators. (COSBOA, sub. 15, pp. 8–9) 
[The] main issue is that there is so much information that it is a big job form SMEs to sift through 
all of it to know what’s relevant for them. NSW has a SME starter kit that is dated 2001. A good 
solution even if outdated. (Small business owner quoted in COSBOA, sub. 31, p. 4)  
 
Challenges for regulators in communicating with small business 
The foregoing discussion highlights that despite efforts by regulators to improve 
communication with small business in recent years, there remains scope for 
improvement. In part, this reflects that the small business sector is notoriously 
difficult to engage with — making it more challenging for regulators to effectively 






communicate with them compared with larger businesses (chapter 1). The 
Tasmanian Small Business Council notes: 
Communicating to and with small business operators is difficult if for no other reason 
than their time is at a premium. Their personal endeavour is the main source of revenue 
for the business. It is therefore extremely costly for them to attend information 
meetings and briefings. If they are away from their business they lose income, they 
have costs of travel and attendance and often have to pay a locum to ‘hold the fort’ at 
the place of their business. (sub. 13, p. 3) 
One of the challenges for regulators is that small businesses frequently expect the 
regulator to find them and tell them about their regulatory requirements. On this, the 
Tasmanian Small Business Council notes: 
For most, they [small business] expect to be told that they have a compliance 
responsibility, the level of it and be informed using the mode of communication most 
often used in their sector. In many instances, just how they expect the regulator to know 
about their enterprise is anybody’s guess. (sub. 13, p. 2) 
As discussed in chapter 3, small businesses generally lack dedicated resources with 
the necessary skills and training to determine their regulatory obligations directly 
from legislation or from detailed written guidance. Small businesses can sometimes 
struggle to read long and complex guidance material. For example, ABS data 
suggest that 44 per cent of Australians aged 15 to 74 years old had literacy skills 
below the level required to read through dense and lengthy text and disregard 
irrelevant or inappropriate text content (NSW Business Chamber, sub. 25, p. 7). The 
NSW Small Business Commissioner noted: 
Given the limited resources, capability and sophistication of most small businesses, a 
significant proportion of small business will not have a sufficient understanding of 
what it needs to comply with certain regulations. (sub. 12, p. 2) 
This was confirmed by research undertaken for Intuit Inc (sub. DR36) in 2013 
which found that only a quarter of small businesses claimed to have a ‘very 
thorough’ understanding of the legislation and policies that apply to their business, 
with more than half (55 per cent) getting by on only a ‘basic’ understanding.  
Producing succinct guidance material that does not oversimplify laws and points 
small business to more detailed guidance where it is appropriate requires careful 
judgment and considerable skill in drafting. In the UK, for example, it was found 
that regulators often feel that comprehensive and detailed explanation is needed to 
avoid misleading business about the complexity of the law (NAO 2008). This point 
was recognised by the NSW Business Chamber, which noted that ‘complex 
regulations will take longer to understand regardless of a regulator’s efforts’, but 
that it was nevertheless important for regulators to ‘do what they can to improve 
their communications’ (sub. 25, p. 6). 






The Commission’s survey of regulators similarly found that the key constraints 
regulators faced in engaging specifically with small business were: small 
businesses’ limited awareness of their regulatory obligations; the number and 
diversity of small businesses; and lack of time and availability of business owners 
or key staff (chapter 3).  
Finally, providing advice and guidance to large numbers of businesses can be very 
resource intensive. VicRoads, for example, estimates that around 30 per cent of its 
transport safety services effort is devoted to providing education and advice 
(National Transport Commission (NTC), sub. 1). With limited resources, selection 
of the most appropriate approaches to employ and the businesses to target will 
necessarily involve prioritising and some tradeoffs.  
Effectiveness of various modes of communication 
Regulators employ a range of different modes to communicate with small 
businesses. The results from the Commission’s regulator survey indicate that 
(figure 5.1): 
• websites, on-site visits and dissemination of information through industry groups 
were the most commonly cited modes for effective communication with small 
business — with over 80 per cent stating these modes were either ‘effective’ or 
‘very effective’  
– of these, ‘on-site visits’ stood out as being around twice as likely to be rated 
‘very effective’ practices for communicating with small business 
• seminars, workshops, helpdesks, business focus groups and other consultative 
fora were also commonly used and found effective (by a majority of regulators) 
• relationship managers were used by around half of regulators and generally 
found to be effective 
• external ‘one-stop shop’ websites and social media (such as Facebook or twitter) 
were less likely to be rated effective, with the majority of regulators who used 
these modes unable to assess their effectiveness with confidence. 
Large regulators generally used a broader range of communication modes than did 
small regulators. However, for two key communication modes — regulator 
websites, and industry groups — the use and perceived effectiveness was the same 
regardless of regulator size (appendix G).  
There was some discrepancy between regulator and business perceptions of the 
usefulness of various communication approaches, with small businesses finding 
regulator websites less useful than advice from third parties (such as accountants 






and solicitors) or from other business owners (figure 5.2). It should be noted, 
however, that third parties often draw on regulator websites for regulatory 
information to disseminate to small business. 
Figure 5.1 Regulators’ assessment of the effectiveness of different 
communication modes 
Per cent of regulatorsa 
 
a Based on responses from 188 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013.  
Figure 5.2 Small business assessment of the effectiveness of different 
communication modes 
Per cent of respondents who found the mode effectivea 
 
a Based on responses from 128 small businesses. 
Source: COSBOA, sub. DR48, attachment A. 
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Broadly similar results were found in a study of over a thousand small business 
owners across Australia commissioned by Intuit Inc. in June 2013 (sub. DR36). 
Almost 50 per cent of small business owners consulted government websites to help 
them understand their regulatory requirements, and two thirds relied on their 
accountants to keep abreast of regulatory requirements.  
Like regulators, small businesses generally considered information disseminated 
through industry groups to be a very effective form of communication on regulatory 
requirements, with respondents to COSBOA’s online forum identifying industry 
associations as their most preferred source of information. This result is 
unsurprising given that overall, less than half of small businesses receive 
information about regulatory changes directly from the regulator or government 
agency (whereas the majority of large businesses do) (ACCI, sub. 5). The Victorian 
Environmental Protection Authority, for example, stated that as part of its 
collaborative approach with business groups it maintains partnerships with AI 
Group and the Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association to provide compliance 
support tools and services to small business (sub. DR42).  
In addition to being effective conduits for communicating with small business, third 
parties can assist regulators collect required information. An example the 
Commission heard during the small business roundtables undertaken for this study 
related to the information franchisees provide to franchisors as part of their 
contractual arrangements. If regulators were able to draw on this information as part 
of their compliance monitoring this would ease reporting burdens for small 
business. 
As was the case for regulators, social media were small businesses’ least preferred 
source of information from regulators, with few rating it effective and over a third 
of respondents unsure how useful the media were. This was consistent with the 
findings of a review of ACCC communications with business which found that: 
Of the ‘new media’ approaches suggested, it is perhaps the least ‘new’, an e-mail alert 
or bulletin, which is most popular … In contrast, social networking sites, blogs and 
online video clips are at best only of interest to a smaller minority. (ORC 
International 2012, p. 23) 
Key aspects of the effectiveness of some of these modes along with examples of 
their use are included in table 5.1. Further discussion of the use these modes as well 
as some of the issues and challenges associated with making them work is included 
in appendix G.  






Table 5.1 Modes of communication 
Mode Examples of circumstances when effective Example of usea 
Printed 
guidance 
• Businesses are geographically diverse 
• Businesses are low tech 
• Some general requirements apply to all/most businesses 
• Regulatory requirements are not changing frequently 
• Industry association can assist in dissemination 






• Businesses are geographically diverse 
• Businesses have access to technology and skills 
• Regulatory requirements change often 
• Requirements vary between business types and require 
specific detailed examples 
• Regulator is known to business community (and 
therefore businesses will look for their website) 
• Businesses rely on after hours access to information 
NMI, ACCC, Fair 
Work Ombudsman, 






• Concentrated population of businesses 
• Sufficiently large number of businesses 
• Similar interests/themes amongst groups of businesses 








• Concentrated population of businesses 
• Small number of businesses 
• Requirements vary between business types and require 






Help desks & 
call centres 
• Businesses are geographically diverse 
• Large number of businesses 
• Regulatory requirements change often 
• Requirements vary between business types and require 
specific tailored assistance 
ATO, ASIC, ACCC, 
NSW Food 
Authority, Australian 




• Businesses lack knowledge/trust of regulator 
• Strong industry or professional associations 
• Industry has history of self regulation 
ACCC, NMI, OLGR 
(NSW), Transport 
Safety (Vic), DAFF  
a ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission), ASIC (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission), ATO (Australian Taxation Office), AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis 
Centre), DAFF (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry), DSEWPaC (Department of Sustainability, 
Environment, Water, Population and Communities), HCSCC (Health and Community Services Complaints 
Commissioner), NICNAS (National Industrial Chemicals Notification and Assessment Scheme), NMI (National 
Measurement Institute), NTC (National Transport Commission), OLGR (Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing), 
OSR (Office of State Revenue). 
Source: Regulator websites. 
Regulator strategies for improving accessibility of advice and 
guidance 
In ensuring their communication strategies are effective, regulators need to make 
judgements about not only which modes to use, but also how to make them as 






accessible as possible. Some key considerations, along with examples of 
communication strategies that seek to address them, are set out below. 
Ensuring guidance is easy to understand 
Regardless of the delivery mode, to be effective, guidance to business must explain 
the legal requirements of regulation as accurately, clearly and succinctly as possible. 
Small business owners, the NSW Business Chamber notes: ‘… will usually prefer a 
simple overview of their obligations, an explanation of the regulations objectives, 
and a step-by-step guide to compliance’ (sub. 25, p. 1). An example of such 
guidance is the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) 
small business checklist (table 5.1).  
Even if all regulators endeavour to follow best practice in their guidance material, 
small businesses may still be burdened by the need to sort through and filter the 
‘overwhelming plethora’ of material they have to deal with across all areas of 
regulation (Strong Strategies Pty Ltd, sub. 19, p. 3). However, such burdens will 
clearly be greatly lessened if, in preparing each set of guidance, regulators place a 
premium on brevity. 
Ensuring guidance is convenient to access 
Even when advice and guidance is brief and clear, for it to have value businesses 
must also be able to access it. Factors affecting accessibility include business 
owners’:  
• geographic location — which can, for example, affect their ability to attend 
seminars and other training 
• technological sophistication — for example, in using online forms (see below) 
or applications for smartphones or tablets 
• language skills — such as for business owners from non-English speaking 
backgrounds 
• available resources — which can be stretched when, for example, required 
regulatory codes or standards must be purchased.  
A recurring concern raised in submissions and during regional small business 
roundtables conducted as part of the study has been in relation to regulator call 
centres and help lines. While in the main, small businesses found these services 
helpful, waiting times were a major problem for many businesses.1 Further, the 
                                              
1  See for example: COSBOA, sub. 15; ACCI, sub. 5; AI Group, DR39. 






Commission heard they were an impractical communication medium for many 
small businesses, for example, some regionally based businesses and those reliant 
on mobile phones such as tradespeople. In these instances an email and call-back 
service would address the problems long waiting times cause for business operators 
reliant on mobile phones and those who have no possibility of physically visiting 
regulators.  
A related issue is that regulatory information needs to be made available at an 
appropriate time. With some notable exceptions (such as the Brisbane City Council 
‘24/7 helpline’, see box 5.10) most call centres and information help lines are closed 
outside business hours, when many small businesses undertake their compliance 
activity after hours. The Commission heard, for example, that around 30 per cent of 
transactions for registering a business name with ASIC occur after hours 
(COSBOA 2013). In this regard, the SBDC (WA) called for regulators to review 
how accessible they are to the public, in particular whether ‘clients are placed on 
hold regularly and for long periods, whether phone numbers and email addresses are 
provided on their website or simply provided as an online contact form’ 
(sub. 22, p. 8). 
Electronic versus paper 
Having a website is an essential precondition for communication with most 
businesses, regardless of size. However, to be effective, a website needs to be well 
set out, comprehensive, easy to understand, provide information collated by 
business type and topic and have useful links (ANAO 2007). This is not always the 
case. Some regulators’ websites have so much information that it was difficult to 
find relevant documents. For others, websites had so little information (for example, 
many local government websites) that businesses had to either go into the office to 
receive documents or request that they be posted or emailed (COSBOA, sub. 15; 
SBDC (WA), sub. 22).  
All Australian jurisdictions provide guidance to assist government agencies with the 
development of websites. The Australian Government Information Management 
Office (AGIMO), for example, provides better practice guides and checklists on a 
range of web related topics including: information architecture for websites; user 
testing; website monitoring and evaluation; briefing and selecting a web developer; 
and writing for the web. AGIMO also administers a suite of awards to recognise and 
promote excellence in the use of Information and Communications Technology 
(ICT) across all levels of government in Australia (AGIMO 2013). Some key 
elements of good website design are included in box 5.3. 






In view of the importance of websites as a first point of contact for many 
businesses, industry and  professional associations and other third parties, all 
governments should consider how they can encourage regulators (including local 
governments) to continually improve their online engagement practices — an 
annual regulator award would be one such approach. 
 
Box 5.3 What makes a good website? 
Key elements of a good website include: 
Accessibility — Web content should be able to be accessed by the maximum possible 
number of people, including people with a disability, those living in remote locations 
and those using alternative technologies such as mobile phones and tablets. 
Good information architecture — Information on websites should be structured into 
subjects and categories that make it as easy as possible for users to find the 
information they want.  
Navigability — Clear, simple, intuitive and consistent navigation tools, including 
unambiguous labels, are needed to help the user find their way around the website, 
know where they are at all times, and determine what the website contains and how to 
use the website. 
Clear writing — Information should be written in a way that can be read and 
understood quickly and easily. Usability improves when writing is concise, easy to 
understand and is organised into clearly labelled sections. 
• Content needs to be written in a style that accommodates how people read 
websites. In particular, users tend to scan text rather than reading word-for-word as 
they would when reading printed text and they are also likely to skip or ignore large 
sections of text that do not seem immediately relevant. 
Clear hyperlinks — Links should be displayed using appropriate and consistent visual 
cues. For example, a change of colour is most often used to differentiate between 
visited and unvisited links.  Text describing links should be meaningful, and accurately 
reflect the link destination. 
Appearance — Website appearance should be governed by the purpose of the website 
and the requirements of the users, that is, form (visual design) should follow function.  
• Elements to consider in ensuring a clear and simple appearance include: selection 
of a font that is easy to read online; using text and colours that are consistent across 
the entire website; ensuring that the contrast of text against the background is 
sufficiently high to ensure it is legible on screen and on paper; reducing clutter by 
laying out information in small chunks rather than large blocks and leaving sufficient 
whitespace; and ensuring use of images is appropriate, including consideration of 
impacts on readability of text (for background images) and page loading times. 
Sources: AGIMO 2013; WA Department of Finance nd.  
 






But even when it is well set out and comprehensive, a website alone is not enough 
for effective communication with business. As COSBOA noted: 
Many regulators tend to believe that having a website … is enough and they’ve done 
their job. Having a website helps, but certainly doesn’t solve the communication 
challenge. (COSBOA, sub. 15, pp. 5-6) 
Businesses therefore need to both know the site exists and have access to the 
technology and skills to make use of it. This is not always the case. Australian 
Bureau of Statistics data indicate, for example, that more than one quarter of 
businesses in the accommodation and food services sector do not have internet 
access (ABS 2013). Regulators then, need to take care to ensure that appropriate 
strategies are also maintained for less computer literate business owners and those 
without the necessary internet access. These can include providing printed 
guidance, help lines, seminars, workshops and direct communication via shopfronts 
and industry visits. Printed guidance — including checklists, guides, newsletters 
and paper forms — can be particularly effective for requirements that apply to many 
businesses and/or do not change frequently. AUSTRAC noted that it ‘offers 
alternative options, such as paper based reporting, for businesses that do not have 
the technology to report electronically’ (sub. DR 47, p. 4) (table 5.1). 
Personalised versus broad based 
There will be times when the only effective means of communication between 
regulators and business is direct or personalised, such as through face-to-face 
meetings (including in the context of inspections) and telephone conversations. 
Master Electricians Australia noted that while information on regulatory 
requirements should be made available in a range of formats including online and 
hard copy, it should always be supplemented by access to a ‘real person’ who can 
answer questions and clarify requirements as needed (sub. DR35, p. 1).  
Similarly, the Tasmanian Small Business Council noted: 
Put simply, if regulators want to talk to us — talk to us. Don’t just put something up on 
a website and expect that somehow we will know it is there, go looking for it, find and 
understand it … (sub. DR44, p. 2) 
Direct communication between regulator and businesses is necessary where the 
issues that have to be dealt with are complex or require frequent interchanges. 
Although more resource intensive, it also has the advantage of allowing tailoring of 
information to meet the needs of the individual business. This can be valuable 
where, for example, small businesses have limited experience or knowledge of 
regulatory requirements, such as for new businesses, or (where translation services 
are available) those with non-English speaking business owners.  






Testing whether the message is getting through 
The one sided nature of some types of communication means that without being 
proactive, regulators will find it difficult to know how well various approaches are 
working in practice. Given this, regulators need to actively monitor the take up and 
usefulness of various communication strategies and then use the resulting 
information to continuously refine and improve communication practices. 
The results from the Commission’s survey indicate that the vast majority (around 90 
per cent) of regulators monitor, at least to some degree, business understanding of 
the regulations they administer. Such monitoring can involve directly seeking 
feedback from business on the effectiveness and usefulness of different 
communication practices (discussed later in the chapter). 
Regulators also examine data on regulatory outcomes, such as changes in levels of 
non-compliance or incorrect submission of data or forms following the use of 
different communication practices. The ATO (2012b), for example, evaluates the 
effectiveness of its communication approaches, including seminars and workshops, 
through both direct feedback from participants as well as scrutiny of subsequent 
changes in regulatory outcomes — such as changes in the rate of correctly 
completed returns (indicating improved understanding of requirements) for the 
targeted business populations. 
A number of regulators also periodically review the usefulness of their helplines 
(for example, ACCC and the Brisbane City Council), including monitoring waiting 
times, quality of advice, satisfaction levels within business and other relevant 
aspects that bear on their effectiveness.  
Regulator strategies for improving the overall effectiveness of their 
communication with small businesses 
Key strategies employed by leading practice regulators for improving the overall 
effectiveness of their efforts to communicate advice and guidance on regulatory 
requirements to small businesses include: effective targeting of businesses; tailoring 
both the form and mode of delivery of information to improve its usefulness; and 
building stronger relationships. 
Effective targeting of business 
Employing a risk based approach means that regulators should target their 
communication efforts towards those businesses or sectors where the payoffs from 






additional information provision are highest. It is not always the businesses with the 
greatest risks of non–compliance or the largest potential impacts that should be 
targeted — providing additional information to high risk businesses that are already 
well informed of their regulatory obligations and how to meet them is unlikely to be 
an efficient use of regulator communication resources. In contrast, the payoffs from 
targeting communication efforts towards a large number of low risk small 
businesses may be worthwhile, since small businesses may be non-compliant 
simply because they find it difficult to ascertain their regulatory obligations.  
Factors regulators may also use as a basis for targeting include the nature of the 
industry sector, size and age of businesses, geographical location and the 
characteristics of the owners of the businesses (chapter 2). Such targeting, in turn, 
may determine the frequency, mode and extent of their communications with 
business. Interactions between regulators and business involve costs to both sides 
and should be the minimum necessary to achieve the desired level of compliance.  
The Commission’s regulator survey found evidence of regulators targeting their 
communication and information strategy based on the risk category of individual 
businesses. Overall, just under half of all regulators that used a risk based approach 
stated they used an individual business’s risk category to determine the guidance 
provided and their education efforts (figure 5.3). Further, around one quarter stated 
they also used the risk category of the business to determine the amount and type of 
information the business reports to them. Regulators were less likely to use risk to 
target communication than to target inspections and audits. While there may be 
more limited scope for targeting of communications and lower cost savings for the 
regulators, the Commission considers there is nevertheless scope for more 
widespread use of targeting in regulator communications.  
That said, as noted in the previous chapter, regulators need to be mindful that a drop 
off in regulator interaction with some businesses under a risk based approach may, 
in the absence of other communication measures, increase costs for those reliant on 
regulator interaction (even that associated with visiting inspectors) for advice on 
regulatory requirements and how to comply. In the longer term, lower interaction 
may also reduce regulator knowledge and understanding of businesses and 
undermine business incentives to comply. Hence, ongoing monitoring by regulators 
will be needed to determine whether levels of advice and interaction with small 
business are appropriate, particularly in industries with high rates of business entry 
and exit or those industries experiencing rapid technological or structural changes. 
 






Figure 5.3 Use of risk category by engagement approach 
Per cent of regulators that used a risk based approach in compliance monitoring 
and enforcementa 
 
a Based on responses from 133 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
Tailoring — no one size fits all 
In certain circumstances regulators may find they can achieve improved regulatory 
outcomes by tailoring advice to reflect differences in businesses that are regulated. 
This may include tailoring assistance and educative approaches (such as through 
workshops or on-site business advice) to facilitate understanding of regulatory 
requirements, and developing improved communication tools and software to ease 
compliance burdens. 
The optimal degree of tailoring will depend on the relevant benefits and costs. For 
industries with a majority of small businesses, the default communication and 
information strategy should be directed towards small business. However, even 
then, small businesses are diverse in their needs, so additional tailoring may be 
needed. COSBOA noted that communications strategies designed with only big 
businesses in mind may not be effective for small businesses, and further, that: 
Communications and process designed, generically, for all small businesses will also 
fail due to the differing nature and needs of each sector. To communicate with a courier 
driver in the same way as communicating with a pharmacist is seeking failure not 
success. Process and communications must be designed for the specific industries and 
workplaces. (sub. 15, p. 4) 
The most appropriate approaches will therefore depend on: the outcomes sought; 


























business awareness of their obligations and experience with meeting them; and the 
costs of establishing, maintaining and operating the chosen communication 
mechanism and the capacity of regulated businesses to use and access it.  
The Commission found that a number of regulators provide some tailoring of 
different aspects of their engagement, including tailored forms or fact sheets, 
coaching, seminars or other training and simplified requirements (see figure 3.4, 
chapter 3). 
One example of a tailored approach is the provision of guidance for non-English 
speaking owners or managers and others who have difficulties in comprehending 
regulatory requirements. There are many examples of regulators tailoring advice 
and guidance to take account of language barriers. For example the National 
Measurement Institute (NMI) focuses its efforts on developing easy-to-understand 
guidance in multiple languages (box 5.4). 
 
Box 5.4 National Measurement Institute’s approach to communicating 
with small business 
To increase transparency and raise awareness of proposed (or potential) changes to 
regulation, the National Measurement Institute (NMI) regularly consults with industry 
associations and makes all of its consultations public on its website. This allows small 
business owners to keep abreast of proposed changes in their own time and provides 
for industry input into the decision-making process. Furthermore, as trade 
measurement is a technical topic, an ongoing priority for NMI is to find ways to explain 
legislation and compliance requirements in simple, easy-to-understand language (in 
both English and translated material). For example, a number of industry-specific 
brochures have been published and translated into five different languages, and 
distributed to Migrant Resources Centres nationwide. NMI also provides an interpreting 
service to aid small business owners should they require it. 
To increase its reach within the diverse small business sector, NMI has implemented a 
direct communication campaign that supports regular communication with servicing 
licensees via an online newsletter. In line with the approach adopted by the Australian 
Tax Office (ATO), NMI seeks to inform businesses of its strategic approach to 
compliance, outlined in its National Compliance Plan 2012-13, which is published on 
the NMI Website.  
Source: Case study provided to the Commission by the Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, 
Research and Tertiary Education, sub. 18.  
 
The food industry, with its high rates of non-English speaking small business 
owners, is a good example of the importance of tailoring. This was emphasised in a 
review by the ACT Auditor-General which noted that while public information 
typically included a notice that interpreting and translating services were available, 






it was not provided in languages other than English, noting, ‘It is therefore 
important that information on food safety be given in languages that reflect the 
cultural diversity of food businesses in the ACT’ (2011, p. 23). 
Tailoring is also important for streamlining information collection from business 
(discussed in the following section). Regulators can tailor the information and 
reporting requirements to different sizes or types of businesses in a variety of ways 
— for example, providing forms which suit the circumstances of the business, 
instead of providing one complex form that meets the needs of the most difficult 
case. Alternatively, they could introduce reporting requirements which take into 
account businesses’ transaction costs in meeting them.  
It should be noted, however, that such flexibility would involve some costs to 
governments, since there are administrative costs in tailoring information or other 
attributes of the delivery of a regulation. It is therefore important that the resources 
expended can be justified by the likely benefits to be gained. 
Building stronger relationships 
The relationships between regulators and small business can have a substantial 
impact on the quality of communication. Relationships characterised by timely 
interactions, technical competence, courtesy and respect can engender trust which 
can, in turn, facilitate better information flows — improving businesses’ 
understanding of regulators’ procedures and compliance expectations as well as 
regulators’ understanding of the motivation and abilities of businesses to meet their 
compliance obligations. Stronger relationships can also reduce administrative and 
compliance costs, provide a means for regulators to receive early warning of 
emerging issues and potentially increase levels of voluntary compliance 
(ANAO 2007). 
But relationships can also pose risks, potentially undermining regulator credibility 
and the effectiveness of the overall regulatory regime (chapter 4). Such risks are, 
however, less likely to occur with small businesses which are less likely than large 
businesses to exert, or be seen to exert, an undue influence on regulators.  
Client service charters can help strengthen relationships by setting out the 
parameters of what business can expect from their relationship with the regulator. 
The Brisbane City Council, for example, notes that its Customer Charter: 
… commits to the customer that when they contact Council, they can expect to be 
treated with honesty, fairness, sensitivity and dignity. All licensing regimes and 
compliance activity associated with those processes will be dealt with fairly, promptly 






and professionally. All customers can expect this level of service, including small 
business operators. (sub. 32, p. 2) 
Client service charters need to be updated as part of regulator continuous 
improvement processes. The ACCC (2013), for example, recently released a new 
client service charter. Key changes included reducing the timeframe for responding 
to correspondence, using plain language in communicating the ACCC’s role and 
streamlining of feedback processes.  
The use of relationship managers can help build mutual respect and trust, provide 
effective guidance and foster associations between key personnel in business and 
regulators (ANAO 2007). 
Further, a number of participants to the study noted the significant stresses 
experienced by many small business owners in seeking to understand and meet their 
regulatory compliance obligations (see for example: Australasian Association of 
Convenience Stores Ltd, sub. DR34; Accord Australasia, sub. DR41; and Appco 
Group Australia, sub. DR46). Ensuring that regulator staff who engage with small 
businesses make efforts to employ an educative and facilitative approach rather than 
an adversarial one can help reduce stress for small business. Strong Strategies, for 
example, commented favourably on the ATO’s helplines:  
It is to be noted and praised that the ATO staff has also undertaken training with 
Beyond Blue to understand how depression affects small business people and soften 
their approach so as not to be a significant part of the problem. (sub. 19, p. 7) 
Building in a degree of separation of the education and compliance roles of a 
regulator is another practice that can help build trust and strengthen relationships. 
Approaches can range from changes to regulator structure and staffing such as the 
creation of separate education and enforcement divisions to changes to internal 
policies regarding the treatment of information provided by business. For example, 
in its submission to this study, the Housing Industry Association (HIA) noted that 
when the ATO provides education and assistance to businesses preparing their 
business activity statements: 
…[it] gives an undertaking that there will be no audit activity arising from such 
assistance having been given. This type of approach should apply across the board. 
(sub. 24, p. 1) 
Time pressures and sometimes severe resource constraints mean that approaches 
such as dedicated relationship managers or separate compliance divisions will not 
always be feasible, particularly for small regulators. However, in general, 
relationships between regulators and small businesses are enhanced where: desired 
outcomes are defined and agreed in advance; all parties understand their roles, 
commitments and obligations; modes of interaction are available that facilitate two 






way communication; and procedures for handling disputes are in place. These 
issues are discussed further later in the chapter. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Regulators should ensure information and advice on regulatory requirements is 
brief, readily available, reliable and provided in user friendly language and 
formats. To cater for the diversity of small businesses, a multi-channel 
engagement strategy should be employed.  
• Where the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs, information and advice 
should be tailored to reflect the compliance capacities of small businesses, 
including the needs of business owners from non-English speaking 
backgrounds. 
• Regulators should provide email and call-back services wherever possible to 
assist those small businesses that have difficulties accessing regulator 
helplines and call centres. 
• Governments should recognise and support progress made by regulators in 
making their websites and online engagement practices more user friendly.  
5.3 Streamlining reporting requirements 
Studies in Australia and overseas indicate that businesses find supplying 
information to regulators to be among the most burdensome aspects of complying 
with regulation (ACCI 2012; AI Group 2011; IFF Research 2012). The information 
businesses provide is essential in allowing regulators to act effectively, including 
analysing and prioritising risk and making well informed, reliable and consistent 
decisions.  
The challenge for regulators is to gather the information they need without 
imposing unnecessary costs on business. 
Most Australian regulators collect compliance information from business. In 
particular, around 40 per cent of regulators require businesses to submit documents 
(such as spreadsheets), although standardised paper or electronic forms are also 
widely used. Inspections and on-site visits are the other main way in which 
compliance information is collected (chapter 4). 






Strategies to reduce reporting burdens 
The Commission heard a number of concerns from small business about excessive, 
inconsistent, duplicative or overlapping information or paperwork requirements, 
including: being asked to provide information for no apparent reason; being asked 
to report too frequently; excessive paperwork; badly designed forms; inability to 
lodge electronically; inconsistent information collection or reporting requirements; 
having to supply the same or closely related information in different forms to 
different regulators; and supplying the same information repeatedly to a single 
regulator (box 5.5). 
 
Box 5.5 Small business concerns about information reporting 
Reporting the same information  
The major difficulty for our business is coping with the additional burden of compliance and 
reporting the same information … on an ongoing basis. (Small business owner quoted in 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia, sub. 7, p. 4) 
Time consuming 
The specific information is not always something you knew ahead of time you would need to 
itemise so gathering it is very time consuming. This takes you away from your core tasks. 
(Small business owner quoted in ACCI, sub. 5, p. 10) 
[T]here are multiple definitions of reportable units, wages being an example. Such measures 
should be defined in exactly the same way whether it be for PAYG, superannuation, workers 
compensation or pay-roll purposes. (Housing Industry Association, sub. 24, p. 2) 
Requirement to hand deliver [development applications] to Council as hard copy (plus 
excessive extra copies) AND on CD. [and] NO email lodgements available. (Small business 
owner quoted in ACCI, sub. 5, p. 10) 
Reporting redundant information  
The information that we have to compile for building licences is repetitive and not used by 
the councils that demand it … (Small business owner quoted in ACCI, sub. 5, p. 10) 
The recent addition of an annual return which requires us to document all subcontractors we 
use each time we pay them seems pointless and an example of getting small business 
taxpayers to do the accounting for the government. (Small business owner quoted in 
ACCI, sub. 5, p. 11)  
 
A number of participants called for improvements in regulators’ administrative 
systems so that data requests are minimised through standardising, streamlining and 
reducing information and reporting requirements. For example, the Western 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry noted: 
A key issue is that business reporting requirements are different across regulators and 
the inconsistent approach can lead to additional reporting requirements and an increase 
in the administrative burden. Removing any duplication would assist to alleviate the 
administrative burden on small business. (sub. 7, pp. 4–5) 






The NSW Small Business Commissioner called for greater use of initiatives by 
regulators to streamline information requests and noted: 
The ‘Report Once Use Often’ framework of the Australian Charities and Not for Profits 
Commission and participating Federal government agencies is a positive development 
which would have significant benefits for small businesses if a similar initiative was 
adopted by State and local council regulators. (sub. DR40, p. 4). 
Further, three of the top four changes identified by small business as likely to have 
the greatest impact on reducing regulatory burdens related to information reporting. 
These included the establishment of reliable electronic and web based reporting, 
reduced reporting frequency and avoiding duplication and overlap between 
regulators in data collection (AI Group 2011). 
The Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business (Regulation 
Taskforce 2006) stated that there was considerable scope to streamline 
business-to-government reporting. It recommended that the Australian Government 
ensure agencies use consistent terms and rationalise existing reporting requirements.  
Regulators employ a range of strategies to streamline reporting. Some examples are 
included in table 5.2.  
Table 5.2 Regulator strategies for streamlining reporting requirementsa 
Strategy Example of use 
• Regulators make use of e-reporting, central 
portals and other web based tools 
DMP (WA) — e-reporting and forms (Mineral 
Titles Division), EPA (Vic) Interaction Portal, 
AUSTRAC Online 
• Risk assessments are used to determine 
the level of information required 
Building Commission (Vic) — risk based data 
collection 
• Illustrative examples of record keeping provided ATO — Record keeping for small business  
• Forms are simple and easy to navigate and 
include guidance on completion 
NMI — forms are kept to a limited number of 
pages or in electronic format 
• Standardised forms across local governments Food safety (NSW Food Authority), SA Govt, 
Municipal Assoc. of Vic. 
• Data collected in a form that businesses 
use themselves  
ATO — SBR (MYOB) 
• Design of forms and guides is based on 
consultation with business 
NSW Police Firearms Register — stakeholder 
involvement in completing guides for business 
• Electronic forms — pre-filled information and/or 
allow business to re-use past form multiple times 
ATO — SBR 
a ATO (Australian Taxation Office), AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre), DMP 
(Department of Mines and Petroleum) WA, EPA (Environmental Protection Authority), MYOB (Mind Your Own 
Business), NMI (National Measurement Institute), SBR (Standard Business Reporting). 
Source: Regulator websites. 







A wide range of business-to-government interactive services is currently available 
online. Many businesses and intermediaries (such as accountants) complete aspects 
of their reporting obligations to government by electronic means. Electronic 
reporting through agency specific portals has evolved over time, and businesses 
have become more adept at using this approach (PC 2011). Some examples are 
included in box 5.6. 
 
Box 5.6 Mechanisms for electronic reporting 
• Small to medium size businesses are typically required to lodge a number of forms 
with the ATO. Tax file number declarations, pay-as-you-go payment summaries, 
business activity statements and employment termination payment summaries are 
examples.  
– The ATO Electronic Lodgement Service (ELS) provides online services in income 
tax return lodgements, activity statements and Australian Business Number 
applications. The Electronic Commerce Interface can lodge bulk data and 
employer obligation reports such as multiple activity statements in a single 
transaction, tax file number declaration reports, bulk superannuation reports and 
claim forms for excise fuel grants (ATO 2012a). 
– The GST Simplified Accounting Method (SAM) was introduced for small food 
retailers when the GST was first implemented in 2000. It was designed to reduce 
the compliance burden for small businesses. In a recent review of SAM 
commissioned by the ATO, Chant Link and Associates (2011) found that it was 
an important tool for many small businesses, with many relying on SAM to 
complete their BAS and tax returns. 
 The study also found that tax agents were of the view that the ATO 
communicated well with them in relation to changes in requirements through 
use of tax agents’ portals, email communications and seminars. 
• ASIC has informed the Commission (2012a) that its electronic channels receive 
around 2.5 million lodgements annually. Several software products are compatible 
with lodging ASIC reports.  
• State revenue offices have a range of online reporting arrangements (for example, 
Western Australia’s Revenue Online lodgement service) that are widely used by 
businesses. 
• The Small Business Superannuation Clearing House, established in July 2010 enables 
small businesses to pay all their employees’ superannuation to a single location in 
one electronic transaction, rather than to different individual super funds. As at 
October 2012, 33 000 employers had signed up. 
Sources: ATO (2012a); PC (2012a); PC (2011); Chant Link and Associates (2011).  
 






Standard Business Reporting 
An initiative designed to reduce the burden on business of reporting information to 
government is Standard Business Reporting (SBR) (box 5.7). SBR is designed to 
facilitate direct reporting to government via financial, accounting and payroll 
software. Development occurred through a process of consultation and 
collaboration with Australian and state government agencies, software developers, 
accountants, bookkeepers and the broader business community, drawing on earlier 
work by the ATO.  
 
Box 5.7 Standard Business Reporting 
In 2008, COAG agreed to support the Standard Business Reporting (SBR) program as 
a mechanism to reduce the burden on business of reporting to government. The 
development of SBR reflected a recognition in government of: 
… a serious lack of standardised terms used across multiple government reports; 
businesses often have to interpret terms for one agency that have a different meaning in 
another, or use a variety of terms for different agencies that actually mean the same thing. 
(Australian Government 2012, p. 1) 
It was estimated that small business that adopted SBR would reduce the time required 
for reporting from an annual average of 38 hours to 26 hours — an estimated 12 hour 
reduction. SBR has been operational since July 2010. Its development has cost the 
Australian Government approximately $170 million. 
The Commission reviewed SBR in 2012 (PC 2012a) and noted that up until that time, 
the take up rate of SBR by business has been very low, and the benefits being 
achieved are small relative to the potential available. The Commission assessed the 
potential benefits from a wider uptake to be substantial — in the order of $500 million 
per year — and noted that greater commitment from participating government agencies 
could substantially improve the take up rate of SBR and the realisation of benefits.  
While the take up rate of SBR by businesses has been low due to a number of 
implementation issues (PC 2012a), the Australian Government stated in March 2013 
that there had been a sharp increase in SBR lodgements in the 2012-13 financial year 
(Bradbury 2013). In addition, the ATO has recently committed to adopting SBR 
technology across the reports lodged to the ATO by June 2015, and ASIC has also 
signalled its intention to expand the capabilities of its SBR platform, although no 
funding has been committed. 
Source: PC (2012a).  
 
SBR was intended to reduce the reporting burden for business by: 
• removing unnecessary and duplicated information from government forms 
• utilising business software to automatically pre-fill government forms 






• adopting a common reporting language, based on international standards and 
best practice 
• making financial reporting to government a by-product of natural business 
processes 
• providing an electronic interface and a single secure online sign-on to enable 
business to report to government agencies directly (PC 2009a).  
The Commission, in reviewing SBR, noted there may be further benefits, subject to 
cost-benefit analysis, from the wider application of SBR methodologies for 
reporting to government and in business reporting (PC 2012a). The value of 
extending SBR methodologies to other fields — to include the collection of 
non-financial data — is likely to be of most benefit where there is a wide array of 
data collected by multiple agencies across a number of jurisdictions. In addition to 
reducing reporting burdens, the use of standard definitions and language give 
greater rigour and confidence in the data that is produced. As a consequence, 
regulators may feel they do not need to collect as much data, in the knowledge that 
the data collected can be relied upon for regulatory purposes. Further, better quality 
data also assists in designing and operating risk based compliance programs, with 
flow-on benefits in reporting burdens — particularly for highly compliant 
businesses (PC 2009a).  
RECOMMENDATION 
Regulators should ensure data and information requested of business are:  
• no more than is needed to regulate effectively 
• tailored around data businesses already collect 
• not already collected by another part of government.  
Regulators should make it as easy as possible for small business to complete and 
lodge forms, including through the use of electronic lodgement.  
5.4 Promoting regulator coordination and information 
sharing 
It is often the case that more than one regulator is involved in the regulatory process 
for a particular business. Where regulators do not coordinate with other regulators 
to address inconsistent, duplicative or overlapping requirements, the costs for a 
small business in understanding and complying with requirements can be higher 
than they need to be. For example, it may be that the business: 






• reports the same data to multiple regulators in the same or different format and 
frequency (discussed earlier) 
• undergoes multiple inspections for a similar or related purpose by different 
regulators (discussed in chapter 4) 
• must read and understand multiple sets of compliance information and 
guidelines on related or overlapping areas (discussed in appendix E) 
• needs to find ways to comply with conflicting sets of requirements from 
different regulators. 
Small business raised a number of concerns about a lack of regulator coordination 
and information sharing (box 5.8).  
 
Box 5.8 Small business concerns about lack of regulator coordination 
and information sharing 
There is a breakdown in communication and information sharing across all levels of 
governments. There is a strong silo mentality amongst government officers. Perhaps all 
government officers must have private sector experience to truly understand how difficult it is 
to make things work without having to repeat your story to 50 different bureaucrats across 
three government agencies. (Small business owner quoted in ACCI, sub. 5, p. 11) 
In order to renovate the premises there are five different and conflicting governmental 
regulatory bodies to thread a way through — ranging from heritage … local council zoning, 
state and federal workplace rules and then building codes — it is much easier to do nothing! 
(Small business owner quoted in ACCI, sub. 5, p. 11) 
The cumulative burden of regulation occurs when regulatory policy development is done on 
a departmental basis rather than a whole of government basis. This problem is exacerbated 
due to jurisdiction overlap and duplication … regulators should find ways to maximise the 
use of existing business data and improve information sharing between regulators, after 
considering legal and other cost implications. (ACCI, sub. 5, p. 14) 
[S]mall businesses seem to be subject to regulation sources in various ‘fiefdoms’. These 
fiefdoms can exist and operate across all three layers of the Australian political structure. 
(Australian Motor Industry Federation, sub. 23, p. 9) 
 
 
In the AI Group CEO survey 2011 examples of unnecessary duplication among 
regulators identified by small businesses included:  
• information required by the ATO, state revenue offices, and workcover 
• local governments and various state regulatory bodies, including water, transport 
and electricity 
• overlapping environmental laws or licences between all three levels of 
government 






• the Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards Scheme, Equipment Energy 
Efficiency Program and Watermark Scheme — in which the same product test 
report is required to be sent to multiple agencies (sub. DR39, pp. 11-12). 
Coordination and cooperation between regulators 
Better coordination is an important way that governments can address the 
widespread concerns about the rising cumulative burden on business. As the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Queensland (CCIQ) noted: 
[T]he most important and profound way to improve regulator engagement and help 
regulators to better understand the needs and the context in which small businesses 
operate is through a focus on cumulative burden. Every regulator should be guided to 
consider what other agencies already impose on small and medium businesses when 
developing and designing their regulatory programs, policies and engagement strategies 
(sub. 16, p. 2) 
Regulators employ a range of formal and informal methods of improving 
information sharing and coordination. The Commission’s regulator survey found 
that around 60 per cent of regulators routinely cooperated with at least one other 
regulator to coordinate information collection (table 5.3). Broadly similar 
proportions of regulators cooperated so as to present information to business in a 
common format or location (such as a single website) and in providing education to 
business. Cooperation was highest among regulators in sharing compliance data and 
developing information for business. 
Table 5.3 Regulator cooperation in information collection and provision  
Per cent of respondent state, territory and Australian government regulators who 
routinely cooperate with others, by type of regulator cooperated with ab 
 
 















collection 11 34 34 32 59 
Sharing compliance data 10 47 46 39 72 
Developing information 
for business 16 45 42 38 66 
Presenting information to 
business in a common 
format/location 11 31 26 21 52 
Providing education to 
business 14 37 35 21 56 
a Based on responses from 190 regulators. While local councils were not asked to respond to this survey, 
other jurisdictions’ regulators could nominate them as a regulator with which they cooperated. b Columns are 
not additive as respondents could nominate more than one category. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 






Regulators cooperated most commonly with regulators at the state-territory and 
national level, with only around 10-15 per cent of regulators routinely cooperating 
with local councils. 
The Commission also heard examples of regulators working together to share 
information. For example, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western 
Australia (CCI WA) noted that the state’s Environmental Assessment and 
Regulatory System, which is used for submitting and tracking environmental 
applications and compliance reporting for project approvals, is a good example of 
regulators sharing information: 
… [b]usinesses only need to provide information on their approval to one agency as 
this is then shared across a number of agencies required to approve the application. In 
addition, this system allows businesses to see at what stage of the approval process 
their documentation is and at which agency. (sub. 7, p. 5) 
The ACCC also noted that it deals regularly with other state and federal agencies on 
small business issues, and seeks to ensure that, wherever possible, a uniform and 
cooperative approach is developed: 
At the regional level, local ACCC Education & Engagement Managers in most states 
participate in their local government business information network, a forum where 
local, state and Commonwealth agencies coordinate delivery of information and advice 
to small firms in that jurisdiction. (sub. 26, p. 8) 
The Commission’s study into the role of local government as regulator (PC 2012b) 
identified the benefits that arise when state government agencies (such as the NSW 
Food Authority) provide information explaining the underlying basis of regulations 
to assist resource constrained local governments, as well as the public, in 
understanding the higher level policies. Another approach noted in the study that 
can help reduce the time it takes for business to understand their regulatory 
requirements is for the state or territory regulator to provide explicit advice to 
prospective licence applications on the approvals they need to get from local 
governments, as is done by the Office of the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner of 
South Australia. 
That said, a number of studies have confirmed that there is scope for greater 
coordination and information sharing between regulators (and other government 
agencies). Examples include:  
• The COAG Business Advisory Forum Taskforce (2012) identified significant 
duplication and overlap in business reporting requirements to government. This 
included: company notification processes; taxation (including payroll tax); 
information sought by the Australian Bureau of Statistics; reporting in relation to 
employees; and some energy efficiency reporting (sub. 18).  






• The NSW Auditor-General’s (2011) performance audit on the transport of 
dangerous goods noted that very little information was shared between agencies 
and that better information and sharing would assist agencies to manage risk. 
• The Victorian Auditor-General’s Report into the management of freshwater 
fisheries called for regulators to improve their information base by ‘working 
with, and sharing relevant information with, other entities that have 
complementary responsibilities and interests’ (2013, p. viii).  
The need for better information on the reach and influence of guidance was a key 
finding of the UK’s Hampton Review which recommended that regulators: ‘work 
together to support research on the effectiveness of different communications 
methods and develop better means of monitoring the take up of guidance’ 
(NAO 2008, p. 21). Given the costs and difficulties in assessing the effectiveness of 
different approaches, as well as the potential benefits associated with the sharing of 
any hard won lessons, cooperation among Australia’s regulators would also have 
merit. This issue is discussed further in chapter 6. 
However, coordination and data sharing by regulators is not costless — both the 
costs and benefits need to be considered in determining the optimal level from a 
community-wide perspective.  
Lead agency model 
The use of ‘lead agencies’ can be an effective mechanism for simplifying and 
rationalising business engagement with regulators. 
In instances where a number of regulators administer a regulatory scheme, generally 
one regulator (the ‘lead agency’) should take primary responsibility to ensure 
effective coordination to reduce duplication of effort and fragmented approaches to 
enforcement and improve overall regulatory outcomes. All states and territories 
have arrangements in place to specify responsibilities of each agency — in Western 
Australia, for example, these are provided by the Department of Premier and 
Cabinet (2009); for Australian Government agencies, one source of such 
information is the principles and practices set out by the Australian Public Service 
Commission (2005). 
A good example of lead agency arrangements working in Australia is Victoria’s 
arrangements for food safety regulation. Four agencies, the Department of Health, 
PrimeSafe, Dairy Food Safety Victoria and the Municipal Association of Victoria 
(representing local councils in Victoria) signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 
June 2012 that identifies lead agencies for different aspects of food safety. 






For the lead agency model to work well: 
• partner agencies should ensure appropriate arrangements are in place that 
identify who will be the lead agency, under what circumstances, and the 
responsibilities of each regulator  
• lead agencies should make information on their policies and procedures for 
administering their regulation freely available to other regulators  
• lead agencies should also encourage consistent enforcement practices and 
procedures throughout the regulatory group and allow timely access by other 
regulators to relevant case information (Queensland Ombudsman 2009, 
pp. 54-56). 
Despite the existence of high level principles in all jurisdictions, it is not always the 
case that regulators have worked together to determine the lead agency (see for 
example, Queensland Ombudsman 2009).  
A novel twist on the lead agency model in operation in the United Kingdom is a 
‘primary authority’ scheme. Under this scheme, businesses (and more importantly 
for small business, industry associations from late 2013) which engage with 
multiple local regulators can select one as their ‘primary authority’, develop an 
agreed compliance approach, and then apply this approach for compliance with 
every other local regulator with which they engage (BRDO 2013). 
Complaints the Commission heard from business during this study about overlap 
and duplication between regulators suggest that this is an area of regulatory 
engagement that requires ongoing attention and in which there could be significant 
potential for improvements that deliver net benefits. Clearly, for lead agency and 
other coordination mechanisms to work effectively, timely and effective feedback 
from regulated businesses is essential. 
5.5 Strengthening consultation and feedback 
Sound processes for consultation and feedback with business are an essential 
element for effective regulator engagement. In its submission, the NSW Business 
Chamber noted: 
The key overarching principle to improving communication with business is for 
regulators to actually test the effectiveness of their communication strategies, by 
seeking feedback from businesses. (sub. 25, p. 7) 
Effective consultation and feedback mechanisms allow business to provide 
information to regulators on: the source and magnitude of compliance burdens; the 






efficacy of the regulation in achieving its objective; and any unintentional adverse 
impacts, including interactions between different regulations and cumulative 
effects. In particular, the information supplied provides a reality check on 
regulators’ understanding of impacts on business. It helps regulators to identify both 
the reasons businesses have difficulty in complying and how they could achieve 
compliance. In addition, regular effective consultation and feedback can strengthen 
relationships and trust between businesses and regulators (ANAO 2007).  
The principles of effective consultation are widely known (COAG 2007; 
OECD 2012) and all Australian jurisdictions encourage regulators and government 
agencies to consult with business. In 2012 COAG’s Business Regulation and 
Competition Working Group endorsed a set of principles for effective consultation 
with small business (box 5.9). The SBDC (WA) called for this guide to be 
mandated and adopted across government, with individual agency heads held 
accountable for adhering to the principles (sub. 22). The Commission sees merit in 
this proposal. However, to be effective it must be accompanied by adequate 
transparency and accountability arrangements. 
 
Box 5.9 COAG principles for achieving best practice consultation 
with small business 
Continuity — meaningful consultation with small business should start early in the 
policy development process and continue through all stages of the regulatory cycle.  
Targeting — small businesses that are likely to be affected by proposed regulatory 
changes should be carefully targeted for consultation. 
Timeliness — consultation should occur early in the regulation making process when 
the policy objectives and different approaches to an issue are still being considered. 
Accessibility — information about regulatory proposals and the consultation process 
should be easily available to the small businesses that are likely to be impacted on. 
Transparency — policy agencies should make the objectives of the consultation 
process clear from the outset and show stakeholders how their responses were taken 
into consideration. 
Consistency and flexibility — consistent procedures can make it easier for stakeholders 
to understand and participate in consultation, but this must be balanced with the need 
for consultation to be designed to suit the circumstances of the particular proposal. 
Evaluation and review — agencies should evaluate consultation processes to consider 
their effectiveness and continually look at ways of making them more effective.  
Source: COAG (2012).  
 
The extent to which consultation reflects best practice principles varies across the 
myriad of regulators and the three levels of government. Concerns about regulator 
consultation practices that have been raised in submissions include: minimal 






engagement with business; adversarial or officious attitudes; belated consultation 
with industry groups; and decisions made prior to the closing date for submissions 
(see for example, Hills Orchard Improvement Group Inc, sub. 9; Australasian 
Association of Convenience Stores Limited, sub. 21; Accord Australasia, 
sub. DR41).  
These concerns have been mirrored in other studies. For example, businesses 
surveyed by AI Group (2011) identified problems with consultation processes being 
onerous, lacking in transparency, being insufficiently broad and lacking genuine 
commitment — with a perception that consultation is sometimes undertaken just to 
be seen to be doing it. 
A wide range of consultation tools is needed 
As noted earlier, consulting with time poor and difficult to contact small businesses 
can be challenging. The CCIQ made the point that most small businesses will not 
participate in consultation activities or make submissions (sub. 16). Similarly, the 
NSW Small Business Commissioner notes that small businesses acknowledge they 
are difficult to engage with ‘but still want their opinions known’ (sub. 12, p. 6). 
Indeed, during the course of this study the Commission received very few 
submissions directly from individual small businesses, with most small business 
views provided to the Commission through industry associations and business groups 
as well as at the roundtables held following release of the draft report (appendix A). 
Over the last two years, 44 per cent of regulators sought systematic feedback from 
small business — and 65 per cent from business regardless of size (figure 5.4). The 
most common method for seeking feedback from small business was consultative 
fora, which was used by 35 per cent of regulators. Surveys were also used by 30 per 
cent of regulators, and a few regulators employed other methods such as social 
media, audits and direct contact. The relative ranking of the different mechanisms 
for receiving feedback was the same for small business as it was for all businesses. 
A key mechanism by which small business is able to provide feedback to regulators 
is through their industry associations. However, small businesses may not always be 
well represented by industry associations. The NTC notes for example, that 
‘industry bodies in some sectors can at times be overly representative of larger 
companies’ (sub 1. p. 6). In addition, some small businesses will not belong to an 
industry association. 
Given this, regulators should undertake a mix of broad and selective consultation to 
ensure feedback is reflective of the larger population of regulated entities. They 
should also gather information from a range of sources to provide a quality check 






on information collected. For some regulators, it may be necessary to adapt 
consultation approaches (such as through provision of additional online resources) 
to the needs of small business owners, such as those in regional and remote areas.  
Figure 5.4 Regulators who sought systematic feedback from business 
during the past two years, by feedback mechanism 
Per cent of regulatorsa 
 
a Based on responses from 190 regulators. Columns are not additive as respondents could nominate more 
than one feedback mechanism. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
This point is reflected in the OECD recommendation on regulatory policy released 
last year which states that: 
Modes of consultation need to reflect the fact that different legitimate interests do not 
have the same access to the resources and opportunities to express their views to 
government, and that a diversity of channels for the communication of these views 
should be created and maintained. (OECD 2012, p. 24) 
A particular method employed by a number of regulators to overcome some of the 
impediments to consulting with small business is to make use of stakeholder 
consultative bodies. 
The Regulation Taskforce (2006) recommended that all regulators whose decisions 
could have significant impacts on business or other sections of the community 
should maintain a standing high-level consultative body. The Taskforce argued that 
such bodies would provide a focal point for feedback to regulators about their 
performance, promote greater understanding and provide a mechanism for 
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In its submission to this study, the Australian Small Business Commissioner 
emphasised the value of ‘user groups’ — regular meetings with businesses that have 
frequent contact with the regulator, together with representatives from key industry 
and professional associations — noting: 
‘User groups’ as well as being a forum for seeking views that will improve the 
administration by the regulator, and compliance by the regulated, can also be useful 
consultative bodies from a broader policy perspective. In this regard, consultation is … 
more than imparting information. It is receiving views, considering them and 
rationalising why, or why not, a particular view is adopted. (sub. 10, p. 7)  
There are a number of examples of stakeholder consultative bodies, for example:  
• the ACCC established the Small Business Consultative Committee as a forum to 
consider competition and consumer law concerns related to small businesses 
(ACCC 2013) 
• the ATO established the small business partnership as a forum for dialogue and 
consultation on issues of mutual concern regarding the administration of the tax 
system (ATO 2013) 
• the Brisbane City Council employs a range of approaches to consult and engage 
with business including the Project Control Group used in the development of 
the Eat Safe Brisbane Framework (box 5.10). 
More generally, Australian regulators have employed a range of approaches for 
consulting with small business (table 5.4). 
Table 5.4 Mechanisms for consultation and feedback used by regulatorsa 
Mechanism Examples of use 
Complaints portals Office of the EPA (WA), WA Department of Finance  
Temporary staff placements 
in business 
PIRSA Fisheries and Agriculture (SA), Construction Code 
Compliance Unit (Vic), Victorian Taxi Directorate 
Stakeholder 
consultative bodies 
ACCC, ATO Small-business partnership, Dairy Food Safety (Vic) 
Learning Network 
Workshops and consultative 
fora 
Worksafe (Vic) focus groups, Victorian Registration and 
Qualifications Authority, ACMA, TGA, AUSTRAC 
Consultation databases and 
business registers 
Victorian Government Business Consultation Database 
Stakeholder surveys Workcover (NSW) telephone survey, ATO SME Perceptions 
Survey, ACCC perceptions research, ASIC Stakeholder Survey 
Public inquires and formal 
reviews 
Transport Safety Victoria (public calls for submissions), Victorian 
EPA (independent review of monitoring and enforcement) 
a ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission), ACMA (Australian Communications and Media 
Authority), ASIC (Australian Securities and Investments Commission), ATO (Australian Taxation Office), 
AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre), EPA (Environmental Protection Authority), 
PIRSA (Department of Primary Industries and Regions SA), TGA (Therapeutic Goods Administration). 
Source: Regulator websites.  







Box 5.10 Brisbane City Council — strategies and approaches for 
engagement with small business 
Brisbane City Council strategies and approaches for engaging with business include: 
• Contact Centre — comprising a call centre and customer service centres. To 
improve accessibility, the call centre operates a dedicated 24 hour a day, seven day 
a week hotline for handling businesses queries and concerns. 
• Toolbox: A Council Knowledge Network — businesses are able to obtain free 
online access to all standards, guidelines and processes across South East 
Queensland Councils for Environmental Health and Disaster Management.   
– This allows businesses to search for information and legislative requirements in 
their own time. The information and fact sheets provided are designed to be easy 
to understand, user friendly and accommodate both ends of the small business 
spectrum in terms of the detail required to develop business operational 
processes or just key pieces of information to ensure the small business operator 
complies with the regulations.  
• Community Engagement Policy — which guides engagement with industry, 
service users and other stakeholders to build an approach based on shared 
responsibility and mutual obligations as well as allowing the community to provide 
input into new legislation, regulations or policy wherever appropriate.   
– In some instances, the Council will test the outcomes and approach with small 
businesses to ensure that they understand the new regulatory requirements and 
obtain specific feedback on any implementation issues. 
 For example, the development of the Eat Safe Brisbane Framework had two 
layers of industry engagement to ensure that a wide range of impacts was 
considered — a Project Control Group consisting of industry bodies which 
was supported by a working group that included individual businesses, 
franchisee leads, and representatives of industry groups.  
• Lord Mayor’s Business Forums — which are a series of free workshops held 
across Brisbane for businesses. At these forums, successful local business owners 
provide insights from their own experiences and offer practical tips to help local 
businesses grow.  Council staff attend these forums to discuss any business needs 
and respond to questions local business operators may have regarding licenses, 
permits, applications, processes or just to provide general information and advice. 
Source: Brisbane City Council, sub. 32.  
 
Testing and transitional arrangements 
An important time for regulator-business engagement is during the testing and 
transitional stage when regulators are developing and preparing to implement new 
or changed regulatory requirements. Engagement between regulators and business 
at this stage has the potential to yield large benefits for all parties. Regulators face 






some uncertainty prior to introducing regulation regarding likely impacts and 
possible problems, and hence are receptive to business feedback on how the roll out 
might be made to work better. Further, as business concerns tend to be highest early 
on, due to the uncertainty about how the changes will affect them, they tend to be 
more willing to participate in consultation efforts. 
Generally speaking, it is in the period leading up to, and immediately following, the 
introduction of new regulation that regulators invest the largest effort in consulting 
with business. However, consultation efforts also tend to be significant when 
regulation is being reviewed.  
As discussed in chapter 3, the costs small businesses face during transition to new 
regulatory arrangements can be high. The Commission heard examples of transition 
problems that may have been reduced or avoided with better consultation during the 
testing and transitional phase. For example, Australian Association of Convenience 
Stores (AACS) stated that the introduction of plain packaging for tobacco occurred 
without adequate consultation with small business leading to a number of problems 
in implementing and complying with these requirements (sub. 21). 
One approach that some regulators use is to test new regulation by trialling it on a 
subset of the target group to gain an understanding of its effectiveness and impacts 
prior to consideration of wider roll out to the full business population. The success 
of this type of approach will ultimately hinge on the representativeness of the trial 
group and the quality of the consultation, feedback and review mechanisms put in 
place to capture the practical lessons learned. 
An example of this was the Drink Safe Precinct trials introduced in Queensland in 
2010 to reduce alcohol related violence in key entertainment precincts in Surfers 
Paradise, Townsville and Fortitude Valley. The announcement of the trial included 
a commitment to a public evaluation of the trial and to improve data collection and 
the evidence base on what works to reduce alcohol related violence in Queensland 
over the long term (DPC 2012). 
Phased implementation of regulation can also reduce adjustment costs for business 
and allow time for regulators to consult with affected business. For example, when 
Victoria’s seafood regulator PrimeSafe introduced regulation of the wild catch and 
harvesting sector, all businesses were licensed, but not subject to audit initially, to 
allow a transition time for businesses and for the regulator to consult with 
businesses to develop food safety programs and determine numbers of audits 
required (VCEC 2006). 
The appropriate use of testing and transitional arrangements needs to be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis. As noted in chapter 3, the reduced adjustment costs for 






business and potentially higher rates of compliance need to be weighed against any 
associated costs, such as the costs borne by business and regulators in the testing 
phase, as well as the delays in the achievement of the regulatory objectives. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Regulators should ensure that effective consultation processes are in place that 
allow small businesses to provide feedback, at low cost, on: the source and 
magnitude of compliance burdens; how well the regulation is achieving 
objectives; and any unintentional adverse impacts, including interactions between 
different regulations and cumulative effects. 
To facilitate this, governments should ensure that already agreed principles for 
effective consultation, including those for small business recently endorsed by 
COAG’s Business Regulation and Competition Working Group, are adhered to by 
regulators. 
5.6 Better handling of complaints and appeals 
Even with the best communication and information management systems and 
consultation processes, disputes between business and regulators may still arise. 
Effective mechanisms for handling business complaints and appeals are needed to 
enable poor decisions to be quickly and efficiently rectified before they become 
serious and/or systemic. The features of these are well accepted, and include 
accessibility, timeliness, fairness, confidentiality and impartiality (ANAO 2007).2  
Good complaints handling procedures enhance fairness and openness in a 
relationship, particularly for business. Further, where the associated investigations 
lead to improvement in regulators’ systems they can result in reductions in 
compliance costs for business. For this to happen, however, regulators need to have 
mechanisms in place to allow for the incorporation of lessons learned into 
administrative practices. 
Regulators need to clearly communicate to business the avenues for lodging or 
making a complaint. AI Group noted, for example, that regulators should: 
                                              
2  As stated by the OECD in its recommendations on regulatory policy: ‘Citizens and businesses 
that are subject to the decisions of public authorities should have ready access to systems for 
challenging the exercise of that authority … In principle, appeals should be heard by a separate 
authority than the body responsible for making the original regulatory decision. Governments 
should, where appropriate, establish standard time periods within which applicants can expect 
an administrative decision to be made’ (OECD 2012, p. 15). 






… actively encourage businesses to use appeal or review mechanisms if the business 
does not understand or agree with the regulatory action taken or the reasons given for 
it. Inspectors should feel confident to say: ‘If you disagree with what I have done, I 
encourage you to take it up with ….’ (sub. DR39, p. 14) 
Evidence received by the Commission suggests that more could be done in this 
area. For example, even were information on appeal procedures and rights are 
included in advice and guidance on regulator websites, printed guides or 
correspondence, there are likely to be substantial benefits in regulators actively 
drawing these processes to the attention of businesses. For example, Hills Orchard 
Improvement Group (HOIG) noted: 
In HOIG’s limited dealings with the APVMA [Australian Pesticides and Veterinary 
Medicines Authority] we were surprised at their repeated assertion that their decisions 
were not subject to review or ministerial oversight. They failed to mention that their 
decisions could be overruled by an administrative tribunal or through a court decision. 
(sub. 9, p. 21) 
Several reports (see for example Queensland Ombudsman (2009) and Ombudsman 
Western Australia (2010)) identified areas where regulators could provide greater 
clarity on complaints processes to stakeholders. 
The Commonwealth Ombudsman notes, however, that complaint handling systems 
in Australian government agencies have improved substantially over the past 
decade. The essential principles for effective complaint handling are provided in its 
Better Practice Guide to Complaint Handling (2009) — which is broadly consistent 
with the Australian Standard on Complaints Handling.3 Western Australian 
Government agencies must adhere to this standard. All other jurisdictions have in 
place similar requirements and provide support and information to regulators. For 
example, the Queensland Ombudsman’s website provides resources to assist 
regulators to enhance their complaints management systems by adopting various 
best practice features. Advice for alternative dispute resolution in dealing with 
Australian Government agencies are provided by the National Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Advisory Council (2012). 
The Commission’s regulator survey found that: 
• 88 per cent of regulators had a complaints or feedback mechanism for business 
— of which around two thirds allowed for lodgements of complaints online 
• 79 per cent had internal, and 88 per cent had external, formal appeal 
mechanisms. 
                                              
3  The Australian Standard on Complaints Handling (AS ISO 10002-2006) consists of three steps: 
enabling people to make complaints; responding to the complaints promptly, fairly and 
confidentially; and ensuring regulator accountability and processes for learning from complaints. 






Internal review mechanisms have the potential advantage of higher speed and lower 
cost, relative to external mechanisms. For example, a reform introduced to help 
streamline review processes by the EPA Victoria was its Remedial Notice Review 
Policy, which enables businesses to apply for an internal review of a notice issued 
ahead of lodging a formal appeal through the Victorian Civial and Administrative 
Tribunal (EPA Victoria, sub. DR42). 
As the ANAO (2007) noted, a sound internal review process:  
• provides a timely and easily accessible form of review 
• is less costly and time consuming to conduct, for the regulator and the applicant, 
than an external review or appeal 
• manages the risk of reviewing officers being ‘captured’ by the regulatory 
organisation’s culture — and hence being reluctant to make variations to original 
decisions 
• provides lessons learned about decision making that the regulator can 
incorporate into its quality assurance system. 
Also, the Administrative Review Council (ARC) noted that, ‘A good system of 
internal review is one which is transparent in process and affords a quick, 
inexpensive and independent review of decisions’ (ARC 2000, p. v).  
One method of strengthening the independence of review mechanisms is for a 
regulator to set up a separate appeals division. Examples include: 
• the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Office of Industry Complaints 
Commissioner, which was established to coordinate the handling of complaints 
about the actions and behaviour of its staff and is independent of the agency’s 
operational division. 
• the separate appeals division announced by the ATO earlier this year, which will 
provide clear processes for objections and appeals with a focus on ensuring cases 
are handled in a timely manner (box 5.11). This change brings Australia’s 
system in line with those of the US and the UK. 
Formal external review mechanisms are usually defined in legislation and allow 
businesses to lodge appeals in relation to regulatory decisions with an independent 
body. While such reviews have the advantage of strict separation and actual and 
perceived impartiality, they can be costly and may be suitable for only a limited 
number of disputes (ANAO 2007). Many of the disputes small businesses raise are 
unlikely to be suitable for such formal processes.  







Box 5.11 Australian Taxation Office — separate appeals division 
The Inspector General of Taxation (IGT) recommended in 2012 that a separate 
appeals area be set up within the ATO following complaints about excessively 
prolonged appeals and a lack of independence by reviewing officers, who could be 
from the same team as the original auditors (Inspector General of Taxation 2012).  
In his deliberations, the IGT identified a broader issue of a gap between high level 
commitment to effective engagement and what happens in practice: 
[A]t a high level, the ATO is committed to engaging with taxpayers to resolve disputes 
earlier. I have noted some examples in which the ATO’s early engagement and appropriate 
use of ADR [alternative dispute resolution] has assisted to resolve matters in dispute either 
wholly or partly without the need for litigation … However, and notwithstanding the ATO’s 
high level commitment, a number of the cases raised in submissions, and which were 
examined in this review, indicate a variance in the taxpayer experience when seeking to 
engage with the ATO to resolve disputes (2012, pp. i–ii). 
In making the recommendation, the IGT identified a number of problems with the 
ATO’s use of ADR including: inexperienced ATO staff lacking awareness and skills to 
‘nip problems in the bud’ (requiring senior technical experts to come in later and sort 
things out); the information gathering approach of ATO was costly; costs for smaller 
taxpayers in identifying appropriate escalation channels for engaging; and perceptions 
of a lack of independence of the objections process. 
The ATO initially rejected the recommendation but the new Tax commissioner 
announced in a speech in March 2013 that it would be implemented (Jordan 2013).   
 
From the perspective of business, the question of where the review body is located 
is less important than ensuring it is a genuine body of appeal, where business 
concerns and challenges are treated seriously and with fairness. Data on outcomes 
provide an indication of how the appeals mechanisms are working. For example, the 
statistics provided by the NSW Office of State Revenue indicate that around 30 per 
cent of objections to assessments lodged with its Review Branch resulted in some 
action or change, either stemming from changes to earlier decisions or due to the 
collection of new information as part of the review process (OSR NSW pers. 
comm., March 2013). 
Role of Small Business Commissioners in mediating disputes 
In recent years, the governments of New South Wales and South Australia, 
following the lead of Victoria and Western Australia, have established Small 
Business Commissioners. The Australian Government has also recently appointed 
an Australian Small Business Commissioner (Australian Small Business 
Commissioner 2013). 






Small Business Commissioners perform a range of roles including: being a ‘voice 
for small business’ to government; conducting investigations into the treatment of 
small businesses; monitoring and reporting on the small business impacts of 
legislation; and other issues affecting small business. Of the current Small Business 
Commissioners, only the Australian Government Small Business Commissioner’s 
position is not legislated (table 5.5). 
A primary role of many Small Business Commissioners is to enable disputes to be 
resolved with minimal stress to small business operators. However, several 
participants canvassed a wider role. The CCI WA noted, for example, that there 
may be value in a greater role for the federal and state Small Business 
Commissioners to engage with small businesses when regulators make changes to 
existing regulation or develop new regulation (sub. 7). The benefits of regulators 
engaging with small business in developing regulation was reiterated by the SBDC 
(WA), which noted: 
To their credit, the WA Departments of Commerce, Transport, Local Government, and 
Regional Development and Lands have all been very forward in asking for the SBDC’s 
input at various stages of their regulatory development and review process. (sub. 22, p. 8) 
Business SA also endorsed a proposal that the South Australian Small Business 
Commissioner play a role in reviewing the likely impact of Work Health and Safety 
Codes of Practice on small business, but noted that it was ‘concerned that the 
Commissioner’s office is not adequately staffed to meet this task’ (sub. 3, p. 3). 
Table 5.5 Small Business Commissioners in Australia 
 Cwlth NSW Vic WA SA 
Legislated position      
Advocacy role a    b 
Dispute resolution role a     
Conduct investigations into small business treatment    b  
Monitor and report on the impact on small business of 
legislation 
    b 
Monitor and report on emerging trends in market 
practices that have an adverse effect on small business 
     
a The stated role of the Australian Small Business Commissioner is to provide advocacy and representation of 
small business interests and concerns to the Australian Government, including referral of small businesses to 
business-to-business dispute resolution services. b At the request of the Minister. 
Sources: Australian Small Business Commissioner (2013); Small Business Development Corporation Act 
1983 (WA); Small Business Commissioner Act 2003 (Vic); Small Business Commissioner Act 2011 (SA); 
Small Business Commissioner Act 2013 (NSW). 
The Commission’s Local Government as Regulator study suggested that enabling 
Small Business Commissioners across all jurisdictions to play a mediating role 






between local government and business and to investigate systemic issues raised 
through complaints would provide business with a path of redress that is less 
formal, time consuming and expensive than judicial appeals, but more independent 
than an internal review (PC 2012b). 
More broadly, effective complaints handing and appeals mechanisms, in addition to 
directly improving the quality of regulatory decisions, build respect, trust and 
openness between regulators and business. This can strengthen business confidence 
in overall regulatory processes, which, in turn, helps underpin the health of 
regulatory systems over time. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Regulators should ensure that processes for lodging complaints and seeking 
review of decisions are readily accessible by small businesses. Appropriate 
mechanisms would have a degree of independence from the compliance 
monitoring operations of the regulator, provision for businesses to obtain reasons 
for decisions taken, and processes that allow regulators to learn from complaints. 
Further, governments should ensure that there are independent, low cost 
mediation services in place to resolve disputes and misunderstandings between 
small businesses and regulators.  
• As a minimum, regulators should be required by legislation or ministerial 
direction to cooperate with the mediation agency and provide whatever 
information the agency reasonably seeks.   
• Mediation services should be provided by Small Business Commissioners 
where currently in place. Such processes should complement (not replace) 
existing statutory and administrative rights to have decisions formally 
reviewed and the functions performed by offices of the ombudsman. 
5.7 Conclusion  
Ensuring that business can readily access and understand information about their 
regulatory rights and obligations is critical for effective regulation. Where 
information on regulatory requirements is clear and easy to find, overall compliance 
is likely to be higher, and the burden on businesses’ often scarce management 
resources is also reduced. 
The Commission found evidence that many regulators had in place sound 
communication strategies and practices that resulted in effective communication 






with small business. However, overall, there remains scope for more widespread 
and consistent application of these leading practices, in particular, through ensuring: 
• information on regulatory requirements is readily available and understandable 
by small business — information should be up-to-date, reliable, widely available 
at minimum cost, in clear and business friendly formats, using plain language 
• use of a multi-channel communication and consultation strategy to more 
effectively engage with the diverse types, and large number, of small businesses 
• targeting of advice and guidance to small business, directed by an assessment of 
the relative risks posed by business activities 
• brevity in all communications with small business, particularly given growing 
concerns by small business about information overload stemming from the 
cumulative burden of regulation 
• streamlining and rationalisation of data collection, consistent with risk 
assessments, and coordination and data sharing, where appropriate, among 
regulators to reduce unnecessary reporting burdens 
• tailoring of communication and consultation strategies to meet the differing 
circumstances and capacities of the variety of businesses, subject to an 
assessment of relative costs and benefits 
• complaints and appeals mechanisms are accessible, timely, fair and impartial. 
At this stage, the use of social media such as Facebook and twitter as a means of 
communicating with business should perhaps be less of an immediate priority for 
regulators than ensuring their website and email communication strategies are 
working well. That said, these approaches have potential for improved 
communication with small business in future years.  
Finally, despite some notable exceptions, regulators in general appear to be 
underinvesting in research into the effectiveness of their communication and 
information strategies. Without this information they are unable to determine 
whether they are making the best use of their scarce engagement resources. It 
cannot be assumed that the current allocation of funding is optimal. More 
systematic efforts by regulators to gather evidence on the effectiveness of their 
communication and information strategies is likely to yield substantial benefits. 
This issue is taken up in the following chapter. 
   





6 Driving better regulator performance 
Key points 
• Improvements in regulator performance and the more widespread adoption of 
leading practices identified in this report are most likely where appropriate 
institutional, governance, transparency and accountability mechanisms are in place 
to ensure: 
– the removal of unnecessary legislative or other constraints on the capacity of 
regulators to implement flexible and responsive approaches 
– strong incentives for cultural change and continuous improvement. 
• In particular, all governments should ensure:  
– good up front institutional and regulatory design, including: 
 consistent application of ex ante processes designed to ensure rigorous 
analysis of the impacts of regulation (including on small business) 
 roles and responsibilities and potential overlap or duplication are carefully 
considered when new regulatory functions are being established 
– clarity of objectives and expectations, including in relation to risk management: 
 there should be explicit acknowledgment that some risk is unavoidable and 
that the regulator should be able to operate independently, without undue 
interference from government 
– regulators have adequate resourcing and effective leaders: 
 leaders have the capacities and commitment to foster an organisational 
culture that appropriately balances risk mitigation and facilitation of business 
activity/economic growth, by minimising unnecessary compliance burdens 
– systematic performance monitoring and review: 
 with emphasis on measuring effectiveness in achieving outcomes while 
minimising compliance costs 
 development of whole of government best practice regulator engagement 
principles (including in relation to the use of discretion) with appropriate 
oversight to ensure they are adopted 
– mechanisms, such as regulator forums, for ensuring better coordination and 
sharing of experiences and lessons learned. 
• Regulators must have the necessary systems in place to ensure: 
– recruitment of staff with the right mix of relevant experience and skills and 
appropriate training and guidance for staff — including a focus on the underlying 
rationale for risk based enforcement and appropriate use of discretion 
– monitoring and review of effectiveness and costs of engagement approaches.  
 







Previous chapters have identified many leading practices in regulator engagement 
with business. However, there is considerable scope for their wider and more 
systematic adoption, both within and across jurisdictions. While recognising that 
important differences between regulators mean that, at a detailed level, a good 
practice for one regulator may not necessarily be suitable for adoption by another, 
the Commission has formed the view that what constitutes good engagement, both 
in principle and practice, is generally well understood. However, various factors are 
impeding the adoption of better approaches by influencing the incentives or 
capacities of regulators. This chapter focuses on some of the more important of 
these barriers and identifies the main drivers of improved regulator performance — 
in particular better engagement with small business. 
Essentially, broad and sustained improvements in regulator performance — 
including reducing unnecessary compliance costs on regulated businesses — are 
most likely to be achieved when governments: 
• first, remove unnecessary legislative or other constraints on regulators 
• second, put in place the framework conditions and mechanisms that create the 
incentives for the adoption of a regulator culture that is flexible and responsive 
and emphasises the importance of continuous improvement. 
As discussed in chapter 2, there are a number of factors largely outside the control 
of regulators that influence and in some cases constrain the way they engage with 
business. Many of these relate to the design of the regulation that the regulator 
administers or the institutional and governance arrangements established at the time 
the regulator was created.  
In designing regulation, policy makers must, for example: 
• provide regulators with an appropriate range of enforcement tools and discretion 
to respond flexibly and proportionately to compliance breaches 
• provide scope for businesses to develop alternative lower cost compliance 
solutions, but at the same time — for those businesses (particularly many small 
businesses) that prefer prescription and certainty — regulations should set out 
clearly the solutions that will be deemed to comply with the regulation. 
Previous chapters have also emphasised the importance of governments ensuring 
the consistent application of ex ante processes designed to ensure rigorous analysis 
of the impacts of regulation (including on small business). These should also 
include careful consideration of how regulations will be implemented and enforced. 
Roles and responsibilities of regulators must also be clearly defined and potential 
   





overlap or duplication carefully considered when new regulatory functions are 
being established. Where some overlap is unavoidable, mechanisms for cooperation 
and coordination between the relevant regulators should be established, ideally 
before regulations take effect. This will help avoid the imposition of unnecessary 
business compliance and regulator administration costs as will appropriate testing 
and transition arrangements (chapter 5). 
The various factors identified above and discussed more fully in the earlier chapters, 
are clearly critical determinants of regulator performance and the compliance 
burden of regulation for business. They are largely ‘up front’ considerations relating 
to the establishment of a regulator or the early phases of implementation of 
regulation. The rest of this chapter discusses a range of other major drivers of 
regulator performance and that tend to be more ‘ongoing’ considerations for the 
regulator and governments that impact on regulator capacities and the way they 
engage with business in the ‘delivery’ of regulation. These include: 
• adequate resourcing, strong leadership and staff with the necessary skills and 
capacities 
• appropriate transparency and accountability mechanisms to ensure regulators are 
motivated to discharge their responsibilities in a manner that best serves the 
community’s interests 
• clear communication of government objectives and expectations of regulators 
• requirements for review and ongoing monitoring of regulators’ performance and 
mechanisms for the sharing of experiences with other regulators, which create a 
culture of continuous improvement. 
6.2 Regulator capacities 
Adequate resourcing of regulators and ensuring staff have the necessary capabilities 
and capacities are key determinants of regulator performance. Even the best 
designed policies will not achieve desired outcomes if staff do not have the 
appropriate skills or if the right culture does not permeate throughout a regulatory 
agency.  
Submissions raised concerns about aspects of regulator capacities. For example: 
Poor understanding and business knowledge of enforcement officers; continual churn 
of enforcement staff; inconsistency of interpretation and application of standards, codes 
and regulatory requirements by enforcement officers; and inability of enforcement staff 
to accommodate innovative or new approaches which achieve the same/similar 
outcomes. This means that audits and inspections require a degree of ‘hand-holding’ of 
the regulatory officers and repetitive process of having to explain the nature and 






practices of their business which increases the cost and burden of compliance. 
(Chamber of Commerce and Industry Queensland (CCIQ), sub. 16, p. 5) 
In our experience, in the consumer products and cosmetics sector, regulators have little 
to no understanding of: our products, our processes, other Australian regulations 
applying to these products, or the impact of their decisions on the overall business. This 
has resulted in regulatory requirements that are near impossible to comply with. … 
Unfortunately, in our experience, very few regulators make the effort to try to 
understand the impact on industry. (Accord Australasia, sub. DR41, p. 7) 
Various audit reports have also identified gaps in skills and capacities as a 
significant barrier to effective regulator performance (see for example, ACT 
Auditor-General 2011; Western Australia Auditor General 2011).  
Leadership, including the values, attitude and commitment of the CEO and senior 
management are also critical influences on culture and the performance of a 
regulatory agency. Governments therefore, to the extent that they have a role in 
decisions about senior appointments, can indirectly have a major influence on the 
posture adopted by regulators in their engagement with small businesses. 
The overall resourcing of regulators was discussed in chapter 2 and it is clear that 
many regulators consider resourcing to be one of the most significant constraints on 
their capacity to effectively engage with business. While regulators essentially must 
take their overall level of resourcing as a given, they can provide feedback to 
government where they perceive those allocations to be inadequate. They also 
benefit from clear guidance from governments on areas of priority for enforcement, 
for instance via ‘statements of expectations’ (section 6.3).  
Within overall budgetary constraints, regulators do have discretion to determine the 
staff they recruit, the allocation of staff between different functions, and how they 
go about ensuring those staff acquire and retain the knowledge and skills required to 
effectively discharge their responsibilities. Not surprisingly, larger regulators with 
greater resources have far more flexibility with respect to the approaches they adopt 
and indeed, as has been noted throughout this report, what may be a cost effective 
strategy for a larger agency may not be a feasible option for a smaller regulator. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Governments should ensure that regulators have sufficient resourcing to enable 
them to administer and enforce regulation effectively and efficiently. This 
includes ensuring regulators have the capacity to make appropriate use of 
educative and facilitative engagement practices. Clear guidance needs to be 
provided by government on enforcement priorities, especially where more severe 
resource constraints cannot be addressed in the short term.  
   





Building staff competencies 
The skills, qualifications and experience of regulatory agency staff can vary widely 
depending on the area of regulation (for example health versus taxation) and the 
specific roles being performed (for example administrative versus enforcement 
officers). Certain staff may need to have highly specialised technical or scientific 
skills and experience to effectively carry out their duties. It can be an ongoing 
problem for some regulators to attract and retain staff with these specialist skills, 
given that they will often be competing with the private sector, which is typically 
able to pay higher salaries. The inability to attract or retain appropriately skilled 
staff was identified as an issue by some 14 per cent of regulators. It was a more 
common concern in particular regulatory areas, such as in the building and 
construction area, where 50 per cent of respondents identified this as a barrier 
(Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013). 
One consequence of a high turnover of regulator staff can be a loss of technical 
capability and corporate knowledge and, as a result, inconsistency and delays in 
decision making. This reinforces the need for regulators to consider strategies that 
improve retention rates.  
In its Local Government as Regulator report (PC 2012), the Commission found 
evidence in many councils of high turnover, staff shortages and problems attracting 
suitably qualified staff in particular workforce categories. Such problems are 
particularly acute in some remote and regional areas. This impacts on the ability of 
local governments to administer and enforce some areas of regulation. In its 
submission to that study, the Small Business Development Corporation (WA) 
stated: 
Just like small business themselves, very small local governments often have problems 
attracting qualified and competent staff for specialised positions (such as managerial 
roles, town planners, engineers and building surveyors), particularly in regional and 
remote areas. The lack of appropriately skilled and experienced council staff can lead 
to poor or inconsistent decision-making, which can have a detrimental impact on small 
businesses. (SBDC (WA) 2011, pp. 10-11) 
The Commission’s report identified a number of initiatives to address skill or staff 
shortages. These included: 
• various forms of cooperation and coordination between local governments to 
achieve economies of scope and scale in resources and skills (for example, 
sharing of building approval services in Western Australia) 
• the use of ‘flying squads’ such as the Rural Planning Flying Squad in Victoria 
that provides support to local councils undertaking regulatory functions relating 
to planning. 






Such initiatives, as well as moderating the effects of skill shortages, can ‘facilitate 
the transfer of knowledge, skills and processes across council areas and encourage 
consistent decision making between different local governments’ (PC 2012, p. 169). 
Other mechanisms for coordination and sharing of knowledge and experiences are 
discussed in section 6.5. 
Traditionally many regulator staff have come from a law enforcement background 
and this has influenced the culture of regulatory agencies, tending to be associated 
with a stricter and less flexible approach to enforcing compliance. Some knowledge 
of administrative law will be essential for many officers, for example those carrying 
out investigations or undertaking inspections. Increasingly though, general 
investigative, education and communication skills are being recognised as 
important, particularly as agencies move from a strict compliance based approach to 
the adoption of a more facilitative and educative posture. The Western Australian 
Department of Fisheries, for example, now places greater emphasis in its 
recruitment on regulatory officers with communication skills and a broader 
understanding of natural resource management in an attempt to shift the cultural 
focus away from the traditional policing approach and toward sustainability of the 
fishery resource (pers. comm., 23 May 2013). 
Around 50 per cent of regulators reported hiring some staff with skills or experience 
in law enforcement and a similar proportion have hired staff that worked in business 
in the area which the agency regulates. This compares with around 40 per cent of 
regulators indicating they have hired staff with skills or experience in education and 
training (Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013). There are some 
significant differences between regulatory areas (figure 6.1). 
Skills and knowledge will be, to some extent, acquired on the job or developed 
through appropriate training. However, recruitment policies and practices need to 
focus on achieving the right mix overall of relevant experience and skills and on 
identifying and addressing key gaps in capabilities. 
Staff must also understand ‘the nuances of the entities they regulate and the laws 
they are enforcing’ (Institute of Public Accountants, sub. 29, p. 5). Participants have 
identified: commercial and technical knowledge; industry awareness; and 
understanding of the specific constraints faced by small business as particular areas 
for improvement. While, as noted above, many regulators have hired staff that 
worked in businesses in the area regulated, some participants have called for a 
stronger emphasis in recruitment on industry experience. Others have suggested the 
use of staff placements in businesses or industry associations to build understanding 
(see, for example, Council of Small Business Organisations of Australia 
(COSBOA), sub. 15).  
   





Figure 6.1 Strategies to ensure regulator staff have appropriate skills 
Per cent of regulators employing staff with particular experience 
 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
To date, staff placements appear to have been infrequently used by regulators. In the 
Commission’s regulator survey, only around 15 per cent of regulators indicated they 
had either placed business staff within their agency or their own staff within a 
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business. Of those agencies that had used either practice, less than half reported that 
they considered that it had been effective.  
In the United Kingdom the ‘Trading Places’ program seeks to build greater 
understanding between local authority regulatory services and the businesses they 
monitor, by facilitating two way learning experiences for regulator and business 
staff. This includes the opportunity for local authority staff to visit and experience 
first-hand the operations of participating businesses. After the first two years of 
operation nearly one-third of local authorities in England and Wales had 
participated in the program (LBRO 2011). Such a program may, however, have 
greater net benefits for regulator engagement with larger (rather than smaller) 
businesses. 
Beyond knowledge and skills, staff must understand and have a commitment to the 
regulator’s engagement goals and values. They must also have the right ‘attitude’.  
… some officers appear to have the view that their role carries with it a wisdom that 
should never be challenged. This can lead to overconfidence, an unwillingness to listen 
and in some instances: ‘bully-boy’ tactics. (Institute of Public Accountants, 
sub. 29, p. 5) 
This differs from agency to agency and from person to person but some regulators have 
a reputation for belligerence and bullying. This is mainly an issue at the Local 
Government level where health and planning issues are managed. (COSBOA, 
sub. 15, p. 5) 
Improving guidance and training for staff 
The Commission considers that improving guidance and training for enforcement 
officers could contribute substantially to addressing the gap between engagement 
policy and practice in many regulatory agencies. 
Staff should have ready access to a policy and procedures manual to provide 
guidance on matters such as: regulatory objectives; the application of a risk 
management framework; conduct of investigations; available enforcement actions 
and when they should be used; the appropriate use of discretion; record keeping; 
dispute resolution; and review processes. With appropriate oversight and 
transparency arrangements in place to ensure they are adhered to, such guidance 
documents can improve the quality and consistency of processes and decisions, to 
the benefit of both regulators and business.  
There are a number of examples of better practice guides and frameworks that have 
been developed for regulators within a portfolio area or as a guide for all regulators 
in a particular regulatory area. For example, the Heads of Workplace Safety 
   





Authorities (HWSA) developed the ‘National Occupational Health and Safety 
(OHS) Compliance and Enforcement Policy’ to assist OHS regulators in each 
jurisdiction to implement effective enforcement practices (HWSA 2008).  
A range of ‘whole of government’ good practice guidance material has also been 
developed by Australian governments for consideration by all regulators within a 
jurisdiction (section 6.4). Differences between regulators will mean principles and 
practices will not be universally suitable, so general guidance should, where 
possible, identify key considerations relevant to the application of a principle or 
practice. 
Guidance on use of discretion 
While consistency and predictability in decision making are clearly important, as 
noted in chapter 4 some flexibility in the use of compliance and enforcement tools 
can improve the effectiveness and lower the cost of regulations. It is generally 
accepted that regulator staff need to be able to exercise discretion and to some 
extent tailor decisions to specific circumstances. For example, the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) refers to ‘an appropriate degree of flexibility to 
…  deal quickly with exceptional or changing circumstances or recognise individual 
needs’ (COAG 2004, p. 6). Regulator staff must, however, show good judgment in 
the use of any discretion available to them.  
Regulators will generally have greater discretion (and be required more often to 
exercise their judgment in determining whether a business is compliant) where 
regulations or standards are process, performance or outcome-based, rather than 
being written prescriptively. Indeed, determining compliance with requirements 
specified in broad performance terms can be challenging for enforcement officers. 
Sometimes a perceived lack of flexibility in a regulator’s processes and practices is 
largely a reflection of a lack of confidence or capacity to use their discretion — for 
example, ‘limits in skills and capacity of staff to respond to legitimate concerns and 
make informed choices between different approaches to modifying behaviour (for 
example, between education and penalties)’ (VCEC 2011, p. 109). 
The provision of appropriate training and guidance for staff on when and how to 
exercise discretion can significantly reduce the risk that decisions will be made that 
are not in the community’s interests.  
More than 60 per cent of regulators indicated that their enforcement officers are 
provided with training and/or written guidelines on the use of discretion in 
determining responses to compliance breaches. Moreover, only five of the 
respondents that indicated that enforcement officers have some discretion, provided 






no guidance at all on the use of that discretion (Productivity Commission regulator 
survey 2013).  
Specific guidance on the use of discretion is sometimes contained in the 
enforcement manuals of individual regulators (for example, Tasmanian Department 
of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment; Planning NSW; and the 
Building Professionals Board in NSW). 
In addition to regulator specific guidance, there are a number of examples of 
general whole of government guidance on the use of discretion that have been 
developed for regulators and their staff. These include: 
• guidelines published by the Western Australia Ombudsman on the Exercise of 
Discretion in Administrative Decision-Making (Ombudsman Western 
Australia 2009) 
• Caution Guidelines issued by the Attorney General in NSW to assist 
enforcement officers in exercising their discretion when deciding whether to 
issue a caution or penalty notice under the Fines Act 1996 (NSW Attorney 
General 2010) — the NSW Business Chamber (sub. 25) suggested that 
consideration be given to developing a similar model guide for federal 
regulatory agencies 
• Enforcement Guidelines for Councils developed by the NSW Ombudsman, 
include a chapter on Using Discretion (NSW Ombudsman 2002).  
In box 6.1, the Commission has identified some key considerations in the use of 
discretion by regulators. 
If officers are to have the necessary confidence to appropriately use their discretion, 
they must be able to rely on the support of their superiors should a decision they 
have made result in unforseen or unintended consequences. It is also important that 
the use by staff of particular enforcement tools (for example fines or prosecutions) 
is not taken as a measure of their performance, since this can create perverse 
incentives — for example, to overuse enforcement actions, rather than trying to 
facilitate compliance. Indeed, an important strategy for changing organisational 
culture toward a more facilitative environment is to reward actions that are 
consistent with the desired culture. 
The Commission considers that suitable whole of government guidance on the 
appropriate use of discretion should be promoted and be readily accessible to 
regulators in all Australian jurisdictions. However, as such guidance will need to be 
general in nature, it is appropriate that all regulators also tailor their own guidance 
for their staff on the use of discretion. Such guidance and complementary training 
   





could cover examples of the exercise of discretion deemed appropriate or 
inappropriate in different scenarios relevant to the specific area of regulation.  
 
Box 6.1 Key considerations in the use of discretion 
In exercising discretionary powers, regulators and their officers should: 
• comply with any specific legislative requirements and criteria set out in policies and 
procedures 
• make policies and procedures related to the use of discretion transparent  
• make rational, defensible decisions based on a risk management, outcome oriented 
approach: 
– rely on relevant supporting evidence, appropriately examined and verified 
– act reasonably and in good faith 
– act independently (and not under the dictation of a third person or body) 
– consider only relevant matters; give appropriate weight to matters reflecting their 
importance; consider extenuating circumstances 
• uphold equity, consistency and fairness: 
– avoid actual or perceived bias; identify and avoid conflicts of interest 
– treat like offences or circumstances equally, but some strategic or symbolic 
actions (such as picking a few for the sake of making an example) may 
sometimes be justified 
• document processes, justify choices and explain reasons for key decisions 
• subject decisions (some proportion chosen randomly and/or more significant 
decisions) to review and approval by senior staff 
• provide businesses affected by processes and decisions with procedural fairness 
and opportunities for review and appeal. 
Sources: Sparrow (2000); Ombudsman Western Australia (2009); Planning NSW (2002).  
 
As noted, many regulators do provide written guidance and training on the use of 
discretion. However, concerns raised about poor judgments made by enforcement 
officers or an unwillingness to use the discretion available to them, suggests the 
need for greater efforts to ensure such guidance and training is both effective and 
consistently implemented in practice. A lack of information about the effectiveness 
of particular regulator strategies also indicates the need for periodic review and 
assessment of how discretion is being used. 
Ensuring decisions are potentially subject to internal review or random spot checks, 
maximises the likelihood that discretion will be exercised in a manner consistent 
with the efficient achievement of regulatory objectives and the interests of the 
broader community. The Brisbane City Council (BCC) is an example of a regulator 
that formally reviews their officer’s use of discretion (BCC, pers. comm., 






8 February 2013). Where problems are identified this can feed back into training 
and guidance material. Knowing their decisions and management of cases may be 
subject to review also discourages any tendency for officers to be too lenient or, in 
the extreme, be captured by business interests. 
RECOMMENDATION 
To address gaps in staff skills and capacities regulators should: 
• implement policies that focus on the recruitment and retention of staff with the 
appropriate industry knowledge and mix of enforcement, investigative and 
communication skills 
• ensure the provision of appropriate training and written guidance for staff, 
including on the rationale for risk based enforcement and the appropriate use 
of discretion, and monitor regulator practices for consistency with such 
guidance 
• facilitate opportunities for staff to enhance their understanding of business 
practices and the nature and magnitude of the compliance costs their 
engagement approaches impose on small businesses 
• implement cooperative arrangements with other regulators that facilitate the 
sharing of knowledge and resources. 
6.3 Transparency and accountability 
Aspects of transparency and accountability have been discussed in earlier chapters. 
A general discussion of how these mechanisms impact on regulator incentives was 
included in chapter 2 and various leading practices in consultation and 
communication of compliance requirements and enforcement policies (which are 
key facets of transparency) were discussed in chapter 5. A range of strategies and 
institutional arrangements for ensuring impartiality and accountability in decision 
making, including documenting of decisions (and reasons), reviews of decisions, 
service charters and Codes of Conduct were outlined in chapter 4. 
Reporting, oversight and dispute resolution 
Public reporting of performance, discussed further in the next section, can be a 
particularly powerful transparency and accountability tool, creating strong 
incentives for improved regulator behaviour and adoption of leading practices in 
engagement with business. Accountability of regulators for their performance 
would be further enhanced with independent oversight and monitoring of reporting 
and of progress in reforming engagement practices over time.  
   





The oversight function could potentially be performed by audit offices in each 
jurisdiction, as suggested by the NSW Business Chamber (sub. 25). Alternatively, 
existing regulatory oversight bodies, such as the Victorian Competition and 
Efficiency Commission (VCEC) or the Better Regulation Office in NSW, could be 
given this responsibility.  
The oversight body could also be charged with conducting reviews of regulators 
and could have input into the development and refinement of performance 
indicators (section 6.4). Publication of an annual report by the oversight body, even 
those located within a government department, could be a further tool for 
highlighting good and bad practices and in particular for disseminating information 
on innovative approaches adopted by regulators that could have wider application.  
Another important accountability mechanism is ensuring fair and independent 
external dispute resolution mechanisms (chapter 5). This enables the community to 
challenge regulator performance and conduct and hold them to account.  
Governments must clearly set out their expectations of regulators 
Clarity in governments’ regulatory objectives and their expectations of regulators is 
also a key driver of better regulator performance. 
A systematic risk based approach to managing and enforcing compliance is central 
to achieving regulatory objectives whilst ensuring administration costs for 
regulators and compliance costs borne by business are the minimum necessary. 
Earlier chapters have noted how regulators can be too risk averse and how their risk 
tolerance can be influenced by public opinion, media attention (particularly 
following adverse events), explicit political direction or the regulator’s perceptions 
about the attitude of the Government or the responsible Minister.  
It is clearly appropriate that community views and the policy priorities of 
governments are taken into account. Indeed, it is vital that regulators have a clear 
understanding of the government’s objectives and expectations. Formal ‘statements 
of expectations’ (SOEs) and corresponding regulator ‘statements of intent’, are 
increasingly being used by some governments to ensure clear communication of 
high level guidance, including with respect to the treatment of risk and use of risk 
based approaches. Such statements should explicitly acknowledge that some level 
of risk is unavoidable and affirm the regulator’s independence to implement its 
agreed risk framework and to take day to day enforcement actions free from 
political interference. The SOE for Energy Safe Victoria (ESV), in the form of a 
letter from the Minister for Energy and Resources, has a number of features that the 
Commission considers should be reflected in SOEs more generally (box 6.2). 







Box 6.2 Energy Safe Victoria Statement of Expectation  
The SOE sets out the Minister’s and the Government’s objectives and priorities for 
ESV. It explicitly states an expectation that ESV should: 
• use a range of regulatory tools, including risk based approaches 
• remain focused on outcomes 
• constantly seek out better and more efficient ways of regulating to achieve these 
outcomes while minimising the regulatory burden on industry and community 
• participate in national and international fora to develop standards to support 
effective risk based regulation 
• keep the minister informed of existing and emerging issues (the statement 
acknowledges the benefit of regular exchange of information and regular meetings 
between ESV and the Minister). 
The SOE also acknowledges the Minister’s recognition of ESV’s independence: 
… [I] will support that independence in discharging your regulatory responsibilities and 
delivering the agreed regulatory program as outlined in the Corporate Plan. 
(O’Brien 2011, p. 2) 
In relation to independence, ESV’s letter of response to the SOE from the Director of 
Energy Safety, states: 
Discharging my statutory responsibilities, particularly enforcing compliance and ensuring 
safety risks are minimised to the lowest practical level, often requires ESV to take firm and 
sometimes unpopular action … whilst I acknowledge the important role of MPs and Ministers 
in facilitating outcomes and assisting constituents on specific issues and decisions, your 
recognition and support for ESVs independence is appreciated and will assist in ensuring 
ongoing clarity of role and the effective public administration of energy safety regulation. 
(Fearon 2012, p. 3) 
Sources: Fearon (2012); O’Brien (2011).  
 
Further, transparency surrounding the magnitude and consequences of risks and the 
approach of regulators to controlling risks can facilitate greater understanding 
within the community. In particular, the provision of information about the costs 
associated with reducing risks and the trade offs that must be made can change 
community perceptions and lead to acceptance of the need to tolerate a certain level 
of risk.  
RECOMMENDATION 
Regulators should ensure there is transparency and accountability in decision 
making and in the use of discretion, in order to minimise uncertainty and the risk 
of corruption or the inappropriate treatment of one business relative to another. 
Generally, this should include:  
   





• formal documentation and publishing of compliance and enforcement 
strategies and key decision making processes 
• documenting enforcement decisions with reasons 
• publication, subject to meeting any confidentiality and privacy requirements, 
of decisions with broader implications or with particular educational or 
deterrent value 
• provision of a client service charter detailing what business can expect in their 
interaction with the regulator  
• ensuring all decisions are potentially subject to review and businesses have 
access to appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms. 
6.4 Evaluation, review and performance monitoring 
There is significant scope to improve the engagement practices of most regulators 
— either to improve effectiveness in achieving regulatory objectives, achieve 
objectives at a lower cost, or both. Even for those regulators that are more advanced 
in their adoption of leading practices, there is a need to remain open to new 
developments and to adapt processes and practices to: evolving risks; changes in the 
‘maturity cycle’ of the regulatory function or regulated activity; and changes in 
technology and business practices. 
For this reason there must be mechanisms in place to monitor and evaluate policies, 
practices, staffing and capacities and to share experiences with other regulators. 
This can take the form of review and performance monitoring processes that are 
internal or external to the regulator, along with various formal or informal 
mechanisms for cooperation with other regulators. It should also include feedback 
mechanisms (discussed in chapter 5) that enable the regulator to systematically take 
account of input from stakeholders, including small businesses. Generally, 
monitoring, evaluation and review is a significant weakness for most regulators and 
regulatory systems in Australia (PC 2011a).  
The Commission recognises there can be significant challenges in evaluating 
performance and in particular determining the relative contribution that different 
tools or strategies make to achieving regulatory outcomes. A fundamental difficulty 
with any such exercise is determining the counterfactual — that is, what would have 
happened if the regulator had adopted a different approach? However, various 
methodological techniques are available and some of these were discussed in the 
Commission’s study Identifying and Evaluating Regulation Reforms (PC 2011a). 






Systematic reviews and performance evaluations 
Responses to the Commission’s regulator survey indicate that around 85 per cent of 
regulators have had their performance subjected to some sort of ongoing or periodic 
review. Typically, however, these are internal self-evaluations and they vary 
significantly in their nature and scope.  
Around 50 per cent of regulators indicated that reviews had included an assessment 
of the effectiveness of the agency’s engagement with business, but only 25 per cent 
considered the effectiveness of engagement with small business. There was some 
variation across jurisdictions. The proportion of regulators reporting consideration 
of both business and small business engagement in reviews was highest in South 
Australia (around 64 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively) and the ACT (around 50 
per cent and 25 per cent, respectively) (Productivity Commission regulator 
survey 2013). 
Internal reviews can be valuable. They clearly have the benefit of the regulator 
having ownership of the process and findings. Regulators should be genuinely 
committed to improving their performance and therefore, in principle, have a strong 
interest in ensuring such reviews are rigorous and be open to considering the merits 
and possible application of a wide range of practices. However, in practice, various 
constraints and incentives faced by regulators can sometimes compromise the 
quality of such reviews. As noted by VCEC: 
… any internal review risks losing rigour and objectivity, and may not have a realistic 
or informed view of good performance. In addition, it does not always create 
opportunities for regulators to share experiences and learn from each other. 
(VCEC 2011, p. 127) 
While the OECD draft best practice principles for the governance of regulators 
recognise the importance of regulators continuously monitoring and evaluating their 
own performance, ‘for major and periodic policy reviews and evaluation of a 
regulatory scheme, including the performance of the regulator’ it is suggested that 
they be carried out independently of the regulator (OECD 2013b, p. 29).  
External independent reviews typically provide greater scope for public 
participation, and perhaps consideration of a wider range of views and experiences 
of other regulators. They also provide a better opportunity to address institutional 
and governance arrangements. External reviews may be regulator specific, industry 
or sector-specific (more typically), or they may compare aspects of regulation and 
regulator performance and practices across different regulatory regimes and/or 
across jurisdictions. 
   





However, regulators may be less committed to any improvements recommended by 
an external review. While such reviews should seek to work with the regulator in a 
collaborative way, public reporting of findings and recommendations and follow up 
examinations of progress in implementing agreed improvement initiatives will help 
ensure regulators are accountable and potential reform benefits are realised. As 
noted in chapter 2, the incentives of regulators or the way they view success may 
not always align with the objectives of governments or the interests of the broader 
community.  
Bodies such as the VCEC and the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 
(IPART) in New South Wales have considered aspects of regulator performance, 
including administration and enforcement issues, through their public inquiry 
programs. The Productivity Commission has also conducted a number of relevant 
studies in recent years, most notably in the series of performance benchmarking 
studies of business regulation (for example, food safety (PC 2009); OHS (PC 2010); 
planning, zoning and development assessments (PC 2011b) and local government as 
regulator (PC 2012)).  
In addition, performance audit programs conducted by the ANAO and jurisdictional 
audit offices examine whether regulators use resources efficiently and effectively 
and also the extent to which they achieve legislative and policy compliance. State 
Service Authorities, Public Sector/Service Commissions and Ombudsman in 
various jurisdictions also assess the governance, accountability and performance of 
public entities, including regulators. 
Criticisms by the Victorian Ombudsman and Audit Office of the performance of the 
Victorian Environment Protection Authority (EPA) encouraged the regulator to 
pursue improvements. Following reports from these bodies, the EPA commissioned 
a comprehensive independent review of its compliance monitoring and enforcement 
(Krpan 2011), which resulted in a number of major reforms (focused on building 
staff capacities and improving risk based approaches) being undertaken. Incentives 
for regulators to conduct or commission rigorous reviews and to strive for 
continuous improvements — that generate net benefits for the community as a 
whole — can also be strengthened by requiring regulators to regularly report 
publicly against a range of key performance indicators (see below). 
While many reviews and evaluations have contributed to significant improvements 
in regulator engagement practices, generally they have been rather ad hoc. The 
Commission considers that governments need to do more to ensure that regulator 
performance is subjected to regular and systematic scrutiny. 






The case for a systematic program of independent reviews of regulator 
performance 
Governments should ensure that the performance of regulators, in administering and 
enforcing regulation, is periodically subjected to independent review. These reviews 
could, as appropriate, focus exclusively on administration and enforcement, or the 
performance of regulators could be examined in the context of already scheduled 
broader reviews of the effectiveness and efficiency of regulations. 
Such reviews could examine the systems and processes of the regulator, the quality 
of its decisions and the effect it is having on regulatory burdens and outcomes. This 
would provide business with confidence that regulators are being held to account 
for the way in which they exercise their powers. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, the Better Regulation Executive carried out 
reviews of 36 national regulators between 2007 and 2009. The focus of the reviews 
was on the extent to which each regulator was conforming to the principles set out 
in the Hampton Review Report (and embodied in the UK Regulators’ Compliance 
Code — see below) in the context of its particular field of regulation and powers. 
In Australia, reviews could be undertaken by a body in each jurisdiction with 
sufficient independence, for instance VCEC in Victoria or IPART in NSW, or an 
existing audit or regulatory oversight body. A review function of this type would be 
similar to the Inspector General of Regulation that the Uhrig Review (2003) 
recommended be established by the Australian Government to investigate, where 
necessary, the systems and procedures used by regulatory authorities in 
administering regulation.1 
The review body would be expected, in developing its review program and 
determining terms of reference, to consult widely, including with: 
• bodies such as the Auditor General and the Ombudsman (including with a view 
to avoiding overlap or inefficiencies in scheduling) 
• the relevant Small Business Commissioner (and in Victoria, also the Red Tape 
Commissioner)  
• business groups (including those representing small business interests) and other 
community groups. 
                                              
1  The proposal for an Inspector General of Regulation was modelled on the Australian 
Government Inspector General of Taxation, which is an independent statutory office that 
reviews systemic tax administration issues and reports to the Australian Government with 
recommendations for improvements. 
   





While some reviews will necessarily involve substantial resources and will 
appropriately be broad in scope and comprehensive, there may often be value in 
quick, less resource intensive reviews. Indeed, such reviews may identify a high 
proportion of the problems and potential improvements at a fraction of the cost. The 
United Kingdom has, for example, had some success with ‘rapid evidence’ 
assessments and reviews (UK Civil Service 2013). In principle, such assessments 
can also be used systematically as a preliminary screen to determine which 
regulator practices warrant more detailed assessments. 
Some Australian jurisdictions have announced initiatives that appear to reflect a 
recognition of the importance of evaluation and review of regulator performance 
and the identification of better practices. For example, in December 2012, the 
Victorian Government announced its intention to commence a series of ‘regulatory 
practice projects’, whereby the VCEC will work with selected regulators to improve 
regulation administration on the ground: 
The focus will be on how regulation is enforced, including identifying best practice risk 
based approaches to reduce the red tape burden for compliant businesses. This new 
approach reflects the practical application of regulation is often as important as the 
existence and form of regulations. (Victorian Government 2012, p. 55) 
In the recently announced Commonwealth Government Framework for Regulators, 
the Australian Government included greater emphasis by ministers and agency 
heads to reviews as one of a number of mechanisms for improving the 
administration of regulators. The Government noted, in particular, that regular 
reviews could be undertaken of the statutory and administrative frameworks 
supporting regulators to ensure that frameworks are consistent with policy 
objectives and provide regulators with appropriate access to contemporary 
regulatory tools, such as proportionate enforcement (Department of Finance and 
Deregulation 2012). Notwithstanding the Government’s recognition of their value, 
currently there is no compulsion on ministers and agencies to conduct such reviews. 
Sharing experiences with other regulators 
Regulators can benefit greatly from opportunities to learn from each other through 
the sharing of information about their specific experiences. Regulator capacities can 
be strengthened where knowledge about what has been effective or has not worked 
well is shared and where regulators work cooperatively together to identify ways to 
overcome common problems.  
The sharing of knowledge, relevant experiences, policies, procedures, templates and 
guidance materials can also reduce administrative costs for regulators (including 
those associated with developing and trialling strategies). Small regulators 






particularly stand to gain because there is not the same potential that exists within 
many larger agencies to benefit from in house sharing of experiences and expertise. 
Business and the general community, as well as regulators, also benefit where costs 
— associated with engagement practices that have been demonstrated, by the 
experience of another regulator, to be unsuccessful or less effective — are avoided. 
Examples of mechanisms that have been set up to share experiences, include:  
• inter jurisdictional — Australian Consumer Law Regulators, Heads of 
Workplace Safety Authorities and Heads of Workers Compensation Authorities 
• Commonwealth — the Council of Financial Regulators 
• New South Wales — Better Regulation Office Innovation and Improvement in 
Regulation Services Group 
• Victorian Forum of Primary Industry Regulators.  
Further information about some of these forums is provided in box 6.3. 
When forums comprise a broader range of regulators — across multiple portfolio 
areas or government wide — they are sometimes called a ‘community of practice’. 
The Victorian Government has announced that VCEC will establish a community of 
practice for Victorian regulators to enhance cross regulator dialogue and pooling of 
experience and information (Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance 2013).  
The Australian Government has also identified portfolio based forums and a broader 
community of practice for Commonwealth regulators as mechanisms that could 
potentially enhance the administration of regulators. (Department of Finance and 
Deregulation 2012). The inaugural ‘Community of Practice for Regulators’ event 
held in June 2013 was well received and there is an intention to hold another event 
prior to the end of 2013 (Department of Finance and Deregulation, pers. comm., 
14 August 2013).  
All Australian governments should consider opportunities to establish standing 
forums of regulators. These could comprise portfolio or area based regulators 
(including as appropriate inter jurisdictional fora) and a broader community of 
practice. The Commission considers that such fora have considerable potential to 
facilitate the wider adoption of leading practices in consultation, communication, 
compliance and enforcement. For example, they provide a mechanism for sharing 
information and building capacities in relation to: 
• the application of risk based approaches — supporting the broader application of 
risk based regulation by improving understanding of available tools and the 
enablers and barriers to adopting such approaches 
   





• measuring and reporting performance — assisting in the development of a 
performance framework (see below), including addressing various methodological 
issues related to the gathering and reporting of performance information. 
They can also be an important mechanism for identifying and addressing overlaps 
and coordination issues — for example they can provide an opportunity for 
regulators to consider ways they can coordinate their compliance and enforcement 
activities (chapter 4). 
Performance monitoring and reporting 
The regular monitoring of performance using well defined indicators or measures of 
effectiveness and costs can be an invaluable source of information for a regulator on 
the appropriateness of its strategies and areas for improvement. When combined 
with public reporting, performance monitoring can greatly increase the transparency 
of the regulator’s activities and support accountability. Greater transparency can 
provide a particularly strong impetus for better performance, including with respect 
to lowering the compliance burden of regulator engagement with small business.  
The ANAO identified the following benefits of performance monitoring and 
reporting: 
Non financial performance information allows entities to assess the impact of policy 
measures, adjust management approaches as required and provide advice to 
government on the success, shortcomings and/or future directions of programs …  
This information also allows for informed decisions to be made on the allocation and 
use of program resources. In addition, performance information and reporting enables 
the Parliament and the public to consider a program’s performance, in relation to both 
the impact of the program in achieving the policy objectives of the government and its 
cost effectiveness. (ANAO 2013, pp. 14, 18) 
The Commission considers that there could be merit in regular and systematic 
benchmarking of the performance of regulators against common indicators, but 
comparisons of regulator performance have limitations (discussed below). 
Therefore, irrespective of any government wide performance monitoring, regulators 
should be encouraged to monitor their own performance against a range of 
performance indicators.  







Box 6.3 Forums of regulators 
Heads of Workplace Safety Authorities (HWSA) is a group of senior representatives of 
workplace health and safety regulators from Australia and New Zealand. HWSA work 
together to improve and harmonise work health and safety at a national level. HWSA 
promotes and implements best practice in policy and legislation, education, 
compliance, and enforcement. Similar to the HWSA, the Heads of Workers 
Compensation Authorities (HWCA) play a similar role for all Australian and New 
Zealand workers compensation regulators. 
Australian Consumer Law (ACL) regulators meet regularly (for example the Education 
and Advisory Committee) to discuss a range of current issues, including those affecting 
small business, to ensure a consistent approach (ACCC, sub. 26). They also share 
intelligence through ACL Link — an online communication platform used by all ACL 
regulators. 
The NSW Innovation and Improvement in Regulatory Services (IIReS) Group of 
regulators — Environment Protection Authority (EPA), NSW Fair Trading, NSW Food 
Authority, Office of Environment and Heritage, Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing 
(OLGR), Roads and Maritime Services and Workcover — work together to deliver 
regulation that is business-friendly and achieves intended outcomes at the least cost to 
business. Established by the Better Regulation Office (BRO) in March 2012, IIReS has 
developed best practice principles which include: a risk based approach to regulation; 
regulatory effort that is focused on outcomes within an improvement framework; 
accountability to business for service efficiency; a clear understanding of business and 
community needs; and a capacity building culture within regulatory agencies. Members 
of the group also work with BRO to implement practical projects within their agencies, 
for example six IIReS regulators will undertake pilot projects in 2013 which will deliver 
guidance for all NSW regulators on Risk Based Mitigation and Outcomes. 
(BRO, pers. comm., 18 June 2013). 
The Victorian Forum of Primary Industry Regulators (FOPIR), set up by the 
Department of Primary Industries in 2008, comprises seven portfolio regulators. The 
forum meets quarterly and aims to share ideas, problems and solutions, and to build 
the capacity of all regulators. Guest speakers are invited and forum members make 
presentations and also receive information from the Department on relevant issues. 
VCEC reported that the FOPIR appeared to have generated benefits ‘with members 
regarding it as valuable’ (VCEC 2011, p. 116).  
 
Regulator-specific 
In all Australian jurisdictions, public sector regulatory agencies are subject to 
accountability and public reporting obligations (chapter 2). While the main focus of 
reporting is typically on financial performance, there is a growing emphasis in 
reporting requirements on non-financial measures of performance and increasingly 
on outcome and effectiveness measures. 
   





For example, under the Australian Government Outcomes and Programs 
framework, all entities in the public sector with responsibilities for the delivery of 
government programs (including regulators) are expected to have key performance 
indicators (KPIs). These indicators assist government to assess the impact of 
programs and whether they might be better targeted to achieve more cost effective 
outcomes. Entities are required to identify and report on appropriate outcome 
focused KPIs (ANAO 2013). 
Regulators that exist as separate legal entities (as opposed to being located within a 
government department) typically have their own websites, where performance 
information is more readily accessible. Furthermore, they generally report more 
detailed information than those regulatory functions that exist within portfolio 
agencies (which often have the reporting of their activities diluted in broader 
departmental reporting). However, reporting by regulators, whether stand alone or 
not, on aspects of their administration and enforcement of regulation, and more 
specifically activities related to their engagement with small business, is generally 
limited. While a relatively high proportion of regulators (particularly large 
regulators) report overall compliance levels, there is often little or no evidence 
presented on how their activities are impacting on outcomes or the relative 
effectiveness of different measures. 
Beyond the presentation of mandatory financial reporting, regulators typically have 
considerable discretion regarding what aspects of performance are highlighted in 
annual reports. Regulators not surprisingly have an interest in using the reports to 
promote the good work achieved in the last year and typically there is less focus on 
areas of performance that have been poor or the identification of areas that need 
improvement.  
The Department of Finance and Deregulation oversees the Commonwealth Policy 
for the construction, use and reporting of KPIs and provides guidance and assistance 
to agencies. The ANAO has authority to undertake audits of the appropriateness of 
Australian Government entities’ performance indicators and the completeness and 
accuracy of their reporting in annual reports. It has recently undertaken a pilot 
project to assess the status of the performance measurement and reporting 
framework and is now continuing work on developing, refining and testing an 
approach and criteria for the systematic audit of indicators (ANAO 2013).  
Notwithstanding the requirements for Australian Government regulators to report 
against indicators of outcomes, the ANAO (2013, pp. 15, 19) has found that 
‘implementation within entities continues to require more focus and attention’ and 
‘it is still difficult to get an accurate picture of the performance of programs’. Other 






key findings from recent ANAO work on performance measurement within the 
Australian Government are outlined in box 6.4.  
 
Box 6.4 ANAO findings on performance measurement of Australian 
Government agencies  
Some key findings of the ANAO based on its pilot project to assess the status of the 
Australian Government performance measurement and reporting framework, as well as 
earlier work on the development and implementation of performance indicators and 
various performance audits, include: 
• many government agencies are finding it challenging to develop and implement 
KPIs that allow for assessments of achievements against stated objectives 
– effectiveness KPIs are often activity based rather than designed to measure the 
impact of a program 
• there is a tendency for agencies to rely on descriptive/qualitative indicators — a 
greater emphasis on quantitative indicators would provide a more measurable basis 
for performance assessment 
• trends over time in performance indicators and targets are often not provided 
• generally where there is a lack of specificity in program objectives, this is associated 
with effectiveness KPIs that are also unclear and not measurable 
• significant differences between government entities can make it difficult for them to 
operationalize some homogeneous KPIs 
• the need for leadership, greater investment and resourcing to strengthen 
performance measurement 
• the need for improved guidance from the Department of Finance and Deregulation 
on performance measurement, including clearer standards or criteria for KPIs  
• systematic review of KPIs can lead to improvements in the quality and credibility of 
indicators. 
Sources: ANAO (2011, 2013).  
 
The Commission notes, however, that the Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act 2013 (Cwlth) (PGPA Act) may, depending on the detail to be 
included in future rules, result in some improvements in performance monitoring 
and reporting by Commonwealth entities, including regulators. Annual performance 
statements, including information about performance in achieving objectives, will 
need to be included in annual reports tabled in Parliament. The legislative 
framework provides for:  
• standards for records about performance and management of those records with 
the aim of improving the quality and reliability of performance information 
   





• a role for the Auditor General, at the request of the responsible Minister or the 
Finance Minister, to examine and report on an entity’s annual performance 
statements. 
Complementing these reforms is a uniform requirement on entities to prepare a 
corporate plan, which creates a clear cycle of performance planning, measuring, 
evaluating and reporting across the Commonwealth. The PGPA Act also seeks to 
encourage greater cooperation between Commonwealth entities and other bodies, 
including those at a state or territory level and the private sector. When imposing 
requirements on other bodies, Commonwealth entities are required to assess the risks 
to use or management of public resources and the impacts of any requirements on 
others (Department of Finance and Deregulation, pers. comm., 14 August 2013). 
A prerequisite for developing robust and meaningful indicators of performance are 
clear statements of objectives and the outcomes that the regulator is expected to 
achieve. In many cases regulators do not appear to have such clarity and this makes 
the development of measures, targets or benchmarks that reflect effective 
performance or successful achievement of objectives, challenging. 
The incentive for regulators to address gaps or weaknesses in performance will be 
strengthened with transparent public reporting. For example, where small 
businesses are better informed about their compliance burden they are more likely 
to place pressure on regulators directly, or indirectly through the media, to find 
ways to lower business compliance costs. However, it is important that regulators 
do not view performance monitoring merely as a mechanism for complying with 
external reporting requirements.  
Ideally, regulators will be committed to continuous improvement and have an interest 
in developing and applying indicators that allow them to identify how they can meet 
government objectives more efficiently. This suggests that they may want to design 
tailored indicators and refine them over time so as to maximise their usefulness. At 
the same time, regulators should also be seeking to achieve consistency with other 
regulators wherever possible — particularly with regulators operating in the same 
broad area of regulation (both within and across jurisdictions). In practice, this means 
regulators should utilise existing relevant indicators, especially those that are 
relatively widely used, unless for example, their use would be misleading or a tailored 
indicator would have significantly greater informational value. 
Some individual regulatory agencies are required under specific legislation to 
publicly report on their regulatory activities, for example, the Victorian Department 
of Human Services, under the Food Act 1984. In most cases the focus of such 






reporting is on outputs, rather than the broader outcomes regulation seeks to achieve 
(VCEC 2011, p. 119).  
At the Commonwealth level, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC) is required under its Act to report in some detail on its performance in its 
Annual Report. This includes reporting on the progress ASIC has made in achieving 
its goals and a range of specific performance indicators, including in relation to 
business compliance cost reduction, the use of risk based surveillance, timeliness 
and provision of guidance. ASIC’s reporting is also noteworthy for its transparency 
in relation to problems and areas for improvement. For example, in its 2012 Annual 
Report, ASIC (2012) acknowledged that the launch of its national Business Names 
Register had resulted in an increased number of callers not being answered in an 
acceptable timeframe, and committed to addressing this problem. 
The Commission notes that in the United Kingdom, under the statutory Regulators’ 
Compliance Code (see below), regulators are required to measure (and to report 
publicly on) their performance. This includes the costs they impose on regulated 
entities. Compliance is not mandatory but any departure from the Code must be 
properly reasoned and based on material evidence. 
What type of performance indicators? 
There needs to be a strong focus in regulator performance monitoring and reporting 
on measures of outcomes (that is success in achieving regulatory objectives, for 
example in terms of environmental or safety outcomes), as well as narrower 
measures of success such as rates of compliance and quality measures (such as 
timeliness or level of satisfaction/complaints).  
It is also important that regulators monitor and report on the compliance costs that 
they impose on businesses and how effective their engagement strategies have been 
in ensuring such costs are the minimum necessary. The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics has adopted a number of strategies to reduce the burden of business 
surveys and reports on the ‘provider load’ — which has been decreasing in recent 
years — as one of the key performance indicators in its Annual Report 
(ABS, sub. DR37, p. 1). 
Simple measures of inputs or outputs — such as number of approvals, successful 
prosecutions, or inspections undertaken — can provide some useful information on 
regulator performance, but typically they will not be good proxies for the 
regulator’s effectiveness in meeting objectives. Similarly, measuring the level of 
compliance only assesses regulated entities’ behaviour towards the law and does not 
assess the ultimate outcome from those behaviours. 
   





In this regard, the Chairman of the ACCC has cautioned against focusing too much 
on simple measures of the success rate in enforcement litigation. In a recent speech 
he noted that losing cases in the courts is not necessarily inconsistent with meeting 
broader regulatory objectives: 
As I have said publically many times, all does not turn on whether we win or lose in 
court. While I do understand the media’s desire to report in a ‘winner takes all’ way, 
this is not how we see it.  
… When taking a case, or even if we lose a case, often messages are sent and behaviour 
can change. 
… Further, and as I have said often, we are being too conservative if we always win 
enforcement litigation. (Sims 2013, p. 4) 
The ANAO stated recently, in relation to the Australian Government, ‘a more 
comprehensive model for performance measurement and reporting … would 
include consideration of the development and implementation of “efficiency 
indicators” to complement the “effectiveness” indicator focus’ (ANAO 2013, p. 20). 
This requires consideration of the administration and compliance costs of regulator 
activities not just the benefits. Currently, less than 15 per cent of regulators monitor 
the costs on business imposed by their engagement practices (Productivity 
Commission regulator survey 2013).  
Table 6.1 lists some specific performance indicators that could be considered for 
regulators to monitor and regularly report against. Where applicable, regulators 
should report their performance against indicators or objectives set out in their 
statements of expectations.  
Wherever possible, quantitative indicators should be used as these provide a 
measurable basis for performance assessment and facilitate comparisons of 
performance over time (and also between regulators — see below). The ANAO has 
identified a number of advantages of quantitative indicators: 
While quantitative indicators are not necessarily always more objective, their precision 
is beneficial in gaining agreement on the interpretation of evidence-driven data, and for 
this reason are usually preferable. On the whole, quantitative indicators are more easily 
recorded, more readily compared, and allow trends over time to be identified. Where 
appropriate, they can be supplemented with relevant qualitative information that 
provides insights into those factors responsible for the success, or otherwise, of a 
program. (ANAO 2011) 
Quantitative measures can only provide a summary indication of aspects of 
performance. They will be of greater value when combined with qualitative, 
descriptive information that can provide necessary context to assist in their 
interpretation. 






Table 6.1 Possible indicators of regulator performance 
Achieving objectives − compliance rates 
− number of businesses in different risk categories and changes 
over time 
− changes in outcomes that regulation is seeking to achieve 
Costs − overall cost of regulator’s administration and enforcement 
activities 
− overall compliance costs imposed on business and reductions 
achieved 
Use of different strategies − nature and frequency of use of different communication, 
compliance monitoring and enforcement measures 
− type and number of inspections, for example 
− specific strategies for engaging with small business 
− cooperative arrangements with other regulators/agencies 
Cost effectiveness 
of different strategies 
− relative cost effectiveness of different measures in terms of: 
− influence on compliance 
− impact on outcomes  
− impact on compliance costs, including for small business 




− use of regulator website and other information sources 
− attendance at seminars, workshops or forums 
Consultation and 
stakeholder feedback 
− nature of consultation strategies used 
− number of consultations and groups providing input 
− outcomes of consultation — evidence of impacts on engagement 
practices 
− number of complaints and stakeholder views about the 
regulator’s performance 
Staff capacities and 
performance  
− number of staff participating in training and/or expenditure per 
employee 
− number of decisions upheld or changed on review 
Continuous improvement − evaluations and reviews conducted 
Dispute resolution − number of appeals to external bodies and proportion of decisions 
upheld or changed 
The Commission considers that annual performance reporting by the ATO (box 6.5) 
has many leading practice features and incorporates many of the types of indicators 
identified in table 6.1. 
The Commission recognises, however, the complexity of measuring some aspects of 
performance. The measurement of the impact of different communication, 
compliance and enforcement strategies on outcomes is particularly challenging, but 
must be a priority. There can also be a significant cost in terms of information 
gathering, data management, and analysis and in some cases regulators may have to 
make an investment in upgrading information technology systems to achieve leading 
practice reporting. In determining the appropriate investment in such processes and 
systems, the costs must be weighed against the benefits on a case-by-case basis. 
   






Box 6.5 ATO annual performance reporting 
The ATO, in its Annual Report, includes a range of key performance indicators (KPIs) 
covering: regulatory outcomes; timeliness targets; the use of communication tools; 
review procedures; effectiveness of strategies; and engagement with small business. 
Strengths 
• Nearly all of the indicators and key statistics are reported for a five year period. 
Improvements over time or concerning trends are generally explained in detail, 
including discussion of related strategies and their effectiveness. 
• The report is laid out clearly, so it is easy to follow the logic behind important 
deliverables and KPIs. 
• Detailed subsections are included on areas of reporting often neglected by other 
regulators, such as staff training and cooperation with other agencies. 
Compliance and outcomes 
• The use of risk based models, as well as other strategies, and their effectiveness in 
improving compliance, are discussed. 
• Compliance activities and outcomes met in specific regulatory areas are detailed. 
• Strategies’ cost effectiveness are reported based on cost per $100 of debt collected. 
• There is also an attempt to measure effectiveness in several areas against what 
would have happened if the ATO did not intervene. 
Communication 
The report contains separate subsections for all important communication areas. 
• Previous reviews, planned reviews, strategies used to improve communication and 
their effectiveness are discussed. 
• A breakdown of how the ATO is contacted, the number of complaints and details of 
dispute resolutions — including strategies used to reduce complaints. 
• 22 service standards that are to be met, mostly related to timeliness, including 
trends in meeting these targets. Even slightly missed targets are explained and 
standards are regularly reviewed. 
• Client perceptions are monitored through surveys, including specific monitoring of 
the perceptions of micro businesses and SMEs. 
Room for improvement 
• Perhaps the most serious shortcoming is the lack of any quantification of direct or 
indirect costs imposed on business — the Commission notes, more generally, that 
this is one of the most common weaknesses in performance reporting by regulators. 
• There is only a limited breakdown of the costs of enforcement. A more detailed 
breakdown (by regulatory areas or activities) could indirectly assist in reducing 
administration costs. 
Source: ATO (2012).  
 






Cross regulator benchmarking 
Comparisons of regulator performance in Australia are limited by the lack of 
consistent benchmarks or standards applied across regulators or regulatory 
activities. There may be benefits therefore in developing and publicly reporting on 
some common performance measures across regulators.  
In principle, a set of higher level indicators could be devised within a common 
framework that could potentially facilitate comparisons of aspects of regulator 
performance — in particular between similar regulatory bodies in the same 
jurisdiction (or perhaps the same type of regulator in different jurisdictions). Public 
reporting based on such indicators should provide government and the community 
more broadly with a clearer picture of regulators’ relative performance and perhaps 
introduce a degree of ‘competition’ among regulators with different approaches and 
methods of regulating, leading to more rapid convergence towards leading practice. 
COSBOA (sub. 15) suggested that all regulators should publish outcomes and 
activities in the same format and that there should be one publication in each 
jurisdiction that lists all regulators that deal with small business. COSBOA 
proposed this should include aggregated information on compliance (such as the 
number of prosecutions, fines or actions that have been undertaken), regulator 
activity and interaction with small business.  
Further work is needed to develop the indicators (especially outcome focused 
indicators) that would be most suitable for comparing the relative performance of 
equivalent regulators, but some of the indicators identified in table 6.1 could be a 
starting point.  
The Commission is very mindful, however, of the cost and other challenges of 
implementing a common performance monitoring and reporting system. Given the 
significant differences between individual regulators — even those operating within 
the same area of regulation — any comparisons based on performance indicators 
have their limitations. Particular indicators may not be appropriate for certain 
regulators because of the nature or the scope of the regulators’ activities. There may 
also be some resistance from regulators to adopting generalised performance 
benchmarks if they are seen as a threat rather than an opportunity, or are perceived 
as a poor source of information on how to improve their approaches and decision 
making.  
Some of the challenges and limitations of comparisons suggest that it may 
sometimes be appropriate to use the standardised framework more as the basis for 
comparing individual regulator performance over time — with comparisons 
   





between regulators restricted to movements and trends in performance — rather 
than indicators at a point in time. 
Regulators should be consulted on the development of common indicators so they 
have some ownership of the measures and benchmarks to be used. Most 
importantly, there must be an overarching requirement that the benefits of 
performance benchmarking justify the development, implementation and ongoing 
costs. More specifically, governments would need to consider: 
• the aspects of performance to be measured 
• relevant performance indicators  
• relevant data and how it would be collected and collated 
• how performance would be reported and how the indicators would be interpreted 
• whether the reporting obligations of smaller regulators should be less than 
regulators with greater capacities to gather and report the necessary information. 
To prevent backsliding and ensure long term success there must also be a strong and 
clear ongoing commitment from governments to performance monitoring and 
benchmarking.  
The challenges of benchmarking performance have not deterred some governments 
from pursuing this reform. As part of the Victorian Government’s response to the 
VCEC inquiry, Strengthening foundations for the next decade: An Inquiry into 
Victoria’s regulatory framework, it committed to implementing a regulator 
performance reporting framework (VCEC 2011). This framework is expected to 
allow regulators to benchmark their performance on key regulatory activities 
against other regulators in Victoria, supporting continuous improvement in 
compliance and administrative practices. Currently, five regulators are required to 
include in their annual reports progress toward achieving key performance targets 
for compliance and administrative activities. These targets are set out in ‘reducing 
red tape’ SOEs issued by responsible ministers. The Government’s intention is to 
eventually extend the performance reporting requirements to all regulators. The 
VCEC will monitor reporting by regulators on their performance against the SOE 
performance targets (Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance 2013).  
Government wide engagement principles and guidance 
The Commission considers there are benefits in the development and 
implementation of a set of better practice principles or guidance for regulator 
engagement with business. While generally these would be relevant to engagement 
with all businesses, regardless of size, in a few instances they would reflect a 






different approach being warranted for small business — for example some 
tailoring of the regulator’s communication of compliance requirements. 
Such principles can complement regulators’ knowledge based on experience, 
evaluations and shared learning. The principles could also provide a framework or 
set of high level standards on which to develop the performance indicators 
discussed above. Table 6.2 provides some examples of principles that all 
governments might consider. 
Some jurisdictions in Australia have released ‘best practice’ (or ‘better practice’) 
guides for use by Australian regulators (box 6.6). The OECD and individual 
member countries have also developed guidance to improve the quality of 
administration and enforcement of regulation. The OECD is currently developing 
best practice principles for improving regulatory enforcement and inspections 
(OECD 2013b) to complement the 2012 Recommendation of the Council on 
Regulatory Policy and Governance (OECD 2012).  
There can be difficulties in translating principles for regulator behaviour into 
practice. This is partly because appropriate actions are contingent on the nature of 
the risk being regulated, the institutional arrangements under which a regulator 
operates, and a range of firm and industry specific considerations. Recognising this, 
guides typically focus on general tips, considerations and principles rather than 
providing detailed direction. Some guides also identify key considerations relevant 
to the application of a principle or practice. The ANAO and the Queensland 
Ombudsman guides, for instance, have helpful case studies to illustrate regulator 
practices that reflect the principles. The United Kingdom’s National Audit Office 
provided guidance for regulators to implement the Hampton Review principles, 
which included a set of high level criteria and positive ‘symptoms’ or indicators that 
assist the understanding of, and compliance with, the principles. 
The United Kingdom Regulators' Compliance Code is an example of guidance that 
has received considerable attention. The Code is a statutory (but not mandatory) 
code of practice intended to encourage regulators to achieve their objectives in a 
way that minimises the burdens on business. A ‘post implementation review’ of the 
Code, however, found it has not been effectively applied by UK regulators. The 
Government is amending the Code and has proposed closer monitoring of its future 
application (box 6.7). 
   





Table 6.2 Government wide engagement principles 
1. Regulators’ engagement practices should, where not constrained by legislation, be designed 
and implemented with the aim of maximising community net benefits. 
2. Regulators should: use risk based approaches in the design and enforcement of regulatory 
compliance strategies; and employ a graduated approach to enforcement, applying a 
range of enforcement instruments to ensure that responses to different types of 
non-compliance are proportionate. 
3. Maximise the potential for voluntary compliance by: clearly communicating requirements 
and ensuring that affected parties understand their rights and obligations; avoiding 
unnecessary complexity; providing rewards and incentives for voluntary action and high 
compliance outcomes; and nurturing compliance capacity (particularly in small businesses). 
4. Provide businesses with flexibility as to how they meet compliance obligations, but ensure 
that those businesses that do not have the capacities to develop alternative solutions have 
the option of adopting clearly specified deemed to comply solutions.  
5. Employ information technology, one-stop shops for licences and other requirements, and 
lead agency approaches to make service delivery more streamlined and user-focused. 
6. Design information collection and management strategies to ensure that necessary 
information is available but businesses do not have to give unnecessary information nor 
the same information more than once. 
7. Ensure transparency of decision making processes, and as far as possible the 
documenting of decisions (and reasons). Establish and publish standard time periods 
within which businesses can expect an administrative decision (such as, an approval or 
infringement process) to be made. 
8. Establish accountability mechanisms that clearly define how regulators will discharge their 
responsibilities with the necessary expertise, integrity, honesty and objectivity. Establish 
appropriate mechanisms for the review of decisions and independent dispute resolution. 
9. Ensure appropriate consultation with regulated businesses and establish mechanisms that 
enable business to provide feedback at low cost. 
10. Employ mechanisms for coordination and cooperation between regulators, including in 
relation to inspections and sharing of information, experiences and capacities.  
11. Establish cooperative and collaborative arrangements with business/business groups 
to build trust and improve efficiency, including: recognition of industry accreditation schemes; 
and the use of private third party inspectors — with appropriate checks and balances to 
ensure outcomes consistent with broader community interests. 
12. Ensure regulator staff have the necessary skills and capacities and receive appropriate 
guidance and training — including in risk management and the appropriate use of discretion. 
13. Adopt transitional arrangements and test approaches, where appropriate, to allow 
adjustment time before the full operation/enforcement of regulation. Evaluate whether 
different treatment of small business, in either the design or delivery of regulations, would 
increase net benefits to the community. 
14. Monitor and publicly report on performance including indicators of effectiveness in 
achieving objectives and reducing compliance burdens imposed on business/small business. 
15. Ensure regular evaluation of the effectiveness and costs (including those imposed on small 
business) of engagement strategies. In addition to regulator self-assessments, administration 
and enforcement practices should periodically be subjected to external independent review. 
Sources: Developed by the Commission drawing on various sources, including: Hampton (2005); 
OECD (2012, 2013a); Parker (2000). 







Box 6.6 Some good practice guides for regulators  
The following are examples of ‘good practice’ guidance for regulators developed by 
Australian governments. 
• The ANAO’s (2007) Administering Regulation: Better Practice Guide emphasised: 
governance considerations (including managing risk); information management; 
relationship management (including facilitating communication and efficient consultation); 
resourcing issues; controlling entry to a market; monitoring compliance; addressing 
non-compliance; and responding to adverse events. The Guide also included case 
studies of better practice principles and approaches.  
• The Queensland Ombudsman’s (2009) Tips and Traps for Regulators (2nd edition) looks 
at the role of: knowledge, skills and values; discretion and the role of risk management; 
investigative practices; systems for effective regulation; regulators working together; 
communication with the public; regulatory independence; recordkeeping and electronic 
data capture; complaint management and audits of regulators. The report also contains a 
set of case studies that demonstrate aspects of good regulatory practice. 
• The NSW Better Regulation Office’s (2008) Risk Based Compliance sets out the steps in 
adopting a risk based compliance approach, including: identifying risks of 
non-compliance; analysing risks of non-compliance; prioritising risks of non-compliance; 
identifying and selecting compliance measures; planning for implementation; and 
reporting and reviewing. 
• The Better Business Regulation framework developed by the Department of Justice in 
Victoria and Consumer Affairs Victoria (2008) provides a practical framework for 
regulators to ensure processes are streamlined, effective and in line with international 
best practice. It sets out good practices relating to various activities and tasks covering 
the full regulatory cycle, including: developing administrative processes to enable 
implementation; educating stakeholders about the government interventions; receiving 
and responding to enquiries and complaints; registering and licensing entities; managing 
ongoing registration/licensing processes; monitoring and enforcing compliance of 
regulated entities’ practices, processes and performance; assessing the performance of 
the government intervention; and reviewing the objectives of the government intervention. 
Sources: PC (2011a), ANAO (2007); Consumer Affairs Victoria (2008); NSW Better Regulation 
Office (2008); Queensland Ombudsman (2009); VCEC (2011).  
 
There is a risk that regulators can treat guiding principles as a box ticking exercise, 
implementing practices that can be shown to be consistent with the principles, but 
without adequate consideration of what will be most effective in meeting outcome 
objectives. The NSW Business Chamber submitted:  
There is … a tendency for existing guidance on best practice regulation to provide a 
laundry list of actions without a more systematic underlying framework. This can 
encourage regulators to see best practice regulation as a box ticking exercise, which 
discourages continuous improvement and creative attempts to adapt the overarching 
principles to suit the circumstances of particular regulators. It also means the 
communication of best practice typically relies on detailed guides that few people will 
ever read. (sub. 25, p. 5) 
   






Box 6.7 UK Regulators’ Compliance Code 
The Regulators’ Compliance Code has a statutory basis in the Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2006 (UK). The Code was drafted in response to the Hampton 
Review Report on inspection and enforcement (UK Government 2005). Regulators are 
required to ‘have regard to’ the provisions of the Code when determining policies, 
setting standards or giving guidance. The purpose of the Code is to embed a risk 
based, proportionate, targeted and flexible approach to regulatory inspection and 
enforcement among the regulators to which it applies. It aims to ensure that risk 
assessment precedes and informs all aspects of their approaches to regulatory activity 
and that inspectors and enforcement officers are enabled to interpret and apply 
regulatory requirements and enforcement policies fairly and consistently. The Code 
emphasises the quality of communication about regulatory activities and legal 
requirements on regulated entities, and information requirements. Where two or more 
regulators require the same information from the same regulated entity they should 
share data where this is practicable, beneficial and cost effective. 
The Code applies to named regulators only, including specified national regulators and 
local authorities. It does not apply at the level of individual cases or decisions. This 
means, for example, that while an inspector or investigator should operate in 
accordance with a regulator’s general policy or guidance on inspections, investigations 
and enforcement activities, the Code does not apply directly to the work of that 
inspector or investigator in carrying out any of these activities in individual cases. 
Despite the duty on a regulator to ‘have regard to’ the Code, the regulator is not bound 
to follow a provision of the Code if they properly conclude that the provision is either 
not relevant or is outweighed by another relevant consideration. However, they should 
ensure that any decision to depart from any provision of the Code is properly reasoned 
and based on material evidence.  
A post implementation review of the Code in 2012, found that it had not fulfilled its 
potential in holding regulators to account for their activities and that although regulators 
had broadly adopted the principles of the Code and these were reflected in their 
policies, there was little evidence of use of the Code as a reference for continuous 
improvement (UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills 2013). The UK 
Government is amending the Code — including simplifying content and enhancing 
accountability mechanisms (UK Treasury 2012). Regulators will be required to publish 
their service standards and a statement of how the requirements of the Code are met 
on an annual basis; the requirements of the Code may be used as part of ongoing 
reviews of regulators to assess their effectiveness in delivering their enforcement 
responsibilities; and when challenged by businesses and the community, regulators will 
be required to have mechanisms in place to discuss the issue and reach agreement. 
The UK Government will monitor the published service standards of regulators subject 
to the Code, and will challenge regulators where there is evidence that service 
standards are lacking or inadequate (UK Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills 2013).  
Sources: UK Government (2005); UK Treasury (2012); UK Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills (2013).  
 






The extent to which better practice principles are reflected in regulator practices 
will continue to depend at least in part on the incentives regulators face to adopt 
such practices. These incentives can be strengthened where there are requirements 
on regulators to publish indicators of performance. In addition, an appropriate body 
in each jurisdiction could be given responsibility for monitoring and reporting on 
regulators’ progress in implementing engagement practices that are consistent with 
the agreed principles. Such reporting would also provide an opportunity to highlight 
innovative practices that could be adopted more widely. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Governments and regulators should ensure mechanisms are in place to 
strengthen the incentives for continuous improvement and the wider adoption of 
leading practice engagement approaches. This includes: 
• ongoing internal, and periodic independent, evaluation of the effectiveness 
and costs of regulator engagement strategies 
• facilitating the efficient sharing of information, experiences and lessons 
learnt, for example, through the use of forums of regulators or ‘communities 
of practice’ 
• requiring regulators, including regulatory functions embedded within 
departments, to monitor and regularly report on their performance — 
including measures of effectiveness in achieving outcomes and reducing the 
compliance burden imposed on business (and small business in particular) 
• a commitment to common, whole of government, performance measures that 
can be used to facilitate, where appropriate, comparisons of regulator 
performance, both within and across jurisdictions 
• development of better practice regulator-business engagement principles that 
can be used as a guide for regulators, including to inform the development of 
performance indicators. 
An appropriate body in each jurisdiction should monitor and periodically report 
on regulators’ progress in implementing engagement practices that are consistent 
with the agreed principles. Such reporting would also provide an opportunity to 
highlight innovative practices that could be adopted more widely. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The Commission has formed the view that what constitutes good engagement, both 
in principle and practice, is generally well understood. The challenge for 
governments appears to be ensuring that the right institutional, governance, 
   





transparency and accountability mechanisms are in place to encourage the wider 
adoption of good engagement practices.  
This includes ensuring the removal of unnecessary legislative or other constraints 
on the capacity of regulators to implement flexible and responsive approaches. It 
also includes implementing systems that work to create strong incentives for 
cultural change and continuous improvement. More specifically, the Commission 
has identified a number of strategies or approaches that governments, or regulators 
where they have the necessary control, can adopt to drive better performance. 
Getting up front institutional and regulatory design right — This includes ensuring 
the consistent application of ex ante processes designed to ensure rigorous analysis 
of the impacts of regulation (including on small business) and careful consideration 
of how regulations will be implemented and enforced. In designing regulation, 
policy makers must provide regulators with an appropriate range of enforcement 
tools and discretion to respond flexibly and proportionately to compliance breaches. 
Roles and responsibilities must also be clearly defined and potential overlap or 
duplication carefully considered when new regulatory functions are being 
established. 
Clear communication of objectives and expectations — Governments must clearly 
communicate their regulatory objectives and their expectations of regulators, 
through legislation and SOEs. It is important that governments provide guidance to 
regulators on how risks are to be managed and any particular enforcement priorities 
they may have. At the same time SOEs should explicitly acknowledge the 
Government’s acceptance that some level of risk is unavoidable and that the 
regulator should be able to operate independently, without undue interference. This 
can reduce the risk of ‘knee jerk’ over reactions to particular incidents or events that 
are not consistent with the regulator’s systematic assessment of risks. 
Regulators have adequate resourcing and strong and effective leaders — Budget 
allocations must provide regulators with sufficient resources to enable the 
administration and enforcement of regulations in a manner that ensures regulatory 
outcomes are achieved and unnecessary business compliance and other costs are 
avoided. Leaders of regulatory agencies or those with chief responsibility for 
oversighting regulatory functions must have the capacities, drive and commitment 
to foster an organisational culture that appropriately balances risk mitigation and, by 
minimising unnecessary compliance burdens, facilitates business activity and 
economic growth. 
Skills and capacities — Regulators must have the necessary systems in place to 
ensure the recruitment of staff with the right mix of experience and skills and 






appropriate ongoing training and guidance for staff. There must be a particular 
focus on ensuring staff understand the underlying rationale for risk based 
enforcement and when and how to use discretion. It is also critical that a culture of 
continual improvement is established within regulatory agencies and an emphasis 
on regular evaluation of the effectiveness and the costs of engagement approaches. 
Systematic performance monitoring and review — Regulators should monitor and 
regularly report against key indicators of their performance. Emphasis should be on 
measuring their effectiveness in achieving outcomes while minimising compliance 
costs. The information generated will be of value in identifying areas for 
improvement. The transparency that comes from public reporting of such measures 
ensures accountability and a stronger incentive to implement reforms that are in the 
broader community’s interests.  
Whole of government performance indicators — A common whole of government 
framework for reporting of a narrower range of performance indicators could 
facilitate comparisons of performance across regulators. This would further 
strengthen the incentives on regulators to improve their performance and to adopt 
leading practices. However, as has been noted frequently in this report, there are 
important differences between regulators (even those operating broadly in the same 
area of regulation), for example, in terms of institutional and governance 
arrangements, resourcing and the degree of discretion and flexibility they have to 
determine how they administer and enforce regulation. The Commission therefore 
recognises the limitations of cross regulator comparisons and the need for caution in 
drawing conclusions based on differences in reported performance.  
Better practice engagement principles — The drawing together of whole of 
government better practice regulator engagement principles (including in relation to 
the use of discretion) can also provide valuable guidance to regulators. There must 
also be appropriate mechanisms, such as regulator forums, for facilitating 
coordination between regulators and the sharing of experiences and lessons learned 
(both within and across portfolio areas and jurisdictions). 
Independent oversight — An appropriate body in each jurisdiction should monitor 
and periodically report on regulators’ progress in implementing, where relevant, 
engagement practices that are consistent with the agreed principles. Such reporting 
would also provide an opportunity to highlight innovative practices that could be 
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A Study participants 
This appendix lists the organisations and individuals that have participated in the 
study to date. Following receipt of the terms of reference on 7 December 2012, an 
initial circular advertising the study was distributed to several hundred government 
representatives, industry organisations and individuals and the study was advertised 
in national and metropolitan newspapers and in all state and territory regional 
newswire services.  
The Commission released an Issues Paper on 25 January 2013 to assist interested 
parties in preparing their submissions. The draft report for the study was released on 
3 July 2013. There were 48 submissions on this study received by the Commission 
and they are listed in table A1. 
In addition, the Commission met with a number of stakeholders, including business 
groups, academics and government agencies. A list of those meetings is in table A2. 
To facilitate small business feedback on the draft report, the Commission liaised 
with local chambers of commerce in Perth, Cairns and Wagga Wagga to hold small 
business roundtables. Small businesses which attended these roundtables are listed 
in table A3. 
A survey was undertaken of approximately 400 national and state government 
regulators. The methodology used for the survey and broad information on 
respondents is discussed in appendix B. The names and responses of individual 
regulator respondents are treated as confidential. 
The Commission partnered with the Council of Small Business of Australia 
(COSBOA) to canvas views of small businesses on regulator engagement practices. 
To facilitate this, COSBOA developed a number of targeted questions for their 
website to which they invited small business responses. An aggregation of these 
responses was then provided to the Commission as part of COSBOA’s submission 
to this study.  
The Commission would like to thank all who have contributed to the study. 






A.1 Public submissions receiveda 
Participant Submission 
Number 
Accord Australasia DR41 
Appco Group Australia DR46 
Australasian Association of Convenience Stores Limited 21, DR34 
Australian Bureau of Statistics DR37 
Australian Businesswomen’s Network 4 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) 5 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 26 
Australian Hotels Association 17 
Australian Industry Group DR39 
Australian Motor Industry Federation 23 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) 30, DR47 
Brisbane City Council 32 
Business SA 3, DR33 
Chamber of Commerce & Industry Queensland 16 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry WA 7, DR45 
Commercial Asset Finance Brokers Association of Australia Limited 6, DR38 
Council of Small Business of Australia (COSBOA) 15,31, DR43, DR48 
Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary 
Education 
18 
Energy Safe Victoria 2 
EPA Victoria DR42 
Fast Access Finance Pty Ltd 20 
Hills Orchard Improvement Group Inc 9 
Housing Industry Association 24 
Institute of Public Accountants 29 
Intuit Inc DR36 
Local Government Association of Queensland 27 
Master Electricians Australia 8, DR35 
Migration Institute of Australia (MIA) 14 
National Transport Commission 1 
NSW Business Chamber 25 
NSW Food Authority 28 
Office of the Australian Small Business Commissioner 10 
Office of the NSW Small Business Commissioner 12, DR40 
Small Business Development Corporation (WA) 22 
Strong Strategies Pty Ltd 19 
Tasmanian Small Business Council 13, DR44 
The Tax Institute 11 
  
Number from businesses or business association 33 
Number from government regulators 15 
  
a ‘DR’ denotes a submission received after the draft report. 
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A.2 Consultations 
Commonwealth and national bodies 
Australasian Association of Convenience Stores  
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 
Australian Government Department of Finance and Deregulation 
Australian Government Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research 
and Tertiary Education 
Australian Government Treasury 
Australian Industry Group 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
Australian Small Business Commissioner 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 
Australian Tourism Export Council 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) 
Council of Small Business of Australia (COSBOA) 
DesignGov 
Independent Contractors Australia  
Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia 
National Heavy Vehicle Regulator 
National Transport Commission 
SME Association of Australia 
New South Wales 
Better Regulation Office 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal  
NSW Business Chamber 
NSW Fair Trading 
NSW Food Authority 
NSW Small Business Commissioner  
Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing 
Office of State Revenue  
Roads and Maritime Services 
Victoria 
Consumer Affairs Victoria  
Dairy Food Safety Victoria 
Department of Business & Innovation (Vic) 
Energy Safe Victoria 
Environment Protection Authority (Vic) 
Local Government Victoria  
Municipal Association of Victoria 
Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission 
Victorian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce and Industry  
Victorian Small Business Commissioner  
Victorian WorkCover Authority 
continued 








Brisbane City Council 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry QLD 
Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
Department of Premier and Cabinet 
Department of Tourism, Major Events, Small Business and the Commonwealth Games 
Department of Transport and Main Roads 
Department of Treasury and Trade 
Local Government Association of Queensland 
Master Builders Queensland 
Office of Fair and Safe Work Queensland 
QLD Building Services Authority 
Tourism industry Council QLD 
Western Australia 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (WA)  
Department of Fisheries (WA) 
Department of Premier and Cabinet 
Department of Racing Gaming and Liquor (WA) 
Department of Treasury 
Office of the Environmental Protection Authority (OEPA)  
WA Fishing Industry Council (WAFIC) 
WA Small Business Commissioner and Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC)  
WA Tourism Industry Council (WATIC) 
South Australia 
Business SA 
Consumer and Business Services (SA) 
Department for Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, Resources and Energy (DMITRE) 
Department of Health 
Department of Premier & Cabinet 
Department of Primary Industries and Regions SA (PIRSA) - Aquaculture 
Enterprise Adelaide – Adelaide City Council 
Local Government Association of South Australia 
Restaurant and Catering Association (SA) 
Small Business Commissioner (SA) 
Tasmania 
Environment Protection Authority (TAS) 
Local Government Association of Tasmania (LGAT) 
Tasmanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Tasmanian Department of Economic Development, Tourism and Arts 
Tasmanian Department of Justice 
Tasmanian Seafood Industry Council 
Tasmanian Small Business Council 
Tourism Industry Council of Tasmania 
continued 
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A.2 (continued) 
Australian Capital Territory 
ACT Environment and Sustainable Development Directorate, Regulation and Services Division  
ACT Office of the Coordinator General 
Australian National University – Regulatory Institutions Network 
Northern Territory 
Environment Protection Authority (NT) 
NT Consumer Affairs 
NT Department of Business, Licensing Services 
United States 
Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy 
Former Chief Advocate, Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy 
World Bank – Global Indicators and Analysis Unit 
George Washington University – Regulatory Studies Centre  
George Washington University – International Congress on Small Business  
George Mason University – Mercatus Centre  
National Federation of Independent Businesses 
Europe 
UK Better Regulation Delivery Office 
UK Federation of Small Business 
British Chambers of Commerce  
London School of Economics and Political Science, Professor of Risk Regulation 
European Commission – Directorate General Enterprise and Industry 
 
  






A.3 Small business roundtables 
Cairns (12 August 2013) 
Accommodation in Kuranda 
Advance Cairns 
Atherton Tablelands Chamber of Commerce 
Centacare Cairns 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Queensland — Cairns 
Chris Gay Real Estate 
First Steps Early Childhood Learning Centre 
Grooms Irrigation 
IGA Supermarket Cairns 
John Hartigan & Associates 
Kleinhart 
Kuranda Chamber of Commerce 
Malanda North 
MSF Sugar Limited 
Newart Commercial Furniture 
Norfolk Wealth 
Ocean Hotels and Tourism 
PhyxMe Physiotherapy & Rehabilitation 
Regency Jewellers 
Regional Development Australia and Far North Queensland and Torres Strait Inc 
Sea Swift Pty Ltd 
Tablelands Industry Workforce Group Inc 
The Coffee Club 




Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia 
Community Employers WA 
Crystal Swan Cruises/Ugly Duck P/L 
Forte Hospitality 
Leeder Cleaning Services 
Master Plumbers’ Association 
Seadragonz 
Skin Deep Medi-Spas 
Small Business Development Corporation 
Sticky Fingers Gourmet Foods 
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A.3 (continued) 




Intergrated Airport Solutions 
Insurance Brokers of Central Wagga 
Junee Railway Workshop 
NSW Business Chamber 
PDK IT 
Riverina Hotel 
RSM Bird Cameron 
Shadforth 
Wagga City Council 
Wagga Directional Drilling 
Wagga Wagga Business Chamber 
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B Survey of regulators 
B.1 Survey design and distribution 
The Commission collected information about national, state and territory 
government regulators through a survey. Local governments were excluded from 
this survey to reduce burden on them as they had been surveyed for a recent 
Commission study (PC 2012). The survey was intended to elicit information on the 
operation of regulators, identify which practices they consider to be working well 
and their barriers to engaging effectively with business. 
Survey forms were emailed to regulators in ‘smart pdf’ format. All respondents 
answered the survey electronically and submitted the completed survey via a return 
email. The surveys were sent out in March 2013 with responses received over the 
following three months.  
The survey was piloted with a small number of regulators and other government 
agencies to ensure the questions were comprehensive, clear and unambiguous. The 
technical aspects of the survey were tested by Commission staff and a number of 
external parties unrelated to the study.  
B.2 Survey responses 
The survey was sent to all national, state and territory government agencies that the 
Commission was able to identify as having regulatory roles that have the potential 
to impact business of any size or type. These regulatory roles included granting 
approvals, compliance monitoring and enforcement and other complementary 
activities. Throughout the study process, the Commission’s list of regulators 
(section B.3) has expanded as additional regulators have been identified. In total, 
408 of the estimated 478 regulators were surveyed and the Commission received 
190 responses — a response rate of 47 per cent (table B.1).  
The explanatory material provided with the survey advised that no survey response 
would be reported in a manner that could be attributable to a particular respondent. 
Consequently, the names of surveyed regulators are not attributed to results used in 
this report.  






A copy of the survey form is reproduced below and aggregated responses can be 
found in tables B.2 to B.9. 
The survey of regulators 
 
   




















   





















   





















   





















   













Table B.1 Survey responses by jurisdiction 
 Surveys sent Survey returns  Response rate (%) 
National/Commonwealth 75 39 52 
New South Wales 71 28 39 
Victoria  56 27 48 
Queensland 30 13 43 
Western Australia 56 23 41 
South Australia 33 14 42 
Tasmania 39 22 56 
Australian Capital Territory 10 8 80 
Northern Territory 38 16 42 
Total  408 190 47 
Table B.2 Survey responses for ‘Section 1: About your agency’ 
Q2. Which regulatory area(s) does your agency oversee? 
Roads or transport   16 Building & construction 14 
Gaming & racing   11 Public health or safety 35 
Occupational health & safety   14 Financial or other professional services 24 
Food Safety   12 Industrial relations 4 
Environment protection   44 Superannuation 3 
Taxation     6 Fair trading, tenancy or consumer protection 21 
Planning, heritage or land use   17 Other 15 
Liquor   10   
Q3. Which of the following functions does your agency perform? 
Develop policy 141 Audits 124 
Write regulation 108 Collecting fees/charges 138 
Set standards 108 Educating business 123 
Review regulation 130 Investigations 161 
Other (policy/regulation design)   15 Complaints resolution 121 
Registration/licensing 151 Other (regulatory) 49 
Inspections 129   
Q4(a) Your agency is a: 
Statutory authority   84 Unit with a department/agency 99 
Other     7   
Q4(b)The head of your agency reports to: 
Board or other governing body   48 Parliament 15 
Statutory office holder   18 Other 5 
Minister 134   
Q5. Apart from legislation, your agency’s roles and responsibilities are set out in: 
Code of conduct/charter   79 Ministerial statement of expectations 33 
Statement of intent   17 Memorandum/memoranda of understanding 45 
Other (varied)   15 Other (internal plan/statement/document) 39 
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Table B.3 Survey responses for  
‘Section 2: Coordination with other regulators’ 
Q6. Does your agency face any difficulties in carrying out its regulatory role due to overlap, or 
unclear delineation, of responsibilities with other regulators? 
No overlap/unclear delineation 
or where it exists it has been 
effectively managed 
         125 
Yes, with local council(s) 17 
Yes, with state/territory regulator(s) 46 
Yes, with national regulator(s) 34 
Q7. Does your agency routinely cooperate with one or more other regulators in any of the following 
ways? 
 













Developing information for 
business 31 85 79 72 
Providing education to 
business 27 70 66 40 
Presenting information to 
business in a common 
format and/or location 
21 59 50 39 
Sharing compliance data 19 89 88 75 
Coordinating information 
collection 21 64 64 61 
Coordinating inspections 20 68 40 34 
Common board members 3 15 9 8 
Please outline any other ways in which your agency routinely cooperates with another regulator. 
Number of responses:   73 
  






Table B.4 Survey responses for  
‘Section 3: Communication practices’ 
Q8. Based on your agency’s experience, rate the effectiveness of each of the following practices 




ineffective Ineffective Neutral Effective 
Very 
effective 
Information on your website 5 0 2 22 126 32 
Information provided to 
external ‘one-stop shop’ 
websites 
60 2 9 60 45 3 
Information disseminated 
through industry groups 8 0 2 26 125 27 
Advice hotline/help desk 31 1 2 24 86 41 
Education seminars or 
workshops 19 1 2 22 97 44 
Business focus groups or 
consultative for a 39 2 4 30 86 21 
On-site visits 14 0 0 14 92 64 
Surveys 51 3 5 55 60 7 
Placement of your staff in 
business 155 0 2 11 7 4 
Business staff placements in 
your agency 157 0 2 11 6 2 
Relationship managers for 
individual business or 
industry sectors 
85 1 2 22 57 13 
Social media (e.g. 
facebook/twitter) 110 2 3 33 27 6 
Please outline any additional communication and consultation practices your agency has adopted 
or provide any further detail on the practices above. 
Number of responses:   76 
Q9. Does your agency monitor business awareness and understanding of the regulations it 
administers? If yes, please describe how. 
Yes 128 No 60 Number of written responses 126 
Q10(a) (i) Does your agency have a complaints or feedback mechanism for business? (ii) If so, 
can complaints be lodged online? 
(i) Yes 165 No 25 (ii) Yes 111 No 54 
Q10(b) When feedback is received, do concerns raised by small business differ significantly from 
those of other businesses? If yes, in what way does feedback from small business differ? 
Yes 19 No 96 Do not know 67 Number of written responses 31 
Q10(c) Does your agency have a formal appeal mechanism for business dissatisfied with 
processes or decisions? 
Internal: Yes 136 No 35 External: Yes 160 No 20 
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Table B.5 Survey responses for  
‘Section 4: Administration and enforcement practices’ 
Q11(a) Does your agency adopt a risk-based approach in its compliance monitoring and 
enforcement? 
Yes 133 No 57 
Q11(b) Are the details of your agency’s risk-based approach accessible to small business? 
Yes 62 No 69 
Q11(c) If your agency classifies regulated businesses into risk categories, please outline them 
below. For each category include: (1) the name of the category; (2) a description of the types of 
businesses in the category (e.g. scale, characteristics or activities); and (3) an approximate 
percentage of the businesses your agency regulates in the category. Note, you could alternatively 
provide a weblink to this information. 
Number of responses:   69 
Q11(d) When dealing with an individual business its risk category is used to determine: 
Guidance provided   63 Reporting frequency 38 
Education efforts   62 Amount of information reported 34 
Fees and charges   18 Type of information reported 35 
Inspection/audit frequency   98 Other 4 
Nature of inspection/audit   81   
Q11(e) What evidence is collected to classify businesses into risk categories and how are changes 
in risk monitored over time? 
Number of responses:   90 
Q12(a) How does your agency collect compliance information about small business?: 
No compliance information is 
collected 
  14 Inspections/on-site visits by another 
regulator on behalf of my agency 
39 
Business submits documents (e.g. 
spreadsheets) 
  93 Inspections/on-site visits by contractors 
engaged by my agency 
35 
Business fills out a standard paper 
form 
  69 Complaints from consumers/members of 
the community 
138 
Business fills out a standard 
electronic form 
  61 Other 27 
Inspections/on-site visits by my 
agency 
139   
Q12(b) Approximately, what percentage of inspections undertaken fall into each of the following 
categories 
No inspections are undertaken   25 Number that filled out the table 147 
Q12(c) Does your agency monitor the costs imposed on business by its administration and 
enforcement practices? (including, for example, paperwork burden and cost of delays) If yes, 
please describe how such costs are monitored. 
Yes 27 No 159 Number of written responses 33 
(Continued next page) 
  






Table B.5 (continued) 
Q13. Does your agency apply any of the following measures to ensure decision making and the 
performance of key regulatory processes are timely: 
Time limits are mandated in 
legislation/regulation 
 132 Regulated businesses are provided with 
advance notice of expected timeframes 
92 
A public commitment to target 
timeframes 
  88 Tracking progress of referrals to other 
agencies 
41 
Public reporting on performance 
against target timeframes 
  89 Other 20 
Q14(a) How frequently are the following tools used in response to compliance breaches? 
 Tool not 
available/ 
applicable 
Tool available, and used: 
Never Rarely Often Usually Always 
Education on compliance 6 3 10 46 53 64 
Warning notice 28 6 42 64 25 18 
Improvement notice 58 12 26 54 18 10 
Name and shame 49 51 51 18 5 3 
Enforceable undertaking 55 24 53 32 7 5 
Product seizure/recall 106 19 37 9 3 0 
Suspending business operation 59 26 84 10 0 0 
Registration/licence 
suspension, restriction or 
cancellation 
29 18 109 21 1 2 
Pecuniary penalty (e.g. fine) 31 33 54 42 20 0 
Civil court action 45 60 58 14 0 0 
Criminal court action 31 43 76 28 3 0 
Please outline any other enforcement tools your agency has used in recent years and indicate how 
frequently they are used or provide any further detail on the tools above. 
Number of responses:   55 
Q14(b) Does your agency have a sufficient range of enforcement tools? If no, which additional 
tool(s) would enable your agency to most effectively achieve its objectives? 
Yes 131 No   55 Number of written responses 52 
Q14(c) Following a compliance breach, enforcement officers have some discretion in choosing: 
Which tool is applied 143 Do not have discretion 30 
The level/severity of the sanction 
(e.g. value of fines) 
  72   
Q14(d) Enforcement officers are provided with guidance on the use of discretion in determining 
responses to compliance breaches via: 
None provided   11 Written guidelines 117 
Training 121 Other 34 
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Table B.6 Survey responses for  
‘Section 5: Engagement with small business’ 
Q15(a) Does your agency have a working definition of small business? 
No 133 ABS definition 35 Other 21 
Q15(b) Based on the ABS definition of small business above, roughly how many of each of the 
following does your agency regulate? 
Total business: Numerical responses 77 Don’t know 100 
Small business: Numerical responses 53 Don’t know 115 
Q16(a) Does your agency provide any special assistance or different treatment to small business? 
No special assistance or different treatment is provided 114 
Yes, this is required (for example in enabling legislation or a ministerial statement of 
expectations) 
20 
Describe the different treatment required or provide a reference/link to the relevant 
document or section (text answers given) 
21 
Yes, although not explicitly required to do so the agency provides: 67 
Leniency or reduced obligations (not set out in the legislation your agency 
administers) 
16 
Waiving or reducing some fees or charges 21 
Simplified requirements 29 
Temporal exemptions (e.g. annual instead of quarterly reporting/inspections) 8 
Tailored forms or fact sheets 29 
Tailored coaching, seminars or other training 43 
Other 5 
Q16(b) Option 1: Different treatment for small business is provided by your agency or you believe 
that it should be. This is mainly because: 
Number ticking at least one box 56 
Compliance costs are disproportionately higher for small businesses 18 
Small businesses need extra help in understanding their compliance obligations 44 
Assistance is required to ensure adequate compliance levels and meet objectives 36 
Small businesses are more likely to comply (and therefore require less attention) 1 
Small businesses are less likely to comply (and therefore require more attention) 17 
The consequences of non-compliance by small business are less significant 9 
The consequences of non-compliance by small business are more significant 6 
Other 15 
  






Q16(b) Option 2: Different treatment for small business is not provided by your agency or you 
believe that it should not be. This is mainly because: 
Number ticking at least one box 124 
My agency's policies aim to facilitate compliance by all business regardless of size 92 
Needs of small businesses are not significantly different to those of other businesses 39 
Legislative requirements for small businesses are less onerous so no additional special 
treatment is required 
7 
Very few regulated entities are small businesses 19 
Majority of regulated entities are small businesses 36 
Extra administration and other costs of providing different treatment outweigh any benefit 13 
Other 29 
 
Table B.7 Survey responses for  
‘Section 6: Barriers to engagement with small business’ 
Q17. Which of the following are the most significant constraints on your agency's capacity to 
effectively engage with business (please select a maximum of five options). 
Regulation is unclear or unnecessarily 
complex 
29 Minister is too risk averse 4 
Range of enforcement tools is too 
narrow 
19 The influence on enforcement decisions of 
media or public reaction to compliance 
breaches 
13 
Regulation provides insufficient 
discretion/flexibility 
21 The influence on enforcement decisions of 
government responses to compliance 
breaches 
1 
Regulation provides insufficient capacity 
to respond to changes in the regulatory 
environment 
19 Budget/resource constraints 116 
Insufficient consideration of 
enforcement issues during the 
regulatory development process 
22 Inability to attract or retain appropriately 
skilled staff 
27 
Regulatory arrangements are not 
adequately tested before implementation 
16 Poor demarcation of roles with other 
regulators 
7 
Difficulties in understanding business 
needs 
16 Challenges in coordinating with other 
regulators 
18 
Other 19   
Q18. What are the main additional constraints or costs related to engagement with small 
business? 
No additional constraints 57 
Constraints on the time or availability of business owners or key staff 57 
Limited awareness of their obligations 72 
Their number and/or diversity 67 
High turnover of small business or of key staff in those businesses 29 
Administrative cost of tailoring engagement strategies for small business 46 
Other 7 
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Table B.8 Survey responses for  
‘Section 7: Resourcing and staff competency’ 
Q19. Please fill out the following resourcing information for your agency. (no. of responses) 
Total full time equivalent (FTE) staff at 30 June 2012 178 
Approximate FTE staff directly involved in regulation of business at 30 June 2012 171 
Total annual budget for your agency in financial year 2011-12 166 
Approximate percentage of total 2011-12 budget for functions related to regulation of 
business 
156 
Q20. In financial year 2011-12, approximately what percentage of total funding was sourced from: 
(no. of responses) 
Government funding 158 
Fees and charges levied on regulated entities 109 
Industry support 47 
Other 68 
Q21. In financial year 2011-12, approximately what percentage of business fees and charges were 
sourced from the following activities: (no. of responses) 
Registration/licensing 126 
Fines (or similar) 67 
Inspections 49 
Audits 51 
Education programs for business 46 
Other 56 
Q22. Which of the following strategies are employed to ensure that staff engaged in administering 
and enforcing regulation have the appropriate skills: 
Formal staff training, including with respect to understanding business needs 159 
Ensuring full documentation of procedures and decisions 174 
Hiring staff that have worked in a business in the area which your agency regulates 92 
Hiring staff with skills or experience in education and training 80 
Hiring staff with skills or experience in law enforcement 99 
Incorporating complaints/feedback from business in staff training and operating procedures 107 
Reviews of staff performance 174 
Reviews of branch/region performance 105 
Q23(a) What measures are in place to reduce the risk of capture, corruption or bias in decision 
making? 
Staff that engage with business must 
document reasons for their decisions 
165 Audits of decisions are periodically 
conducted by staff in a separate office 
of your agency 
69 
Significant decisions are subject to 
review by supervisor, board or other 
authority 
176 Audits of decisions are periodically 
conducted by an independent agency 
58 
Policies are in place to ensure 
conflicts of interest are reported 
167 Rotation of staff 50 
Q23(b) What other mechanisms are used to ensure appropriate oversight and that agency-wide 
policies are adhered to, in practice, by staff that engage with business? 
Number of responses:   67 
  






Table B.9 Survey responses for ‘Section 8: Review and evaluation’ 
Q24(a) Is your agency's regulatory performance subjected to ongoing or periodic review via: 
Formalised internal assessment drawing on feedback from stakeholders 46 
Within portfolio review 40 
External independent review within the last five years 55 
Other 31 
Q24(b) If yes above, did any of these reviews include an assessment of the effectiveness of your 
agency's engagement with: 
Total business: Yes 75 No 77 
Small business: Yes 34 No 105 
Q24(c) If applicable, how is the effectiveness of your agency's engagement practices monitored 
and evaluated? 
Number of responses:   50 
Q25(a) In the last two years, has your agency sought systematic feedback from business or small 
business through: 
Surveys: Business 72 Small business 57 
Consultative fora: Business 94 Small business 67 
Other: Business 18 Small business 14 
Q25(b) In the last five years, has your agency substantially reformed its approach to engagement 
with business? [this may include, but is not limited to, seeking to change: agency culture; levels of 
discretion given to enforcement officers; decision review processes; or recruitment practices]. 
If yes, please provide further information, including on the motivations or aims for these reforms. 
Yes 107 No 73 Number of written responses 102 
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B.3 Commonwealth, state and territory regulators 
Table B.10 Commonwealth regulatorsa 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Practice Board of Australia 
Aged Care Standards and Accreditation Agency Limited 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
Australian Accounting Standards Board 
Australian Communications and Media Authority 
Australian Community Pharmacy Authority 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
Australian Energy Regulator 
Australian Federal Police 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency  
Australian Human Rights Commission 
Australian Information Commissioner 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Australian Skills Quality Authority 
Australian Taxation Office 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
Comcare 
Fair Work Building and Construction 
Fair Work Commission 
Fair Work Ombudsman 
Food Standards Australia New Zealand 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
IP Australia 
Migration Agents Registration Authority 
Murray Darling Basin Authority 
National Heavy Vehicle Regulator 
National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority 
National Rail Safety Regulator 
Private Health Insurance Administration Council 
Reserve Bank of Australia 
          Payments System Board 
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission 
Seafarers' Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission 
Sydney Harbour Federation Trust 
a Not listed here is the Australian Bureau of Statistics, which does not regard itself as a regulator and lacks 
some characteristics of a regulator. Like a number of government agencies, however, it does place a 
compliance burden on small business in order to deliver a desirable outcome for the community. 






Tax Practitioners Board 
Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency 
Treasury: Foreign Investment and Trade Policy Division 
Tuition Protection Service 
Wine Australia Corporation 
Workplace Gender Equality Agency 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry: 
          Business Support Operations Branch (DAFF levies) 
          Biosecurity 
          Export Services and Control 
          Illegal Logging 
          Import Services and Controls 
          Meat, Wool and Dairy Section 
          Northern Territory Fisheries Joint Authority 
          Queensland Fisheries Joint Authority 
          Quota Administration Unit 
          Torres Strait Protected Zone Joint Authority 
          Western Australia Fisheries Joint Authority 
          Wood Exports 
Department of Attorney General: 
          Classification Board 
          Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia 
          National Security Law and Policy Division 
          Registrar of Marriage Celebrants 
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency: 
            Clean Energy regulator 
Department of Defence: 
          Defence Export Control Office 
          US Trade Treaty 
          Woomera Prohibited Area Coordination Office 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations: 
          Office of Early Childhood Education and Child Care 
          Office of the Federal Safety Commissioner 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs: 
          Additional Classification Restrictions in the Northern Territory 
          Anindilyakwa Land Council 
          Central Land Council 
          Community Store Licensing Scheme 
          Executive Director of Township Leasing 
          National Gambling Regulator 
          Northern Land Council 
          Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations 
          Tiwi Land Council 
          Torres Strait Regional Authority 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: 
          Sanctions and Transnational Crime Section 
          Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
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Department of Health and Ageing: 
          Embryo Research Licensing Committee of the NHMRC 
          Gene Technology Regulator 
          National Industrial Chemicals Notification and Assessment Scheme 
          Office of Aged Care and Quality Compliance 
          Office of Chemical Safety - Medicines & Poisons Scheduling Secretariat 
          Office of Chemical Safety - Drug Import/Export Licensing and Compliance  
          Population Health Division - Tobacco Sections 
          Therapeutic Goods Administration 
Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education: 
           National Measurement Institute 
           Professional Standards Board for Patent and Trade Marks Attorneys 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport: 
           Airports Branch 
           Aviation Branches 
           Office of Transport Security 
           Registrar of Liner Shipping 
           Surface Transport Policy — Maritime and Shipping Branch 
           Vehicle Safety Standards Branch 
Department of Regional Australia, Regional Development and Local Government: 
           National Capital Authority 
Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism 
           Australian Greenhouse and Energy Minimum Standards Regulator 
           Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency Division  
           Commercial Building Disclosure Program Regulator 
           Energy Efficiency Opportunities Program Regulator 
           Uranium Mining Regulator 
           Uranium Exports Regulator 
Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities 
           Accreditation of Fishery Management Arrangements (Protected Species) 
           Australian Antarctic Division 
           Biodiversity and Conservation Division 
           Director of National Parks 
           Environment Assessment and Compliance Division 
           Environmental Quality Division 
                     Fuel Quality Standards 
                     Hazardous Waste 
                     Ozone and Synthetic Gas Team 
                     TV and Computers 
                     Water Efficiency and Labelling Standards 
           Heritage and Wildlife Division 
                     Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection 
                     Heritage Reform and Shipwrecks 
           HRSS Input 
           International Wildlife Trade 
           Product Stewardship Regulator 
           Supervising Scientist Division 






Table B.11 New South Wales regulators 
Anti-Discrimination Board 
Architects Registration Board 
Attorney General's Department 
Board of Studies NSW 
Board of Surveying and Spatial Information 
Border Rivers-Gwydir Catchment Management Authority 
Central West Catchment Management Authority 
Department of Education & Communities: 
          Office of Communities 
                     Commission for Children & Young People 
Department of Family & Community Services: 
         Ageing, Disability & Home Care 
Department of Finance and Services: 
         NSW Fair Trading 
         NSW Products Safety Committee 
Department of Health: 
          Clinical Excellence Commission 
          Pharmaceutical Services 
Department of Planning and Infrastructure: 
            Building Professionals Board 
Department of Premier and Cabinet: 
          Division of Local Government 
Environment Protection Authority 
Firearms Registry 
Greyhound Racing NSW 
Harness Racing NSW 
Hawkesbury-Nepean Catchment Management Authority 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 
Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator 
Information and Privacy Commission 
Institute of Teachers 
Lower Murray Darling Catchment Management Authority 
Motor Accidents Authority 
Murrumbidgee CMA 
Namoi Catchment Management Authority 
National Parks and Wildlife Service 
Northern Rivers Catchment Management Authority 
NSW Fire and Rescue 
NSW Health: Private Health Care Branch 
NSW Police Force: Security Licensing and Enforcement Directorate 
NSW Rural Fire Service 
NSW Trade and Investment: 
          Industry, Innovation, Resources, Energy, Hospitality and the Arts 
                   Office of Liquor, Gaming & Racing 
                   Independent Liquor and Gaming Authority 
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          Department of Primary Industries 
                            Agriculture NSW 
                            Biosecurity 
                            Fisheries NSW 
                            Marine Parks Authority NSW 
                            NSW Food Authority 
                            Forests NSW 
                            NSW Office of Water 
                            Office of Agricultural Sustainability & Food Security 
                            Animal Welfare Section 
                            Plantation Assessment Unit 
                            Division of Resources and Energy 
                                  Mine Safety 
           Small Business Commissioner 
Office of Biofuels 
Office for Children: Children's Guardian 
Office of Communities, Sport and Recreation 
Office of Industrial Relations 
Pharmacy Council of New South Wales 
Psychology Council of New South Wales 
Racing NSW 
Roads and Maritime Services 
Southern Rivers Catchment Management Authority 
Transport for NSW 
Treasury: 
          NSW Industrial Relations 
          Office of State Revenue 
Veterinary Practitioners Board 
Western Catchment Management Authority 
WorkCover NSW 
Table B.12 Victorian regulators 
Automotive Alternative Fuels Registration Board 
Building Commission 
Children's Services 
Chinese Medicine Registration Board of Victoria 
Council of Legal Education 
Country Fire Authority 
Department of Health 
            Cooling Towers and Warm Water Systems 
            Communicable Disease Prevention and Control Unit 
            Drugs and Poisons Regulation Group 
            Food Safety and Regulation Unit 
            Pest Control Licensing 
            Private hospitals and Non-Emergency Patient Transport 
            Public Swimming Pools 
            Radiation Safety 






            Safe Drinking Water 
            Supported Residential Services 
            Policy Instruments and Compliance 
            Cemeteries & Crematoria Regulation Unit 
Department of Justice 
            Business Licensing Authority 
            Consumer Affairs Victoria 
            Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing 
                      Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation 
                      Harness Racing Victoria 
                      Greyhound Racing Victoria 
            Victorian Police: Licensing and Regulation Division 
            Working with Children Check Unit 
Department of Primary Industries 
            Biosecurity Victoria 
                      Animal, Plant and Chemical Operations 
                      Bureau of Animal Welfare 
                      Plant and Product Integrity 
            Dairy Food Safety Victoria 
            Regulation and Compliance Group 
            Earth Resources Regulation Branch 
            Agriculture Productivity and Industry Development 
            Fisheries Victoria 
Department of Planning and Community Development 
           Aboriginal Affairs Victoria 
           Architects Registration Board of Victoria 
Department of Sustainability and Environment 
Department of Transport 
            VicRoads 
            Victorian Taxi Directorate 
Energy Safe Victoria 
Environmental Health Unit 
Environmental Protection Authority 
Essential Services Commission 
Health Services Commissioner 




Legal Services Board 
Legal Services Commissioner 
Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 
Parks Victoria 
Plumbing Industry Commission 
Primesafe 
Private Hospital Unit 
Professional Boxing and Combat Sports Board of Victoria 
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Small Business Commissioner 
Sustainability Victoria 
State Revenue Office 
Surveyors Registration Board of Victoria 
Transport Safety Victoria 
Veterinary Practitioners Registration Board of Victoria 
Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment Authority 
Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission 
Victorian Institute of Teaching 
Victorian Pharmacy Authority 
Victorian Registration and Qualifications Authority 
Victorian Skills Commission 
Worksafe Victoria 
Table B.13 Queensland regulators 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
            Agriculture and Forestry 
            Biosecurity Queensland 
            Fisheries Queensland 
Department of Energy and Water Supply 
Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
Department of Housing and Public Works 
            Board of Architects of Queensland 
            Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland 
            Plumbing Industry Council 
            Pool Safety Council 
           Queensland Building Services Authority 
Department of Justice and Attorney-General 
           Council of Legal Education/Board of Examiners 
           Liquor, Gaming and Fair Trading 
           Office of Electrical Safety 
           Office of Fair Trading 
           Office of Fair and Safe Work Queensland 
Department of Local Government, Community Recovery and Resilience 
          Queensland Police Service 
Department of National Parks, Recreation, Sport and Racing 
Department of Natural Resources and Mines 
           Surveyors Board of Queensland 
           Valuers Registration Board of Queensland 
Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning 
Department of Transport and Main Roads 
Department of Treasury and Trade 
         Office of State Revenue 
         Queensland Competition Authority 
Legal Services Commission 
Workers' Compensation Regulatory Authority (Q-COMP) Board 






Table B.14 West Australian regulators 
Albany Port Authority 
Botanic Gardens and Parks Authority 
Broome Port Authority 
Dampier Port Authority 
Department of Agriculture and Food 
Department of the Attorney General: 
           Fines Enforcement Registry 
Department of Commerce: 
           Building Commission 
           Consumer Protection 
           Energy Safety 
           Labour Relations Division 
           WorkSafe 
Department of Environment and Conservation: 
           Keep Australia Beautiful WA 
           Waste Authority 
Department of Finance: 
           Shared Services 
           Public Utilities Office 
           State Revenue 
Department of Fire and Emergency Services 
Department of Fisheries 
Department of Health: 
          Drug and Alcohol Office 
          Office of Safety and Quality in Healthcare 
          Office of the Chief Psychiatrist 
Department of Housing 
Department of Local Government 
Department of Mines and Petroleum: 
          Mineral Titles Division 
          Petroleum 
          Resources Safety 
          Environment 
          Royalties 
Department of Planning 
Department of Racing, Gaming and Liquor 
Department of Regional Development and Lands 
Department of Transport  
Department of Water 
Economic Regulation Authority 
Environmental Protection Authority 
Esperance Port Authority 
Fremantle Ports 
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Geraldton Port Authority 
Independent Market Operator 
Legal Practice Board of Western Australia 
Office of Road Safety 
Training Accreditation Council 
Perth Market Authority 
Plumbers Licensing Board 
Port Hedland Port Authority 
Potato Marketing Corporation of Western Australia 
Racing and Wagering Western Australia 
Western Australian Fisheries Joint Authority  
Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
Western Australian Meat Industry Authority 
Western Australia Police 
WorkCover WA 
Table B.15 South Australian regulators 
Attorney-General's Department: 
         Consumer and Business Services 
Dairy Authority of South Australia 
Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources 
Department of Health 
Department for Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, Resources and Energy: 
         Manufacturing Consultative Council 
         Small Business Commissioner 
Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure 
Department of Primary Industries and Regions SA: 
         Agriculture, Food, Wine and Forestry 
         Biosecurity SA 
         Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Department of Treasury and Finance: 
         Revenue SA 
Development Assessment Commission 
Environment Protection Authority South Australia 
Essential Services Commission of South Australia 
Independent Gambling Authority 
Legal Practitioners  Conduct Board 
Mining and Quarry Occupational Health and Safety Committee 
Motor Accident Commission 
Natural resources - Adelaide and Mt Lofty Ranges 
Natural resources - South East 
Pharmacy Regulation of South Australia 
SA Lotteries 
SafeWork SA 
South Australia Police 
Teachers Registration Board of South Australia 






The Architectural Practice Board of South Australia 
Veterinary Surgeons Board of South Australia 
WorkCover South Australia 
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Advisory Committee 
Table B.16 Tasmanian regulators 
Department of Education: 
             Skills Tasmania 
             Teachers Registration Board 
Department of Health and Human Services: 
            Ambulance Tasmania 
            Public and Environmental Health 
            Radiation Protection Unit 
Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources: 
            Mineral Resources Tasmania 
            Office of Energy 
            Racing Services 
            Transport 
Department of Justice: 
            Anti-Discrimination Commissioner 
            Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading 
            Legal Profession Board 
            Monetary Penalties Enforcement Service 
            Poppy Advisory and Control Board 
            WorkCover Tasmania 
            Workplace Standards 
Department of Police & Emergency Management: 
            Tasmania Police 
            Tasmanian Fire Service 
Department of Premier and Cabinet 
            Local Government Division 
Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment: 
            Biosecurity 
            Environment Protection Authority Tasmania 
            Inland Fisheries Service 
            Land Titles Office 
            Quarantine Tasmania 
            Resources Management Division 
            Tasmanian Heritage Council 
            Sea Fishing & Aquaculture 
            Veterinary Board of Tasmania 
            Water 
Department of Treasury and Finance: 
            Licensing Board 
            Liquor and Gaming Branch 
            Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 
            State Revenue Office 
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Forest Practices Authority 
Marine and Safety Tasmania  
Table B.17 Australian Capital Territory regulators 
ACT Revenue Office (Commerce and Works Directorate) 
Community Services Directorate: 
            Children's Policy and Regulation Unit 
Education and Training Directorate 
Environment and Sustainable Development Directorate: 
           ACT Architects Board 
Health Directorate: 
        Health Protection Service 
           Veterinary Surgeons 
Indpendent Competition and Regulatory Commission 
Justice and Community Safety Directorate 
Table B.18 Northern Territory regulators 
Aboriginal areas protection authority 
Darwin  Harbourmaster 
Darwin Port Corporation 
Darwin Waterfront Corporation 
Department of Attorney-General and Justice: 
            NT Anti-Discrimination Commission 
            NT Consumer Affairs 
Department of Business: 
            NT Licensing Commission 
            NT Worksafe 
            Gambling & Licensing Services 
Department of Health 
Department of Land Resource Management 
Department of Lands, Planning and the Environment: 
          Architects Board 
          Building Appeals Board 
          Building Practitioners Board 
          Building Advisory Committee 
          Electrical Workers and Contractors Licensing Board 
          Plumbers and Drainers Licensing Board 
Department of Local Government: 
          Animal Welfare Branch 
Department of Mines and Energy 
Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries: 
         Agvet chemical regulation 
         Animal Biosecurity 
         Fisheries 






         Plant Biosecurity 
         Primary Industry 
Department of Transport: 
          Planning, Policy & Reform 
          Public Transport 
          Transport Safety 
Department of Treasury and Finance: 
        Territory Revenue Office 
        Utilities Commission 
        Work Health and Safety Advisory Council 
        Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Advisory Council 
Environment Protection Authority 
Health and Community Services Complaints Commission 
Northern Territory Police 
Teacher Registration Board NT 
 
   




C Definitions of small business  
C.1 Definitions of small business in Australia 
While it is possible to broadly define small businesses by their characteristics, such 
a multi-layer definition of small business can be difficult, if not impossible, to use 
to collect statistics, to define in regulation or to determine eligibility for any 
government assistance (see chapter 1). Consequently, a definition based on a simple 
metric that proxies the characteristic based definition may be desirable. However, 
there is no such single universally accepted proxy definition of a small business. 
Government organisations have chosen to define small business using definitive 
metrics such as the number employed, turnover, assets, loan size, wages and even 
the number of gaming machines (table C.1).  
One of the most used definitions of small business is the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) definition. The ABS defines small businesses as those employing 
fewer than 20 people. There are also sub categories of small business such as micro 
businesses, which have fewer than five employees, as well as employing and 
non-employing small business. This current definition is based on a review 
undertaken in 1999 (box C.1).  
Another well known definition is that of the Australian Tax Office (ATO), which 
defines a small business as an individual, partnership, trust or company with an 
aggregate annual turnover of less than $2 million — although it uses additional 
criteria to satisfy different regulatory objectives (for example, fringe benefit tax 
concession for car parking). The ATO uses this turnover based definition to provide 
tax concessions as well as targeting advice and education programs to small 
business.  
While the ABS and ATO definitions are general and are applied in other 
circumstances (such as the RBA business liaison and financial analysis), other 
definitions are based on metrics and thresholds that are more specific and targeted 
to the regulatory objective. For example, small hotels and clubs with less than 15 
gaming machines are exempted from some of the requirements of the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006.  






Table C.1 Examples of small business definitions  
Metric Threshold Institution/legislation Purpose 
Employees <15a FWA Unfair dismissal &  
redundancy 
 <20 ABS Statistical reporting 
 <20 RBA Business liaison 
 <100 Workplace Gender 
Equality Act 2012 
Equal opportunity laws 
Turnover  <$2 million ATO Taxation 
 <$3 millionb Privacy Act 1988 Privacy laws 
Assets <$50 million APRA Prudential supervision 
Individual loan size <$1 million APRA Prudential supervision 
 <$2 million RBA Analysis of financing 
conditions 
Legal structure Unincorporated RBA Analysis of financing 
conditions 
Value of transaction <$3 millionc ACCC Collective bargaining  
Wages  Varies by state payroll tax Taxation 
Gaming machines <15 AUSTRAC Anti-money laundering  
and counter-terrorism 
financing rules 
a Calculated as a simple head count including casual employees who are employed on a regular and 
systematic basis  b There are specified small businesses that are not exempt.  c General threshold. There are 
industry specific thresholds for petrol retailing, new motor vehicle retailing, farm machinery retailing, primary 
production.  
Sources: Australian Government (2011); ABS (2013); RBA (2012); Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012; 
ATO (2012); Privacy Act 1988; ACCC (2011); PC (2012); Austrac (2009). 
   





Box C.1 Businesses with fewer than 20 employees — ABS definition  
The ABS employee based definition of small business is the outcome of a review that 
compared a number of metrics — such as total employment, full-time equivalent, 
wages and salaries expenditure, annual income, assets and net profit — and various 
thresholds for each proxy measure. This investigation aimed to find an operational 
definition of small business that would simultaneously include the vast majority of small 
businesses (comprehensiveness) and exclude most businesses identified as not small 
(purity) for national statistical purposes.  
The ABS concluded that employment based proxies performed well against these 
indicators and had a number of advantages over financial measures of size, including: 
• being an easily understood and readily visualised concept 
• it maintained the basis of measuring small business (previous definitions had been 
based on employment, albeit with a different threshold for manufacturing) 
• financial measures would, over time, need to be adjusted for inflation.  
While some sectors, such as Accommodation, cafes and restaurants, did not perform 
as well as others sectors on the indicators of comprehensiveness and purity, the 
implications were not considered sufficiently serious to warrant a separate definition for 
this sector. While a definition based on full-time equivalent would overcome this 
problem, such data is not always available from ABS data collections (for example 
monthly labour force survey).  
Sources: ABS (2000, 2002).   
 
C.2 International definitions of small business  
The definition of small business varies considerably across countries. While the 
European Union has a standard definition, this is not always adopted (for example 
Denmark does not use the financial component of the European Union definition). 
The definitions used for statistical data collection are presented in table C.3. Similar 
to Australia, some countries have a definition for data collection but use other 
definitions for taxation or research purposes.  
In comparison to the Australian definitions of small business, the definitions used in 
other countries can to be more complex and vary by industry. For example, in 
Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and the USA the definition of small business varies by 
industry and in some instances is dependent on satisfying two metrics such as 
employment and turnover limits, such as China, European Union.  






Table C.2 Selected international definitions of small business  
Country Metric  Industry Threshold 
Canada employees all  < 99 
Chile annual sales all < UF 25 000 
China  employment or 
annual sales 
varies but general rule:  
<500 staff or annual sales of <30 m yuan 
Denmark employees all < 50 
EUa  employee &  
turnover or  
balance sheet total 
all < 50 
≤ € 10 m 
≤ € 10 m 





¥300 m or < 300 
  wholesale ¥100 m or < 100 
  service ¥50 m or < 100 
  retail trade ¥50 m or < 50 
Hong Kong employees manufacturing  
other sectors 
< 100 
< 50  
Malaysia turnover manufacturing  
other sectors 
< RM 10 m 
< RM 1 m  
 employment manufacturing  
other sectors 




full-time employees all  < 20 




< S$15 m  
< 200 employees 
Switzerland  employees all < 50 
Thailand  employees &  
fixed capital 
all < 50 
< 200 m THB  
UK  employees all < 50 
USA  employees manufacturing  
 
< 500 employees (up to 1 500) depending on 
the type of product manufactured 
 employees wholesaling < 100 employees (up to 500) depending on 
the particular product being provided 
 annual receipts  services < US$2.5 m to US$21.5 m depending on the 
particular service being provided 
 annual receipts retail trade < US$5.0 m to US$21.0 m, depending on the 
particular product being provided 
 annual receipts general & heavy 
construction 
< US$13.5 m to US$17 m, depending on the 
type of construction 
 annual receipts special trade 
construction 
< US$7 m  
 annual receipts agriculture < US$0.5 to US$9.0 m, depending on the 
agricultural product. 





< VND 200 b  
a Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Sweden.   
Sources: Industry Canada (2012); New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2012); 
OECD (2004); OECD (2012); Schaper et al. (2010); Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2009); US Small Business 
Administration (2013).  
   




C.3 Considerations in defining small business 
An operational definition or proxy measure of small business needs to be relatively 
simple, easily understood, practical to implement and capture those businesses that 
are considered ‘small’. This requires the relevant agency to assess the reason why 
they need to define small business (such as to collect statistics to count the number 
of small business) to ensure there is a clear understanding of the target population in 
order to develop an accurate proxy. The target population may vary depending on 
the objective.  
Even simple measures are subject to interpretation and may require more complex 
or sub-definitions to ensure clarity. For example, defining small business by the 
number of employees raises the issue of whether casual and part–time employees 
should be counted in the same manner as full-time employees. The Fair Dismissal 
Code applies to small business employers with fewer than 15 employees calculated 
on a simple headcount of all employees including casual employees who are 
employed on a regular and systematic basis. 
The aim of having a simple proxy also needs to be balanced against accuracy: 
having a definition that captures a high proportion of those business that are 
genuinely ‘small’ while at the same minimising the number of businesses captured 
that are obviously not small (box C.1). Participants to this study highlighted this 
difficulty, noting that some businesses will be classified as small by certain 
definitions but not by other definitions. The Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry provided one such hypothetical example:  
Business XYZ which employs 19 workers is classified as small business under the 
definition of the Australian Bureau of Statistics; however with $2.5 million annual 
revenue it is not eligible to access the small business tax concession, as it exceeds the 
annual turnover threshold of $2 million. The Small Business Fair Dismissal Code also 
does not apply to Business XYZ as it employs 15 or more employees. (sub. 5, p. 6) 
The purpose of the definition also has substantial impacts on the way small 
businesses are defined. A definition for national statistics is unlikely to prompt a 
change in behaviour from an individual small business to influence the way the 
ABS classifies them (that is, small, medium or large). Consequently, the definition 
of small business can be relatively simple. In circumstances where businesses are 
likely to benefit from being classified as a small business (such as exemption from 
paying tax or reporting requirements), definitions tend to be more complex and 
specific to the regulatory objective to prevent ‘gaming’. 
 

   





D Risk based delivery of regulation 
D.1 What is a risk based approach? 
A risk based approach to delivering regulation provides a framework to optimally 
reduce the risks to regulatory outcomes posed by different businesses (figure D.1). 
It facilitates a tolerance of risk in meeting regulatory objectives by prompting 
regulators to recognise that elimination of all risk is likely to be an uneconomical 
aspiration, in terms of both administrative costs and the efficiency loss for society 
— additional regulatory constraints to further mitigate risk may reduce consumer 
and producer choices, lead to higher business costs and consequently, higher prices. 
Figure D.1 The basis of a risk based frameworka 
 
a The bottom left component of this chart is not formally incorporated without a risk based approach. In 
contrast, under a non–risk based approach, regulatory objectives would simply specify the conditions for 
compliance and the ways in which compliance can be satisfied in order to achieve specified outcomes — 
while not explicitly accounting for risks to achieving these outcomes. 
Source: Solicitors Regulation Authority (2012). 
When a regulator employs a risk based approach, they are recognising that different 
business characteristics such as size or business activity may present different levels 
of risk to meeting intended regulatory objectives. Likewise, regulators can also 
accommodate the different nature of risk — some regulations seek to prevent 






catastrophic outcomes, such as the loss of lives, while others aim to reduce less 
significant adverse events such as the evasion of tax payments by small businesses.  
Armed with knowledge about such differences in risk, a regulator can then tailor the 
delivery of regulation so that the allocation of regulatory resources and consequent 
compliance costs for businesses are proportionate to the risks pose to regulatory 
outcomes. Accordingly, when applied well, a risk based approach will generally 
maintain regulatory outcomes, but also potentially: 
• reduce the compliance costs for low risk businesses and sometimes make it 
easier to comply, thereby increasing overall compliance 
• lower administrative costs for regulators in achieving regulatory objectives.  
Although a risk based approach may increase compliance costs for some higher risk 
businesses, such costs should be more than offset by improved outcomes for the 
community. 
Use of a risk based approach requires regulators to develop the information and 
capacity to systematically target their effort to regulatory areas and businesses 
presenting the greatest risks. This contrasts with a more traditional approach to 
delivering regulation, which would tend to involve regulators pursuing a ‘lowest 
common denominator’ approach that does not consider the different risks presented 
by businesses; but might rather focus on the risks presented by the average, or even 
the ‘riskiest’ business. 
What is risk and how it is measured?  
Risk can be defined as the probability of an unfavourable event multiplied by the 
severity of harm if the event occurs (figure D.2). Accordingly, probability and the 
magnitude of harm (impact) are the key concepts in a risk based approach — both 
of which should be given proper consideration in prioritising risk based compliance 
and enforcement. 
Lack of information is a reality when dealing with risk, and any attempt to measure 
risk will necessarily be imperfect. How regulators address this challenge has been 
identified as a considerable concern by the OECD: 
the difficulty in dealing with … uncertainty often leads to a proliferation of … ad hoc 
methods [for measuring risk] … which reveal a lack of understanding of the logic of 
decision making under uncertainty. (2010, p. 99) 
However, this does not mean that regulators cannot make reasonable estimates of 
the relative risk of particular activities — for example, by adopting an approach that 
   





consistently and robustly relies on as much available evidence as possible (ideally 
with some quantitative evidence). This commonly means using a matrix such as that 
shown in figure D.2. 
Figure D.2 Defining riska 
 
a It should be noted that the nature of risks and correspondingly, the measurement and classification of risk, 
will naturally vary between regulatory areas. Consequently, this figure is meant only as a demonstration of one 
perspective a regulator may take when defining risk.  
The varied nature of risk means regulators using a risk based approach will use 
different (qualitative and quantitative) evidence to measure risk according to their 
regulatory area (box D.1). Although this evidence base can sometimes be thin, as 
long as regulators recognise this potential limitation and use caution in their 
interpretation, it can still form the foundation for a sound risk based approach. 
However, regulators may need guidance on how to measure and classify risks in a 
formalised manner, when there is a lack of information about risks. Without either 
information or guidance, ‘ad hoc’ methods could emerge, resulting in regulators 
adopting a risk averse regulatory posture — directing too many resources towards 
lower risk businesses as a result of a lack of information on risks (chapter 2).  
Once they have established an evidence base that can be used to estimate risk, 
regulators should continually review these estimates and improve the quality of 
information to ensure their approach remains relevant. It is important for regulators 
to recognise that some risks may disappear over time, new risks may emerge in line 
with changing business and economic conditions, and many risks may be 
interconnected. For example, the Commission is aware that the ATO adapts their 
risk based approach by changing the specific risks they focus on each year. New 
risks are continually identified and current risks reviewed in line with economic and 
business conditions and new legislation. This review process forms part of a 
framework that assesses tax risk and determines the likelihood, formality and 
intensity of review in a consistent manner. 







Box D.1 Evidence used to measure risk 
• The ATO uses individual business activity as an indicator of risk, including when tax 
performance varies substantially from business performance and that of similar 
businesses; or there are spikes in refunds or unexplained losses. 
– The ATO also uses the industry a business belongs to as a risk indicator — for 
example, industries heavily involved in the cash economy (such as cafés) are 
likely to have a higher probability of non–compliance.  
• The Victorian Environmental Protection Authority (EPA 2013) uses six criteria to 
measure risk, three each for impact and probability. 
– Impact: site activity (complexity of activities, types of processes and chemicals 
used), proximity to receptors (the environment around the site) and emissions 
and waste. 
– Probability: site management, compliance rating (number and severity of non–
compliances) and community engagement (including whether the site 
communicates with the community and the number of reports made to the EPA’s 
hotline about a site). 
• In food safety regulation (case study, section D.3), regulators in different states 
have taken different approaches: 
– The Victorian Department of Health (2011) places food businesses into pre–
determined categories based on the type of food they produce. 
– The Brisbane City Council (BCC 2010), in contrast, uses mostly information from 
past audits as an indicator of the probability of non–compliance. 
• The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA 2012, p. 17) focuses on 
activities which are more likely to cause environmental damage, particularly 
activities such as illegal fishing, illegal access to preservation zones and the safety 
of protected species. 
• Wine Australia’s (2011) quality compliance strategy of label integrity and chemical 
residue audits maintains a focus on the reputation of Australian wine as a whole. 
This implies a trade–off between probability and impact when measuring risk that 
recognises one business can pose a risk to the entire industry. While the largest 
producers may have better quality control in place (reducing the probability of an 
adverse event), their size also means they have the potential to have the largest 
impact on the reputation of Australian wine. 
– In addition to producers, half of all label integrity inspections in 2011-12 were of 
exporters trading wine made by entities other than themselves (Wine 
Australia 2012, p. 20). Such exporters potentially present risks to multiple brands. 
• The Queensland Building Services Authority (BSA 2012) uses (among other factors) 
a business’s compliance with financial requirements as an indicator of other risks 
(such as safety risks).  
Sources: ATO website; BCC (2010); Queensland BSA (2012); Victorian EPA (2013); GBRMPA (2012); 
Victorian Department of Health (2011); Wine Australia (2011, 2012).  
 
   





The costs of measuring risk 
Much of the information collection for a risk based approach occurs early in 
implementation. Correctly identifying and measuring risks may require regulators to 
invest in additional training and guidance material to overcome knowledge gaps and 
other limitations, and undertake extensive consultation and analysis. For instance, 
the Commission is aware that prior to implementing its enabling Act, the Australian 
Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) sought advice from 
regulated industries to determine the risks likely to be present in regulated 
businesses and the costs associated with addressing these risks. Regulators may also 
need to draw on cross disciplinary expertise to spot emerging problems 
(Sparrow 2000) and integrate workgroups that previously saw themselves as 
specialised or discrete units (Black 2010). 
Regulated businesses may also incur costs when regulators seek to measure risk. 
For instance, one dilemma a regulator can face is that good information is integral 
to accurately assessing the cost and benefits of alternative regulatory approaches. 
However, if collected from business this data requirement imposes a burden on 
these businesses. The regulator must ensure this burden is not excessive, and 
endeavour to make more effective use of existing and other sources of information 
wherever possible.  
The elements of a risk based approach 
Although no two risk based regulatory approaches are exactly alike, a well designed 
and implemented risk based approach, in principle, can generally be broken down to 
six core elements. These elements are discussed in further detail below and adapted 
from the work of Black and Baldwin (2010) and the NSW Better Regulation 
Office (2008). These elements appear to be present, with varying levels and styles 
of implementation, in most structured Australian risk based regulatory approaches:  
1. Defining outcomes and identifying risks — the regulator must determine its 
objectives from the enabling legislation and identify the risks it is required to 
control. Clearly, the less prescriptive the legislation, the more discretion is afforded 
to the regulator in its interpretation of regulatory outcomes and resulting objectives 
(box D.2). 
2. Determining the risk appetite — The regulator must determine the risks it is 
prepared to tolerate and at what level, consistent with the legislation set down by 
parliament and other guidance given by government, and its operating resources. 
This can be challenging — particularly if the regulator is given poor statutory or 
administrative guidance, and therefore itself needs to consider community views 
and determine what weight to place on quantitative risk assessment. 







Box D.2 Changes to discretion afforded in liquor regulation legislation 
Liquor regulation is one area where legislation has been prescriptive and where 
regulators have not adopted risk based approaches. Many states have recognised the 
issues with liquor regulation and are starting to move away from restrictive liquor laws 
in recognition of the risks posed by different businesses. Liquor licensing changes in 
many states are by no means ‘best practice’, but the changes represent a shift away 
from highly prescriptive approaches and provide more discretion to adopt risk based 
practices. These changes (as well as some associated prescriptive legislation) are 
discussed below. 
• In Victoria, legislated liquor licensing fees are lower for licensees assessed as 
having a low risk of alcohol–related violence such as restaurants and cafes; based 
on operating hours, compliance history and venue capacity (Victorian Commission 
for Gambling and Liquor Regulation 2012). The Commission understands that WA, 
QLD, NSW, SA and the ACT operate, or are beginning to operate, similar licensing 
schemes to varying extents.  
• The Queensland Government has recently begun moving away from restrictive 
liquor licensing by introducing separate ‘small bar’ and ‘café’ licences. These 
licences reduce licence fees and other requirements, making it possible to open low 
risk small businesses where it may have previously been infeasible to do so 
(Jabour 2013; Office for Liquor and Gambling Regulation 2013).  
– For instance, the café licence means licensees are no longer required to meet 
the requirement to build a kitchen at the venue, which can impose confusing 
regulatory requirements surrounding food preparation. The Brisbane Times 
(Jabour 2013) identified one case where a licensee struggled to meet arbitrary, 
non–risk based regulations surrounding what constituted a meal before the 
introduction of the café licence — in one instance the licensee was told that two 
poached eggs with prosciutto on toast was not classified as a meal, but two 
poached eggs with bacon on toast was. 
– Similar small bar licences exist in Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and WA.  
• The Queensland Government (2013, pp. 25–9) identified potential issues in its 
‘glassing’ regulations in a recent discussion paper. It considers that: 
– The official ‘high risk’ glassing classification may have unreasonable commercial 
consequences for licensees, including implications for business reputation and 
insurance costs; and the ability to classify a business as ‘high risk’ based on one 
incident is potentially unfair. 
– It may be better to consider a more flexible approach that would complement 
licensees that voluntarily remove glass, particularly in late trading venues where 
the risk of violence is higher. 
Sources: Jabour (2013); OLGR (2013); Queensland Government (2013); VCGLR (2012).  
 
3. Risk assessment — having determined the risk appetite, the regulator can then 
formally assess the likelihood and potential impact of an adverse event, the 
expected value of that impact, and the costs and benefits of any regulatory action or 
inaction. This can incorporate various forms of qualitative and/or quantitative 
   





analysis and should also consider which businesses (or types of businesses) present 
high risks, and whether any of these businesses can self–manage those risks.  
4. Prioritising risks — to assist in the implementation of compliance monitoring and 
enforcement, the information generated by risk assessments should be used to 
prioritise risks, ideally by assigning scores or ranks to those being regulated. 
Scoring and ranking systems may vary widely, based on the characteristics of the 
regulated industry and business, scale of activities and history of compliance. These 
systems may or may not explicitly account for, or relate to, business size. 
5. Implementation and the allocation of resources — the regulator will choose 
appropriate compliance and enforcement measures and how to allocate its resources 
to address risks, based on risk assessments and the prioritisation of different 
businesses being regulated. This has been most commonly applied in informing 
decisions on how to allocate supervisory, inspection and enforcement resources 
(Black 2010).  
6. Reviewing outcomes — an effective risk based approach requires regulators to 
continually review their effectiveness at reducing the risks to their objectives, and 
the objectives themselves. This is essential to improving a regulator’s understanding 
of risk, ensuring that risks are being managed and resources allocated in the most 
effective manner, and enabling proactive responses to emerging and changing risks.  
A key challenge for regulators in reviewing outcomes is determining what would 
have happened if they had (or had not) intervened (Hutter 2005; Peterson and 
Fensling 2011). Regulators may find the concept of measuring regulatory 
effectiveness challenging if they have been more used to measuring success in 
terms of enforcement activities (such as inspections undertaken or prosecutions 
brought) or in financial terms.  
D.2 Implementing a risk based approach  
Regulators should commit to a structured approach 
What regulators perceive as a risk based approach can vary significantly — as 
identified by Hutter: 
In some cases, regulatory agencies seem to talk of a risk based approach as if it 
represents an entire perspective or framework of governance; in other cases it is used 
much more loosely to refer to an ad hoc scenario involving the piecemeal adoption of 
risk based tools and an uneven use of the language and rhetoric of risk. (2005, p. 3)  
Such varied perceptions are evidenced in the Commission’s regulator survey — 
many regulators claiming to adopt a risk based approach are using methods that are 






not highly structured or formalised. Although 70 per cent of regulators said they had 
adopted a risk based approach, of these: 
• over half did not make the details of this approach available to business 
• 85 per cent did not monitor the costs imposed on businesses — an important 
aspect of ensuring compliance costs are proportionate to the risks a business 
poses 
• 56 per cent did not give enforcement officers discretion in choosing the severity 
of sanctions used following a compliance breach. 
From these responses, it appears that there is considerable scope for many 
regulators to implement more effective, formalised risk based approaches, including 
more explicit consideration of the compliance costs imposed on businesses and 
opportunities to reduce those costs.  
A structured risk based approach would include the six elements discussed above as 
part of an explicit framework. In particular, a more formal approach to the elements 
1–4 discussed above (identifying and prioritising risk) is essential to ensuring an 
effective allocation of resources. At a minimum, a risk based approach should entail 
the use of technical risk based tools, emerging out of economics (cost benefit 
approaches) and science (risk assessment techniques) (Hutter 2005). 
Hood et al. (2001) refer to the use of such tools and techniques as a move away 
from informal, qualitatively based standard setting towards a ‘cost benefit analysis 
culture’ and a more calculative and formalised approach.  
Conversely, a non–structured approach means that a regulator may not collect 
information to assign risk based scores or ranks, enforce compliance or otherwise 
behave in a way that is consistent and defensible, which can result in criticism of 
the regulator (such as was the case with the APVMA, box D.3). An unstructured 
approach is unlikely to reliably address risks in the most efficient manner, and may 
consequently reduce the net benefits possible from the adopting of a risk based 
approach. In fact, the OECD (2010, p. 96) identified that: 
One of the most important issues facing legislators and risk regulators today is the 
move away from the ad hoc rules of the past, towards more inclusive and logically 
defensible principles. 
   






Box D.3 Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority  
A submission from the Hills Orchard Improvement Group (sub. 9) criticised the 
APVMA’s approach, which they considered to be inconsistent, indefensible and non–
consultative. 
A Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry’s (DAFF 2011a, 2011b) review of 
the APVMA also found numerous problems and criticised the agency’s regulatory 
approach. The problems identified by DAFF appear to be due to both the enabling 
legislation and the conduct of the regulator. DAFF found that: 
• The existing basis for the APVMA’s decisions is not sufficiently clear and the current 
approach lacks flexibility. A one–size–fits–all approach appears to be used for all 
applications and there is a limited ability in the APVMA’s existing framework to 
match regulatory effort to risk. 
• Applications must be assessed against all parts of subsection 14(3) of the Agvet 
code, which describes what the APVMA must consider in deciding whether to grant 
or refuse an application; regardless of the risk the product poses. This can impose 
unnecessary data requirements on applicants. 
DAFF also found that the lack of clear process means applications must be made 
without a complete understanding of the APVMA’s approach to assessing risk. This 
makes it difficult to address application requirements and can result in lengthy delays 
and additional costs. These delays affect the ability of businesses to plan production 
and marketing and limit opportunities for innovation. 
• The lack of a consistent transparent risk based approach acts as a disincentive for 
investment and has been identified as a possible reason why important ‘agvet’ 
chemicals registered overseas have not been registered in Australia. 
Recognising these concerns, the government recently amended the legislation 
governing the APVMA to: 
• make clear that the APVMA is to take a risk based approach to delivering regulation 
• remove unnecessary legislative constraints on the capacity of the APVMA to 
implement flexible and responsive approaches 
• enhance consistency and transparency by publishing the principles for how the 
APVMA is to assess and manage chemical risks and application requirements 
 
Sources: DAFF (2011a, 2011b).  
A risk based approach as part of a net benefit framework 
A well designed risk based approach should be used within an explicit net benefit 
framework. When applied in this way, a risk based approach is not just a simple 
guide to deployment of regulatory resources, but rather determines the optimal 
regulatory strategy that maximises net benefits to the community. Such an approach 
seeks to align the allocation of regulatory resources and the consequent compliance 
costs for businesses to the risks presented by the actions of businesses and the 






benefits of reducing these risks (box D.4). Regulatory activities involve an 
‘opportunity cost’, so economic efficiency requires that resources be allocated to 
alleviating risks where there is the greatest net benefit to society. 
For instance, while reducing a risk may yield large gross benefits, the costs of 
intervention may also be large — including the cost and resources involved in 
identifying and measuring risks and classifying businesses, whether borne by the 
regulator or the businesses they administer.  
 
Box D.4 Considerations in a net benefit framework 
• The benefits from avoiding or reducing risks 
• The compliance costs for business stemming from provision of information and from 
enforcement activities — particularly those associated with inspections and 
reporting requirements, which may disproportionately affect small business 
• The costs (benefits) associated with any decrease (increase) in competition from 
regulation 
• The administration costs for regulators in identifying and mitigating risks 




Failure to account for the cost imposed on businesses can result in unnecessary 
costs for businesses that are not commensurate with the benefits of the action taken, 
for example: 
• The NSW Small Business Commissioner (sub. 12) advised of one case where, 
after a random inspection discovered an inadvertent breach, a small business was 
to be closed for up to six weeks while the regulator granted a missing regulatory 
requirement. However, after the Commissioner contacted the regulator, the 
licence was able to be granted within 24 hours. Without such assistance from the 
Commissioner, the actions of the regulator could have had an unnecessarily 
detrimental impact on the small business concerned.  
Both Australian and international regulatory oversight bodies and regulators have 
recognised the need to account for regulatory burdens in their approach to 
delivering regulation: 
• The Australian National Audit Office’s (2007, p. 56) Better Practice Guide to 
administering regulation states that ‘A regulator should also consider the cost 
burden the monitoring strategy is likely to place on regulated entities. Where 
possible, the strategy’s design should aim to minimise these costs, without 
undermining the regulator’s capacity to effectively monitor compliance’. 
   





• The UK Government’s (2005) Hampton Review argued that ‘a proper analysis 
of risk should … enable them [regulators] to reduce the administrative burden of 
regulation, while maintaining or even improving regulatory outcomes’ (p. 1) and 
that ‘regulators should recognise that a key element of their activity will be to 
allow, or even encourage, economic progress.’ (p. 7) 
Advantages of using a net benefit framework 
A key advantage of using net benefit analysis as the basis for decision making is 
that it provides a clear and objective framework that encourages consistency in 
decision making (Office of Best Practice Regulation 2013; OECD 2010). In 
addition to creating better decisions, consistency facilitates communication with 
business, among experts and regulators, and between experts, regulators and policy 
makers. It can also facilitate accountability and enable businesses and society to 
accept the best rational trade offs by providing a clear presentation of both sides of 
the cost benefit equation. 
Using a net benefits framework should mitigate the potential tendency of regulators 
— caused, in large part, by their traditional role as purely enforcers of legal 
compliance — to adopt an overly ‘safe’ approach and attempt to reduce a particular 
risk beyond the point where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. This is 
because using a net benefit framework to choose between alternative regulatory 
approaches can give regulators considerable flexibility in how to prioritise 
regulatory objectives and resources, based on an assessment of risk to achieving 
regulatory outcomes. This flexibility means regulators are able to pursue any policy 
that allows them to address risks to their objectives. 
For instance, when considering the net benefits of a regulatory action, a regulator 
may decide not to intervene at all due to the limited benefits of doing so (potentially 
the case where businesses present low risks) or the high costs imposed, or to 
consider reducing the costs for business in other ways (examples in box D.5) where 
such actions would not be detrimental to regulatory objectives.  
Furthermore, using an objective driven, flexible approach does not mean regulators 
are precluded from using blanket, purely prescriptive techniques such as random 
inspections and minimum standards — it simply means that any regulatory tool 
used is deployed with an objective in mind, rather than because a rule specifies its 
use. A regulator may choose to employ a purely ‘outcomes based’ system; a 
traditional prescriptive style system with a heavy focus on inspections and 
standards; or a mixture of both systems — what is important is that the tools used 
optimally address the risks posed by regulated businesses, based on an analysis of 
their costs and benefits. 







Box D.5 Reducing costs imposed on regulated entities 
• The UK’s Office of Fair Trading (OFT) accepted an upfront cost to regulated entities 
in an attempt to reduce compliance costs in the future. The OFT requires licence 
applicants to give a significant amount of information, on the basis this will give it the 
data it needs in order to refine its risk based approach in the future (OECD 2010). 
• The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) bases its audit 
frequency for fish exporters on an establishment’s compliance history and the level 
of risks with the products produced, using the frequency matrix below. Audit 
frequency in this matrix is measured in months (Australian Quarantine and 
Inspection Service 2009). 









 A B C D 
Low 12 6 4 2 
Medium 9 5 3 1.5 
High 6 4 2 1 
• The Commission understands that the Queensland Building Services Authority uses 
a business’s compliance with financial requirements as an indicator of overall 
regulatory compliance (BSA 2012). This potentially allows the BSA to use financial 
non–compliance as a basis to better target its technical site audits and reduce costs 
for compliant businesses. For example, a business may be found to be financially 
non–compliant or have a record of not paying subcontractors — the Authority could 
then target this business for a technical audit, since a business with poor financial 
and business practices is more likely to be technically non–compliant too. 
• AUSTRAC exempts small businesses with fewer than five employees from paying 
AUSTRAC’s supervisory levy. Even if a small business undertakes an activity where 
it is required to lodge a transaction report, they are not billed if the resultant levy is 
less than $100. 
Sources: OECD (2010); Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (2009); BSA (2012); AUSTRAC 
website.  
 
Varied risks will mean varied implementation 
Regulators in different industries face different types of risks and priorities when 
balancing these risks, so require different approaches. Regulators adopting a risk 
based approach could be expected to use an escalation model of enforcement 
(chapter 4), meaning the severity of an enforcement action would correspond to the 
severity of risks presented by an identified breach (box D.6). 
   






Box D.6 Escalating enforcement in a risk based approach 
• AUSTRAC takes a conciliatory approach to innocent breaches of compliance and 
may first encourage businesses to rectify identified faults (under the threat of 
penalty). 
• The ATO’s involvement with low risk businesses is generally focused on targeted 
communication, providing education materials and sending compliance notification 
letters. The ATO has a preference for assisting businesses to ‘nurture willing 
participation’ and only uses harsh measures when non–compliance is systemic or 
deliberate. 
– For example, during one audit, a taxpayer made a voluntary disclosure at the 
commencement of the interview that they had incorrectly claimed $500 000 as 
repairs and maintenance. The disclosure led to an 80 per cent remission in 
penalties (Hayes 2012). 
• The ACCC determines enforcement actions on a case by case basis that takes into 
consideration the alleged contravention, the business involved and the impact of the 
breach. 
(a) Where breaches are low risk, particularly where they are inadvertent, the 
ACCC may accept an administrative resolution where the business agrees to 
conditions to rectify the situation. 
(b) Infringement notices are issued where more formal sanctions are needed, but 
where the matter can be resolved quickly without legal proceedings that can be 
costly to small business — generally speaking, an infringement notice will not 
be considered unless the breach is serious enough that the ACCC would be 
likely to seek a court–based resolution should the recipient choose not to pay. 
(c) A court enforceable undertaking requires a business to go on the public 
record and agree to remedy harm they have caused, accept responsibility and 
review their compliance programs. Businesses are allowed to tailor some 
elements of their undertaking to reflect their size and available resources 
(particularly compliance program design). Small business programs are less 
onerous and able to be undertaken without necessarily seeking external advice 
from compliance professionals. 
(d) Court action is only taken when conduct is particularly egregious. 
Sources: ACCC (sub. 26); ATO website; AUSTRAC (sub. 30); Hayes (2012).  
 
Even within similar regulatory areas, regulators might need to base their 
enforcement approach on business/industry specific factors such as size, a business’ 
compliance history, the ease of detecting breaches, the probability and detriment 
caused by breaches and the resources available to the regulator. Consequently, one 
could expect that no two regulators would be using precisely the same approach. 
For example, an aviation regulator works within a relatively narrow and specific 
area with potentially catastrophic risks, whereas an environmental regulator may 






work with thousands of businesses, many of whom may, individually, pose 
negligible risks. A low risk area may only require a focus on low impact 
information gathering tools, education, warnings and small civil penalties and have 
little need for large pecuniary or criminal penalties. In contrast, a high risk area may 
have intensive information gathering tools with a heavy reliance on inspections 
under the threat of substantial penalties.  
Varied implementation, the evolving nature of risk and the difficulty in measuring 
the effectiveness of a risk based approach means assessing what constitutes ‘best’ 
practice, even within a particular industry (such as food safety, section D.3), can be 
a significant challenge. In particular, good practice should not be seen as a ‘box 
ticking’ exercise — such an approach discourages continuous improvement and is 
likely to be disconnected from regulatory outcomes on the ground. Rather, good 
practice requires a systematic underlying framework that attempts to adapt 
regulatory behaviour to suit the circumstances of particular regulators.  
Given this challenge of identifying best practice, the examples in this appendix 
should only be considered as being indicative of the broad principles of a good risk 
based approach, and not as the ‘best’ practice in Australia or their respective 
regulatory areas. 
When is a risk based approach most beneficial? 
Where the risks presented by different businesses are diverse (for example, in 
taxation, environmental regulation and consumer law), it is clear that a risk based 
approach can result in substantial societal gains. Although the gains of such an 
approach may seem less apparent where risks are more homogeneous (that is, 
businesses are primarily only high or low risk), a risk based approach is still the 
appropriate method to guide the compliance and enforcement practices of 
regulators. 
Low risk businesses 
Where a regulator is primarily dealing with low risk businesses, it is still important 
to consider the costs imposed on regulated entities and ensure these costs are 
proportionate to the low risks businesses present: 
• For example, the National Measurement Institute (NMI) adopts a risk based 
approach even when enforcing compliance with trade measurement standards 
among businesses (a very low risk area). NMI engages in field visits to business 
premises to inform them of their obligations and adopts a conciliatory approach 
   





to non–compliance, using an educative approach to ensure future compliance 
(DIISRTE, sub. 18). 
If a regulator does not realise the limited benefits and potentially high costs of 
reducing low risks, they may impose unnecessary costs on regulated businesses 
themselves — resulting in an efficiency loss (a net loss or reduced net gain) to 
society (such as was the case with Primesafe Victoria, box D.7). 
 
Box D.7 Primesafe Victoria and the yabby industry 
An inquiry by the Victorian Parliament (2013) found that Primesafe took a non–risk 
based and ‘adversarial approach’ to licensing in the yabby industry. It found: 
The testing requirements for yabbies were in excess of those required for higher risk 
foods such as oysters and mussels. 
• These requirements were not based on risk or scientific evidence and were not 
required by any other state or the Commonwealth. 
This approach was taken even though yabbies are considered by Food Standards 
Australia New Zealand as a low risk food. 
• The inquiry concluded that this approach went ‘against a High Order Principle of the 
Legislative and Government Forum on Food Regulation, namely that the Primary 
Production and Processing Standards should ‘provide a regulatory framework that 
applies only to the extent justified by market failure’ (p. 111). 
Evidence suggests that the cost of these requirements made Victoria’s yabby industry 
‘uncompetitive compared with the rest of Australia’ (p. 108). 
• The Victorian yabby industry went from 60 producers licensed for human 
consumption down to zero in a few years. 
Source: Parliament of Victoria (2013, pp. 107–11).  
 
In regulatory areas presenting comparatively low risks overall, it may in fact be net 
beneficial to more efficiently target risks through further subdividing of risk 
categories. This can avoid the potential tendency for a regulator to adopt a ‘lowest 
common denominator’ style approach and allow for the use of strategies such as 
permitting very low risk businesses to self–regulate. This is apparent in the area of 
food safety (section D.3), where regulators have broken down comparatively low 
risk businesses into further risk categories, including on the basis of the type of food 
prepared, intended use (such as in hospitals), compliance history and more 
complicated systems involving a combination these factors. 






High risk businesses 
Where a regulator is primarily dealing with businesses whose activities present 
potentially catastrophic risks, a risk based approach can certainly help ensure a 
thorough understanding of these risks and their consequences. A risk based 
approach can also be used to determine whether it is appropriate to treat all 
businesses with the same level of caution, or whether even primarily high risk 
businesses can be appropriately broken down into additional risk categories.  
Adopting a risk based approach when dealing with high risk businesses can thereby 
give rise to the same kind of benefits as adopting this approach with low risk 
businesses: ensuring costs are proportionate to the potentially varied risks presented 
by businesses and avoiding imposing unnecessary costs by facilitating more 
efficient targeting of resources. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is a 
regulator that deals with such primarily higher risks, and has still adopted a risk 
based approach (box D.8).  
Exceptions 
One potential exception where a risk based approach would not result in substantial 
societal gains, might be areas where any consideration of risks will not need to be as 
extensive as described above. This exception might apply to regulators that oversee 
fairly homogeneous businesses, such as accreditation bodies for specific 
professions. However, even this type of regulatory body should account for the 
costs it imposes on regulated entities. This type of regulatory area would likely be 
better suited to the use of minimum standards or ‘deemed to comply’ checklists 
(chapter 3), rather than a particularly complicated framework. 
   






Box D.8 CASA’s risk based approach 
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has a formal risk based framework that 
broadly resembles the elements of a risk based approach discussed above. These 
steps include, in order: 
1. Establish the context for the risk assessment. The process of identification of risk 
and the criteria against which risk will be evaluated should be defined at this stage. 
The overall objective for the assessment needs to be established.  
2. Identify the aviation safety risks that need to be addressed. 
3. Assess and evaluate the safety risks for sources of likelihood and consequences 
and determine the level of risks using the Risk Analysis Table (below) as a guide. 
4. Determine what kind and what level of risk mitigation is required. Non–regulatory 
approaches (e.g. education, advisory material) may be sufficient to address the 
issue without regulatory intervention. 
Later steps also include: 
• explicitly considering the ‘costs and benefits of each regulatory option’ 
• establishing ‘which regulatory solution has the greatest net benefit and results in the 
most efficient use of industry and CASA resources’ 
• identifying ‘any residual risks and issues that may require further analysis’. 
Consequences  
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Likely Moderate High High Extreme Extreme 
Moderate Low Moderate High Extreme Extreme 
Unlikely Low Low Moderate High Extreme 
Rare Low Low Low High High 







Fatality GA/  
1–5/hull loss 
Fatality LCAT/ 6–
14/ hull loss 
Fatality HCAT/ 
























Fatality >30/ hull 
loss 
Other possibilities Lack of safety 





practice — no 
immediate 
threat to 
aircraft, lack of 
safety data 
Breach of 























Loss of critical 
system, 
immediate threat 
to aircraft, aircraft 
accident, loss of 
aircraft, applies 





Source: CASA (2011).  
 






D.3 Case study: Food safety and varied implementation 
Food safety is an area of regulation that demonstrates substantial variation in its 
implementation across different states. The variations in risk based approaches in 
this area provide a useful example of how the principles of good practice can be met 
by different means; whereas which approach, if any, is ‘best’ practice can remain 
unclear. Food safety policies in New South Wales, Victoria and Brisbane are 
examined below. 
First, it is necessary to note that Food Standards Australia New Zealand 
(FSANZ 2001) has developed a risk based ‘priority classification system for food 
businesses’ (box D.9).1 This system is intended as a reference for enforcement 
agencies to allow them to explain the risk factors used to classify businesses. 
However, each state regulatory agency is free to modify this system or institute their 
own, while enforcement is generally under the purview of local councils. This 
results in the varied implementation of food safety regulation seen in Australia, 
although all these systems contain the elements of a good risk based approach. 
 
Box D.9 Food Standards Australia New Zealand classification system 
• FSANZ provides a classification system for food businesses that is based upon a 
scoring system it developed. Trials of this system indicated that its use produced 
consistent classification of food businesses. 
• Businesses are classified as high, medium or low risk depending on their score. 
– Their score is determined by factors such as food type and intended use (ready–
to–eat or not), activities of the food business (food handling, whether the 
business is a catering business and risk level of the food), method of processing 
and whether the business is a small business. 
• FSANZ considers this system may be used to individually classify businesses if 
appropriate and is meant to inform food safety program implementation 
requirements and initial audit frequency. 
– Audit frequency can then be adjusted according to performance in later audits 
(within a range set by the risk classification of the business). 
• While this classification system could be considered good practice in terms of its 
use of a risk based approach, some states have heavily modified the FSANZ 
system or implemented their own risk based approaches, all of which reflect the 
broad principles of good regulatory practice to ranging extents. 
Source: FSANZ (2001). 
 
 
                                              
1  FSANZ is an independent statutory agency that develops and administers the Australia New 
Zealand Food Standards Code. In Australia, FSANZ has broader coverage and also prepares 
standards across the food supply chain — although it does not have an enforcement role. 
   





New South Wales 
The NSW Food Authority’s (NSWFA) risk based approach is prescribed in its 
enabling legislation. The Food Act 2003 (s93) requires that the NSWFA (2010b) 
determine ‘the priority classification of individual food businesses’ for purposes 
‘relating to food safety programs and the frequency of auditing’. This legislation 
affords considerable discretion to the NSWFA in its interpretation of regulatory 
outcomes and resulting policies. 
The NSWFA (2011) uses the FSANZ scoring system as one element within its own 
risk based approach (figure D.3). Food businesses are first classified into four risk 
prioritisation categories, using the national food safety risk profiling framework 
available from the Department of Health and Ageing (2007).  
• Priority 1–2 businesses are required to undergo audits and implement food safety 
programs, while priority 3–4 businesses are exempt. 
• Audits then use the same scoring system the FSANZ developed for risk 
prioritisation to rate businesses as acceptable (A, B), marginal (C) or 
unacceptable (D, E).  
The priority classification and the rating from the most recent audit are combined to 
inform the frequency of audits, shown in figure D.3 below.  
Figure D.3 NSWFA audit frequency matrix 
. 
Food business rating Priority 1 Priority 2 
A 12 months 24 months 
B 6 months 12 months 
C 3 months 6 months 
 





D or E 1 month 
Remain on 1 monthly 
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enforcement action 
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Source: NSWFA (2011). 
After classification, the NSWFA (2010a) uses a graduated approach to enforcement 
and has a wide array of enforcement tools. These tools are designed to be used in a 
manner that is proportionate to the identified non–compliance and range from 
warning letters and improvement notices to licence suspension and prosecution. 






It should be noted that all NSW councils have been formally appointed as 
enforcement agencies under the Food Act 2003, and the adoption of this escalating 
enforcement policy by these councils is not mandatory (NSWFA, sub. 28). The 
success of this approach is thus dependent on the quality of training council officers 
receive and their enforcement culture. There is therefore potentially room for 
improvement in regulatory practice, since individual council officers may not 
always apply this policy.  
Victoria 
After extensive amendments to the Victorian Food Act (1984) in 2010, the 
Victorian Department of Health (2011) now uses a risk based approach that does 
not incorporate any specific elements of the FSANZ system. Foregoing a scoring 
system, Victorian food businesses are classified into one of four predetermined risk 
based tiers based almost entirely on the type of food they prepare (with some 
consideration of whether they serve high risk groups, such as in hospitals). As in 
NSW, the lower two tiers are exempted from undergoing audits and implementing a 
food safety program (FSP). 
• Class 1 businesses undergo an annual audit of their FSP by an approved auditor, 
who informs the relevant local council of any deficiencies. These businesses also 
undergo separate annual assessment from their local council for compliance with 
both FSP requirements and food safety standards. 
• Class 2 businesses may either develop their own independent FSP and be 
audited annually in the same way as Class 1 businesses; or use a Department of 
Health registered standard FSP and only undergo the latter annual assessment 
from their local council. 
By using predetermined risk based categories, the Victorian system appears simpler, 
and therefore less costly than the more complicated NSW or FSANZ systems. 
However, there does not appear to be any formal allowance to adjust this system, 
such as linking the frequency of audits to a business’ compliance history. This is 
arguably a weakness of the enabling Victorian legislation. However, it is unclear 
whether this considerably alters the system’s effectiveness, and Victoria’s risk 
based categories and FSP and audit processes remain indicative of good practice. 
Brisbane City Council 
While the Queensland Department of Health (2006) specifies when a business does 
not require a licence, most other regulatory practices are the responsibility of local 
councils.  
   





The Brisbane City Council (BCC 2010, 2012, p. 49) gives businesses a star rating 
(0, 2, 3, 4 or 5 stars). 
• Four and five star businesses can undertake self–audits, reducing costs. 
• Businesses with three stars or higher can choose to publicly display their star 
rating and be promoted on a BCC website. 
• Licensing fees are substantially reduced for businesses with higher star ratings. 
These star ratings are based on a combination of compliance practice (based on 44 
criteria), rated A–E, and good management practice (based on 13 criteria), rated 
A-D. These scores are combined in a matrix to determine a star rating (figure D.4). 
Figure D.4 Brisbane City Council star rating matrix 
 











Rating A B C D E 
A 5 4 4 2 0 
B 4 4 3 2 0 
C 4 3 3 2 0 
D 3 3 3 2 0 
 
 
Source: BCC (2010). 
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E Cumulative burden on small business 
Small businesses are typically subject to a myriad of regulations, which, taken 
together, contribute to the cumulative burden of regulation that they are subject to. 
While the cumulative burden of regulation should be expected to vary with the risk 
that a business’s activities pose, concerns about the level of cumulative burdens 
have been raised by businesses across a broad range of activities and regulatory 
areas. Whilst regulations are implemented to meet various social objectives, and a 
burdensome regulation may be justified if it is necessary to meet those objectives, 
regulatory requirements should be subject to periodic review, with the aim of 
reducing any unnecessary regulatory burdens — including those arising from 
duplication of, or inconsistency between, regulations. 
To comply with regulations, most businesses deal with several or many government 
agencies, potentially at different levels of government. Better coordination of 
engagement by regulatory agencies may provide scope to alleviate some of the 
regulatory burden imposed on small businesses. 
In addition to the general regulatory burdens faced by small businesses in any 
industry, businesses must comply with further regulations specific to their industry. 
The burden of these will vary considerably between types of businesses — some 
businesses may face relatively few additional regulations, while other sectors are 
heavily regulated. To illustrate the extent of regulations facing some businesses, the 
additional regulatory burden for two different types of business — a winery and a 
residential builder — are briefly summarised in this appendix. 
E.1 General regulatory burdens on small business 
The key regulatory burdens on small business that are not activity specific primarily 
relate to issues around taxation and obligations with respect to employees, but there 
are also others including financial reporting, and various requirements that mainly 
impact on businesses at start up or during an expansion of activities, such as 
business registrations and development applications. The extent of the burden of 
these on a business is typically related to factors such as a business’s structure, 
turnover and number of employees, rather than the industry in which a business 






operates. In particular, the 61 per cent of small businesses that are non employing 
would be automatically exempt from some of the general regulatory requirements. 
Key taxation obligations include: 
• Income tax — Businesses are required to maintain records and submit tax returns 
to the Australian Tax Office (ATO). The regulatory burden of this is likely to 
vary depending on the structures used for business. For example, a business may 
be operated as a sole trader, partnership, company, trust or some permutation of 
these. 
• Goods and services tax (GST) — Most businesses are required to charge GST on 
their sales and collect the revenue on behalf of government. Through business 
activity statements, businesses are required to report and pay their GST liability 
to the ATO. These statements are completed on either a monthly, quarterly or 
annual basis depending on a business’s turnover and some other eligibility 
criteria.  
• Pay as you go (PAYG) withholding — Businesses that have employees are 
required to withhold a portion of payments to these employees. Employers are 
required to report and send all withheld amounts to the ATO. 
• Fringe benefits tax (FBT) — Businesses that provide fringe benefits to 
employees or associates are required to pay FBT and submit a return to the 
ATO. 
• Payroll tax — This is a state tax that is levied on the wage bill of businesses who 
pay out wages in excess of a threshold, and collected by state revenue offices. 
While there has been some harmonisation of payroll tax and non-employing and 
many micro businesses would qualify for exemptions, the thresholds and rates 
still vary by jurisdiction (Victoria has the lowest threshold — the annual 
threshold above which payroll tax applies is a gross wage bill (includes 
payments such as super) of $550 000). 
Key employment obligations include: 
• Industrial relations — Employment of staff is regulated under the Fair Work Act 
2009. The Fair Work Commission is the national tribunal that deals with a range 
of issues, including setting minimum wages, enterprise bargaining and industrial 
disputes. The Fair Work Ombudsman provides information on employment 
obligations and investigates workplace complaints. There are a range of 
regulatory requirements surrounding the employment of staff. Under the 
National Employment Standards there are 10 minimum entitlements that apply 
to staff (although not all of these apply to casual staff). There are also different 
awards that apply to staff. Dismissing staff is also heavily regulated and there are 
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specific obligations that need to be met, although there are some concessions in 
the unfair dismissal regulations for small businesses. 
• Superannuation — Employers are required to forward employees’ super 
entitlements to their nominated super fund on a periodic basis. 
• Worker health and safety (WHS) — Employers have WHS obligations to their 
employees. WHS is regulated and enforced by state work safety agencies, but 
there is an intergovernmental agreement between the Commonwealth, state and 
territory governments to harmonise WHS regulations. While there are general 
obligations that apply to all employers, there are additional requirements in 
higher risk areas, with training and accreditation required to undertake specified 
activities. 
– Employers are also required to pay workers’ compensation insurance 
premiums. 
Other general regulatory requirements that may impact on small businesses include: 
• Financial reporting — Small businesses with more complex business structures 
are subject to more onerous financial reporting obligations. For instance, a 
business operating through a company structure has additional reporting 
obligations to the Australian Investments and Securities Commission (ASIC), 
that do not apply to businesses operated as, say, a sole trader. 
• Business registrations — There can be a range of regulatory obligations 
associated with starting a business. For instance, under the new national business 
name registration system, business names need to be registered with ASIC. 
Businesses have reported difficulties and delays in registering names since the 
commencement of the national system. 
• Planning and development — In starting up or expanding a business, it may be 
necessary to lodge a development application or seek consent to construct new 
infrastructure or undertake a business activity at a given location. In addition to 
the business premises itself, planning and development requirements can cover 
aspects such as vehicle access to the property, car parking, hours of operation 
and noise levels. Development consent is usually granted by local governments. 
E.2 Case study — a winery 
There are a range of activities that winery businesses may encompass, including: 
• grape growing 
• wine production and bottling 






• wine sales — retail, wholesale and export 
• ancillary cellar door activities, such as a café. 
To undertake this range of activities, a winery would need to comply with a range 
of different regulations (beyond the generic regulatory requirements that apply to all 
businesses). The potential number of licences, approvals, or other regulatory 
obligations that such a business might face varies by jurisdiction is illustrated in 
table E.1.  
Table E.1 Potential number of licences required for a winerya 
 NSW Vic Qld WA Tas ACT 
Commonwealth 45 45 45 45 45 45 
State 25 43 72 86 28 31 
Localb 6 10 5 8   
a Based on a search of licences for the ANZSIC categories: grape growing (A0131); fruit and vegetable 
processing (C1140); wine and other alcoholic beverage manufacturing (C1214); pubs, taverns and bars 
(H4520); scientific testing and analysis services (M6925); packaging services (N7320); and cafes, restaurants 
& takeaway food services (H451). May include licences for some activities unrelated to a particular winery. 
‘Licence’ includes various accreditations, approvals, permits and codes. Data not available for South Australia 
or Northern Territory, or for Tasmania local government requirements. b This is the total local government 
licences for each state divided by the number of local governments in that state (155 in NSW; 79 in Vic; 73 in 
Qld; 138 in WA). 
Source: Commission estimates based on data from Stenning & Associates. 
An important point to note is that wineries are subject to a range of national and 
state regulations, which are enforced by all levels of government. While the exact 
regulatory requirements, the way they are administered, and hence, the extent of the 
compliance burden, will vary by jurisdiction, in general, some of the key 
compliance obligations are likely to include the following. It is important to note 
that many of these regulations are applied at the request of the grape growing or 
wine industry. 
Grape growing  
• Chemical use — Agricultural chemical use is regulated for both environmental 
and health and safety reasons. Chemicals must be registered for use by the 
Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA). Users 
must comply with label directions for use, including dosage rates, withholding 
periods, storage and disposal. To purchase and use some chemicals, growers are 
required to be certified, requiring completion of training. 
• Irrigation — Extraction of irrigation water is subject to licensing in most cases 
and is regulated by state authorities, such as an office for water, within a primary 
industry, environment, or natural resource department. Trade in water 
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entitlements is permitted, subject to regulatory restrictions, for some water 
sources in some regions. Users may also be subject to compliance tools, such as 
metering requirements and may require approval for particular irrigation works 
or practices.  
• Quarantine — Growers are subject to various movement restrictions on 
grapevines, grape products and equipment. These are imposed to reduce the 
threat of the spread of pests and diseases, particularly phylloxera — an insect 
pest that infects grapevines. Domestic quarantine zones are regulated by state 
primary industry authorities, while the importation of material is also regulated 
by the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry. 
• Levies — The Grape Research Levy (currently $2 per tonne of fresh grape 
equivalent), is payable on fresh and dried grapes and grape juice delivered to a 
processing facility. The grape producer is liable for the levy, but it is collected 
and forwarded to the Levies Revenue Service (in the Australian Government 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry) by the grape processor. In the 
case of a winery processing its own grapes, it would be required to forward the 
levy. 
Wine production  
• Food standards — Wine production in Australia is governed by Standard 4.5.1 
of the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code, which is administered by 
Food Standards Australia New Zealand. The standard governs the composition 
of wine, including the use of additives and processing aids.  
• Labelling — Producers are required to include information on wine labels 
related to: product designation, alcohol content, number of standard drinks, 
allergens statement, product volume, country of origin and the address of the 
producer. For some of these, there are further prescriptions surrounding the 
wording, placement or size of the statement on the label. Vintage, variety and 
geographical claims are optional, but if made are also subject to specific 
requirements. Wine Labelling requirements are overseen by Wine Australia. 
– There is also a Label Integrity Program, which is meant to ensure the 
integrity of statements made about a wine’s vintage, variety or geographical 
indication. Producers are required to maintain appropriate records to 
substantiate label claims and provide a wine goods supply statement (Wine 
Australia 2013). 
• Levies — The Wine Grapes Levy (the levy includes a base amount plus a per 
tonne charge, both of which vary depending on the quantity processed by the 






winery) is paid by the owner of the grapes at the beginning of the wine making 
process. The levy payer is required to submit an annual return to the Levies 
Revenue Service by September 30 for the preceding financial year. 
Wine sales  
• Wine equalisation tax (WET) — WET is a value based tax of 29 per cent that is 
applied on the last wholesale sale of wine. WET is reported and paid through the 
business activity statement, as per GST. Wine producers can claim a wine 
producer rebate (which is counted as assessable income) equal to their WET 
payments, up to $500 000 per year.  
• Liquor licencing — In order to sell wine, wineries require a liquor licence issued 
by their state liquor licensing authority. The standard conditions of wine 
producer, or vigneron, licences vary between jurisdiction with respect to things 
such as the origin of the fruit or wine, limits on the sale of alcohol to the public, 
the provision of samples for tasting and the provision of wine with meals (see 
PC 2008). A licensee may also be required to do a responsible service of alcohol 
course, even if they do not operate a cellar door. 
• Export requirements — Shipments of wine over 100 litres (unless subject to an 
exemption, such as for household use or use as samples) require export approval 
from Wine Australia. There is a three step process for approval. First the 
exporter must have a licence to export. Licences are renewable annually and 
there is a yearly fee of $700. The granting of a licence is subject to criteria such 
as an applicant’s financial standing and any matters that may adversely affect the 
export trade. A licensee must then register products prior to export. To register a 
wine, the applicant must submit an analysis of the wine and provide 
compositional details (vintage, variety and geographical indication). Finally, 
exporters are required to obtain an export permit prior to shipping. In applying 
for the permit, the exporter must provide the shipping details, as well as the 
‘continuing approval numbers’ of the registered products in the shipment. Wine 
Australia advises that permit applications should be lodged 10 days before the 
departure date. There are further requirements for exports to the European 
Union, for bulk wine exports, or where organic claims are made (Wine 
Australia 2013). 
– Exported wine is also subject to the Wine Export Levy. The levy is charged 
as a percentage of the ‘free on board’ value of exported wine. Exporters are 
required to lodge a quarterly return with the Levies Revenue Service of the 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. 
• Transport — The operation of heavy vehicles is subject to a wide range of 
regulations, including driver licensing, mass limits and fatigue management 
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requirements (particularly for vehicles with a gross vehicle mass over 
12 tonnes). These are enforced by state road and traffic authorities (and the 
police). 
An onsite café 
• Food safety — Businesses that prepare or serve food are required to comply with 
food safety regulations. Depending on the jurisdiction , a café food business may 
need to either notify, register, or be licensed. Businesses are then required to 
comply with the national Food Standard Code, which sets out requirements for 
food premises, safety practices and general requirements, amongst others. There 
may also be additional requirements. For example, in New South Wales, a café 
must have an appointed Food Safety Supervisor (FFS), who holds a FSS 
certificate. These certificates are issued by registered training organisations, 
upon undertaking appropriating training (generally equivalent to one full day) 
and are valid for five years. Compliance with food safety regulatory obligations 
is enforced through inspection regimes. Food businesses may need to engage 
with multiple regulators as regulatory responsibility is, for some products and in 
some jurisdictions, shared between a state regulatory agency (such as the NSW 
Food Authority) and local councils. 
• Liquor licensing — The winery may need an additional endorsement to its liquor 
licence from the state liquor licensing authority if it serves alcohol with meals in 
a café. 
• Health and safety — Businesses also have obligations to non-employees, such as 
customers, to ensure they are not endangered by work environments or practices. 
E.3 Case study — residential builder 
Building is a relatively highly regulated industry. Builders and tradesmen are 
typically required to be licensed in order to undertake building works. They are 
subject to regulatory obligations in order to keep and maintain their licence. Further, 
many aspects of their work require ongoing compliance with regulatory 
requirements, with many building projects subject to development controls.  
The potential number of licences, accreditations, or other regulatory obligations that 
a residential builder might face varies by jurisdiction, as illustrated in table E.2. 






Table E.2 Potential number of licences required for a buildera 
 NSW Vic Qld WA Tas ACT 
Commonwealth 7 7 7 7 7 7 
State 24 47 42 89 31 40 
Localb 5 13 3 6   
a Based on a search of licences for the ANZSIC categories: residential building construction (E301); site 
preparation services (E3212); bricklaying services (E3222); roofing services (E3223); structural steel erection 
services (E3224); other building installation services (E3239); plastering and ceiling services (E3241); 
carpentry services (E3242); and glazing services (E3245). May include licences for some activities unrelated 
to a particular builder. ‘Licence’ includes various accreditations, approvals, permits and codes. Data not 
available for South Australia or Northern Territory, or for Tasmania local government requirements. b This is 
the total local government licences for each state divided by the number of local governments in that state 
(155 in NSW; 79 in Vic; 73 in Qld; 138 in WA). 
Source: Commission estimates based on data from Stenning & Associates. 
Building activities are subject to national standards and state regulations, with 
enforcement carried out by local governments and state authorities. 
While they vary by jurisdiction, some of the key types of compliance requirements 
that a residential builder may face are summarised below. 
Requirements of builders 
• Licensing — Licensing criteria can be based on elements including: training or 
competency; experience; personal and professional conduct; and financial 
resources. There can be differing arrangements for sole traders, partnerships and 
companies and these vary by jurisdiction. Licensing is administered by state 
authorities, such as consumer and fair trading agencies, or specific building 
authorities. 
– Home warranty insurance, which protects home owners in the case of non-
completion or faulty work, is also a condition of licensing.  
– There are some exemptions to licensing requirements. For example, in New 
South Wales, a licence is not required for jobs where the combined value of 
labour and materials is less than $1000, while home warranty insurance is not 
required for jobs under $20 000. And, in Western Australia, licensing is not 
required for individuals for work up to $20 000, provided the work doesn’t 
require the builder to apply for building permit from the council. 
• Customer contracts — Builders may be required to provide written contracts to 
customers for building jobs. In Victoria, for example, all jobs worth over $5000 
require a written contract. These are regulated by state consumer or fair trading 
agencies.  
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• National Construction Code (NCC) — The NCC (comprising the Building Code 
of Australia and the Plumbing Code of Australia) is a uniform set of technical 
provisions for the design and construction of buildings, which is overseen by the 
Australian Building Codes Board. It is referenced by the relevant legislation in 
each jurisdiction and sets the technical requirements that need to be met when 
undertaking building (or plumbing) work. With respect to the housing provisions 
of the NCC, there are over 60 Australian standards that are referenced covering 
specifications for building materials, uses and designs.  
– In complying with the code, a builder can either comply with the deemed-to-
satisfy provisions, or choose an alternate solution. Where an alternative 
solution is used, there needs to be evidence, using one of a number of 
assessment methods, that it meets performance requirements. 
– The NCC is amended and republished annually. Users are required to pay for 
access to each year’s code (currently about $200 for the housing provisions 
volume). 
• Worker health and safety (WHS) — While these apply to all businesses, these 
obligations are likely to be more onerous for relatively dangerous occupations, 
such as construction. For instance, there are over 20 codes of practice that are 
relevant to builders. There are also a range of licensing arrangements for various 
high risk activities, including asbestos removal, demolition, crane operation and 
scaffolding erection, as well as construction induction cards (which are required 
by those who access construction zones).  
Development processes 
• Development Approval processes — Prior to many building projects, 
development approval must be obtained. The compliance burden of planning and 
development controls fall on both homeowners and builders. Development 
applications (or building permits) for proposed building works need to be 
submitted, typically, to the local council. Applications need to comply with a 
range of planning, environmental and zoning regulations. A potential source of 
additional burden is that requirements may vary between local government 
areas, which each having their own environmental planning and development 
control regulations. 
– There may be further requirements to ensure construction is in accordance 
with development approvals. For example, in New South Wales, once 
development consent is obtained for a project, a construction certificate is 
required from council to verify that construction plans are in accordance with 
the building code and the conditions of consent. 






– There are some avenues for less onerous approval processes for certain 
developments. For example, South Australia has a residential development 
code where residential development proposals that meet a tick box 
assessment criteria will be approved with in ten days. Similarly, in New 
South Wales, some work can be approved under more streamlined procedures 
if it is classified as ‘complying development’. 
• Inspection regimes — Building works are subject to inspections at various stages 
of the construction process, by either a council, or private third party accredited 
certifier. Builders need to ensure that inspections are arranged at the designated 
stages, so that the certifier can issue an occupation certificate on completion. 
 





F Enforcement tools 
There is a range of enforcement tools potentially available to regulators when a 
regulatory breach is discovered. These tools can be classified into a number of 
categories:  
• Warnings 
• Public notifications 
• Enforceable undertakings 
• Trading restrictions 
• Pecuniary penalties 
• Court action. 
Some of these categories are relatively broad and encompass a spectrum of tools, 
while others include just one tool that has some more specific characteristics. 
Further, while warnings are typically the lowest level of enforcement tool, and 
prosecution through the courts is typically the most severe, the categories cannot be 
easily ranked in terms of severity, as the magnitude of the impacts of different 
enforcement tools will vary on a case-by-case basis. 
This appendix examines some of the key features of various enforcement tools, the 
extent of their use by Australian regulators, and some of the issues identified with 
their implementation. 
F.1 Warnings 
Warnings are typically the lowest level of enforcement where there is a breach of 
regulations. However, there is also variation in the nature of warnings. Warnings 
may be of a relatively informal, or educative, nature, aimed at providing 
information and advice to businesses to enable them to meet their compliance 
requirements and that failure to comply may result in further action. In this respect, 
there may be considerable overlap with regulators’ more general education 
programs (see chapter 5). 






Warnings may also be of a more formal nature, such as a written warning or 
improvement notice that requires a business to comply with a regulatory 
requirement within a specified period of time to avoid further action.  
Application by regulators 
As a group, warnings are the most commonly used enforcement tool. In the 
Commission’s regulator survey, the most cited enforcement tool used in response to 
compliance breaches was education on compliance, which was used either often, 
usually or always by the bulk of responding regulatory agencies (table F.1). While 
education is typically used to increase compliance and prevent breaches (chapter 5), 
remedial education, perhaps in the form of informal verbal warnings, would also 
appear to be a commonly used response to some identified compliance breaches by 
most regulators. Warning or improvement notices are also commonly used by many 
regulators, although there is a reasonable share of regulators for whom these, 
particularly improvement notices, were either not available or applicable. 
Table F.1 Regulator use of enforcement tools — warningsa 
Per cent of regulators using this enforcement tool 






Not available/applicable 3 15 33 
Never 2 3 7 
Rarely 5 23 15 
Often 25 35 30 
Usually 29 14 10 
Always 35 10 6 
a Based on responses from 190 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
While warnings are used by agencies across the range of regulatory areas, 
respondents indicating that they used warnings, often, usually or always were more 
commonly those administering regulations in the areas of environment protection, 
public health or safety, and financial or other professional services. 
Issues surrounding implementation 
Warnings can be cost effective and timely to administer, and provide an option for 
businesses to remedy compliance breaches, without the added sanction (such as a 
fine, or cessation of trade) of other enforcement options. 





While warnings may be ineffective in some situations, and in and of themselves do 
not impose a sanction for non-compliance, they typically form the basis of an 
escalating enforcement model where low level compliance breaches can be 
addressed with a proportionate response. An example of the greater use of warnings 
relative to more severe enforcement actions is demonstrated by the enforcement 
activities of councils against food businesses in New South Wales, where warning 
letters and improvement notices account for over 80 per cent of enforcement action 
(table F.2). The relatively small number of stronger enforcement actions suggests 
that in most cases a warning is sufficient to remedy compliance breaches. 
Table F.2 Enforcement action against food businesses in NSW 
1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 
Enforcement action Number 
Warning letters 7 108 
Improvement notices 1 246 
Penalty notices 1 714 
Seizures 31 
Prohibition orders 82 
Penalty notices — court elected 14 
Prosecutions 14 
Source: NSW Food Authority (2013c). 
One weakness of warnings is that they may be ineffective. This is a particular risk 
of verbal warnings. For instance, the NSW Food Authority notes that: 
Verbal warnings, as they are not accompanied by formal notification, are prone to 
improper documentation by the regulator and the business, or misinterpretation or 
being completely forgotten. Due to the informal nature of verbal warnings, it is 
suggested that they are only used for issues of a minor technical nature. 
(NSWFA 2013a, p. 11) 
F.2 Public notifications 
Public notification, or the ‘name and shame’ approach is a relatively specific 
method of enforcement where regulatory breaches are dealt with by publishing the 
identity of offenders. While the use of some other tools may result in the identity of 
offenders being publicly discoverable, in some cases, the public naming and 
shaming of offenders is an explicit objective.  






Application by regulators 
Public notification approaches do not appear to be commonly used by Australian 
regulators. In the Commission’s regulator survey, the majority of respondents 
indicated that the tool was not available to them or was never used. A further 
30 per cent reported that it was rarely used (table F.3). 
Table F.3 Regulator use of enforcement tools — public notificationsa 
Per cent of regulators using this enforcement tool 
 Name and shame 






a Based on responses from 190 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
Of those agencies reporting that they often, usually or always used the name and 
shame approach, most administered regulation in the areas of environment 
protection, fair trading, tenancy or consumer protection, public health or safety, 
gaming and racing, and liquor. While name and shame is an enforcement tool that is 
also used by some food safety regulators — including in NSW (NSW Food 
Authority, sub. 28) and the ACT (as noted by COSBOA, sub. 15 — see below) — 
its use in this area is not common in Australia. 
Issues surrounding implementation 
Public notification approaches are typically used where it is perceived to be in the 
public interest to be aware of regulatory breaches. For instance, the NSW Food 
Authority uses a name and shame approach in conjunction with penalty notices and 
prosecution, publishing the names of those who are fined or successfully 
prosecuted. The stated aim of the public register is to ‘make information on alleged 
breaches of food safety law available to consumers’ (NSWFA 2013b).  
In addition to public interest, there may be an additional deterrent effect of this 
enforcement tool, improving regulatory compliance, with the NSW Food Authority 
also submitting that:  
Additional leverage is provided by the Authority’s public penalty notice register which 
publishes penalty notices issued by the Authority and councils in relation to food safety 
breaches. The register is supported by a documented publication protocol and decision 





matrix to ensure that in all cases publication is permitted and meets the aims of the 
register. (NSW Food Authority, sub. 28, p. 12) 
However, there are concerns that there may be unintended adverse impacts from 
this approach. For example, COSBOA submits: 
Certainly the lowest form of regulation is naming and shaming individuals. Perhaps this 
has a place but it should be rarely used. If a business person is publicly humiliated it 
will affect their general health and the health of their employees and their families. 
(COSBOA, sub. 15, p. 4) 
COSBOA were particularly critical of the use of this enforcement option by the 
ACT Health Protection Service: 
The ACT Health Protection Service has embraced a name and shame culture in 
dealings with restaurants and cafes. They frequently close restaurants and cafes and go 
out of their way to make sure the owners are publicly humiliated … The agency seems 
to have the approach to regulation that the more closures and public humiliations that 
occur the more likely there will be compliance. Their approach has obviously failed yet 
they continue to use a process that is flawed.  
This is a regulator who notches closures onto its corporate belt and takes pride in their 
actions. It is obvious to anyone in business that this agency has no idea about 
communications, process, education or due diligence. (sub. 15, p. 8) 
Further, the impacts of name and shame actions may be highly variable and difficult 
to predict — the publication may have no discernible effect on the business, or it 
could precipitate business closure. Also, if the name and shame approach is applied 
in error, it may be very difficult to remedy the situation as the reputational damage 
will have been done. 
F.3 Enforceable undertakings 
Another relatively specific tool is an enforceable undertaking. Where a regulatory 
breach has been discovered, a regulator may accept an undertaking from the party to 
remedy the breach. Failure to perform the agreed actions can result in escalated 
enforcement action, including court action. 
As an example, the ACCC often resolves breaches through enforceable 
undertakings where the company or individual agrees to: 
• remedy the harm caused by the conduct 
• accept responsibility for their actions  
• establish or review and improve their trade practices compliance programs 
(sub. 26, p. 5).  






Application by regulators 
While enforceable undertakings do not appear to be very widely used, one quarter 
of respondents to the Commission’s regulator survey indicated that they use this 
enforcement approach often, usually or always (table F.4).  
Table F.4 Regulator use of enforcement tools — enforceable 
undertakingsa 
Per cent of regulators using this enforcement tool 
 Enforceable undertakings 






a Based on responses from 190 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
Respondents who indicated that they use enforceable undertakings often, usually or 
always covered a range of regulatory areas, with environment protection the most 
common.  
Issues surrounding implementation 
Enforceable undertakings allow regulators to tailor action to reflect the type or size 
of the business. For example, the ACCC submitted that it: 
… allows businesses to tailor some elements of their undertaking to reflect their size 
and available resources. For example, the ACCC would expect a large business to 
maintain a strong trade practices compliance program that includes a complaints 
handling system that complies with the relevant Australian Standard. On the other 
hand, it would be acceptable for a small business to maintain a more basic compliance 
program with a simpler complaints handling system that is nonetheless effective. 
(sub. 26, p. 5) 
Similarly, the National Measurement Institute notes that enforceable undertakings 
can provide a broader compliance outcome compared to prosecution: 
Enforceable undertakings allow more flexibility and broader outcomes than those 
available through prosecutions. Successful prosecutions lead to convictions where the 
outcome is limited to a criminal record and/or a fine. On the other hand, enforceable 
undertakings can provide a range of solutions tailored to particular circumstances of 
non-compliance within a single remedy. (National Measurement Institute 2011, p. 7)  





There have been some concerns expressed about the procedural fairness of 
enforceable undertakings, where the procedures followed by regulators in accepting 
undertakings have not been properly specified. Also, enforceable undertakings are a 
form of negotiated settlement between the parties, but there may be considerable 
inequality in bargaining power between a business and the regulator (Nehme 2010).  
F.4 Trading restrictions 
There are a range of enforcement tools available to regulators that involve 
restrictions on a business’s activity. Most commonly, this may involve the 
suspension or cancelling of any licences or permits required to undertake activities 
if the conditions of the licence or permit are breached. An alternative form is 
negative licensing, where a licence or permit is not required to undertake a given 
activity, but compliance breaches can result in a business being excluded from a 
market or subject to restrictions in undertaking the activity in the future. Product 
recalls and seizures are another form of trading restriction that may be imposed on 
businesses where products do not meet regulatory requirements.  
Application by regulators 
Results from the Commission’s regulator survey indicate that trading restrictions of 
one form or another are used by a relatively large proportion of regulators, but fairly 
infrequently (table F.5). Product seizure/recall tools are not applicable to most 
regulators and are used only rarely by those regulators that do use them. While the 
suspension or cancellation of licences or registration is a tool available to most 
regulators who responded to the survey, the majority report that it is used only 
rarely. 
Table F.5 Regulator use of enforcement tools — trading restrictionsa 
Per cent of regulators using this enforcement tool 





Not available/applicable 61 33 16 
Never 11 15 10 
Rarely 21 47 61 
Often 5 6 12 
Usually 2 0 1 
Always 0 0 1 
a Based on responses from 190 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 






Those regulators who responded that they used these types of tools often, usually or 
always were most commonly overseeing regulation in the areas of gaming and 
racing, financial or other professional services, and fair trading, tenancy or 
consumer protection. 
Issues surrounding implementation 
Measures that restrict the operation of businesses, or the seizure/recall of goods are 
relatively severe forms of enforcement that are typically undertaken where lower 
level enforcement tools, such as warning or improvement notices have been 
ineffective, or there are substantial public risks. At their most severe, if a licence to 
operate is cancelled, it can result in the closure of a business. Breaches of trading 
restrictions can often lead to prosecution. 
The imposition of trading restrictions will typically involve a follow up course of 
action by the business and the regulator, such as inspections to approve any 
remedial actions by the business prior to lifting restrictions. Regulations may 
impose conditions on the operation of regulators in conducting these inspections. 
For instance, in regard to prohibition orders on food businesses, the NSW Food 
Authority notes: 
A prohibition order will remain in place until a certificate of clearance is issued 
following a request for inspection from the business. An inspection is to take place 
within 48 hours of receiving a written request for inspection from the proprietor of a 
food business. Should an inspection not be undertaken within this timeframe, the Food 
Act 2003 requires that a certificate of clearance be automatically issued to a business 
under a prohibition order. (NSWFA 2013a, p. 13) 
Similarly, Safe Work Australia noted that the revocation or suspension of 
someone’s authorisation to undertake specified work can have serious consequences 
and the decision to use this tool needs to be considered carefully: 
Regulators may decide to revoke, suspend or cancel a person’s authorisation given in 
order to deal with inappropriate conduct or practices identified during inspection work 
or as a result of information received. Such action is a protective measure and may be 
undertaken even where steps have been taken to remedy a contravention or where an 
offender has otherwise been punished (ie. fined). 
The regulators recognise that the revocation, suspension or cancellation of 
authorisations may have serious consequences for a person. When making decisions 
about authorisations, the regulators balance these considerations with the paramount 
need to protect the health and safety of workers and other persons. In making a decision 
whether or not to issue or renew an authorisation, the regulators will consider the 
person’s history of compliance. (Safe Work Australia 2011, p. 11) 





Seizure of goods is a particular form of trading restriction. Goods may be seized 
because they are noncompliant with regulations, or as evidence of an offence. While 
the seizure of goods may not be the intended penalty in and of itself, this can be the 
effect, as the NSW Food Authority has noted: 
While seizures are undertaken to collect evidence or prevent further offences being 
committed they effectively impose a penalty upon the person from whom the food, 
vehicle, equipment and labelling or advertising material has been seized. 
(NSWFA 2013a, p. 13) 
F.5 Pecuniary penalties 
A common enforcement tool is the issuing of fines. When a breach is detected an 
infringement notice is issued, which the offender may elect to pay, or contest in 
court.  
Application by regulators 
The use of pecuniary penalties, that is fines, is fairly mixed. In the Commission’s 
regulator survey, an overall a majority of regulators reported using fines, although a 
considerable proportion of respondents said fines were not available or never used. 
While many reported using fines often or usually, no regulator reported that they 
were always used (table F.6). 
Table F.6 Regulator use of enforcement tools — pecuniary penaltiesa 
Per cent of regulators using this enforcement tool 
 Pecuniary penalty 






a Based on responses from 190 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
Pecuniary penalties were most commonly reported to be frequently used by 
regulators in the area of environment protection. 






Issues surrounding implementation 
Infringement notices can be useful as a formal, yet administratively efficient and 
timely enforcement tool. For instance, the ACCC submitted that it: 
… may issue an infringement notice where it believes there has been a contravention of 
the CCA [Competiton and Consumer Act 2010] that requires a more formal sanction 
than an administrative resolution but where the ACCC considers that the matter can be 
resolved quickly without legal proceedings (which can be extremely costly for small 
businesses). (sub. 26, p. 4) 
They are often used as a lower level alternative to court action (although the 
recipient of an infringement notice may elect to have the matter dealt with by a 
court): 
Generally speaking, the ACCC will only consider issuing an infringement notice where 
it is likely to seek a court-based resolution should the recipient of the notice choose not 
to pay. (ACCC, sub. 26, p. 4) 
Similarly, the NSW Food Authority states: 
Penalty notices provide an efficient method of dealing with breaches of food legislation 
that may otherwise require presentation to a court. (NSWFA 2013a, p. 14) 
One consideration with fines is getting the value of the fine high enough for it to act 
as a deterrent. In this respect, fines can be regressive, and their deterrence effect can 
depend on the different financial circumstances of businesses. Fines also need to be 
in proportion to the offence and are not likely to be an appropriate tool where the 
penalty amounts are not commensurate with the scale of the breach. For example, 
the NSW Food Authority states: 
Penalty notices may not be used where the penalty imposed is significantly out of 
proportion to the profit gained by the business through the noncompliance or where the 
penalty is not likely to have an impact on the proprietor of a very large food business. 
In this instance, another enforcement tool may be more appropriate, eg prosecution or 
the imposition of specific licence conditions upon a business. (NSWFA 2013a, p. 14) 
And the ACCC submits that it: 
… may issue multiple infringement notices where it considers it appropriate to do so, 
taking into account all of the circumstances. … 
On over 15 occasions, multiple infringement notices have been paid in relation to the same 
matter. These have usually related to large businesses … (sub. 26, pp. 4–5) 





F.6 Court action 
Where lower level tools have been ineffective, or have been judged to be 
inappropriate, prosecution through the courts may be used to enforce regulation. 
Court action includes both civil and criminal proceedings and can be used to seek a 
broad range of remedies, such as injunctions, fines or imprisonment. Regulation 
might also create rights for a person or business to seek compensation through civil 
proceedings for a regulatory breach (BRO 2008).  
As an example of the range of outcomes that may result from court action, the 
ACCC states that under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, legal proceedings 
may lead to the court: 
• making declarations that a company or individual has contravened the Act 
• making injunctions restraining current or future conduct, or requiring respondents to 
take certain action 
• requiring respondents to publish notices about their conduct and corrective 
advertising, and to disclose relevant information to others (for example, to their 
customers) 
• making findings of fact that show contraventions of the Act so that damages may be 
recovered by consumers and businesses affected by the conduct 
• making orders to achieve financial redress for consumers or businesses harmed by 
the conduct 
• making various non-punitive orders, including community service or probation 
orders (which may include orders for implementing a compliance or an education 
and training program) 
• imposing significant pecuniary penalties for breaches of the consumer protection or 
restrictive trade practices provisions (the ACCC is more likely to seek pecuniary 
penalties in matters which result in significant consumer detriment, involve blatant 
conduct or where the traders or individuals concerned have a history of past 
conduct) 
• convicting persons found to have contravened various offence provisions in the Act, 
and/or 
• imposing prison sentences for serious cartel conduct. (ACCC 2013) 
Application by regulators 
Enforcing regulation through the courts would appear to be used relatively 
infrequently, compared to the other enforcement tools available to regulators. In the 
Commission’s regulator survey, many regulators indicated that court action was 
either not available/applicable or was never used. Of those that do resort to court 






action, most regulators report they do so rarely, with a smaller proportion doing so 
often. Only a few regulators reported that they usually resort to criminal court 
action (table F.7). 
Table F.7 Regulator use of enforcement tools — court actiona 
Per cent of regulators using this enforcement tool 
 Civil court action Criminal court action 
Not available/applicable 25 17 
Never 34 24 
Rarely 33 42 
Often 8 15 
Usually 0 2 
Always 0 0 
a Based on responses from 190 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
Court action was most commonly used by regulators in the areas of environment 
protection, along with gaming and racing, liquor, building and construction, and 
financial or other professional services. 
Issues surrounding implementation 
Court action is time consuming and costly, for both regulators and business. It is 
typically only resorted to where other enforcement options have been ineffective, or 
for egregious breaches where other tools are considered inadequate. For instance, 
the ACCC submitted: 
Legal proceedings are only taken where, having regard to all the circumstances, the 
ACCC considers litigation is the most appropriate way to achieve its enforcement and 
compliance objectives. The ACCC is more likely to proceed to litigation in 
circumstances where the conduct is particularly egregious (having regard to the factors 
set out in its Compliance and Enforcement Policy), where there is reason to be 
concerned about future behaviour, or where the party involved is unwilling to provide a 
satisfactory alternate resolution to the matter. (sub. 26, p. 6) 
Court action is also a very public process and can be damaging to the reputation and 
credibility of the regulator and/or the business involved. As such, there are often 
strong incentives for businesses to avoid the need for court action or for regulators 
to avoid using court action as an enforcement tool. 





G Communication modes 
Regulators employ a range of different modes of communication with small 
business. These include: 
• websites and other electronic forms of communication 
• direct communication (including on-site visits and relationship managers) 
• communication via industry groups 
• seminars and workshops 
• advice hotlines and help desks. 
This appendix examines some of the key features of these modes and the extent of 
their use by Australian regulators, assesses their effectiveness and discusses some of 
the issues identified with their implementation.  
G.1 Websites and other electronic forms of 
communication 
The use of web based and other electronic forms of communication to provide 
advice and assistance to business is an important part of most regulators’ 
communication strategies. Websites — whether it be the regulator’s own website or 
an external ‘one-stop-shop’ website to which different regulators supply 
information — allow business to access regulatory information at a time and place 
of their choosing.  
A newer form of electronic communication being employed by regulators is social 
media such as Facebook and twitter, which can provide a more succinct and 
targeted means of communicating advice and information to business. 
Other forms of electronic communication include: 
• e-newsletters, e-lerts and email — nominated by many regulators as an effective 
means by which they communicate with business 
• webinars (web-based seminars) — an increasingly common means of providing 
help and advice to business 






• technology tools, such as smartphone applications — these have potential to 
improve communication, particularly given the high rates of use of smartphones 
and other mobile electronic devices among some groups of small business 
operators.  
Application by regulators 
Websites were the most commonly reported mode of communication in the 
Commission’s regulator survey, with 84 per cent nominating information provided 
on their website as either an effective or a very effective means of communicating 
with business (table G.1). Information provided to external one-stop-shop websites 
was used by around two thirds of regulators. This mode was not rated as effective as 
the regulator’s own website, with most regulators who used it giving a neutral 
response. This is perhaps unsurprising, and likely reflects the lack of data regulators 
would have on the use and effectiveness of external websites compared to their own 
websites. 
Social media was used by around 40 per cent of regulators. As with one-stop-shop 
websites, many regulators were reluctant to make judgements as to the effectiveness 
of this mode. In some cases this because the use of social media was too recent for 
them to assess their effectiveness. 
Table G.1 Regulator assessment of the effectiveness of communication 
modes — websites and social mediaa 
Per cent of regulators 
 Regulator’s website One stop shop websites Social media 
Never used 3 34 61 
Very ineffective 0 1 1 
Ineffective 1 5 2 
Neutral 12 34 18 
Effective 67 25 15 
Very effective 17 2 3 
a Based on responses from 188 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
The use and perceived effectiveness of regulator and one stop shop websites did not 
differ appreciably between large and small regulators. However, small regulators 
were much less likely to use social media than large regulators — with three 
quarters of small regulators reporting they never used social media compared with 
only one third of large regulators. 





Issues surrounding implementation 
Evidence of small business views on regulator communication provided by 
COSBOA (sub. DR48) indicates some discrepancy between regulator and business 
perceptions of the usefulness of various communication approaches. In particular, 
regulator websites were rated less useful than advice from third parties (such as 
accountants and solicitors) or from other business owners.  
The Commission heard that many small businesses feel that there is scope for 
improvement in the use of government websites and other electronic modes of 
communication. The SBDC (WA) (sub. 22), for example, noted that regulator 
websites varied significantly in their layout, ease with which relevant policies and 
procedures could be found, and provision of contact details.  
COAG’s Business Regulation and Competition Working Group warned in its Guide 
for Government Best Practice Consultation with Small Business, that: ‘[s]imply 
uploading a 25 page document outlining your proposed policy to your agency 
website will have limited reach within the small business community’ 
(COAG 2012, p. 4). 
One respondent to the Commission’s regulator survey noted that in their experience, 
small business operators were more likely than larger firms to find navigation of 
regulator websites confusing and to have greater difficulty understanding 
procedures — problems that were exacerbated for regional based businesses, that 
often had slow internet connections and slower mail turnaround. 
Social media such as Facebook, twitter blogs and chat rooms, as well as other tools 
such as smartphone and tablet applications, webinars (web based seminars) and 
email, can provide a more targeted and user friendly means of communicating 
advice and information to business — particularly with younger and more 
technologically literate small business owners. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority, 
for example, uses twitter to inform business and the wider community of 
developments in aviation safety regulation including forthcoming workshops and 
other education initiatives.  
As the introduction or upgrading of electronic modes of communication can be very 
costly, regulators, before proceeding, need to undertake appropriate analysis and 
pilot testing to assess whether the benefits are likely to exceed the costs. Moreover, 
as some small businesses do not operate online, regulators need to ensure that 
alternative means of communication are also available.  






G.2 On-site visits, relationship managers and staff 
placements 
Direct or personalised interaction between regulators and business such as 
face-to-face meetings can sometimes be the most effective means of 
communication. 
• On-site visits by regulators provide an opportunity for small businesses to obtain 
relevant and timely advice and guidance on meeting their regulatory obligations.  
• The use of relationship managers can promote mutual respect and trust between 
business and regulators and provide a ready channel for two-way feedback. 
• Staff placements (of regulator staff in business or industry associations, or 
business staff in regulators) can also help improve mutual understanding. 
Application by regulators 
On-site visits were used by almost all regulators to communicate with business. The 
great majority rated them as effective, with 35 per cent rating them as ‘very 
effective’ and no regulators found them to be ineffective (table G.2). Around half of 
regulators used relationship managers and these were generally rated as effective. 
Large regulators were somewhat more likely to use on-site visits and around twice 
as likely to use relationship managers to communicate with small business than 
were small regulators.   
Table G.2 Regulator assessment of the effectiveness of communication 
modes — on-site visits, relationship managers and staff 
placementsa 
Per cent of regulators 
 On-site visits Relationship managers Staff placements 
   Regulator staff in 
business 
Business staff in 
regulator 
Never used 8 47 87 88 
Very ineffective 0 1 0 0 
Ineffective 0 1 1 1 
Neutral 8 12 6 6 
Effective 50 32 4 3 
Very effective 35 7 2 1 
a Based on responses from 188 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 





Issues surrounding implementation 
Although resource intensive, direct communication with business has the advantage 
of allowing ready tailoring of information to meet the needs of individual 
businesses. This can be valuable in instances where, for example, small businesses 
have limited experience or knowledge of regulatory requirements.  
COSBOA noted that placing regulator staff, particularly field officers, for three 
month periods into industry associations: 
… would provide that person with a better understanding of issues for small business 
and better ways to communicate and also develop improved processes. It also would 
inform the members and staff of the associations about the way government agencies 
work and better ways of influencing process and policy. (sub. 15, p. 10) 
Clearly, in cases where regulator resources are limited, the placement of staff in 
business or industry associations would need to be undertaken with care to ensure 
that it did not result in a reduction in the quality of the services provided by the 
regulator. 
Staff placements were not commonly used by regulators, regardless of regulator 
size, and in cases where they were, regulators, as often as not, rated their 
effectiveness as ‘neutral’. 
With regard to relationship managers, the Commission heard that they should be 
used selectively. One respondent to the Commission’s regulator survey noted that 
while they may be seen as effective from the perspective of small business, 
downsides included the risk, or perceived risk, of regulatory capture, limited 
effectiveness and that they diverted resources from core activities underpinning 
regulator service standards. 
G.3 Industry groups 
Industry groups and professional associations are a key source of information and 
advice for small business. Small businesses tend to rely heavily on trusted networks 
for information, including: industry and professional associations; business 
chambers; business intermediaries such as accountants; and family and friends. 
Industry and professional associations generally have well established membership 
groups and effective methods in place that are well suited to communicating 
messages on behalf of regulators. These can include industry newsletters and other 
publications; industry expos; and training sessions operated in conjunction with the 
regulator. Given this, communication strategies by regulators that are directed 






through industry groups can be more effective than those targeted directly at small 
business.1 
Application by regulators 
Industry groups are widely used by regulators, both large and small, to 
communicate with business. Over 95 per cent of regulators use industry groups, 
with the vast majority rating them effective (table G.3).  
Table G.3 Regulator assessment of the effectiveness of communication 
modes — industry groupsa 
Per cent of regulators 
   Industry groups 
Never used   4 
Very ineffective   0 
Ineffective   1 
Neutral   14 
Effective   66 
Very effective   14 
a Based on responses from 188 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
As with regulators, small businesses generally considered information disseminated 
through industry groups to be one of the most useful forms of communication on 
regulatory requirements (COSBOA, sub. 31). 
Issues surrounding implementation 
Industry groups generally have well established membership groups and effective 
methods in place that are well suited to communicating messages on behalf of 
regulators. These can include industry newsletters and other publications; industry 
expos and training sessions operated in conjunction with the regulator. 
                                              
1  The role industry and professional associations can play as a conduit for information from 
regulators was identified in a number of submissions to this study (see for example: ACCI, 
sub. 5; Office of the Australian Small Business Commissioner, sub. 10; Business SA, sub. 30; 
COSBOA, sub. 15, 31; Commercial Asset Finance Brokers Association of Australia Limited, 
sub. DR38. 





G.4 Seminars, workshops and focus groups 
Seminars and workshops can be a very effective means of providing: practical 
advice and guidance to business on regulatory obligations and how to meet them; 
advance notice of impending changes; and tailored advice and training on specific 
aspects of the regulatory requirements. They can be effective where there are 
concentrated populations of small businesses that have similar interests and 
information requirements or for specific businesses that have been identified as 
requiring help.  
Business focus groups are used by regulators to gain an understanding of business 
knowledge and awareness of regulatory requirements. 
Application by regulators 
Seminars and workshops are widely used, with the majority of regulators rating 
them either effective or very effective (table G.4). Focus groups were also quite 
widely used and generally rated as effective. 
Small regulators were less likely to use these modes of communication, with around 
one quarter of small regulators reporting that they had never used seminars and 
workshops and almost half reporting that they had never used focus groups. 
Table G.4 Regulator assessment of the effectiveness of communication 
modes — seminars/workshops and business focus groupsa 
Per cent of regulators 
  Seminars/workshops Business focus groups 
Never used  10 21 
Very ineffective  1 1 
Ineffective  1 2 
Neutral  12 16 
Effective  52 47 
Very effective  24 12 
a Based on responses from 188 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
Issues surrounding implementation 
The Commission heard in discussions with regulators that small businesses can at 
times be more willing to participate in training sessions that are run by industry and 






professional associations (albeit often with behind-the-scenes support by the 
regulator) than training sessions run by the regulator alone.  
As attending seminars and workshops involves an investment of time by small 
businesses that can be quite costly where it takes them away from their core 
business, ensuring that the information provided is relevant and practical to the 
target businesses is essential. This is not always the case. Appco Group, for 
example, noted that the content of current seminars and workshops on offer was: 
… not tailored to meet the specific needs of small business by sector. Thus, their 
usefulness in helping businesses … is limited. (sub. DR46, p. 18) 
For business focus groups to be effective, regulators need to ensure that the 
participating businesses are sufficiently representative of the broader population. 
G.5 Advice hotlines/help desks 
Help desks can provide business with a simple and convenient way of accessing the 
regulator. The Commission heard that small businesses were more likely to use help 
desks and hotlines than large firms — the latter being more likely to contact agency 
relationship managers or write formally to the relevant general manager. 
Active monitoring of the nature and volume of call centre queries can also yield 
valuable information to the regulator on specific gaps in industry understanding that 
may be leading to increased compliance costs for business or other adverse 
regulatory outcomes. 
Application by regulators 
More than 80 per cent of regulators provide hotlines and help desks, with the 
majority of regulators rating them as effective (table G.5). Small regulators, 
however, were less likely to use this mode of communication, with one third 
reporting that they had never used it to communicate with small business. 
Issues surrounding implementation 
The Commission heard that in general help desk services work reasonably well for 
those firms that are able to set aside the time to call during business hours. A 
common concern, however, is the amount of time small businesses sometimes 
spend waiting for operators to answer their phones, with waiting periods sometimes 
exceeding one hour (Office of the NSW Small Business Commissioner, sub. 12, 





Tasmanian Small Business Council, sub. 13). The point was made that owner 
operators of small businesses who need to talk to an agency ‘ … will not have the 
time to be on hold for long periods of time as they have customers to attend to’ 
(SBDC (WA), sub. 22, pp. 7-8). 
Table G.5 Regulator assessment of effectiveness of different 
communication modes — advice hotlines/help desksa 
Per cent of regulators 
Never used   17 
Very ineffective   1 
Ineffective   1 
Neutral   13 
Effective   46 
Very effective   22 
a Based on responses from 188 regulators. 
Source: Productivity Commission regulator survey 2013. 
The Commission also heard that help lines for the ATO and Centrelink had 
improved markedly in recent years — moving from an adversarial attitude to a more 
educative and facilitative approach, reducing stress for small business. Strong 
Strategies noted in this regard: 
Whereas previously I worked with clients to try and fix problems without the stress of 
involving the regulator I now consider the help lines to be a good resource (as long as I 
pick the right time to ring!). (sub. 19, p. 7) 
For a regulator, determining the optimal level of resources to devote to call centres 
requires assessing the benefits, including shorter waiting times and better quality 
advice for businesses that used these services, against the added cost of factors such 
as hiring and training additional operators, and expanding contact hours outside 
normal business trading times.  
Clearly, for regulators to make best use of the resources devoted to call centres they 
need to have a sound appreciation of when the peak periods of demand are most 
likely to occur — including key reporting dates, or immediately preceding the 
introduction of new or amended regulatory requirements. 
A number of regulators periodically review the usefulness of their call centres, 
including monitoring waiting times, quality of advice, satisfaction levels within 
business and other relevant aspects bearing on their effectiveness. In 2011, the 
ATO, for example, commissioned ORC International to undertake research to track 
and monitor its call centre service on a monthly basis. Issues examined included 
customer satisfaction, how quickly queries were resolved and the time taken for 
calls to be answered. The results of the survey were placed on the ATO’s website. 
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